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TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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PREFACE

In retrospect, 1964 was the quiet before the storm. In that year new leadership cautiously established itself in key nations around the globe. Here in the United States, President Lyndon B. Johnson spent his first year in the White House, following the assassination of President Kennedy, not only constructing a domestic and international program, but facing election in his own right. In October, the Soviet Union unceremoniously deposed Premier Nikita Krushchev and replaced him with Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. Still unknown was whether the new team would pursue "peaceful coexistence" or "wars of liberation." In Asia, the founding father of Indian independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, was followed by a caretaker government. But of even greater concern to the United States was the new, untried, and unstable government of South Vietnam, following the coup that overthrew and assassinated Ngo Dinh Diem.

As the year opened, a junta of generals, led by Duong Van Minh, popularly known as Big Minh, tried to restore order in South Vietnam and to pursue the war against the Vietcong. Its lack of success in both areas quickly became apparent, and by the end of January it too was toppled in a military coup. Gen. Nguyen Khanh took over the government and offered the promise of vigorous leadership, but the problems he faced were truly staggering. The strategic hamlet strategy had all but collapsed, and Communist forces controlled vast rural areas of South Vietnam, replenished by supply lines from North Vietnam that ran unimpeded through Laos and Cambodia.

The United States, having encouraged the coup against Diem and done nothing to stop the coup against Big Minh, felt committed to Khanh's leadership, no matter what its limitations. Slowly but steadily the U.S. military role increased, but President Johnson hoped to avoid any major decisions regarding escalation of the war until after the election. Then on August 1, the American destroyer *Maddox* exchanged fire with North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Three days later, on a dark night in heavy seas, the *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* may or may not have been attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats. Twenty years later the incident remains shrouded in mystery, but at the time the threat seemed real and the danger imminent. The Johnson administration called upon Congress to declare its support through passage of a resolution authorizing the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

When considering the magnitude of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and its later Presidential interpretations, it is appalling how abruptly the Congress acted. The Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held one joint meeting, and the Senate spent only a few hours debating the resolution. The House acted with similar dispatch. By contrast, the Congress had deliberated long and hard over comparable resolutions concerning Formosa, the Middle East, Cuba, and Berlin, as chronicled in previous volumes of this series. Perhaps the successful outcome of those earlier episodes had dispelled congressional fears that such resolutions were "predated declarations of war," and that congressional intent must be carefully delineated. Only two Senators dissented from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, but many came to regret that vote in the terrible following years.

Despite the overwhelming vote of approval for the resolution, Congress had in no way given President Johnson the blank check that he would later claim. As the hearings contained in this volume indicate, there was considerable skepticism from members of both parties, and of all ideological persuasions about the wisdom of America's presence in Vietnam and the tactics we were pursuing. That wise old Vermonter George Aiken perhaps best expressed these sentiments after listening to a report from retiring U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge: "Ambassador Lodge has told us that when he went out there last August that things were at a pretty low ebb, and subsequent events proved that statement to be correct. He seems considerably more optimistic now, although he tells us that it will take a while in coming. I recall that just before Ambassador Lodge went to Vietnam, Ambassador Nolting, the retiring Ambassador. sat right where Cabot does now and told us that when he went out there things were kind of bad, but he had a very rosy picture for the future. In fact, it was so rosy that most of us didn't believe it. And Secretary McNamara was talking very optimistically of getting all our forces home in a very short time. The only conclusion I can draw is that South Vietnam looks much better to an Ambassador when he is leaving it behind him."

It is my hope that the publication of these hearings will serve to remind us of the lessons of the Vietnam war, especially of the importance of candor and openness in the executive branch's dealings with Congress in the making of American foreign policy.

The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" references for which no transcript was made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes of those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1964 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. Some transcripts will require further declassification procedures.

In accordance with the general policy of this series, portions of the volume were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense for review and comment.

The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to the Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in approving the release of those sessions in which its members participated.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

CLAIBORNE PELL.

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MINUTES

FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in room S–116, Capitol, at 1:15 p.m.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Smathers, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt. Senators Russell, Dirksen, and Saltonstall also attended.

The group was briefed on the current situation in Panama by Under Secretary of State George Ball.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

MONDAY, JANUARY 13, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session in room S–116, Capitol, at 3 p.m.

Present: Senator Symington (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Morse, Lausche, and Hickenlooper.

The subcommittee was briefed on the current aspects of the Arab-Israeli situation by Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

THURSDAY, JANUARY 16, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

Also Present: Senator Saltonstall; Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Newhouse, of the committee staff.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased today to have the Secretary of State here, who will brief us on current affairs.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary **RUSK**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since we undoubtedly will need a certain amount of time on Panama today, it may not be possible to cover a representative portion of all of the other problems the committee may be interested in, and I will be glad to come back at your convenience.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I wonder, and I make this merely as a suggestion, since I anticipate that the main question will be on Panama by others of the committee who will come in, that you could give us a briefing on the other things besides Panama. Would that be agreeable?

Secretary **RUSK**. Yes. Let me talk very briefly then about certain other matters of immediate importance.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

One possible significant development in the last 2 weeks is a fresh German initiative to review the German and Berlin problem with a view toward fresh proposals for a permanent settlement of the situation in Central Europe. They will be bringing proposals before the Ambassadorial Group of the four powers principally concerned for discussion there, but the very fact of a German initiative is of some importance. They have been in a rather static and frozen position.

The **CHAIRMAN**. In other words, they suggested it?

Secretary **RUSK**. On this question. They suggested it at our quadripartite dinner in Paris at the time of the NATO meeting. The

Germans took the initiative to say they wished to ask the Western Powers to review broadly the possibilities of a final settlement of the German question.

I think this is a combination of two factors at work. One is there is a feeling in the West that some very important things are happening in the Soviet bloc, and that it is conceivable that proposals which 3 or 4 or 5 years ago or even last year could have made no progress might possibly be of some interest to the Soviet Union at this time, given the Moscow-Peiping discussion, given the economic problems in the Soviet Union, given the rather considerable movement that one senses among the smaller Communist countries in Eastern Europe, that it may be well for the West to take an initiative to explore those possibilities further.

Second, inside Germany itself there has been increasing interest in some mobility in relations with the East Germans and on the Berlin question. The Christmas passes were a very important example of that.

The parties—that is about 60 percent of the CDU and the SPD [1], and the Free Democrats—seem to be interested in what Mr. Schroeder [2] has called a policy of mobility. Private groups with elements from all three parties have put forward some fairly interesting proposals about what might be done to move, even gradually, toward a unification of Germany and a reduction of tensions in Central Europe.

FOUR POWERS' POSITION ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

We have no evidence that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept the idea of a reunified Germany, but nevertheless there may be possibilities in the situation that would be worth exploring. Some of these private groups to whom the German Government has been listening rather intently lately have proposed that at least the four powers, and this time I mean the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union, establish a standing conference somewhat like the Austrian Commission.

Senator **Mundt**. France is out of it?

Secretary **Rusk**. No. France, ourselves, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, without Germany. It would include the Soviet Union. Out of such a protracted discussion might come from time to time particular steps that would be of advantage; for example, humanitarian measures as between the two Berlins or humanitarian measures as between the two Germanies or something which might have a bearing on trade questions—matters of that sort, gradually, possibly working toward the kind of comprehensive political and security settlement in Central Europe that might make some sense from our point of view. We would believe hopefully also from the point of view of the other side that this would occur.

We do not know much about the details of the German proposals. We do know that from the procedural point of view, very high on their list is the constitution of a standing negotiating commission with the Soviets to begin to work on these questions without leaving the situation simply frozen and subject to whatever sparks might come out of autobahn incidents or whatever it might be.

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[1] Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party.

[2] West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

I mention that because I think the willingness of the Germans to take the initiative is a rather interesting and important new development. Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard has indicated that he is going to be looking on his side for new ideas and for what Germany itself can do to contribute toward the kind of solution which the Germans feel they must get if there is to be peace in Central Europe. So there is one point of some interest.

INDONESIAN ADVENTURISM

A second matter of some consequence is the situation with regard to Indonesia. We believe that we are in, or approaching, something of a watershed in the development of Indonesian policy and attitudes.

They have been pursuing a policy of confrontation with Malaysia. They claim that it is aimed principally at the British rather than the Malaysians, that they are interested in an Asian solution for Asian problems, but it appears that this pressure on Malaysia is another instance of foreign policy adventurism on Sukarno's part as an alternative to turning his attention to the serious internal economic and other problems of his own country.

President [Diosdado] Macapagal of the Philippines has been very much concerned about how the situation will develop. He has been doing a good deal to try to pull Sukarno away from a policy of confrontation, to try to restore the three-power consultation between Djakarta, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur, to try to resolve these questions by discussion among the three governments.

Sukarno has not come far enough toward assurances about his peaceful intentions. We feel that it is very important that he be under no misapprehensions whatever about the dangers that lie ahead if he goes down the road of military pressures against Malaysia.

We have asked the Attorney General to see Sukarno in Japan, and once again to make it very clear to Sukarno that we cannot give him any support whatever in his confrontation policy. We are supporting the security of Malaysia. The British and Australian commitments there are serious and should be taken seriously by Sukarno. If this becomes a matter of aggression before the United Nations, it is our judgment that the United Nations will be solidly opposed to Sukarno on this matter. If there is to be any future for development of relations between Indonesia and ourselves, this policy of confrontation must come to an end.

I might say on that, that because we are in a period of, I should say, critical importance, the President has not yet made a finding with respect to any future aid to Indonesia under the recently passed aid legislation.

NO NEW COMMITMENTS

On the other hand, we have not made any new commitments, and we have not been proceeding with the types of aid which would require such a finding under the act of last year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you said that we have made new commitments?

Secretary RUSK. We have not made new commitments. There are certain things in the pipeline, some Public Law 480,[3] some Peace Corps activities. We have withheld certain shipments that had been designed for Indonesia, small arms, for example, under the military assistance program we had for some period of years. But we would expect that in the course of the next 10 days or so the President will have to come to a conclusion one way or the other about any such determination.

We feel that he should be permitted a reasonable time to come to those conclusions, particularly in view of the summitry that is now going on in Southeast Asia between Sukarno and Macapagal on one side, and shortly between Macapagal and the Tunku of Malaysia, on the other. But that is a situation of some considerable danger.

SIHANOUK'S UNPREDICTABILITY

As far as Sihanouk is concerned, he is more than ever unpredictable, temperamental, hard to fathom. We went through an experience before Christmas of public declarations on his side that we should terminate our aid programs and get our missions out of Cambodia.

When we proceeded to take steps to do so, he charged us with breaking off aid unilaterally without advance consultation. But here again President Macapagal has moved in to see whether he can be helpful in these relationships. Our information in the last day or two is that Sihanouk has been somewhat responsive partly because Sihanouk is beginning to face the facts with which he will be confronted if there is a complete stoppage of American aid, and partly because of considerable pressures from his own advisers and key people in his own government about the consequences of a sharp break with us and a turn to Communist China.

Meanwhile, the French have tried to persuade Sihanouk to follow a line of some caution. The French have themselves undertaken a military assistance program and economic program. We would be glad to see the French take over some of the burdens so far as we are concerned; perhaps the French feel they are not in a position to do that entirely, but nevertheless they sent their defense minister to see Sihanouk recently, and the visit was apparently a helpful one, and Sihanouk is going to visit President de Gaulle in Paris shortly.

So there is a probing of that situation. We do not wish to break with Cambodia because there are explosive elements in the situation.

CONFERENCE ON NEUTRALITY

So far as Sihanouk's proposal for a conference on neutrality is concerned, Britain is the cochairman of the Geneva Conference, and would be responsible for the principal negotiating initiative.

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[3] Food for Peace Program.

France is rather in favor of a conference in order to palliate Sihanouk.

We have some misgivings about a conference which would be only an exchange of polemics among all sides with perhaps no result, and which would leave the situation worse than it was before. There are also very strong indications that the purpose of such a conference in Sihanouk's mind would be aimed at Thailand and South Vietnam.

So we have asked our friends, the British, to try and find out in advance whether there is any possibility of an agreed result to such a conference, whether there is a neutrality declaration by Cambodia that could be affirmed or supported by the powers concerned, with some additional responsibility for the ICC in Cambodia to observe and supervise, in effect, such a declaration. If the conference were negotiated in advance, similar to the type of thing that Mr. [John Foster] Dulles did with regard to the Japanese Peace Conference, then we would at least know whether a conference could be held without inflaming the Thais and the South Vietnamese and whether it could come to any result at all. Or if there were general agreement on what the results of such a conference might be, we might raise the question as to whether it is necessary to hold the conference at all, but instead simply register an agreement as to the desired result. We do not know how that is likely to come out, but we are extremely reluctant because of Thailand and South Vietnam to give any blank check to a conference of which one of the main purposes might be to lambaste Thailand and South Vietnam, with full support from the Communist side who would be present at such a conference.

FRANCE MIGHT RECOGNIZE CHINA

We are concerned about the real possibility that France might recognize Peiping. We have said, I suppose, every year for 15 years, that whatever one thinks about the problem this is not a good year for it. We think this is very especially true this year.

Peiping is defying the Geneva accords in Southeast Asia, both those of 1954 and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos.

In South Vietnam the forces there captured 7 tons of arms and ammunition manufactured in China that had been sent into the delta south of Saigon.

We felt we had in 1954, in 1961, and in 1962 taken French policy toward Southeast Asia into very heavy account in determining the attitude of the United States and that it therefore seemed to us a highly unprofitable thing for Paris to consider recognizing Peiping when Peiping is undermining in every possible way the very agreements to which France has committed so much prestige in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, Peiping has attacked India. The Chinese Communists are pressuring Sukarno through the PKI [4] in Indonesia; they are using funds here and there, not on a large scale, but funds to stimulate agents and subversives in Latin America and Africa; they are making a major play for Africa at the present time.

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[4] Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia).

If France recognizes the Peiping regime and the French-speaking African countries follow suit, Chinese Communist embassies will be established in many places over that continent as centers of subversion. This would be, we think, from France's point of view, as well as from our own, a very adverse development.

Peiping has rejected for 8 years the idea of renouncing force in the Formosa Straits originally put to them by Mr. Dulles. They are taking the line of militancy in their argument with Moscow. Although there are very deep reservations about the quality of Moscow's adherence to, or retention of, peaceful coexistence, nevertheless in that argument the Chinese line is even more menacing and threatening as far as its own neighbors are concerned.

So on totaling up the situation, we would be very much distressed by action taken by France to recognize Red China.

If they were to do it, and many others were to follow suit, then the situation in the United Nations would, of course, be very difficult. At the present time there are 60 U.N. members that recognize Nationalist China, and 42 that recognize Peiping. If that balance were to change quickly the question of membership there could be a very difficult one to manage indeed. So I mention that as one of the questions that is before us.

REMARKS NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

I would appreciate it very much if I could rely very heavily upon the executive character of this session as far as any attribution to me is concerned today because all of these points that I am mentioning are under discussion, and our attempts to deal with them could be, I think, adversely affected by attributions to me as a result of this discussion today.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that apply to everything you have said or just this?

Secretary RUSK. I think everything I have said as far as any attribution to me is concerned, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Secretary RUSK. I do not know whether the committee is ready to get into Panama.

ARAB SUMMIT MEETING

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do, I would just like to get into the Arab meeting.[5] Is there anything you want to say about it?

Senator Symington asked me to inquire what we know concerning the progress and the development about the Arab nations with respect to Israel. Don't take much time.

Secretary RUSK. I would say this: We had some indications before that summit meeting occurred that Arabs were pulling away from the idea of armed action against Israel in connection with the withdrawal of waters from the Jordan River, so that we had not supposed that they would be violent on that subject at the meeting.

---

[5] United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser called a summit meeting of the heads of 13 Arab League nations in Cairo, from January 13-17, 1964. They agreed upon a unified military command against Israel, and appointed U.A.R. chief of staff Gen. Abdel Hakim Amer as chief of its joint command.

Our present reports—and we will undoubtedly get more detailed reports—indicate that the intra-Arab questions were discussed more fully than we had expected. It was not just an anti-Israel meeting.

For example, Jordan and U.A.R. resumed relations. This was a more moderate and workable Arab meeting than had been predicted.

There were apparently some discussions of using dams in Arab territory to frustrate the Israeli use of the Jordan waters, but that is a several-year proposition.

Thus far we have had no indication that there was any agreement at all to use force against Jordan water extraction, although I think we can assume that there is going to be a great deal of propaganda, political pressure, perhaps debate in the U.N., and other political steps taken when in the next several weeks Israel begins to undertake test withdrawals from the Jordan.

Our general view on that has been fairly consistent since 1955, that the agreement that was reached at the technical level between the two sides, the plan that Mr. Eric Johnston developed, seemed to us to be fair and reasonable. Although it was never agreed to at the government level on the two sides, we are inclined to think that where there are withdrawals from the Jordan, that consistent with that plan we would support those withdrawals, whether on the Arab side or on the Israeli side.

Now, there are some few questions of detail for discussion between ourselves and the Israelis about the exact quantities. What they have in mind doing fits the plan itself, but I think we can anticipate that this will sharpen the tensions in the area, but I would be somewhat surprised at this stage if the withdrawal of Jordan waters would lead to armed action of any consequence; maybe some sniping across the river, things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

THE ZANZIBAR SITUATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Could you touch on this Zanzibar situation which, it seems to me, may have far reaching results?[6] It looks to me like another Cuba over there, and with nothing being done about it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, quite frankly we elected not to buy into responsibilities at Zanzibar when they became independent. It is a small island with 500,000 or 600,000 people, a British protectorate to which the British gave responsibilities.

We have felt it was the general attitude on this end of Pennsylvania Avenue that we should not add to our list of responsibilities indefinitely, and that we thought here might be one where we should not attempt to take responsibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did the British want to go in there and protect the integrity of the government which they set up against this revolutionary group?

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[6] On January 12, 1964, an armed revolt overthrew the Government of Zanzibar, banished the sultan, and proclaimed a republic. Four days later Zanzibar broke diplomatic relations with the United States, because it had failed to recognize the new regime, but on February 23 relations were reestablished. On April 26, Zanzibar merged with Tanganyika to form a single republic.

Secretary **Rusk**. No. They have elected thus far not to do that. First, the government under which independence was established was basically an Arab government. The Arabs are about 20 percent of the population. The Africans make up about 80 percent of the population.

The recent overthrow occurred through a combination of a minority Arab group under a man who has had very strong Communist ties, has visited Peiping, plus the African nationalist group which represents a very large part of the African majority on the island. It is not easy to discover yet just which of these elements will have predominant influence in the new regime. The British and we are fearful that this extreme Arab element might well come out on top. We also know that some of the countries of East Africa, Kenya, Tanganyika are concerned about such a development in relation to their attitude of support toward the large African majority.

We had a very small group there. Our Ambassador in Tanganyika is doubly accredited to Zanzibar. We did not plan to set up an independent mission. The Americans have been evacuated in the last 36 hours because of the violence over the island and the absence of police forces or anyone to take responsibility for their safety, and they are now in Tanganyika, having been taken off by an American destroyer.

AMERICAN SPACE TRACKING STATION

The British are remaining there. They have a much larger group, a larger colony, and they are following the situation very carefully. But our principal interest in the island, except for the broad strategic problem of a Communist foothold on an island off the coast of Africa, was our space tracking station that had been used for the Mercury Program.

Our information this morning is that the station and its equipment are safe. It is under the protection of some local caretakers, and we have two of our diplomatic representatives still on the island.

We will do what we can to assure the safety of that equipment, although in the long run we have in mind that we should shift that station to some other base, whether ashore or afloat in that part of the world.

But I can say to the committee quite frankly that we had pretty well decided that we would not add Zanzibar to our list of responsibilities all over the world. We were not making a major play for influence there, or position there, in regard to aid or any of these other things, so that we have been somewhat outsiders in that situation.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It was not that. My question was not with the idea that we should go in there.

Secretary **Rusk**. Right.

DID THE BRITISH ASK FOR AMERICAN HELP?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My question was whether the British have their responsibility of some sort, having been previously in control and having set up this new government. I just wondered whether the British had in any way proposed that they go in and resist this revolutionary upset there, and that we turned them down, whether we should not back them if they wanted to do it.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the British did look at that question in the first few hours and also the defense ministers of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya met to consider whether they jointly should do something about it. Apparently in both cases they decided not to move in because the takeover was a joint effort by an Arab minority element and this large African movement that had been resisting the Arab Government from the beginning. I think the East Africans felt that they ought to make their play, to establish their ties, and have their influence with the African side of this, the 80-percent majority, in effect, of the island, rather than find themselves in the position of putting troops ashore and perhaps fighting the Africans, the very Africans they have been trying to support. But the situation is very confused and volatile.

I think the fellow who has turned up as Foreign Minister there, the fellow known as Babu,[7] is a man that we are not at all comfortable about. He is the man who has been working with Peiping, and some of these people who took part in the revolt were sent to Cuba for training—some on the Arab side—so that we just do not know literally how that situation will develop.

The British and the East Africans are supporting the African leader, but whether he will be able to take over and be the dominant figure in relation to this Babu that I was talking about is still to be seen.

FOREIGN AID FOR ZANZIBAR

Senator MUNDT. Has Zanzibar been on our foreign aid list?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think so. I think we have offered in the last few days a little medicine for all of the disorders there, and perhaps we might be able to send over a few tons of foodstuffs for the present, but we have not contemplated having an aid program there of any substance at all.

RECOGNITION OF REGIMES IN ZANZIBAR

Senator SPARKMAN. Did we recognize the Government of Zanzibar when it was made independent?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. We joined practically everybody else in recognizing them and voted for their admission to the United Nations.

Senator SPARKMAN. But we have not yet recognized the new regime.

Secretary RUSK. No, we have not yet recognized the new regime. I think only three or four countries thus far have, including, by the way, Tanganyika and, I believe, also Kenya. But I think that the African countries are sort of waiting to see what sort of regime this will turn out to be.

This event provoked comment from one of your colleagues last evening, to which I was somewhat sympathetic, and that is in the case of a newly independent government, at least it ought to demonstrate that it is able to retain its independence for 60 days before it joins the United Nations.

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[7] Abdul Rahman Mohammed Babu, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is not the modern thinking at all. [Laughter.]

REFORMING THE U.N.

Senator **Sparkman**. By the way, this is a little off the beaten path, but I was very much interested in the speech you made at Columbia on the U.N. about some of the needs of its being overhauled. I am not asking for any discussion of it now, but the thought has occurred to me that some day we ought to have a session devoted to that.

Secretary **Rusk**. I think it would be a very useful thing, Senator, to look into that further, because although we have not had great difficulty thus far, as I indicated at the time that I reported to the committee on these weighted voting studies that we had made, nevertheless, when you have 10 percent of the world's population and 5 percent of the contributions to the United Nations representing a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, then you begin to think about ways for the future of relating decisions taken by the U.N. with the responsible capability of carrying them out.

In the charter itself you will recall that in elections for the Security Council, the first criterion was ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. This was put in, I think, after Australia's insistence that the middle powers should have a special consideration, and then geographical distribution was added as a second criterion, you see.

So it may well be that we will want to try to move toward some form of bicameral consideration at the United Nations. We consider this last session as perhaps having an advisory vote by the members on financial matters taken in relation to or weighted by contributions to the U.N., so that at least before the Assembly took its final vote it would have in front of it the attitude of the responsible paying members as reflected by their proportionate contributions before they cast final votes on the issue. That could be done without a charter amendment.

But this is a matter that I think needs considerable exploration as to just how the U.N. is going to organize and conduct its business in the face of a rapid extension of membership and changes in the relationship between position and power in the U.N. system as compared with, say, 1945.

GROWTH IN U.N. MEMBERSHIP

Senator **Lausche**. What was the number in 1945, the number that were members?

Secretary **Rusk**. Fifty-one, Senator.

Senator **Lausche**. Fifty-one?

Secretary **Rusk**. Fifty-one.

Senator **Lausche**. And now it is 113?

Secretary **Rusk**. 113.

Senator **Lausche**. Zanzibar is now in it?

Secretary **Rusk**. It was the 113th.

Senator **Lausche**. And it has 600,000 people?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. Just to follow up for the record, it has one vote just as we have in the General Assembly?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Mundt**. Is that the smallest member?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, I think Iceland and Luxembourg are smaller. Iceland certainly is the smaller, and in relation to population there may be two or three of these African countries which have a smaller population but are far larger in size.

SITUATION IN PANAMA

Mr. Chairman, if I might then turn to Panama, this is a very fast-moving situation, and I will try to bring the committee up to date on where we actually are at the moment and try to look back from that to what has occurred in the last few days and look ahead a little bit to what might be seen for the future.

The **Chairman**. All right.

Secretary **Rusk**. I think the simplest point of departure would be the text of the declaration made by the Inter-American Peace Commission on January 15 after discussions with the Panamanians and ourselves, if I might just read that:

> The Inter-American Peace Commission, based on its statutes which authorize it to offer its good offices to the states requesting them, has carried on conversations with representatives of Panama and the United States, and notes with satisfaction the reestablishment of the peace which is an indispensable condition for understanding and negotiations between the parties.
>
> As a consequence, the Inter-American Peace Commission has invited the parties to reestablish their diplomatic relations as quickly as possible. The parties have agreed to accept this invitation and, as a consequence thereof, have agreed to begin formal discussions which will be initiated 30 days after diplomatic relations are reestablished by means of representatives who have sufficient powers to discuss without limitation all existing matters of any nature which might affect the relations between the United States and Panama.

NEGOTIATE AND DISCUSS

Now, let me just comment very briefly on the dispute which was predicted by me yesterday morning to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a dispute which has come up because of the word "negotiate" and word "discuss."

First, on the text, the Spanish version used "negociar" which our people tell us is traditionally translated as "negotiate," but also carries with it and has been translated as "discuss."

But our word "discussion," upon which we insisted, is not accurately translated into "discutir" in Spanish because "discutir" carries with it not only what we consider discussion but also the idea of argumentation, debate; that is, the hostile confrontation of ideas.

The **Chairman**. Disputes.

Secretary **Rusk**. Now, there is also in the——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is a less positive term though than the Spanish term for discussion.

Secretary **Rusk**. "Discutir."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Than negotiate.

Secretary **Rusk**. "Discutir" is somewhat less, although it involves more elements of controversy than "negotiate." Nevertheless, it is less precise than the word "negociar" although the word "negociar" I am told has been translated both as "negotiate" and "discuss."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am trying to get at is that the use in the statement there would come near indicating an agreement on our part to negotiate rather than to discuss, so we went farther than——

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; because so far as we are concerned, the English is the official text.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the text using "discuss," in English?

Secretary RUSK. Ours said, "have agreed to begin formal discussions which will be initiated 30 days after diplomatic relations are established."

NO TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one technical point I would like to ask because I have seen this going through these dispatches quite a bit.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They keep referring to the "resumption of diplomatic relations" or whatever the term is.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have never agreed that diplomatic relations, at least from our standpoint, have been terminated, have we? The Panamanians said they had terminated them. They denounced the treaties.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. We did not ourselves take any steps to acknowledge that relations had been broken——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Because we wanted to leave the door open for the Panamanians to pull back from that as easily as possible and, indeed, the announcement by the Inter-American Peace Commission was exactly the kind of thing that we hoped would come about on that subject.

But I should say to the committee that we heard this afternoon, just before I came down here, by monitoring of a Panamanian broadcast, that apparently the foreign minister has now ordered American diplomats out of Panama, and that they are now moving to make this breach formal. But that is getting a little bit ahead of the problem.

THE AMBASSADORIAL SEAL

Senator MORSE. Have we taken any action, our Embassy, symbolic action in our Embassy, Mr. Secretary, such as taking down our ambassadorial seal or ensign?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. The only steps we took were in the face of potential mob action. We did destroy our codes and burn classified material in the event we would have to evacuate our people quickly to the Canal Zone, but we have had our offices in the Embassy throughout this period.

Senator MORSE. I was not thinking about some item of protocol. I had read in the paper, was it yesterday or today, that the Panamanians had ordered the taking off the front of their Embassy here their ambassadorial seal. Is that true?

Secretary **Rusk**. I have not heard that.[8] That would be really very unusual between two countries who represent each other as states even though they have broken relations because they would normally ask, and I understand they may ask, Costa Rica, for example, to assume responsibility for their affairs, in which case their Embassy would operate within that framework, you see, without the removal of insignia or things of that sort.

Underneath this problem, this controversy, of the last several years is, at a superficial level, a kind of minuet which has been going on over the years, based upon disagreement on certain fundamental points.

SECURITY OF THE CANAL

Now, so far as the United States is concerned, we have a vital interest in the most literal sense in two things. One is the operation of the canal; and, two, its security. I think on that most Panamanians would agree; at least we have never had any responsible Panamanian tell us that they did not agree that these two essential points are a necessary part of the picture.

Senator **Lausche**. What is the second point?

Secretary **Rusk**. The second point is the security of the canal.

I mean, for example, today we could operate the canal if Panama and Panamanians withdrew all of their cooperation. For example, if Panamanian laborers were not allowed to enter the zone, it would be difficult for a little while until certain adjustments were made, but nevertheless we are in a position to operate the canal independently of Panama if it became necessary to do that. Our physical position in the zone is very strong indeed in terms of our military position and any intent to dislodge us from our responsibilities there.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CANAL ZONE AND PANAMA

But periodically, the Panamanian Government, particularly in election years—and this is an election year, they are holding one on May 10—raises the question of its second-class status, as they put it, the need for a new treaty to reflect more modern relationships between, as they put it, the Canal Zone and Panama, and this is a subject which is very attractive for political purposes in Panama. It appeals to strong nationalist feelings. It is also a subject on which it is easy to stimulate agitation from those who just want to agitate.

We have said that if order is restored, and if diplomatic relations are restored or confirmed, that if there is anything that the Panamanian Government wishes to say to us it is their privilege to do so. This is the same relationship that exists between us and any government with whom we have relations, unless they send us a communication which is so obnoxious in terms and offensive in language that we turn it back simply as a matter of protocol.

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[8] The State Department was later informed by a Panamanian Embassy officer that the report was true.

Senator **Mundt**. Specifically what do you think they mean by this modern readjustment? What would they like to have if they had their own way?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, President [Roberto F.] Chiari recently has been using the phrase "structural revision." This is a reason why we have not felt able to agree to negotiate a new treaty.

Senator **Lausche**. What is that word?

Secretary **Rusk**. Structural revision.

Now, structural revision, if it means anything at all, undoubtedly goes to such things as our degree of control of the zone itself, the element of perpetuity, for example, and the exercise of Panamanian authority within the zone, questions of that sort. But, on the other hand, privately we have never had any ideas from the Chiari government about what they would put forward, and they have had many opportunities to tell us informally the kind of thoughts they had in mind.

PROBLEM OF TREATY REVISION

Just today, the foreign minister told us that they were not going to challenge our administration and defense of the canal. Nevertheless we have felt that if you get into a discussion in which you have agreed beforehand to negotiate on a revision of a treaty, that prejudges the position to a point that puts you in a very bad position and gives them something to build on in terms of whipping up a controversy later.

Let me illustrate it in terms of the Russian proposal on Berlin. They proposed over and over again that we sit down and negotiate peace treaties with the two Germanies in a settlement of the Berlin question on that basis. We have been discussing their ideas on Berlin for 2½ years interminably, over and over, but we have not negotiated on that item of an agenda because to do that involves a certain prior commitment.

We are not taking the view that there cannot be, shall I say, an additional treaty between us and Panama. We have had several. We have had the 1903, the 1936, the 1955 treaties. In 1936 and 1955, we made some very substantial changes in our relations with Panama over the canal. So it is possible that there are some changes that could be thinkable that would require treaty action.

EXPANSION OF COLON

I have in mind, for example, that the city of Colon would like to expand northward. That is—I am sorry, southward, in the direction opposite from the canal. There is a part of old France Field just across a narrow strip of water which they think would be a suitable direction in which the city can grow. It may well be that this is something we can do with respect to that situation.

Senator **Lausche**. Would the expansion go into our Canal Zone rights?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, in 1955 we returned very substantial territory to Panama that had before that time been a part of the Canal Zone. We rectified the boundaries in 1955. In this instance it would, in effect, turn over to Panama as a part of Panama in the same way that Colon is, some acreage that is adjacent to Colon, but which is now in the Canal Zone, you see.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I would not on general principles say that we would not be willing to look realistically in terms of the finances of the zone and our relations to Panama at this question of annuity. It started out at a quarter of a million dollars; it is now $1.9 million. The income from the zone has shown some net profit. We pay ourselves about $8 or $9 million a year on interest on the capital investment, and in the last few years we returned about $25 million of capital to the Treasury from the earnings of the company. We have financed all capital improvements out of canal income. So I think the question of annuity has been discussed in the past, and I should think that theoretically it could be discussed in the future if there is some way to settle this thing with that.

PANAMANIAN BRIDGE

The CHAIRMAN. Have we ever built the bridge we agreed to build?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and that has been opened and now there is a question of whether we give Panama a corridor across that bridge. In 1936, we gave them a corridor from Colon to Panama, a highway that runs from the city into the republic, you see, and we have had no particular problem with that over the years.

We did stop, interfere with that corridor the other day with that violence, because some people were getting in behind our troops by the use of that corridor. But we could close that corridor for security purposes.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the cost of the bridge?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it is $20 million.

Secretary RUSK. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my memory that it is in the neighborhood of $20 million.

DRAWING DISTINCTIONS

Secretary RUSK. What I am trying to do here is draw two distinctions. One is a distinction between a readiness to listen to anything the Panamanian Government wants to say to us about any of our relations with them, on the one side, and I would say that we are prepared to do that.

On the other side, the commitment to negotiate a new treaty, particularly when President Chiari is talking about a structural revision in the treaty relationship is something quite different. It would set us, I think, off in another direction which would be much more difficult to handle and control, particularly since in informal conversations they have not given us any ideas at all about what they have in mind when they use such language.

Now, quite frankly we believe that most of this is the electoral problem at the moment. There are some other elements, and these are important, but the way in which this is being handled at the moment is primarily an internal political matter with President Chiari during a political campaign.

One of the biggest questions when the Inter-American Peace Committee came out with this statement was whether President Chiari would be able to get away with this statement in the face of the kind of political opposition that was already developing there in Panama, because it would appear that he had agreed to restore relations in the absence of a commitment from us to negotiate structural revisions in the treaty. Indeed he did just that, either using the word "discussion" or the word "negotiate."

So he has, in fact, proved that pressures now upon him, chiefly from the extreme left, from the student groups and others, have led him to denounce this and to go back to his original position, that he will not restore diplomatic relations except on the basis of a commitment to negotiate a new treaty, and he is not talking about an additional treaty to clear out various practical problems that might be resolved. When he talks about a new treaty, he means a new basic treaty, basic in the sense of 1903.

PRESSURE FROM THE LEFT

Senator **MORSE**. If I might interrupt for just a second——

Secretary **RUSK**. Yes, please do, sir.

Senator **MORSE** [continuing]. If he has notified our Embassy people to get out today, does that not mean some indication that he does not intend to accept this statement?

Secretary **RUSK**. It looks as though he is bending under the pressure from the extreme left. Two thousand of these students went over to the presidential palace yesterday to demonstrate in front of the palace. He made them a speech in which he said he made good on his promise not to establish relations unless we agreed to negotiate a new treaty, and they went home peacefully.

The more they read this, and the more people like them began marching, the more that stimulated him to challenge this commission.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. The report, I saw in the paper said that he stated to the students there would be no treaty until—there would be no reestablishment of relations until there was discussion.

Secretary **RUSK**. That is right, the kind of speech that we predicted he would be making for his internal purposes. We were inclined to think that since the Peace Commission itself, of five member nations, had worked out this agreement, and since the Peace Commission had clearly been very much upset with the attitude of the Panamanians in handling this problem and were rather fed up with them in two or three stages, that we ought to try to remain relatively quiet up here, give him a little run for his money in domestic politics down there, provided we could get on with this particular settlement, you see, the restoration of relations and some discussions.

But the extreme left there has been putting on these pressures, and there is now some uneasiness on the part of Chiari himself as to whether he can stand up to that pressure. There is some possibility, and I certainly would not suggest this—I would hope very much that no one would mention this at all—there is some possibility that President Chiari might, in fact, resign in the face of this situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask this question——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator.

STRUCTURAL REVISIONS IN TREATY

Senator LAUSCHE. They want a termination of the treaty of 1903, and the amendments that were made to it, and negotiation for a new treaty starting from scratch?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is what they sound like they want when they use this phrase "structural revision," but actually they have never gone anything like that far with us in their private talks.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. But, anyhow, that is what he seemingly told those 2,000 students.

Secretary RUSK. He seems to be holding this out to the people in Panama, but in private talks they have indicated that there is a great deal less than that that would meet their problems, and therefore we are not too nervous about letting them say anything they want to us in these discussions that have come up, you see, about this subject because they, too, have a very considerable stake in our running and defending that canal. It means $85 million a year to them, and if they were to try to oust us from that position they would get very little help from the rest of Latin America, many of whom have got a high stake in the proper administration and operation of the canal, despite some of the public opinion aspect of it with which you are familiar. But they have not really said very much about it.

They have talked about wage problems. For the last 2 years we have been talking with them about wages, about jobs, about reducing the number of jobs reserved for Americans, about being willing to collect income tax or withholding income taxes for Panama on Panamanians working in the zone. We have accepted certain limitations on the kind of activities, business carried on by commissaries and post exchanges. There have been a number of these things which cumulatively are so important.

THE FLAG PROBLEM

The flag problem was also in that bundle.

On the flag matter, I realize there can be honest differences of opinion on this, but when you look at the question as to who is sovereign in Panama there is no simple answer to it. I hesitate to get into this among distinguished lawyers, but sovereignty, I suppose, is at least a bundle of 100 sticks. We probably hold 98 or 99 of those sticks, but Panama holds 1 or 2 of them anyhow. We got the Canal Zone by grant from Panama, which suggests something. We have the rights in the zone as if we were sovereign, which says to me that we are not sovereign.

President Taft recognized we are not fully sovereign there, I should say. President Taft recognized a titular sovereignty in Panama, so this is something we felt, in this matter of flying the Panamanian flag, where civil authority flies a flag in the zone, not in military establishments, not in private homes or private organizations, there was a minimum acknowledgement of the symbolic fact that Panama has a stake in the zone, and that just as these two flags are flying there, the zone is going to work best if we and Panama can work together on it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUSK. But there are those who have taken another view.

FLYING TWO FLAGS

Senator MUNDT. When was the decision made of the flying of two flags?

Secretary RUSK. The first decision was made by President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy and President Chiari agreed where civilian authority flew the flag in front of official government buildings in the zone that two flags would be flown.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was a commission that worked that out.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Joint commission, and accepted by the two countries.

Secretary RUSK. But President Kennedy and President Chiari talked about this when they were meeting, and they agreed that the commission would work out something on it. But what happened was there were about 60 stations in the zone where civilian authority originally flew the American flag—some of them were, for example, on garbage disposal plants—but when they got to looking at places where they would fly two flags, they reduced the number very considerably locally down to a total of 16 posts and this eliminated the public schools.

Now, they had the American flags in the schoolrooms and in the hallways, in the auditorium, but they had decided they would not fly the American flag outside, because they thought the Panamanian flag would be somewhat inflammatory to the Americans there, you see.

BALBOA HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

When the students—and this is the way this thing began—when the American students at Balboa High School were confronted with this, they decided they were going to fly the American flag. They put it on the regular flagpole the first day.

Senator MUNDT. How much of a timelag are we talking about when they decided not to have them and the students did?

Secretary RUSK. These specific decisions about flag flying have been progressive. Stations were sort of brought into operation because they had to put up another flagpole and things like that, you see, from last fall until into January, so this was something that was in motion at the time.

Senator MUNDT. About 30 days?

Secretary RUSK. It is cumulative, over a 30-day period.

Well, the American students in the high school decided they wanted to fly the American flag. They put it up one day and were told to take it down. They improvised a flagpole and put it up the second day, and they camped around it. Their parents brought them food and they sort of patrolled, protected the flag, getting a great deal of fun out of it, apparently.

Panamanian students asked to come into the zone for a peaceful demonstration bearing a Panamanian flag and move to the Balboa High School. They were given permission to come in, but about seven blocks away from the school, and five students were permitted to come to Balboa High School, not raising the flag, but displaying the flag and returning. On the way out of the zone the main body of students, then about halfway home, started throwing rocks at street lamps and broke a few windows and things like that.

The police, the zone police, used no violence with them. They kept just shushing them on and ushering them out of the zone.

MOB ACTION

But very shortly thereafter, there developed a considerable mob on the zone boundary itself, much of it, apparently, having originated out of a labor meeting that was involved in a bus strike. Almost instantaneously, this mob was joined by elements that we know are Communist in character, Castro-inspired, and Molotov cocktails, rocks, some arms were brought to play against a handful of zone police, zone police responsible to the Governor, some 15 of them initially.

Here was a mob of over 2,000 using Molotov cocktails and other deadly weapons, against a handful of police. The police, under orders to use fire only to protect life, did in fact open fire. Most of their fire was in the air, some of it, obviously, was not, and about four Panamanians were killed at that point.

Meanwhile, the mob grew and snipers began to appear at different places around the zone, indicating to us some element of organization. The Governor then, the acting Governor, called immediately on General O'Meara to take over the situation.

Now, he did so, and I think the story has not yet been sufficiently well told—we are trying to get it out—with respect to the sense of responsibility and the high discipline shown by American forces, the actual armed forces when they were asked to take over security of the zone.

NO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN PANAMA

One of the things that is involved in this situation that to me presents a very interesting problem—I don't think government should move with it, but I think something should be done in the private field about it—there were almost no American correspondents down there about it. The A.P. and U.P. stringers were Panamanian. For the first 24 or 36 hours, most of the stories that were coming out from down there were somewhat unbalanced.

It was not until Thursday or Friday evening that American correspondents began to arrive on the zone to try to look at it from all points of view. These A.P. stories were published without its being slugged at the top "by our Panamanian representatives," indicating anything else. It was simply an ordinary wire service story.

That is somewhat incidental, but nevertheless of some importance.

RIOT CONTROL ACTIONS

At no time did we use machineguns, as charged, against the Panamanians. No machinegun ammunition was ever issued to the armed services. At no time did American tanks go into Panama as charged. Tanks were never used at all.

The first 24 hours, only seven rounds of ball ammunition were used, as compared with the tear gas and other riot control measures. And these were used to kill a sniper who had just gotten through wounding five American soliders from one position. More than half the Panamanian dead were killed by Panamanians, seven by suffocation in a building in Panama City burned by Panamanians, two being killed by Molotov cocktails thrown by a Panamanian in an automobile.

So that our soldiers, I must say, conducted themselves with, I think, great patience under the most difficult circumstances. No greater discipline is required than to have men subjected to fire, withhold their fire, and they did this in situation after situation, getting in touch with the national guard on the other side to go and clean out the snipers before the Americans felt compelled to fire upon them.

They did kill several of these snipers because the national guard didn't run them down fast enough.

ROLE OF COMMUNISTS

On the question of the attitude toward this violence by President Chiari and others in Panama; we do not believe that the Communists organized the student demonstration. Our people locally there do not think so, and we have no indication that they did.

We are not yet sure that the Communists organized that crowd that first gathered at the zone frontier, but both we and the Panamanians agree that almost immediately the Communists did come in to try to exploit it. So from that time on, almost from the first half hour on, the ringleaders in the agitation were, in fact, known and identifiable Communist leaders, some of whom had been in Cuba.

USE OF PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD

Now, we have very close working relationships between our own security forces and the national guard forces of Panama and have had for many months now in connection with the Cuban business, and the cooperation during this situation was very good between General O'Meara and the national guard commander. We were able to identify a considerable number of people in these crowds who were arrested by the national guard, and whose background were known to both sides as a result of their security checks with each other in times past.

It was not until Sunday that the national guard really threw its full weight to the situation to restore order. We are inclined to think that President Chiari let these demonstrations go pretty far in the first 2 days as a means of putting pressure on the United States. It was not until he became disturbed about these mobs turning to him and about the loss of life and the concern of the business community and the restlessness of the national guard that he in effect gave a blank check on Sunday to restore order.

The **Chairman**. How big is their national guard?

Secretary **Rusk**. Their national guard is about 2,800 men.

It is to me very interesting and significant that we have about 4,000 American civilians living in Panama, 3,700 of those having been evacuated to the zone during this disorder. We didn't have a single casualty.

ATTACKS ON AMERICANS

The national guard, plus Panamanian friends, offered their help and services to Americans living there. This is not a general anti-American bloodbath, as it were, aimed at every one of the Americans. There was a great deal of regard for American individuals in Panama itself. There were some reports about some Americans being lynched. These turned out to be untrue.

There was damage to American buildings and some damage to American homes, but Americans have not been, civilians have not been casualties out in Panama itself.

There were some civilian——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Were there some Americans beaten up on the streets?

Secretary **Rusk**. There were some 100 American casualties in the zone itself.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No, I mean in Panama, Panama City.

Secretary **Rusk**. I would have to check to see whether there was any violence short of being wounded or killed, but I have not had reports on their being wounded or killed.

If someone got slugged and it was not reported, I don't know, Senator. I am just quoting the casualty statistics that I saw last night.

There have been frictions that may be described as normal in any situation where there is a substantial military presence. In Panama, for example—and these stories are exaggerated by the natives—the Panamanian merchants don't like to see PX's and commissaries operated in the zone. They want to draw that business over to themselves. We have that problem wherever there is a military base right here in this country.

Senator **Mundt**. Yes, sir.

Secretary **Rusk**. You have that kind of friction.

ATTITUDES OF AMERICANS IN PANAMA

Then there is something to the report that the attitude of some of our own Americans living in the zone has not helped on some of these problems. I am not going to talk about all of 4,000 so-called zonians employed by the Canal Zone Co., because I am quite sure when the Army and the zonians carried out their Operation Friendship that a great many of these people pitched in to do a great many things to build up friendly relations with the Panamanians, but undoubtedly there have been some with bad attitudes down there.

There are some third generation zonians living there; there have been some who have reflected the attitude and the feelings of the colonialist. They have resisted the increase in the position and privileges of the Panamanians even though these increases for the Panamanians did not detract any from the perquisites of the Americans living down there. There has been some shadow of the old gold-silver distinction hanging over in the psychological attitude of some of our people working there.

I was there during the war in uniform, and I must say I was shocked to see gold stores where only Americans could go, silver stores where only Panamanians could go; a gold drinking fountain for Americans, and a silver drinking fountain for Panamanians. This was after three terms of men like F.D.R., and this was still going on right in the middle of the war.

Much of that has been eliminated, I mean all of these discriminations of this sort pretty well have gone, but there are still questions of discrimination in the Panamanian mind based upon the kind of jobs that they are able to get in the Canal Zone Co.

PAY DIFFERENTIAL

They complain that this 25-percent differential pay that the Americans get for overseas service is discriminatory because many of these Americans have been living in the zone all their lives, just like the Panamanians have been living in Panama.

Senator **Lausche**. There is some substance to that argument, is there not, Mr. Secretary? That is, they have been living there all their lives and we still say they ought to have 25 percent more pay because they are assigned to a place that is not desirable?

Secretary **Rusk**. You can make that argument, Senator. I don't quite know how you come out in a situation where you are competing in two wholly different markets for manpower. If we want to get the trained Americans that we need for certain jobs down there, we have to compete in the American market. It just costs more.

Now, this report that you gentlemen have in front of you shows that the wages in the zone are much higher than the wages in Panama itself from the point of view of the Panamanian wages, you see.

A HARDSHIP POST

The **Chairman**. Do you consider this as a real hardship post?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think living on any Government reservation where you can't buy your home, accumulate equities in your community—I think there are some differentials there that ought to be taken into account when people go on overseas service or in situations where they can't do many of the normal things individual families can do to build up a stake.

The **Chairman**. Do our Foreign Service officers who serve in the Embassy in Panama get a hardship allowance?

Secretary **Rusk**. I would think they would get something because of this being in the tropics. I think there is a tropical allowance, Mr. Chairman.[9]

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[9] They received no differential or hardship allowance.

Perhaps you know the answer. I didn't check it.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Holt doesn't think so.

Secretary **Rusk**. I would think they probably get a tropical allowance.

They get credits on their health retirement as a minimum. I am sure of that.

The **Chairman**. Having just been in the tropics, I prefer it to Washington, if you want my personal view.

SALARIES OF PROFESSIONALS

Senator **Mundt**. In the tropics you should rotate these people a little faster, instead of keeping third generation folks down there on an extra pay basis.

Secretary **Rusk**. My impression is, Senator, that it is not easy to recruit people for those jobs. You see, the job market up here has changed a lot. You are competing with universities who can now pay $12,000, $14,000, $15,000 a year for professors; you are competing with companies who are in that wage bracket. It isn't easy to recruit where you need any special training of any consequence, you see.

Senator **Mundt**. You wouldn't think people in the $14,000 or $15,000 wage bracket, professional people, would be involved in agitation against Panama. You would think that would be more likely among common laborers, wouldn't it?

Secretary **Rusk**. There are relatively few American laborers left. There are 14,000 Panamanians employed in the zone and 10,000 Americans.[10] Thus has been a considerable change over time, and we have been lifting all the time the jobs to which Panamanians can be qualified. There are 600 jobs at the present time that are reserved for Americans on security grounds.

The **Chairman**. 600?

Secretary **Rusk**. 600 in the entire outfit.

Senator **Mundt**. Out of 24,000?

Secretary **Rusk**. Out of a total employment of 24,000.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Secretary, I am going to have to leave, but I want to ask a question, if I may.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, sir.

COMPARISON TO SUEZ CANAL

Senator **Sparkman**. More out of curiosity than anything else, I have just been wondering if the attitude that we took in connection with the Suez Canal, the nationalizing of that by Egypt after Britain, France, and Israel moved in—we supported Nasser in the nationalizing; has that had any impact on the thinking of the Panamanians?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well——

Senator **Sparkman**. Have they ever used that?

Secretary **Rusk**. There has been some reference to it in their press, but the Government representatives have not discussed this with us in those terms. This has also had some influence on press reaction in some places in Britain and France about this present problem we have in Panama.

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[10] The State Department later revised the figure to 4,000 Americans.

Senator **Sparkman**. I should think it would.

Secretary **Rusk**. No, but this has not really entered seriously into governmental discussions.

However, I might comment very briefly, Senator, on something that is very close to that.

AN ALTERNATE CANAL

The question arises as to an alternative canal. Now, there would be some advantage in our knowing that we are prepared to sit down and work out with somebody else an alternative canal if the situation in Panama becomes either obsolete or unworkable politically.

But the difficulty of that is that you would never in the world get from any government in 1964 a treaty that is comparable to the Treaty of 1903 with Panama. If we have any thought that we could negotiate with Colombia or Mexico or Nicaragua the kind of treaty we have with Panama we might as well dismiss it. No government would ever do it.

Senator **Mundt**. We would be less secure with the new one than the old one?

Secretary **Rusk**. So, if we were to go to Panama and say "We have got an agreement or we are getting an agreement with Colombia or Nicaragua for a new sea level canal," they would very likely come back and say, "All right, we will take the same agreement you have got with them for the Panama Canal." Then you would get a structural revision of our treaty with Panama.

Senator **Sparkman**. By the way——

Senator **Morse**. Doesn't that seem to indicate, though, Mr. Secretary, that maybe our 1903 treaty ought to be revised?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, Senator, there have been two revisions and they have been very important. We have given up the right to intervene in Panama, eminent domain in Panama City. We have given up sanitation facilities in Panama City and Colon.

I think there could still be another agreement with certain limited consideration of new points that would bring this relationship into somewhat more comfortable relationship with the Panamanians, but I would be very reluctant at the moment, Senator, or for the indefinite future as far as I can see it now, to do anything that would impair our right almost regardless of circumstances to operate and defend the canal.

PRESIDENT CHIARI'S CONTRADICTIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Doesn't President Chiari claim at this meeting here with President Kennedy that President Kennedy agreed that there would be discussions of the revision of the treaty?

Secretary **Rusk**. There are the two corners of the mouth, Senator. When he was here, and we put out a joint communique that they could tell us anything that was on their mind and about our relationships, that was on the basis of his assurance to us that he was not going to raise what he now calls the structural revision of the canal treaty.

We then predicted earlier this week, and we were right, that when he gets to talking to his own people he is going to talk about that kind of a structural revision. I think if we were starting all over today we would have a different treaty; there is no question about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that.

NO UNDISCLOSED AGREEMENTS

What I was asking was whether or not he doesn't claim that there was an agreement as shown by the notes and the minutes of that meeting which were not made public, that there was an understanding that at a certain time there would be discussions leading to the possible revision of that treaty in several important respects.

Secretary RUSK. There have never been any undisclosed agreements about the structure of the treaty. Now, the commission's activities, I think you know about, and these discussions have been given along and from time to time particular steps are announced, but there never was any agreement, in fact, the agreement ran the other way. President Chiari told President Kennedy he would not raise structural revisions of the treaty, although we clearly had the impression at that time that when he went home he was going to say that he was going to raise them, for internal reasons in Panama.

RELATION TO ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to spend a great deal of time on it, except I want to note for the record I am not so sure that the 1903 treaty as revised from time to time is necessarily a treaty, the terms of which we want to defend in 1964, from the standpoint of fair dealing with a country that was exceedingly weak and was greatly obligated to us in 1903 when we negotiated the treaty in the first place.

There is another facet of this that we ought to kick around a bit at some time at some of our discussions here: If you go in for an alternative treaty whether you shouldn't make it a part of the whole Alliance for Progress Program. Make it a canal under the jurisdiction of an agency set up by the Alliance for Progress Program to which all of our Latin American cohorts make their fair contribution on the theory that eventually it will liquidate itself as far as repayment is concerned, and you have not a U.S. canal but a hemispheric canal in which we are all partners. This might remove a lot of the nationalistic causes of dissension that I think you are going to have to live with so long as you keep the Panama Canal on its present basis.

You are going to get over this hump. We all have to work together to see that we do, but you are not going to solve United States-Panama relations as long as the United States runs that canal.

FIRST TREATY EFFORTS WITH COLOMBIA

The **Chairman**. As long as you raised that question, because you probably know it—my memory is very vague—is it a fact that we first proposed a treaty with Colombia for a canal and they rejected it?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

The **Chairman**. And then, later, a little insurrection occurred.

Secretary **Rusk**. When the Colombian senate turned down the treaty.

The **Chairman**. What happened, just for the record.

Secretary **Rusk**. The Panamanians themselves were highly incensed about the action of Colombia in turning it down.

The **Chairman**. Panama was part of Colombia then, was it not?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is right, that is correct. It was a Federation of New Granada at that time.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Secretary **Rusk**. And then when the Colombian forces went in to Panama to restore order they ran into American gunboats nearby.

The **Chairman**. That just happened to be there.

Secretary **Rusk**. And they——

The **Chairman**. Go on, put it on the record so the committee will know what happened.

Secretary **Rusk**. I wonder if I couldn't, because I would like to get the right names of the treaties, the treaty with Colombia that was proposed.

The **Chairman**. You are doing all right now. Just refresh our memories.

Secretary **Rusk**. Then I could perhaps make it a little more elegant in writing.

When the Panamanians declared their independence, the United States undertook negotiations——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We recognized them almost as quickly as we did Zanzibar, didn't we?

Secretary **Rusk**. Or Israel. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. We did.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRENCH AGENT

Secretary **Rusk**. But we then undertook negotiations with a French agent [11] in New York acting for Panama. He was also acting for interests who were trying to sell French Stock in a canal claim to the United States, about $40 million involved in that——

The **Chairman**. Were they able to spend $40 million?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, these rights to an isthmian canal were being offered for $40 million.

There is some lack of clarity as to whether that French agent had any authority from the Panamanian Government to conclude such a treaty. Also, the Panamanians say they were never given any chance to comment on the treaty. I think this is probably right.

Senator **Mundt**. Did somebody higher up in Panama than this French agent ultimately ratify it?

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[11] Philippe Bunau-Varilla.

Secretary **Rusk**. In the most formal sense; yes, Senator. In other words, that arrangement, as valuable as it was to the United States, is not something that could very well succeed in 1964 under such conditions.

So we have had a good deal of history to work our way out of, and as we moved into the latter part of the 20th century, nationalist feelings and things of that sort became mixed up in these problems. On the other hand, there are considerations that go on it the other way.

One of the reasons why we did not have great difficulty with the Inter-American Peace Committee—could we put this one off the record, please, sir?

[Discussion off the record.] [12]

OTHER CANAL ROUTES

Senator **Lausche**. Might I ask if they decided to build a canal in Nicaragua or Colombia, in what respect would the terms be harder, would it be on the annuity that is being paid?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think, sir, that we would in the first place never get a grant in perpetuity. I think it would be extremely unlikely that we could get the degree of jurisdiction over people that we have in the Canal Zone. I think we would have to take something like a NATO status of forces agreement, for example. I think we would expect that things like stamps and currency and all of those public facilities unconnected with the operation and security of the canal would be in the hands of local authorities.

In other words, I think you would be on quite a different footing. I would think the better alternative, rather than get involved with still another country over the kind of a relationship that could cause friction indefinitely, would be to explore the possibility—if as in the case of Colombia, the possible canal route is quite far to the north and out of any range of normal Colombian interests in terms of population and things of that sort—to offer to buy, straight-out purchase, just as within your and my lifetime we bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark, wasn't it, so that we get rid of all these entanglements, and it is clean one way or the other. Otherwise we will have a very complex relationship with overlapping jurisdictions on any other canal we are trying to build.

Senator **Lausche**. One more question. If we build in Nicaragua or Colombia, unless you acquired absolute title without any conditions attached to it, what assurance would we have that at some time in the future similar complications would not arise?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think you wouldn't have such assurance. Although I think there is still another possibility, and I am not committing myself to any of these at the moment. In connection with what Senator Morse said a moment ago, I think if we had an inter-American canal in title, in effect, as a part of the inter-American system for which the United States acted as the executive agent, we could come the closest to getting the best of both worlds in this situation.

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[12] No transcript was made of "off the record" discussions.

In other words, I think there are various ways in which you can retain the substance and give away the symbol, the prestige, the comfortable feeling that other people would like to have about these various arrangements but keep the substance.

RECORD OF CONCESSIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Before I forget, would you have supplied for the record a narration of the concessions that we have made since 1903?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I will be glad to.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. Tabulating them as one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and whatever else it might be.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are at this, include this historical background of the origin.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, all right.

As late as 1955 we gave up our monopoly of transisthmian roads in railroad transportation. Up until then the Panamanian relied upon us to get from one edge of the isthmus to the other. We gave up control of sanitation in Panama and Colon. When I was down there as an army officer during the war I used to make sanitary patrols in Panama and Panama City as an exercise of American jurisdiction inside Panama. We gave large areas in the zone back to Panama in 1955; readjusted the boundaries, and we got some training area rights.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They demand we give those up now, don't they?

Secretary RUSK. Well——

Senator LAUSCHE. Panama was given what?

Secretary RUSK. Panama was given the right to tax Panamanians working in the zone in 1955. This is certainly an extension of a sovereign right at the time.

The annuity was raised from $1,500,000 to $1,930,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, $430,000 to $1,930,000.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon, it was raised by $1,500,000. You are quite right, I am sorry.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Then in 1942 we agreed to build that bridge, agreed to build some highways, and we agreed to use Panamanian labor in the Canal Zone whenever possible. We moved our railroad station out of Panama into the zone.

Back in 1936 we gave up a right of eminent domain in Panama and in Colon. We gave up the right to maintain order in Panama City and in Colon. I will give you a full list of that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, we have made some very important changes in the 1903 arrangements since then, but the thing we are sensitive to and I think we have to be sensitive to is anything that cuts into the bone of our requirements for the operation and the defense of the canal. If we can get over this electoral period in Panama, I am somewhat optimistic we can cut this thing out without cutting to the bone in those two essential requirements.

RAISING THE AMERICAN FLAG

Senator **Mundt**. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary had something to say about his disenchantment with the A.P. and U.P. reports coming from Panamanian reporters. I would like to ask him a question geared to American newsmen and see if their veracity is any better if we had them down there.

In the morning Post, Drew Pearson had an article dealing with this subject in which he said, "The fact is that the American flag was hoisted by these American teenagers on Tuesday, January 7. It was on January 10, after 3 days, that the Panamanians started to take things into their own hands."

He raises the question as to why during those 3 days the principal of the school or the superintendent or the Governor or some American authority didn't stop this nonsense on the part of students, which apparently, according to him, had gone on for 72 hours before the Panamanians even reacted to it. Is his statement right or is it wrong and what is the answer?

Secretary **Rusk**. My understanding of the situation on that is that when the flag was raised on the school flagpole, the principal, under the earlier directive from the Governor, removed it, but when the students then put up their own flag, the Governor felt that rather than moving against the students, he would consider that as a flag not raised and flown by civilian authorities. This is a flag flown by students, and he made a judgment on that which——

Senator **Mundt**. It was on a civilian authority flagpole, was it not?

Secretary **Rusk**. There is some doubt about that as to whether they had not improvised a flagpole at one stage. I am not quite certain that this was on the main school flagpole.

Now, since then, and this is the point——

INFLAMING THE PANAMANIANS

Senator **Mundt**. Let's assume that it was on a flagpole that the students built. This was an obvious effort to agitate Panamanian sentiment. It seems to me that a Governor—whoever is in charge, the Governor, the superintendent of schools, or the principal—had an obligation not to needlessly antagonize and inflame the Panamanians since he must have been alerted to the fact that this was a matter of substantial controversy.

Secretary **Rusk**. I think that is correct, and certainly looking at it from the perspective we can now have on it. But I would point out that in this community of some 30,000 people that things are happening every day subject to incidents, misunderstanding and feelings as between the Americans and the Panamanians and that the government is in a constant process of dealing with these things on the spot.

Now, we are looking into the question as to how, in what detail, we expect to be informed about these things, because it was not until they started throwing Molotov cocktails that we knew in our department, for example, that there had been an issue about this flag at the Balboa High School. I think this is because the Governor is administering a $100 million enterprise, a large community, and that if he were reporting on all the things that were going on in the decisions he is making that could possibly stir up this kind of an issue, that he would be heavily overburdened with it on the reporting side.

NO REPORT FROM THE EMBASSY

Senator **Mundt**. Don't you have a State Department representative down there whose job it is to tell you that for 72 hours this kind of antagonistic activity was going on even if the Governor is busy doing something else?

Secretary **Rusk**. The Embassy does not get involved in the actual administration of the zone itself. There was no report to Washington on this for these 72 hours.

Senator **Mundt**. Don't they report to you on something as inflammatory as that?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is the Department of Defense, it is the Army that administers the zone.

Senator **Mundt**. The State Department is just there as a kibitzer; you had no control. I still would say you ought to be aware of something that may happen here—there is a controversy about a flagpole that is going on for 72 hours.

Secretary **Rusk**. This didn't appear to be that kind of a problem until the Panamanian delegation went back peacefully and then the bricks began flying.

Senator **Mundt**. This thing went on for 30 days.

The **Chairman**. Thirty days?

Senator **Mundt**. Thirty days the Secretary says they were trying to work out——

Secretary **Rusk**. During which they were raising more and more Panamanian flags alongside of American.

Senator **Mundt**. They were trying to work it out on a stable basis?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, I won't take any last ditch position on it. We are looking into it to see whether we need to look at our procedures to see whether that kind of thing ought to be reported much more promptly than it was.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL

Senator **Mundt**. I don't know how a principal down there gets his job or whom he is responsible to, but I have been a principal of a high school. If my students had put up a Communist flag, I shouldn't wait for 72 hours to do something—before doing it before they came in and burned down——

Secretary **Rusk**. It is much more difficult for you to pull down an American flag with the American Legion looking over your shoulder.

Senator **Mundt**. They could have run up the other.

Senator **Lausche**. When I was Governor I had a situation where a red light was flashed to me during a telephone call and I didn't pay heed to it. I was leaving the office. About 10 days later——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What do you mean a red light flashed to you through a telephone?

Senator **Lausche**. I got a call condition X was wrong. My term was to expire in 10 days and I paid no attention to it. When I went back into the Governorship 2 years later, I told my directors never to disregard a red light or a red flag. If you see one portending trouble, stop and examine it.

Now, that is what you are talking about here, a red light, a red flash indicating something wrong, and there was delay in acting on it.

CRITICISM OF STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator **Mundt**. I think there are two things, looking into the future, that are seriously wrong. In the first place, I think it is seriously wrong that you have a principal down there who doesn't show a matter of judgment, whoever he is, however he gets the job. Second, I think if I were Secretary of State I would be pounding some heads down there if for 72 hours they didn't tell me this was happening.

The first thing you do is read a dispatch that they are throwing Molotov cocktails. You would have been certainly aware of the fact if this thing was going on it would have led to trouble—if you had 72 hours' notice on it.

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Secretary, this raises a point, and I think we always have to do what we can to defend the State Department from critics who are not constructive. There is a certain amount of criticism that has been hurled at the State Department, I have heard around these precincts.

There was a long, long delay in not appointing a new ambassador to Panama. We don't have any diplomatic relations with them now, but I think that hole has got to be plugged. My question is, Are steps underway so when we do restore diplomatic relations we are going to send up a new appointee for an ambassador?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, we would expect to move very promptly on that when the chance arises.

When President Johnson took over responsibility, he made a review of all key appointments, including some of those that had already been announced. He did want to take a completely new look at it and, as you know, he brought Mr. [Thomas] Mann in, got Mr. [Ellsworth] Bunker down here for the OAS, and he wanted to get Mr. Mann's judgment on some of these key appointments. Mr. Mann took office January 3, and so we will move promptly on that point.

Let me say also about the Governor, Governor Fleming, that he has been trying over the last several months to work things out with the Panamanians. In doing so, he has become rather unpopular with some of the Americans in the zone, and I think that he had been having some difficulties with the civic groups, the Legion, the other service clubs, and so forth, not with the Armed Forces or their dependents; they have been very good about these problems. When these high school students took this action on the flag, I think he wanted to take a little time to kind of try to work it out and did not see the explosive possibilities as quickly as those possibilities developed. He has had a rough time, this Governor, in trying to persuade the zonites to play ball on these problems.

MOTIVES OF THE PARENTS

Senator **Mundt**. Have you explored the nature of the parents who you say brought blankets and foodstuffs to encourage them, their sons and daughters, who were sitting down there at the bottom of the flagpole insisting that this rather arrogant and unnecessary action should prevail?

There is a possibility that they were motivated by un-American or anti-American motivations rather than being super-duper patriots.

Secretary **Rusk**. No, sir, I think from their point of view this was from patriotic motives. I don't think there is any chance any of them were subversive or the left wing.

But Secretary [Cyrus] Vance was sent down with Mr. Mann, because he had been responsible for the administration of the zone, in order to have some very direct and hairshirt talks with the leadership of the zone employees. It has been announced down there that failure to cooperate on these matters affecting our relations with Panama will be a cause for sending people home, so that this discipline of the zone employees on this matter is something we are just going to have to insist upon.

THE CANAL CO. BOARD

The **Chairman**. What is Fleming's status, who appoints him?

Secretary **Rusk**. He is the Governor, appointed by—he reports to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army is the sole stockholder of the Panama Canal Co.

The **Chairman**. Is he a military man?

Secretary **Rusk**. He is a military man. Traditionally an engineer has held that post.

There is a Canal Co. Board of 12 made up of, among others, certain officials such as the Secretary of the Navy; we usually have a State Department member—Mr. Ball was for a time our member, Mr. Martin was for a time our member—and about 6 private citizens from the United States.

We are taking a look at the board to see whether we ought to lift this to a higher level of public responsibility on such issues.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, may I make this comment: I think that when there exists a disposition on the part of one individual or a group to reach a specific objective, reasons will be found to reach that objective. If you eliminate one cause, another one will be discovered.

In this situation the immediate reason was the raising of the flag, but preexistent there has been a disposition to find some reason to make the complaint, and you might say that the nonexistence of an ambassador down there contributed to it. I don't think that it was an important contributory cause, and I don't think that the failure to raise that flag was the only cause. There is an inclination to find reasons to nullify the treaty, and causes will be found to make the argument.

CASTRO AGENTS IN PANAMA

Secretary **Rusk**. I think, sir, also we were aware of the Castro agents and Panamanians who have been in Cuba for training and things of that sort, and were working very closely with the Panamanian security people to keep an eye on possible disorders, but those were aimed at alert to disorders whose objective was the Government of Panama. This capability that we knew about and were watching was turned very quickly into jumping aboard this activity aimed at the zone, you see.

By the way, I think I perhaps might just say to the committee that in the other House it was stated that Thelma King, who is the No. 1 Castro Communist agent in Panama and a member of the legislature there, was awarded a medal by the United States, at the recommendation of the State Department. I think I just might mention her. It is a matter of no real importance, but a group of national legislators went to the jungle training center down there for an afternoon to have a look at what was going on in that center. She was in the group, quite a few of the legislators, and on the way out they gave them each a little medallion of some sort calling them graduates of the jungle training center.

They do that for all VIP visitors for that center. Well, that apparently was the medal that Thelma King was given.

OTHER CUBAN ACTIVITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Secretary Rusk, you mentioned that the Cubans were in Zanzibar. They are in Panama. What other places have they been?

The CHAIRMAN. Cubans or Chinese?

Secretary RUSK. I think I said that it is our information that some of the people in the Zanzibar takeover had been in Cuba for training. Now, there were some newspaper reports that there were a couple of them who seemed to be Cubans or speaking Spanish. We have had no confirmation on that, but we do know some of the Zanzibarists were in Cuba for training.

Senator LAUSCHE. We know they were in the Dominican Republic. We now have them in Panama. Some were in training in Cuba that were in Zanzibar. What other places are they operating in?

Secretary RUSK. I think Cuban activity of one sort or another is present in most Latin American countries, whether as agents or in furnishing funds or in printing propaganda, things of that sort. There have been some Cubans in Algeria, but one of the reasons we were interested in this report about Zanzibar was that is pretty far afield and this was the first time we had any indication of Cuban activity that far away from home.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is Cuba acting as the agent for Russia in these activities?

Secretary RUSK. I think as far as Zanzibar it is more likely to be Red China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, do you have any knowledge or information that—this has been told to me, I don't know whether it is accurate or not—there have been some Egyptians in Panama agitating the seizure of the canal and nationalization? I have been told that.

Secretary RUSK. I haven't seen any reports on that at all about Egyptians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There were a number of Egyptians there.

CASTRO'S TRIP TO SOVIET UNION

Senator **Morse**. Do you have any late information about this Castro trip to Russia?

Secretary **Rusk**. No. We have asked our watch committee, beginning last Thursday night, to look for any possible connection between the Panama matter and Castro's trip to the Soviet Union. He returned at the same time that Podgorny [13] did, who has been in Cuba talking about the economic assistance program. His trip to Moscow could be explainable in non-Panamanian terms, but we wanted to be alerted as best we could be as to any possible connection. We don't rule out the possibility that Castro might, in light of Panama, make some move with respect to Guantanamo, either politically in the U.N. or by some other means, so we have been watching very closely this aspect of it. So far we haven't had any real connection.

COMPARISON TO GUANTANAMO RIGHTS

Senator **Lausche**. If you allow them to abrogate the 1903 treaty, how will we escape a demand to abrogate the Guantanamo rights?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, to begin with, we do not believe that Panama can legally abrogate those treaties.

Senator **Lausche**. I understand that.

Secretary **Rusk**. We have looked into this very carefully from a legal point of view. As a matter of international law, our legal adviser tells us he would be quite comfortable in the International Court on this matter. Recognition of this treaty is, by the way, incorporated in the constitution of Panama itself, in article III, so that if the President of Panama were to denounce this treaty, there would be a real question as to whether this would not be unconstitutional in the domestic law of Panama.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He has denounced it, hasn't he?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I thought he said he denounced all treaties.

Secretary **Rusk**. He said he was denouncing it in his public statement. He said he was just expressing an intention to denounce and then his Foreign Minister, pulling back completely from that, they would not denounce; those were not scraps of paper. If we have discussions about a revision of the treaty that don't come to agreement, of course, the existing treaties stand.

In other words, they pulled back very far from the concept of denunciation, because they could just get nowhere with that, either legally or as a matter of practical fact on the ground. We can operate the canal without any interference from Panama and without, and against the failure of any cooperation from them if all of their workers went home tomorrow we could still operate the canal.

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[13] Soviet Communist Party Presidium member N.V. Podgorny.

CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT

Senator MUNDT. How do you feel about the prospects of the election on May 10? Is it likely to be a pro-American or anti-American president?

Secretary RUSK. Robles,[14] who is Chiari's candidate, seems to us to be a capable man, and under normal circumstances we would think he would be a most desirable prospect and we think he still is. To what extent he will be caught up in the present inflammation and get himself committed to the Chiari line and even beyond is something that is still not clear.

Senator MUNDT. Is he a certain winner?

Secretary RUSK. Not necessarily. There is another candidate, [deleted].

But it looks as though Robles would probably win the election and this does not concern us too much. [Deleted.]

The second Vice President, [Jose D.] Bazan, is [deleted] formidable and, I think, reliable kind of man, but I think it is likely if Chiari were to resign that there would be a struggle for power and the national guard would play a crucial role.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Before you leave, I wonder if you would stay just 2 or 3 minutes—I don't want to delay you—to say something on Vietnam. The accounts are rather confusing. Is it going well, badly, or what?

Secretary RUSK. I think the first quarter of this year will tell us a great deal about whether the situation, in which direction the situation will move.

After the change in government there was a period of about 45 days when the Vietcong stepped up their activity considerably and the new government was trying to get itself in position to get its province chiefs organized, its forces redisposed after the coup. They made some key military appointments, just after the turn of the new year, that we think were very good.

I think we will know more about it relatively shortly.

The Vietcong incidents have now dropped to where they were before the coup. In other words, they have not sustained the pace that they set during the confusion of the coup period. But there is still a substantial job.

The truce made between the government and the two principal political-religious sects was a very important political move and has helped in the countryside. What they are now doing is establishing some priorities on the areas in which they will concentrate their interests and their attention.

The CHAIRMAN. The government?

Secretary RUSK. Starting with those in the general vicinity of Saigon where the most dangerous threat is coming from the delta area and building out from positions of strength, rather than scattering their effort into the most outlying areas and then having them overrun by Vietcong while their attention is turned somewhere else.

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[14] Marco Aurelio Robles, who was elected President of Panama in 1964.

So, I am relatively optimistic, but I say the first quarter of this year will give us a great deal of indication as to where this new government is going and what it will do.

FUNCTIONING OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Does the government seem to be functioning all right?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, in general. They told us about 4 or 5 days ago they have completed their reorganization, and they are now going to get on with the war. I think they are a little inept in their political operations in the countryside and so forth, but so was the other government.

One thing has come to light since the coup and that is that in certain areas, particularly in the delta area, the situation was considerably worse under the Diem government than we realized. We didn't have people in the villages to get firsthand certified information, and we were given a good deal of information that just wasn't so by the Vietnamese authorities.

RELATIONS BETWEEN LODGE AND HARKINS

Senator MORSE. Anything to the newspaper accounts that there is serious conflict between Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge and General [Paul] Harkins?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think so, sir. I have met with them on a number of occasions. Certainly Ambassador Lodge has not said anything to me about that.

I think that there was a period when the Vietnamese military thought that General Harkins was in strong support of the Diem government and therefore could not give them equally strong support. But, you see, you have a good many Americans in that whole Saigon area, and what we have been trying to do is to get the MAAG,[15] the military side, the Embassy, the information services, and the aid all pulling together better as a team, because they were scattered over the city. They didn't see each other frequently enough, and I think there is some improvement in that. But both Harkins and Lodge have separately and individually expressed to me their very high regard for each other.

I just don't know what is behind these stories.

PRECEDENTS SET IN PANAMA

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I would like to leave this word with you. If we allow the structure upon which our rights are based in Panama to be altered or surrendered, we had better look to see what precedent will be established in respect to our Guantanamo structure rights.

My own belief is that if you allow the structure to be destroyed in Panama, precedents will be established for the destruction of our structure in the rights which we have in Guantanamo. That is in accord, I think, with what you are saying, that we can't afford to change our basic rights in Panama.

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[15] Military Assistance Advisory Group.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I don't think I am disagreeing with your conclusions, but I think I would turn the basis of them around a little bit. To me, Panama is many times more important than Guantanamo, if it were not for the Castro problem.

When I was on the general staff at the Pentagon at the end of the war, the military did not think much of the need for Guantanamo over an extended period of time. If there were a free Cuban government and we had bases in Puerto Rico and other places and the change in circumstances and so forth, I don't think our commitment to Guantanamo would be one-half so compelling as our permanent commitment is in Panama. But with the Castro regime, we are in Guantanamo, and we are not going to be thrown out.

I would think that Panama is important in its own right and that the considerations in Guantanamo are a part of this total free world-Communist confrontation. So we will stay in Guantanamo. We are not going to get out of there.

Senator LAUSCHE. On the basis of what you have said, the necessity of adhering to our structual rights in Panama are all the stronger.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Senator MORSE. I think the Secretary's analysis, if I understand it, is absolutely correct. In fact, if [Fulgencio] Batista was succeeded by a democrat and we had a free government in Cuba today, the probabilities are that Guantanamo today would be a university site because it was under consideration at one time. If we were going to give it up, we would turn it into a great cultural center, maybe have a University of the Americas or something there.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You have been very helpful.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thanks very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 1:12 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Hickenlooper.

The chairman brought up the original resolution requesting necessary funds for the conduct of committee studies and investigations during 1964. The resolution was ordered reported without objection.

The nominations of Ellsworth Bunker, to be Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and C. Burke Elbrick, to be Ambassador to Yugoslavia, were ordered to be reported without objection.

The Protocol amending the Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Ex. O, 88–1) also was ordered reported without objection.

The Protocol for the Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement of 1958 (EX. R. 88–1) also was ordered to be reported without objection.

The bill (S. 2394) to facilitate compliance with the Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, signed August 29, 1963 (Ex. N, 88–1) was passed over temporarily.

New security regulations for the handling of classified material in the committee and by committee members were adopted without objection.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 11 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Mansfield and Symington.

On motion by Senator Mansfield, and without objection, the committee favorably reported the nominations of Vincent Corry, to be Ambassador to Sierra Leone, and Maj. Gen. Fred M. Dean, to be Assistant Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The bill (S. 2394) to facilitate compliance with the Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, and the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 120) providing for the recognition and endorsement of the 17th International Publishers Congress, were next considered. On motion by Senator Mansfield, and without objection, both measures were reported to the Senate.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:05 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 3:40 p.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senator Lausche. Senator Symington attended later.

The committee was briefed by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On January 1, 1964, Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, telegraphed world leaders that he intended to abrogate the treaties which permitted Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain to station troops on Cyprus. As rioting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Britain airlifted an additional 2,000 troops to their garrison on the island. A conference was convened in London on January 15, but proved unable to resolve the crisis. The United States and Great Britain then proposed that some 10,000 NATO troops be sent to the island, but the Cypriot Government rejected this plan, insisting that any troops be directly answerable to the U.N. Security Council. On February 18 the Security Council began a protracted debate on the issue, and on March 24 the first U.N. peacekeeping forces arrived in Cyprus.]

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:40 p.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILLIPS TALBOT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BALL. I wanted to have a chance to bring the committee up to date on the developments in the Cyprus affair, which is a very dangerous one.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BALL. I think in many ways it is the most critical situation, as far as NATO is concerned, that has developed since, almost since the beginning, but to go back just a bit, at the risk of repeating things that you already know very well, the situation on the island is the problem of a mixed population which have not succeeded in living comfortably with one another for hundreds of years, about 450,000 Greeks and about 100,000 Turks.

This was, as you know, a colonial possession of the United Kingdom for a very long time. Prior to that time it had been under Turkish rule, 400 years, I guess.

The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred years?

Mr. BALL. Yes. It has never been under Greek rule, incidentally.

The CHAIRMAN. It has not? How did all those Greeks get there?

Mr. **Ball**. Well, they were just handy.

The **Chairman**. I just wondered. That the Turks allowed them there 400 years is what surprises me.

Senator **Lausche**. I thought the Greeks were there from ancient times.

Mr. **Ball**. As far as modern Greece is concerned.

The **Chairman**. And they never merged for 400 years, they still kept their separate identity?

Mr. **Ball**. They never had a chance, because the Turkish Empire had them for 400 years. Then the British had control, since what?

Mr. **Talbot**. The Turks took over in 1571; the British in the 19th century.

Mr. **Ball**. The 19th or late 18th?

The **Chairman**. Go ahead.

CONSTITUTION OF 1960

Mr. **Ball**. As a result of the independence drive which was conducted and which became a very effective sabotage and underground operation under a man named Grivas, the British finally worked out a constitution in 1960 which provided for, as best they could develop it, the recognition of the rights of the Turkish minority as well as the Greek majority.

It is a very cumbersome document. It provided for a Greek-Cypriot president and a Turkish-Cypriot vice president; two houses in which there was representation by sort of separate colleges in each house representing the two communities; provision where most measures had to be passed with a majority of both of the separate majority, and where a great many of the actions, the most important actions, taken by the Cypriot state could be taken only by the joint agreement of the Greek President Makarios and the Turkish-Cypriot vice president.

Along about the end of November of last year——

The **Chairman**. Does that mean each has a veto?

Mr. **Ball**. Each has a veto; and underlying and supporting this constitution was a treaty of guarantee by the three guaranteeing powers, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece, which gave each one certain rights to intervene to protect the constitution, after giving notice and opportunity for discussion, and so on. So there is a kind of right of unilateral intervention on the side of each one of the three.

PERIOD OF TENSION

At the end of November, rather unexpectedly, Makarios apparently in a mood of frustration served notice on the Turkish community and on the Greek community that the constitution had to be revised. He put up certain revisions which the Turkish Cypriots turned down, and the result of this was the beginning of another period of tension.

This developed into serious bloodshed around about December 22. The British then, in conversation with Makarios, had Makarios request them to send in some forces in order to keep peace.

The British now have about 2,700 troops that are engaged in trying to keep the communities apart. Nevertheless, the unrest has continued, and there has been a quiet movement on the part of the Turkish community to begin to consolidate geographically on the north part of the island. This has alarmed the Greeks because they see in this the possibility of a kind of de facto recognition of what the Turks have wanted all along, and that is partition.

So this has tended to intensify the excitement, and there have been efforts to shut off the water and the utilities from the Turks, and all kinds of harassment.

SIGNS OF TURKISH INTERVENTION

There was the discovery a couple of weeks ago of a grave where there were some 40 Turkish bodies which apparently represented the execution of some hostages, and so on. It is a very bad situation. It has grown extremely tense, and Turkey, which is only 4 miles away from the island—Greece is about 400 miles away—Turkey has given every sign of being on the verge of intervening unilaterally to protect the Turkish population because of the excitement and nervousness and which has developed.

The **CHAIRMAN**. With an army?

Mr. **BALL**. With an army, and we know Iskenderon, which is the closest major staging area to the island, is what, 90 miles, something of that sort, 110 miles—there is quite a collection of forests which could be used for this purpose.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Of Turks?

Mr. **BALL**. Turks, and the Turks have not attempted to conceal the fact that if the situation were inflamed and there were very serious jeopardy of Turkish population, the beginning of a massacre or anything, they would move.

If the Turks moved against the island, then the Greeks could not stand down, they would move immediately, too. They are poised to do the same thing.

So we would then have two of our NATO allies, the two who really hold the southern flank of NATO, at one another's throats. This would be an extremely dangerous business.

A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY

We have been very concerned about it for some time, but we have tried to keep this a British responsibility. It has seemed to us that this was one we would stay out of if we possibly could, because we get committed all around the world, and we did not want to get committed here.

The British came to us about what, a week ago, 10 days ago, yes—it was on Friday, as I recall—and said to us that they had made a decision that they could no longer maintain sole responsibility for keeping the peace, not so much because they were spread so thin they could not put more troops on, although this would cause them some problems, but because of the antipathies against the British which had developed and the fact that the Turks had lost confidence in the objectivity of the British and thought the British were on the Greeks' side. If they got bogged down further in the island, they thought they would never get themselves out and that the situation would become one where they would be the targets.

Senator AIKEN. Instead of us.

Mr. BALL. And they would be generally in a mess.

BRITISH RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE

Let me say in addition there are domestic reasons why they—this is a fact also. Nothing was more unpopular in Britain than this long agony of the Cyprus situation prior to 1960 when they finally got the constitution set up. For a conservative government, or for any government, to put an additional body of troops back into the island enough to guarantee the peace would be politically catastrophic for them.

So we said, "Look, don't give us this line because what we would suggest to you is that they would have to take troops out of West Germany, the BAOR.[1] Why, we would look with some tolerance on that. We might even help you with some airlift to get some troops down there, but this is your problem."

We kept this heat on them for about a period of 24 hours, and then the cabinet, the British Government, said, "We don't want any mistake about this. If there is a Turkish move, we are simply going to retire to the sovereign bases," which they have, the two bases on Cyprus, "and not try to maintain the peace."

They said, "This is a government decision not to send any more troops in. If there is no other way of doing this, we think that this ought to be internationalized in some way, because we think that this would quiet the situation down, and then we propose to go to the Security Council with the problem although we recognize the disadvantages of doing it."

Now, the disadvantages of the Security Council are that they get the bloc into the affairs of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and if there were talk of a peacekeeping force under United Nations auspices, it might very well be a force of Egyptians and Nigerians, and so on. To get them in, trying to keep peace between two NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean, is something that is not very advantageous for the Western interests.

So after a great deal of discussion with the British in which we satisfied ourselves that they meant what they said as far as not taking further responsibility, and that there was no way in which we could get them to do it—and to some extent what they said was justified by the facts also, because there is no doubt but that the British are under a great disability of history in that they have accumulated years of antipathies, and they are not a quieting force in the island to the extent that a Western force might be—we said to them that the only basis upon which we could consider taking any responsibility would be, first, that we do not get ourselves in the middle of trying to settle this matter. To the extent we would consider supplying any component from a force drawn from NATO nations, it would be a very minor component. We would be prepared to come in only if from the condition that the whole package were accepted.

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[1] British Army of the Rhine.

PROVISIONS OF U.S. PROPOSAL

The package consisted of the following: First, that a force drawn from NATO nations might be created which, on the basis of their military judgment, combined with the judgment of our own people who worked with their military looking at it, would consist of 10,000 men; that of that number the British would probably put in about 4,000, and that is including the 2,700 they have now; the United States would put in in the neighborhood of 1,200, and the rest would be drawn from other Western European nations; that we would do this only if all four of the governments asked us to, which means the British, the Turkish Government, the Greek Government, and the Government of Cyprus. We would do this only if there was a full acceptance by all governments of the appointment of a neutral mediator drawn from one of the NATO countries, not one of the guarantor powers and not the United States, so we would not have our own man trying to do the mediation, because we do not want to take the responsibility for the mediation. These are the principal provisions of the proposals.

The proposal was accepted without change by the United Kingdom Government, by the Greek Government, and by the Turkish Government.

Makarios, however, has not accepted it. He has not officially rejected it as yet. Makarios——

HOW THE U.S. WOULD GO IN

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you repeat just how we would go in?

Mr. BALL. At the request of the Cyprus Government, which means Makarios, and the Turkish Government, the Turkish vice president, at the request of those two representing the Cyprus Government. The Turkish vice president has accepted it, I may say.

The CHAIRMAN. He has?

Mr. BALL. He has accepted it. At the request of the Turkish Government, the request of the Greek Government, the request of the United Kingdom Government, a force would be sent in, drawn from various NATO countries, one component of which—but we are thinking in terms of about 1,200 men——

Senator LAUSCHE. Would be United States?

Mr. BALL. Would be United States. The total force would be around 10,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many Britons?

Mr. BALL. 4,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. BALL. So what we are talking about is not having much more than one-tenth of the force, or one-eighth of the force would be American. It would only go in if there were prior agreement: First, that it was to be there for not more than 3 months, 90 days; second, that there would be a mediator appointed from one of the NATO countries, not a guarantor power, and not the United States, who would undertake immediately the mediation in an attempt to reach a political solution. These are the principal provisions.

WHAT MAKARIOS WANTS

What Makarios wants and the game he is playing, I think, is pretty clearly this: He wants to get this thing into the United Nations because his friends, he thinks, are on the side, are the nonaligned powers.

He has had a lot of approaches by the Soviet Union. He is rather bemused by these, I think. He thinks that if he could get this into the United Nations, that he could get the Russians on his side and the nonaligned powers on his side, that they might then get a peacekeeping force which would consist of representatives of some of the neutrals, and that out of this would come a declaration of the independence of Cyprus separating it from the guaranty arrangements, so that it would be completely free of any unilateral rights on the part of the Greeks, the Turks, or the British, and providing it with a unitary constitution, which is what he wants, under the principles of self-determination, which means that the majority could do what it wanted with the Turkish minority.

He has made perfectly clear what he has in mind. His inclination at the moment is, at least for tactical purposes, to indicate great concern about any kind of a force drawn from the NATO countries, any great concern with any kind of an arrangement in which the United Nations is not the controlling element.

This is the posture of it tonight, which is that he has promised to give an answer in writing to our proposal. It has not yet been forthcoming. It may be forthcoming tomorrow or the next day.

In the meantime, the very talk of an allied force has tended to quiet the situation down somewhat. But this morning there were demonstrations by the Greek-Cypriots, and this situation could really get out of hand almost any time, and the Turks and the Greeks are poised ready to move, the Turks particularly.

We are waiting to see what he has to say. As I say, we do not want to get this in the United Nations if there is any way to avoid it. We do not want to get the Egyptians and the Yugoslavs, and so on into Cyprus.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Senator AIKEN. Suppose the United Nations votes to send a police force in, what do we do then?

Mr. BALL. I think that if we have to go to the United Nations, then it may be that we will decide to move faster than they will, and we have got quite a few things on our side.

In the first place, the question of a U.N. peacekeeping force is a question of who pays for it, and there has not been much enthusiasm for paying for these things on the part of the bloc.

Senator AIKEN. It is really on the books, on credit, half of it.

Mr. BALL. The question of the fact that I think that the Secretary General has understood our situation pretty well is important, so we are not without some strength in the Security Council with the whole NATO on our side, so that I think we can probably avoid anything too serious coming out of the Security Council.

If they go into the General Assembly, that is another problem.

IF TURKEY MOVES TROOPS INTO CYPRUS

Senator **Aiken**. Suppose Turkey moves troops into Cyprus and they start to fight. What do we do then?

Mr. **Ball**. If Turkey moves any troops into Cyprus, then the Greeks are going to move troops into Cyprus, too——

Senator **Aiken**. What will we do?

Mr. **Ball**. The only thing we can do at that time, if we cannot get them to pull back, is to try to get the thing into the United Nations and see if we can quiet it down. Do you see any alternative?

Mr. **Talbot**. Our whole effort, of course, is to prevent these things from happening.

KEEPING THE SOVIETS OUT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Senator **Aiken**. Why don't we go into the United Nations first and take the initiative?

Mr. **Ball**. Because if we can work this out, Senator, without involving the United Nations, then we have not got the Soviet Union and the bloc into the eastern end of the Mediterranean. To get them involved in the affairs of Cyprus is from our point of view a very serious thing.

The Soviet Union has said to the Turks that if they move they will tickle their rear—that is the expression they use—and they promised the Cypriots this will happen. This thing is terrifically explosive.

GUINEA ASKS FOR UNITED STATES HELP

Senator **Aiken**. Is it true that Guinea has said they are fed up with Soviet help and they are asking us to take over now?

Mr. **Ball**. Yes, Guinea is one place——

Senator **Aiken**. It was on the ticker a couple of hours ago.

Mr. **Ball**. This has been brewing for some time.

Senator **Aiken**. I do not know why we should have a monoply on all the trouble in the world.

Mr. **Ball**. Let me say, Senator, that I agree with you entirely, and our effort, our whole effort, in this case is to have a limited liability——

The **Chairman**. Try to keep out of it.

Mr. **Ball** [continuing]. In a situation where all the parties tried to involve us in full liability.

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary, who principally?

Mr. **Ball**. Every single one.

Senator **Church**. Greece and Turkey both?

The **Chairman**. He said Makarios.

Mr. **Ball**. Even Makarios wants to involve us, but he wants to involve us for his special purposes.

Senator **Aiken**. Is it the threat of partition that is worrying the Cypriots most?

Mr. **Ball**. Yes, yes, sir. That is what is worrying the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish position is they want partition or a fall-back situation.

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief in expressing my view.

AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF THE U.N.

I think it is perfectly obvious that the British initiated the move to involve the United States, and they are the ones who want to get us involved.

I am at a loss to understand why we should be proposing to circumvent the United Nations. If there ever was a case that ought to go to the United Nations, this is it. I do not know why the United Nations should not take jurisdiction over it. I thought the purpose of it was to help preserve the peace when peace was threatened, and I do not see any logic at all in the State Department's reason that this is between two NATO nations and therefore NATO ought to take jurisdiction, because the ramifications of this quarrel does not limit itself to NATO, but to the world.

I think if you want to stop involving the U.S. troops, then you ought to stop these negotiations outside of the United Nations. We ought to be a leader in the United Nations and try to get the United Nations to carry out the purposes of its charter. I think it is perfectly within the purposes of the United Nations Charter to take jurisdiction in this matter, and that is where it ought to go.

USE OF NONALIGNED NATIONS

Senator **Lausche**. What are the dangers you have outlined in the event the United Nations steps in? You said the Yugoslavs, Red Russia, and others will step in.

Mr. **Ball**. You know the experience we have had with United Nations peacekeeping forces. In the first place, the first thing, I mean the tendency of the United Nations is to say, would be to say, "We will not take any forces from the NATO countries because they are too much involved here; therefore, we will turn to the nonaligned countries for the forces. That means turning to countries such as the ones that have been involved in Africa, countries like Nigeria or countries like Yugoslavia, and the result of it is that first of all, in a quarrel between two of our NATO allies, to get the Soviet Union exercising its influence in a very direct way, and the bloc countries in collaboration with the nonaligned countries, trying to dictate the solution of a problem between two NATO allies. This does not seem to us to be a healthy or desirable consequence or result. But this is what we have been trying to find an alternative solution to, and I think we will probably find it.

POSITION OF NATO ALLIES

Senator **Aiken**. Are you sure that all of our bigger allies in NATO are going to stay put if we wanted to?

Mr. **Ball**. I think so.

Senator **Aiken**. Is France going to line right up with us?

Mr. **Ball**. France is the only one that I would have any doubt about so far as making any active contribution is concerned. The German Government is considering contributing forces; the Belgian Government has already started, already decided to contribute forces. I think that we will have no difficulty getting the contributions from the NATO allies of forces that would make up the difference.

Senator **Aiken**. Canada?

Mr. **Ball**. Canada has the matter under consideration.

Senator **Aiken**. And Norway, the smaller ones.

Mr. **Ball**. But I think this is a situation where we do have in a sense a family quarrel here, two countries which are very important because of their geographic position which they occupy as the southern flank of NATO. We ought to try to settle this among ourselves, and this is the first effort.

REASONS FOR BRITISH CONCERN

Senator **Church**. George, hasn't this historically been an area of peculiar British responsibility?

Mr. **Ball**. Yes.

Senator **Church**. Why can't they take it on? I mean, are they really so hard pressed on so many fronts in such a way that they really do not have the resources to supply more than 4,000 troops in Cyprus?

Mr. **Ball**. If it were a matter of resources, I think that the answer would be clearly that they can do it. No, this is a matter where you are taking exactly the position which we took with the British; that is, if it is a matter of resources, then if you have to—I mean, they have just gone into Tanganyika, and they have, or may have, further troubles in East Africa, and so on, and they are also threatened with problems in Borneo and in the Malaysian situation. But if that is all that is worrying them, then we would even be prepared to see them take some troops out of West Germany on a temporary basis to meet this situation.

Their reply is that is not the problem. The problem is they feel that because of their having been the ex-colonial power here, their having acquired the mistrust of the Turks as far as their objectivity is concerned, their having been through the experience where the whole Greek-Cypriot underground directed their fire against the British for all the years before 1960, that for them to go back in with additional forces now would set off all these ancient antipathies and would exacerbate an already difficult situation.

But if the British try to handle this without an internationalization by the injection of some additional forces, there is not a concentration——

Senator **Morse**. It is the old story that you use the United Nations when you think you can use it, and when you think it might exercise justice against us, you give it the runaround. I am completely opposed to the State Department program, and I shall oppose it on the floor.

The **Chairman**. You have heard the answer. What more can we do about it?

U.S. WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Senator **Church**. I must say that I see a certain tendency, at least when other foreign troops are used, there comes a time when they withdraw, and there seems to be a disposition on our part never to withdraw once we get involved. It was not as true a few years ago when we got involved in the Near East, purely temporary, but certainly it has been true at other points.

Mr. **Ball**. Mr. Talbot has just reminded me of something which I think you should be informed of.

Senator **Church**. What is that?

Mr. **Talbot**. I am pleased at the moment, because we have just withdrawn our air unit from Saudi Arabia that we kept there during the peak of the Yemen crisis.

Senator **Church**. I am glad to know that.

Mr. **Talbot**. The combat units left a couple of days ago, and the support units will be out tomorrow or the next day.

Senator **Church**. I am glad to know that, and I want to temper my remarks by acknowledging that there are occasions when we do accomplish a withdrawal.

90-DAY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD

But 90 days—there is no assurance, even if they were to accept our proposition, that at the end of 90 days we would, in fact, be able to withdraw.

Mr. **Ball**. No, there is not. I mean, quite frankly, that should be said.

Senator **Church**. So the 90-day period may be utterly meaningless.

Mr. **Ball**. The 90-day period is a device to put some heat on this, on the solution. But let me say our approach to this matter has been one of trying to take every measure possible to avoid involvement in something which we did not ask for and we did not want, at the same time facing the hard realities of what can develop if something is not worked out to solve this problem.

We satisfied ourselves that the British meant what they said, that they would either go into the U.N., or if there were a movement by the Turks, they would simply retire to their bases and the fight would go forward.

MATTER COULD GET OUT OF HAND

We satisfied ourselves also that the tension was such that the danger of Turkish movement was very considerable. In fact, there have been 2 or 3 nights lately when we have been afraid, on the basis of troop movements in the heat of passion, that this thing might go off like a firecracker. This is the reason, for example, that we asked General Lemnitzer to go down to Ankara quite suddenly the other night, because we had some intimations there might be some serious danger.

Senator **Aiken**. The Turks own a disproportionate amount of the property on Cyprus, like the Arabs did on Zanzibar?

Mr. **Talbot**. No, there is not that same distribution. As a matter of fact, the Greeks are the more active business people.

Senator **Aiken**. You do not think the United Nations would be foolish enough to send troops in there from a nation that was traditionally hostile to Cyprus, do you?

Mr. **Ball**. Well, the danger——

Senator **Aiken**. Send Arabs?

Mr. **Ball** [continuing]. The danger is that of a matter that can get out of hand, particularly if it gets over into the General Assembly, because when you get Afro-Asian nations feeling sympathetic toward a Makarios who represents in their minds a man who delivered his country from a colonial situation, I think you can get some actions which could be very unhappy for us.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Unhappy any way you look at it. I do not see the final solution.

What are you going to do with these people? It sounds to me very much like Algeria. Even if you go in there, do you have any idea how you can ever solve it?

INSOLUBLE SITUATION

Mr. **BALL**. This is one of those situations that looks practically insoluble.

Senator **CHURCH**. Is it within the vital interests of the United States here that we are going to involve ourselves in yet another insoluble situation and slowly—if the record speaks of anything, it bespeaks of a tendency of such a situation like this that we assume more and more of a load and others less and less until finally we are in a predicament.

Mr. **BALL**. Let me say this: We are just as aware of this as you are.

Senator **CHURCH**. I understand that, George.

Mr. **BALL**. The last thing in the world we wanted to do was to get any part of this situation. But here was a case where we looked with the greatest care at all aspects of it, and we were perfectly convinced that there was no solution without our playing some role here.

First we said to the British, "You continue responsibility." The answer came back, "No, there is a Government decision we will not because we are convinced that we are just going to be the target if we do, with all the accumulated hatred that has been built up against the British in the island on both sides."

Then we said, "All right, if it is not a question of you doing it, then this is one that you can do with the continental NATO powers." This would be an opportunity for Great Britain to show its relationships with Europe and possibly establish a kind of new link with Europe by trying to work this out with the Europeans. The answer came back from everyone, "No one is coming in unless the United States comes in to some degree." This is one of the——

Senator **AIKEN**. Makarios does not insist on our coming in there, does he?

Mr. **BALL**. No; Makarios would like to get the bloc involved to some extent because he thinks that this would improve his own bargaining position.

KEEP IT OUT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator **LAUSCHE**. What will your answer be if the argument is made that whenever a dispute arises in which the United Nations, by force of trying to be fair, decides that it cannot send in any of the troops of the NATO nations and therefore must send in troops of the Communist bloc, the Far East, and Africa? When that is done we cannot suffer the prospective dangers and problems. That is about the implication of what we have said, since the United Nations will not send in NATO troops, but will only send in African and others, and we cannot afford to rely upon the General Assembly. How would you answer that?

Mr. **BALL**. Let me say first of all, the whole thrust of our policy is to keep it out of the General Assembly. If we have to go to the Security Council, we still hope it can be manageable, and if we still have to have forces that are not NATO forces, then we would try to bring the Australians and Irish and Swedes in, forces of this kind.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Are there any others? Australians, Irish, Swedes—what about the Far East, the Japanese?

Mr. **BALL**. Let me say that the Cypriots are racist, and the one thing that Makarios is not particularly going to want is to have the Africans in or even the Asians pulled in, because there is deep antipathy between the people on the island and the Africans and the Asians. Is this not your experience and observation?

Mr. **TALBOT**. Yes.

Mr. **BALL**. So, to some extent, Makarios himself does not want that to happen. But, on the other hand, he might be prepared to have the Yugoslavs in or some of the bloc representatives pulled in, because he would like to think that he can play with the Soviet Union against the Western alliance.

Senator **AIKEN**. The Yugoslavs are in the Holy Land police force now, the Jordan-Israel dispute, aren't they? I have not heard any complaints about them. In fact, they have been very insistent that the police force remain in there, and then the U.N. did not send United States or British troops into the Congo, as I recall it; Canadians went in.

Mr. **BALL**. Canadians, Swedes, Irish.

Senator **AIKEN**. And the Arabs went in and backed out again.

EFFECT ON NATO

Mr. **TALBOT**. If I might comment on this dispute, it really is a difficulty in two levels, one of which concerns us very much more greatly than the other one does.

Cyprus is a small island with a small population. There has been great difficulty in getting any viable government. We wish them well, we hope they get some viable government, and what it is does not really make any difference to our national interest.

Our own conern is that——

Mr. **BALL**. As long as it is not a Communist government.

Mr. **TALBOT** [continuing]. As long as it is not a Communist government. The effect on Greece and Turkey is what bothers us. As the southern wing of NATO they are, of course, bound by the agreement in NATO in 1956 that when NATO powers have a dispute they shall consult together and NATO shall offer its good offices.

Normally, tension of this kind between two NATO members would be handled that way, but it is complicated, of course, because Greece and Turkey are NATO countries and Cyprus is not a NATO country, and Cyprus does not want its affairs run by NATO. So this plan was devised to try to bracket both aspects, to use NATO nations working out, making contributions individually at the request of the Government of Cyprus so that the dispute between

Greece and Turkey over Cyprus would be kept within a NATO framework and therefore would be handled mainly as a family dispute.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you fear having the U.N. handle it?

Mr. TALBOT. The dispute between Greece and Turkey?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. TALBOT. We would prefer to see a dispute between NATO powers handled as a family dispute by a mechanism set up by NATO. If the thing in the end does not work, then I think we are all agreed we have to go to the U.N.

PASSIONS OF HATRED

Senator LAUSCHE. If I may say, you cannot understand the passions of hatred that exist between what you call the Orthodox Eastern Catholics and the Turks. The Serbs have a poet by the name of Njegos, who wrote a poem that means "The Mountain Wreath." Njegos was the Shakespeare of the Montenegrans, and this is a tragedy. The tragedy is between the Montenegrans who took on the Mohammedan religion, and Montenegrans who remained Orthodox Catholics.

Mr. TALBOT. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is bloodcurdling. It is just brother against brother, son against parent, all trying to find out means of bringing to an end—where the Catholic altar once stood, now is the minaret; where there was the cap and the hat of the peasant, now is the headgear of the Turk. The fight goes on, and that is what that is now.

Mr. TALBOT. And both the Greek and the Turkish Governments are so conscious of this and their own history, they have both been trying to act with great restraint in this. But in both countries, of course, the turbulence, as you say, is just below the surface.

Senator LAUSCHE. Makarios cannot do it. I have been watching Makarios. He tries to, but finally there emerges this overpowering impact of his background.

Mr. TALBOT. That is right. This is the difficulty. In Greece and Turkey themselves, just below the surface, there are enough of these emotions so that in the middle of a Greek election, where they now are, as you know, it has been rather extraordinary how well they have held it down so far. We are just not all that sure they are going to be able to continue holding it down.

Similarly, in Turkey, with a minority government now, it is an extremely touchy situation.

IN FAVOR OF U.N. ACTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Aiken, may I say to you that today you made the most dynamic argument that I have heard you make in 7 years in favor of the United Nations stepping in.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. I was in the chair.

Senator AIKEN. It was completely unrehearsed and completely unprepared. But I realize the situation; I think I do. Cyprus has very keen, smart individuals in their offices. I know they feel very keenly. George Malis used to come up once a year to see me, and before he came out he would give me an hour and a half oration with all the Greek gestures and everything. He finally came up one year and hung a medal around my neck, and I figured if I had not earned it by listening to him for 4 years, nobody had. So it is down in the State Department now.

But I do not like the idea of our being forced—of their taking the initiative. If you cannot see their way through—I would go to the United Nations first and then I think you are in a stronger position. What Russia will do, I do not know. I do not think Yugoslavia would want troops moved in there. I would not want her in there.

Mr. BALL. I only mentioned Yugoslavia——

Senator AIKEN. I think the U.N. should not put anyone in there who is prejudiced on one side or the other, or both.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if they get there, that is the first step, it seems to me. I do not see where you are coming out at the end.

Senator AIKEN. Me neither.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why did you mention Yugoslavia and Nigeria? Was that just out of——

Mr. BALL. I was just giving you examples, you see, because these have both been forces that have been used in peacekeeping operations before.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

So there was nothing motivating you other than just giving examples.

Mr. BALL. Just examples.

RESPONSIBILITY OF COLONIAL NATIONS

Senator AIKEN. They just got fed up with these old colonial empires giving their colonies freedom and then saying, "Now, you take care of them." I think France has been the worst offender. I think they have some responsibility toward their own colonies.

Senator LAUSCHE. George, maybe they are right in a measure, because we made them give them up.

Senator CHURCH. I think the forces of history had a lot to do with that.

Senator AIKEN. Some of them were not ready to be nations.

Senator CHURCH. Who would pay for the expenses of this military occupation as proposed, other than just donating the troops?

Mr. BALL. Just on the idea of each country putting in its own component.

Senator CHURCH. That component would be equal to a percentage of troops?

Mr. BALL. Each country would pay its share of it.

Senator AIKEN. What does France say?

Mr. BALL. It has not given us an answer. It is still considering it.

PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION

Senator CHURCH. Who is providing the transportation? Do we pick that up?

Mr. BALL. Most of the European countries have transport.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what to say about it. I must say this initial stage, whichever it be, however it goes, it seems to me is just an initial one. I do not see the ultimate outcome.

Mr. **Ball**. I quite agree.

The **Chairman**. I think it may be important one way or the other, but whichever way you go here, what are you going to do about this thing even if you did get in? Are you going to transport Turks back to Turkey? Would the Turks stand for that without going to war?

Mr. **Ball**. You could not move them off the island and, of course, the Greeks have got this extreme view that anything that means giving up even a part of the real estate of the island to a partitioned country would be in derogation——

LIMIT AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY

Senator **Aiken**. Wouldn't the Turks invite us to leave Turkey if we appeared to be supporting the Cypriot-Greek cause?

Mr. **Ball**. This is exactly why we have tried to avoid getting into the middle of it. This is why we have insisted on a mediator, not an American, and not one of the guarantor powers, to get someone else who will take some responsibility. The whole intention of the line we have played so far has been to try to limit the American responsibility to the minimum, but, at the same time, to meet a situation which is a very critical one.

The **Chairman**. Putting it all together, what Frank says about the hatred, with which you agree, and everything else, I do not see any answer to it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Don't the British feel any obligation to take care of this situation on their own? Why do they throw it into NATO, is it because Greece and Turkey are NATO partners?

Senator **Aiken**. They have an election coming up, John, just like Panama.

Mr. **Ball**. Let me say we have some interest in Turkey and Cyprus ourselves. We have got a communication relay station which is a very important one to us.

The **Chairman**. We have a great interest in keeping a war from breaking out between Greece and Turkey, obviously.

Mr. **Ball**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. It looks worse than Vietnam so far as a settlement is concerned.

Senator **Lausche**. Were there any strings left in existence when Britain gave up its dominion over Cyprus and said, "You shall be sovereign"? Were there any commitments made by treaty or by constitution that Britain shall be a protector? Have any——

Mr. **Ball**. There were three powers. Britain, Greece, and Turkey all assumed responsibility for upholding the constitution.

Senator **Lausche**. I see.

Mr. **Ball**. And those were the three guarantor powers. There is a Greek garrison of about 950 men. There is a Turkish garrison of about 650 men. But in the way things have developed lately, these have not been useful because each has sided with its own population, and they have been kind of spearheads for some of the difficulties.

JAUNDICED AGAINST THE U.N.

Senator **Church**. It seems to me in view of the successful experience we have had with the United Nations in an equally volatile, much less civilized part of the world, where we were equally interested in preventing Communist intrusion in the Congo, and the way that has been carried off, on the whole successfully——

Mr. **Ball**. This is the only situation that involves——

Senator **Church**. Aren't you a little jaundiced against the United Nations in this case?

Mr. **Ball**. No, but I think you have to think of the situations in which you used the U.N. and in which you prefer to use the U.N.

Senator **Sparkman**. What did you start to say when you started to say "this is the only"——

Mr. **Ball**. This is the only situation where serious use of the U.N. has been contemplated in a quarrel between two members of NATO, and this is what distinguishes this from everything else. I mean, if this were a quarrel in any other part of the world or involving other parties, then obviously the United Nations would be the point of first recourse. But what we are concerned with is getting the United Nations in to mediate a family quarrel between two of the members of NATO.

Senator **Church**. I am not so sure that NATO is as much of a family as you think it is any more. I will tell you about the family quarrels that are going on; they are something to behold.

CYPRIOTS ARE NEUTRALIST

Mr. **Talbot**. There is another aspect of the difficulty. The Greeks are firm NATO members, as are the Turks. But the Greek-Cypriots are very neutralist, whereas the Turk-Cypriots are very much on the Allied side. The Turkish Government is convinced that Makarios wants to get the support of the Afro-Asian world or the nonaligned world for his policy of suppressing the Turk-Cypriots, and therefore in the mode of agitation now in Turkey, we are just not all that confident that Turkey will stand still if Makarios goes to the United Nations and gets a group of nonaligned countries to come in, because the Turks will feel that this is a screen within which the Greek-Cypriots can move against the Turk-Cypriots without fear of any kind of retaliation.

So it is not only our feeling on this, it is trying again to keep this situation from coming to a boil when it is only a degree or two below the boil in so many different places.

Senator **Aiken**. How does the military strength compare between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus?

Mr. **Talbot**. Turkey is a country with 27 million people and Greece, 8 or 9 million. Turkish military strength——

FEASIBILITY OF PARTITION

The **Chairman**. What about partition? Even though they do not want it, is that a feasible, possible solution?

Mr. **Ball**. I think it is probably the only solution in the long run.

Senator **Lausche**. Partition of Cyprus?

Mr. **Talbot**. Maybe a federation.

The CHAIRMAN. Supposing you did get in and you were the mediator, if you were mediator, is that what you would do?

Mr. BALL. There is an intermediate solution which is the one the Turkish Government says they want, which is what they call federation, which would be a situation in which each community would speak more or less for itself, even though there was not a geographic separation, or only a partial geographic separation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a high degree of concentration now in certain areas geographically?

Mr. BALL. Certain areas, but there is also a considerable dispersal throughout the island. The problem is that a lot of Turks are minorities in small villages, and these are the ones who are the most afraid, because they can very easily be massacred. I mean, this is their fear, and they have been moving, by and large, in concentrating in the northern part of the island. I do not know how many of them have moved. Do you have any idea?

Mr. TALBOT. No, but the Greek-Cypriots think this is a process of separation going on now, and the British are encouraging the Turks to separate and congregate in special areas.

The CHAIRMAN. The British are?

Mr. TALBOT. This what the Greek-Cypriots think.

Mr. BALL. On the other hand, the Turks are persuaded the British are playing a Greek game so that British have now succeeded in getting themselves in a position where they do not have the confidence of either side, which is the fate of a country that had a colonial interest.

PARALLEL WITH SITUATION IN PANAMA

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any relationship between the plan in the Western Hemisphere to keep the dispute of Panama and the United States out of the United Nations and within the Organization of American States and that——

Mr. BALL. Exactly, this is the parallel, Senator Lausche. I think that states it very well. We take the position that as far as the American system is concerned, we ought to settle our family problems. We take the position as far as the NATO countries are concerned, they ought to settle their family problems, and that this ought to be fully exhausted before there is recourse to the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. If we go in there, will the British take over Panama and solve that for us? Have you made a proposal, a counteroffer to them? [Laughter.]

Well, I have got to go.

Mr. BALL. I think that analogy is a very real one.

Senator AIKEN. There is no legislation needed now anyway.

USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. My own fear is that all of this indicates that you just cannot use the United Nations as our first tribunal of relief, and maybe ultimately we cannot use them at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The way it stands, you may end up with it anyway. That is what you want. You think you will know by tomorrow or the next day?

Mr. **Ball**. I think what we will get is probably not a clear yes or no, but a negotiating position.

The **Chairman**. If he refuses, then you do not have much alternative anyway, do you?

Mr. **Ball**. No. If it is a flat refusal, it would go into the Security Council.

The **Chairman**. If it is a flat refusal, you have to move that way. You are not going to take it over by yourself?

Mr. **Ball**. That, Mr. Chairman, I assure you we will not do.

[Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m. the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The chairman announced the committee was meeting informally to discuss the markup of the bill (S. 2136) to amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, and to give the staff guidance on same. He also presented the committee with a proposed report on the bill.

The chairman also initiated a discussion about a proposed study by the committee on new aspects of East-West trade, suggesting that committee attention be directed toward it, as appropriate.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

PROPOSED CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The hour of 10 having arrived, the committee is in session.

Mr. Secretary, you are here to present the proposed consular convention between the United States and the Soviet Union, is that correct?

STATEMENT OF W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY LEONARD C. MEEKER, DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER; WARD CAMERON, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; AND KEMPTON JENKINS, OFFICE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the proposed consular agreement with the Soviet Union.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry that we don't have other members here at the present time. I hope some of them will come in, but I see no reason why we should not start the discussion, so if you will lead off, I will appreciate it.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understand that the draft has been submitted to the staff of the committee for consideration. The purpose of my requesting the privilege of appearing is to explain the purposes of consular convention, what we expect to gain from it, some of the important provisions, and to answer any questions that you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee may have.

May I first indicate that I hope this will be kept confidential because there are one or two provisions that haven't been settled, and it might prejudice our case if it were discussed in the press before we have a chance to negotiate them out with the Soviet Union.

A SUBSTANTIAL BREAKTHROUGH

Fundamentally we feel that this is quite a substantial breakthrough with the Soviet Union on a matter of very great importance to us, and that is the obligation which would be assumed by the Soviet Union to notify the American Embassy or American authorities in the Soviet Union about the arrest of any American, tourist or otherwise, and to obtain access to the arrested individual.

As you undoubtedly know, there have been some very unhappy cases of arrest of Americans in the Soviet Union for reasons that we didn't know anything about. We were not able to reach them. We weren't notified even about their arrest, and we weren't able to reach them, and they were not able to receive the protection of our Embassy and the benefit of pressure that can be put upon the Soviet Government in the event that they were arrested for what appeared to be trivial matters.

AMERICANS HELD IN THE SOVIET UNION

There are any number of cases. I haven't got the full list, but I think you remember Professor Barghoorn[1] of Yale was held for quite a period of time without our being informed of it. Then he was released and flown out of the country without any member of the Embassy staff being allowed to talk to him.

Senator **Sparkman**. Would this proposal change that situation?

Mr. **Harriman**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. In other words, they would be obligated under this report and to grant——

Mr. **Harriman**. This proposal would obligate the Soviet Union to notify us from 1 to 3 days after arrest, and they would be obligated to give the Embassy staff access to the individual arrested within 2 to 4 days. This may seem a little longer than normal, but they are fearful that the man might be arrested at considerable distances from Moscow, and I think it is clear that they want to bring him to Moscow before they notify us.

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me pursue that a little further. Take the case of Gary Powers, for instance. He was held for some time, I believe, incommunicado, wasn't he?

Mr. **Harriman**. He was held for a couple of weeks before we were even notified.

Senator **Sparkman**. Would this apply to such a case?

Mr. **Harriman**. We were never permitted to have access to him.

Senator **Sparkman**. Would this apply in his case?

Mr. **Harriman**. Every case of arrest of any American for whatever purpose his visit was. We have had cases of several students, several tourists that had trivial charges against them. One student tourist was held for 6 weeks without notification to the United States, and finally we had access shortly thereafter.

There has been of course the strange case of Father Ciszek, a Catholic priest who was held for 15 years without our being notified. That was during wartime. Therefore we feel this is a very important breakthrough in our relations to have them accept the principle which we accept, that if foreigners are arrested in our country their Embassies should have reasonable access to these individuals and the Embassies should be informed.

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[1] In November 1963, Yale Prof. Frederick Barghoorn was arrested in the Soviet Union and charged with espionage. Following President Kennedy's personal intervention, Barghoorn was released a few days later.

The Vienna Convention, which is the basis of international relations and a model for bilateral consular conventions, speaks in general terms, such as "without delay." But since terms of that kind can be interpreted as a country may wish to do it, we felt that it was very desirable to specify a fixed time so that there would not be the delay of the type that the Soviets have in the past considered to be necessary for their purposes.

AMERICANS TRAVELING TO THE SOVIET BLOC

Now, we think this is a very important advance forward. Some 12,000 to 15,000 tourists go to the Soviet Union every year. There are several dozen students who go to the Soviet Union for study, and we hope that this convention, if we are able to work it out with the Soviet Union, will be a pattern which will apply to the satellites. Of course, as you probably know, there are a number of Americans picked up for one reason or another on the charges of espionage for taking pictures. The numbers involved among the Eastern European states is very much greater—10,000 I think go to Poland, and so this will relate to a very substantial number of Americans. We think it gives them very real protection.

Under the agreement, nationals of the sending state on the permanent staffs of any consulate established here by the Soviet Union and by us in the Soviet Union are given immunity from criminal jurisdiction. That aspect is one which we think is essential to protect our people living in the Soviet Union.

We have had different types of arrangements with other countries, and we have never gone quite so far as this with other countries. I think that we have treaties containing most-favored-nation provisions with 30 other countries, and if we sign this convention, agree to this convention with the Soviet Union the same provisions will be available to these other countries.

CONSULAR OFFICES

The consular offices over the years have had a somewhat different status than diplomatic missions. Gradually, as far as we are concerned, in most countries, certainly in the Soviet Union it is true, it has become the practice to consider their consular offices on the same basis as diplomatic offices, and those engaged in consular work are interchangeable with our normal diplomatic representatives. Therefore we think this is a logical and correct step forward.

As you know, in the old days, and the practice is still followed by some countries, they give the consular title to a national in the country, in our case an American, and the work has been more of a mechanical nature rather than diplomatic representation. Therefore this custom wasn't followed formerly.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Immunity provided in this convention is short of full diplomatic immunity since the consul will be subject to civil suits but will have immunity from all criminal action. We feel that it would be unwise for us to have any Americans in the Soviet Union subject to criminal action by the Russian courts as they are so different from ours, since many things that a man may normally do could be interpreted as espionage in the U.S.S.R. We think this is an essential provision.

We have looked into the question of how much this would affect the other 30 countries with which we have most-favored-nation clauses in treaties, and I find that since the end of the war there have only been 11 arrests among consuls, of which about half were for driving offenses and the others were for different reasons. There has never been a single conviction of any of these individuals arrested, and therefore it doesn't seem as if we are giving away any particular rights in connection with the people that are associated with the consulates of these different countries.

These people do not come under local law. I beg your pardon, I am wrong. There have been two convictions. They have to be tried under federal law. Local law cannot apply to them. So we see no disadvantage, and we have checked this with the Attorney General's office. We see no disadvantage in giving the same type of privilege and protections to consular personnel of these countries.

Incidentally, our representatives in those countries will have greater protection as a result of it. So on balance we think it is a good thing.

CASES OF ARREST

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me clear this up in my mind. You speak of those 13 cases.

Mr. **Harriman**. Eleven cases.

Senator **Sparkman**. Eleven cases. Were they our representatives in those countries?

Mr. **Harriman**. No, no.

Senator **Sparkman**. Or their representatives in the United States?

Mr. **Harriman**. These were representatives of, they happened to be France, Switzerland——

Senator **Sparkman**. Of those countries in the United States.

Mr. **Harriman** [continuing]. Argentina, Panama. Yes. Most of them were traffic offenses. Over half of them were traffic offenses. There was one related to the consul of the Soviet Union in New York in connection with the Mrs. Kasenkina case, as you will remember. This poor woman jumped out of the window.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Mr. **Harriman**. But the others were from different countries with which we have normal relations. We do not feel there is any loss in terms of our ability to maintain law and order in this country if we give these countries the same type of immunity against a criminal offense which we are now proposing in connection with the Russian convention.

Those are the two principal provisions. As far as I know, the balance of the convention is normal procedure and conforms substantially to the practices which we have been engaged in over the years, many of which have been included under the Vienna Convention.

POTENTIAL CONSULATE SITES

We have no agreement at the present time to open a consulate or permit the Russians to open a consulate. We have thought that possibly we might start with one; if they would permit an American consulate to be opened in Leningrad, we would permit them to open one in New York. It might lead to others, but we have no immediate plans.

There is one other aspect of this which is important and I think unusual. Each country has the right to approve in advance the individuals that are to be assigned to any consulate established in its country. Now, if any of these people misbehave, of course, we have the full right to declare them persona non grata, in other words, throw them out because they are not desirable from our standpoint. We see no loss in American authority, and we see the gains that I have described.

MEANING OF IMMUNITY

Senator **SPARKMAN**. May I ask, What is the full meaning of the term "political immunity" under this?

Mr. **HARRIMAN**. These consulates do not have full diplomatic immunity. They have immunity from criminal offenses but not civil offenses.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I thought you used the term "political immunity."

Mr. **HARRIMAN**. I meant diplomatic immunity.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Diplomatic immunity. Perhaps I misunderstood. In other words, what you have described, the manner in which they will be handled by arrest and trial and so forth in this country or ours in that country, that is the coverage that this would take, and that is in line with the other countries of the world.

Mr. **HARRIMAN**. No, it is not quite in line with the consuls. It is in line with, although not quite as sweeping, the Embassy representatives that we have throughout the world. This gives somewhat more immunity to our consuls, consular service than we have had before; not full diplomatic immunity, but considerably more protection. By the same token, we give their representatives in this country somewhat more protection.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I think it might be well to review the statement.

Mr. **HARRIMAN**. Mr. Meeker might explain, if he will, that at the present time the consular representatives in this country and ours abroad do not have the normal diplomatic immunity.

Mr. **MEEKER**. At the present time, consuls in general have a very limited kind of immunity. They have immunity from any kind of legal process with respect to their official acts as consuls. They do not have a general and complete immunity either from criminal prosecution or from civil suit.

Now, the feature of this convention, of the proposal which we have been negotiating, is that under it United States consuls in the Soviet Union and Soviet consuls here would have complete immunity from criminal prosecution. American consuls could not be held on criminal charges in the Soviet Union. Soviet consuls could not be held on criminal charges in this country. But there would still be full liability to civil suit so far as it related to unofficial matters.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, of course, you could always expel them from the country if they were found to be undesirable.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Oh, yes.

ARRESTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to go back to the comparison of these countries. You spoke of the most-favored countries, and you said that since the end of World War II, there had been only 11 arrests of their representatives in this country, is that right?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think this is all we could find.

Senator SPARKMAN. And only two convictions?

Mr. HARRIMAN. And of those arrests, about half, five of them, were for traffic violations.

Senator SPARKMAN. Traffic violations?

How were you able to try these two and convict these two that you referred to if they represented the most-favored nation?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I might explain under the previous practice these consular representatives did not have immunity except in connection with official acts which they were performing.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. In line of duty, but not in private activity.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am trying to tie this in with it. This would make a change.

Mr. HARRIMAN. This would make a change in that practice.

RECIPROCAL IMMUNITY

Senator SPARKMAN. Would that change apply to these countries as well as to the Soviet Union?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir, this would apply. If we make this arrangement giving broader immunity to consular representatives, this same immunity would apply to these other 30 countries for which we have the most-favored nation, of course, on condition that these countries reciprocate with us.

Senator SPARKMAN. Reciprocate, yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Therefore we gain abroad for our representatives, and I think I would like to underline again that there has been a change over the years in our representation in consular activity, and other countries as well. They have become almost interchangeable with our Foreign Service, as you know, so with us it is completely interchangeable.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. In other countries it is becoming more and more so, whereas in the old days almost anyone could have been picked as a consular representative, a national of the country, to save money, in which the consulate was established. In many cases they were men of another country, men who had part-time activity in that country, businessmen or others. But these are now more and more trained diplomatic representatives.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Trained in the Foreign Service.

U.S. CITIZENS REPRESENTING OTHER NATIONS

Senator **Sparkman**. In that connection we have in this country, I think, a good many of our own citizens who serve as consular representatives of other countries. Does this apply to them in any way?

Mr. **Harriman**. This would apply.

Senator **Sparkman**. Since they are citizens of this country, I presume they would still be liable just like one of our citizens.

Mr. **Harriman**. Would you want to discuss that?

Mr. **Meeker**. I take it your question relates to consuls of other countries who are appointed to serve here, and who have U.S. nationality rather than the nationality of the country whose consul they are?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. I don't know whether they have the title "consul" or not, but yes, I think they are called consular representatives, aren't they? I know a number of places, Birmingham and Mobile for instance, in which other countries, some of the smaller countries have consular representatives who are citizens of this country.

Mr. **Meeker**. Those consuls who are U.S. citizens would have no immunity under the convention because it provides that any consul, in order to have immunity, must be a national of the sending state.

Senator **Sparkman**. Very good.

Mr. **Harriman** [continuing]. And a member of the normal Foreign Service.

Mr. **Meeker**. Someone to whom we already would have given our individual approval before he is stationed here.

REQUIRE REPORTS ON ALL ARRESTS

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. Now the one other point, as I understand it, that you say is advantageous to us is that this would require the Soviet Union to report the arrest or detention of any American citizen in the Soviet Union, and also to give access within reasonable time of some representative of the American Government to that person.

Mr. **Harriman**. Yes, sir, but the important part of it is that the time has been specified, because reasonable time access is interpreted quite differently by us than by the Soviet Union. So notification must be within 1 to 3 days, and access between 2 to 4 days.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. Senator Carlson.

Mr. **Harriman** [continuing]. Provided this agreement is worked out. We have not closed on it, but we are hopeful that we can get this agreement along these lines, and we don't intend to agree to the consular convention unless these provisions are included.

Senator **Sparkman**. And no consulate would be established automatically?

Mr. **Harriman**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. That would have to be worked out.

ADDITIONAL CONSULATES IN SOVIET UNION

Mr. **Harriman**. Approved. We have no agreement so far on any additional consulates. We would suggest, our plan is now to suggest one for each, one in Leningrad for one in the United States.

Senator **Sparkman**. Senator Carlson.

Mr. **Harriman**. It might lead, in other years, if it was satisfactory and seems important to us, to further steps. We used to have a consulate, I remember, in Vladivostok, which was of considerable importance, but we have not had any consulate since the end of the war, only diplomatic representation or representation of our country to the Soviet Union in Moscow.

Senator **Carlson**. Governor, I am sorry I was late getting in. Is our present representation in the Soviet Union only in Moscow?

Mr. **Harriman**. Only in Moscow.

Senator **Carlson**. As I understand it, this is to expand our representation in the Soviet Union, providing this is agreed to?

Mr. **Harriman**. That is right.

Senator **Carlson**. What would be the purpose of it? I am sorry I was late. Just briefly.

Mr. **Harriman**. We think it is desirable for our interests to have representation in other parts of the Soviet Union than simply Moscow. Our people are traveling all over. We had 14,000 tourists last year. We have students in different universities. I know there are some in Leningrad. We feel that the interests of our citizens would be protected, and the United States would generally have more representation. They are naturally a source of important information to us. I am not talking about anything covert, but overt information is very important.

Anyone can know about the United States by buying our periodicals, but they are difficult to get there. To have different representatives in different parts of the Soviet Union would contribute to knowing more about what went on in those particular parts of the country.

COMPARISON TO MILITARY INSPECTIONS

Senator **Carlson**. In your conference which you have held, I presume, according to this paper you have presented marked "confidential," you state something about opening other offices in other areas of Russia. Would this be acceptable to them?

Mr. **Harriman**. We have been discussing only the terms of this consular convention. We have not discussed with them how many consulates might be opened up by each of us. As I say, if this convention is signed, we propose suggesting one more, one consular office; namely, Leningrad for us and New York for the Soviet Union.

Senator **Carlson**. At Geneva for years we have been trying to get on-site inspection in regard to disarmament. As I understand it, they have never agreed to give us inspection.

Mr. **Harriman**. That is right.

Senator **Carlson**. Is there any hope that they would be willing to let us establish consular offices in other areas of Russia than the capital?

Mr. **Harriman**. Our military inspection would be an entirely different thing. Our consular representatives wouldn't have a right to inspect factories. They could only go to those areas which the public is permitted to go. In some areas foreigners are not permitted to go. I think at the present time the rules in Moscow are that the diplomats in Moscow can't go beyond about 25 miles from the city without special permission, so that any foreigner living in the Soviet Union is under restriction. But this would not have an important bearing, it wouldn't have a bearing on the type of military inspection that we would need to have in case there was any agreement relating to arms limitation.

Senator **Carlson**. We limit, do we not, travel of the Soviet Union's representatives in this Nation?

Mr. **Harriman**. Yes, we do. We limit them to certain areas, which is roughly the same percentage of nation as they limit our people.

Mr. Meeker points out to me that the Soviet Union has indicated it would agree to Leningrad in exchange for a consulate in New York, so I was wrong in saying we have had no discussion. We have had informal discussion. But if this convention is entered into, we would then make a formal application. As I explained, the staff of the Soviet consulate would be subject to our approval, and in the case of our consulate staff, subject to Soviet Government approval.

FUNCTIONS OF CONSULATE OFFICES

Senator **Carlson**. These consulate offices if established, would they be headquarters, for instance, where our Nation, at least officers of our Nation, could use in expanding a trade program?

Mr. **Harriman**. Yes. Of course, normally, in a free enterprise society our consular offices are very important business development offices. They collect information for our businessmen transmitted to the Department of Commerce. They also assist businessmen if they come to the area in connection with their business.

Of course, they also help tourists, give visas and give information, and generally represent the interests of the United States. These are a source of economic reporting which is of very considerable value to our business community, and also to the general knowledge of our country of what is going on in other countries.

In the case of the Soviet Union, since all business must be done through the government, there would be no way to promote our enterprise except through the increase of knowledge of what was going on. They will have access in the Soviet Union to the publications that are sold, be able to travel about, to observe, and to contribute to our general knowledge.

Now, Leningrad is really very important to us because almost all the citizens, our citizens that go to the Soviet Union go not only to Moscow but also to Leningrad, and we have students living in Leningrad. Therefore they would be able to contribute considerably to the protection of our citizens. In addition, as you know, Leningrad is the principal port. It is the largest port for trade, and if our businessmen are shipping goods into the Soviet Union, the consulate can be of assistance to our businessmen who have actual trade relations with the Soviet Government.

NO TRADE PROMOTION WORK

Senator **Carlson**. As I understand our dealings with Russia, it is through the very government itself. I mean they don't branch out with regional offices like we do in this Nation. My point in asking that question was just simply this, it just seems to me that if we establish this office, about all they could do and all the service that they could be of value in would be in observation and they could be of help to our citizens who travel. But from an actual operation of selling things, actual business contracts, I can't see it.

Mr. **Harriman**. No, we can't do that there. They can be of help to our citizens; that is, those who may be shipping into Leningrad. There may be some claim that the goods arrived in other than perfect condition, and they would be able to help the citizen who is trading through the government. But all contracts with the Soviet Union have to go through their channels, and they couldn't do the trade promotion work.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION INSIDE SOVIET UNION

But since we know so little about what goes on in the Soviet Union, they would be a source of information which is important to us. The Soviet Union has that source of information through the normal open channels here. I personally would like to see us reestablish it as soon as possible, a representative in Vladivostok, because of the importance of that port in the Pacific, but that has not been discussed as yet. We used to have it before the war, and it was of very considerable value.

When I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, we found having a consulate in Vladivostok was of very considerable value because we used to send people out there. It meant traveling back and forth on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

BENEFIT TO AMERICANS WHO TRAVEL

Senator **Carlson**. I think it has got some merit, but I would be less than frank if I didn't state that I think there will be some question of our citizens in this Nation about further getting into the Soviet Union with consular posts. Based on some of the recent actions of Mr. Khrushchev in Cuba and a lot of other points, there will be some questions. I don't know how our citizens are going to receive this.

Mr. **Harriman**. I don't doubt that, sir, but I think that on balance it is very strongly in our favor, and certainly the citizens who travel will find it very desirable. I brought out, perhaps before you came, that there is a very important provision which protects our citizens in the Soviet Union, either those who reside there for one reason or another, students or otherwise, or those who travel. Up to now the Soviets have been free to arrest our citizens without notification, hold them without informing us, and without giving us access to the arrested citizen. This convention, if signed, will obligate the Soviets to inform us within 3 days and to give access within 4 days, which we think is very, very important protection.

CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION

We hope that if this convention is signed, we will be able to have a similar convention with the Eastern European countries, where there are also large numbers of Americans traveling now—10,000 Americans going to Poland, for instance. It is perfectly true that some people think that it is well to restrict relations with the Soviet Union. I personally don't agree with that.

A vast change is going on, sir, in the Soviet Union. I have watched it now since I first went to the Soviet Union in 1926, and there are vast changes going on, and the greater interchange of people traveling back and forth, I think, is going to have an effect which will in time change the whole atmosphere. But that, as you well know, doesn't exist today.

Mr. Khrushchev is determined to promote Communist activity all over the world. But within his own country there are far greater freedoms developing, and the Soviet people—our relations with the Soviet people improve through American contact. I feel very strongly through my experience that it is desirable to permit Americans, and to encourage them as far as they want to, to go to the Soviet Union. But I am very much concerned because we can't give them the kind of protection we should.

This consular convention will give us the ability to give them at least considerably more protection that we could before.

Senator CARLSON. Does this require Senate ratification?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This will require Senate ratification. I am here this morning, sir, to explain it. A draft of the convention has been submitted.

I have asked that its terms be kept confidential because we are still in the process of negotiation, and it might compromise our negotiation if we had any publicity or discussion of it. But this convention, if it is signed, will be submitted, of course, to the Senate for ratification.

Senator CARLSON. Do you expect to do that within the next few months?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. We would hope to be able to come to an agreement within the next few weeks, and then it would be promptly submitted.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

[The confidential draft of the United States of America-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Consular Convention follows:]

DRAFT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONSULAR CONVENTION

FEBRUARY 6, 1964

Prepared upon the basis of the negotiating draft of January 28, 1964, with revision of Articles 2 and 20 to effectuate the proposed immunities position; with revisions of Articles 7, 8, and 10, and the deletion of Article 16 to take into account the proposed U.S.S.R. concessions for the adoption of the proposed U.S. immunities position; and with revisions to Articles 6 and 30, the remaining unagreed Articles, which would also be required as a condition of the U.S. acceptance of the proposed immunities position.

CONSULAR CONVENTION.—BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to cooperate in strengthening friendly relations and to regulate consular relations between both states,

Have decided to conclude a consular convention and for this purpose have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

For the purpose of the present Convention, the terms introduced hereunder have the following meaning:

(1) "Consular establishment"—means any consulate-general, consulate, vice-consulate or consular agency;

(2) "Consular district" means the area assigned to a consular establishment for the exercise of consular functions;

(3) "Head of consular establishment" means a consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent directing the consular establishment;

(4) "Consular officer"—means any person, including the head of the consular establishment, entrusted with the exercise of consular functions. Also included in the definition of "consular officer" are persons assigned to the consular establishment for training in the consular service.

(5) "Employee of the consular establishment"—means any person performing administrative, technical, or service functions in a consular establishment.

ARTICLE 2

1. A consular establishment may be opened in the territory of the receiving state only with that state's consent.

2. The location of a consular establishment and the limits of its consular district will be determined by agreement between the sending and receiving states.

3. Prior to the appointment of a head of a consular establishment, the sending state shall obtain the approval of the receiving state to such an appointment through diplomatic channels.

4. The diplomatic mission of the sending state shall transmit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving state a consular commission which shall contain the full name of the head of the consular establishment, his citizenship, his class, the consular district assigned to him, and the seat of the consular district.

5. A head of a consular establishment may enter upon the exercise of his duties only after having been recognized in this capacity by the receiving state. Such recognition after the presentation of the commission shall be in the form of an exequatur or in another form and shall be free of charge.

6. Prior to the appointment of all other consular officers and employees of the consular establishment the sending State shall obtain the approval of the receiving State to such appointments through diplomatic channels. In order that this approval may be obtained, the sending State shall notify to the receiving State in advance of such appointment the full name, category, and class of such officers and employees. The receiving State shall issue to each consular officer so approved an appropriate document confirming his right to carry out consular functions in the territory of the receiving State.

7. The receiving State may at any time, and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment is persona non grata. In any such case the sending State shall recall the officer or employee concerned. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry out its obligations under this Paragraph, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the officer or employee concerned as a member of the consular establishment.

ARTICLE 3

Consular officers may be nationals only of the sending state.

ARTICLE 4

The receiving state shall take the necessary measures in order that a consular officer may carry out his duties and enjoy the rights, privileges, and immunities provided for in the present Convention and by the laws of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 5

1. The receiving state shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws and regulations, by the sending state of promises necessary for its consular establishment or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way.

2. It shall also, where necessary, assist the sending state in obtaining suitable accommodation for the personnel of its consular establishment.

ARTICLE 6

1. If the head of the consular establishment cannot carry out his functions or if the position of head of a consular establishment is vacant, the sending State may empower a consular officer of the same or another consular establishment, or one of the members of the diplomatic staff of its diplomatic mission in the receiving State, to act temporarily as head of the consular establishment. The name of this person must be transmitted in advance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving State.

2. A person empowered to act as temporary head of the consular establishment shall enjoy the rights, privileges and immunities of the head of the consular establishment.

3. When, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article, a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending State in the receiving State is designated by the sending State as an acting head of the consular establishment, he shall continue to enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

ARTICLE 7

A consular officer shall be entitled within his consular district to perform the following functions, and in so doing may apply orally or in writing to the competent authorities of the consular district:

1. To protect the rights and interests of the sending State and its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate;

2. To further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State and otherwise promote the development of friendly relations between them;

3. To register nationals of the sending State, to issue or amend passports and other certificates of identity, and also to issue entry, exit, and transit visas;

4. To draw up and record birth and death certificates of citizens of the sending State taking place in the receiving State, to record marriages and divorces, if both persons entering into marriage or divorce are citizens of the sending State, and also to receive such declarations pertaining to family relationships of a national of the sending State as may be required under the law of that State, unless prohibited by the laws of the receiving State;

5. To draw up, certify, attest, authenticate, legalize and take other actions which might be necessary to validate any act or document of a legal character, as well as copies thereof, including commercial documents, declarations, registrations, testamentary dispositions, and contracts, upon the application of a national of the sending State, when such document is intended for use outside the territory of the receiving State, and also for any person, when such document is intended for use in the territory of the sending State;

6. To translate any acts and documents into the Russian and English languages and to certify to the accuracy of the translations;

7. To perform other official consular functions entrusted to him by the sending State if they are not contrary to the laws of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 8

1. The acts and documents specified in Paragraph 6 of Article 7 of the present Convention which are drawn up or certified by the consular officer with his official seal affixed, as well as copies, extracts, and translations of such acts and documents certified by him with his official seal affixed, shall be receivable in evidence in the receiving state as official or officially certified acts, documents, copies, translations, or extracts, and shall have the same force and effect as though they were drawn up or certified by the competent authorities or officials of the receiving state; provided that such documents shall have been drawn and executed in conformity with the laws and regulations of the country where they are designed to take effect.

2. The acts, documents, copies, translations, or extracts thereof, enumerated in paragraph 1 shall be authenticated if required by the laws of the receiving state when they are presented to the authorities of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 9

If the relevant information is available to the competent authorities of the receiving state, such authorities shall inform the consular establishment of the death of a national of the sending state.

ARTICLE 10

(1) In the case of the death of a national of the sending State in the territory of the receiving State, without leaving in the territory of his decease any known heir or testamentary executor, the appropriate local authorities of the receiving State shall as promptly as possible inform a consular officer of the sending State.

(2) A consular officer of the sending State may, within the discretion of the appropriate judicial authorities and if permissible under then existing applicable local law in the receiving State:

(a) taken provisional custody of the personal property left by a deceased national of the sending State, provided that the decedent shall have left in the receiving State no heir or testamentary executor appointed by the decedent to take care of his personal estate; provided that such provisional custody shall be relinquished to a duly appointed administrator;

(b) administer the estate of a deceased national of the sending State who is not a resident of the receiving State at the time of his death, who leaves no testamentary executor, and who leaves in the receiving States no heir, provided that if authorized to administer the estate, the consular officer shall relinquish such administration upon the appointment of another administrator.

(c) represent the interests of a national of the sending State in an estate in the receiving State, provided that such national is not a resident of the receiving State, unless or until such national is otherwise represented: provided, however, that nothing herein shall authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney at law.

(3) Unless prohibited by law, a consular officer may, within the discretion of the court, agency, or person making distribution, receive for transmission to a national of the sending State who is not a resident of the receiving State any money or property to which such national is entitled as a consequence of the death of another person, including shares in an estate, payments made pursuant to workmen's compensation laws, pension and social benefits systems in general, and proceeds of insurance policies. The court, agency, or person making distribution may require that a consular officer comply with conditions laid down with regard to (a) presenting a power of attorney or other authorization from such non-resident national, (b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the receipt of such money or property by such national, and (c) returning the money or property in the event he is unable to furnish such evidence.

(4) Whenever a consular officer shall perform the functions referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, he shall be subject, with respect to the exercise of such functions, to the laws of the receiving state and to the jurisdiction of the judicial and administrative authorities of the receiving State in the same manner and to the same extent as a national of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 11

1. A consular officer shall have the right within his district to interview, communicate with, assist, and advise any national of the sending state and, where necessary, arrange for legal assistance for him. The receiving state shall in no way restrict the access of nationals of the sending state to its consular establishments.

2. The appropriate authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer of the sending state about the arrest or detention of a national of the sending state.

3. A consular officer of the sending state shall without delay have the right to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The rights referred to in this paragraph shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights

ARTICLE 12

A consular officer may recommend to the courts or to other competent authorities of the receiving state appropriate persons to act in the capacity of guardians or trustees for citizens of the sending state or for the property of such citizens when this property is left without supervision.

In the event that the court or competent authorities consider that the recommended candidate is for some reason unacceptable, the consular officer may propose a new candidate.

ARTICLE 13

1. A consular officer may provide aid and assistance to vessels registered under the flag of the sending state which have entered a port in his consular district.

2. Without prejudice to the powers of the receiving state, a consular officer may conduct investigations into any incidents which occurred during the voyage on vessels registered under the flag of the sending state, and may settle disputes of any kind between the master, the officers and the seamen insofar as this may be authorized by the laws of the sending state. A consular officer may request the assistance of the competent authorities of the receiving state in the performance of such duties.

3. In the event that the courts or other competent authorities of the receiving state intend to take any coercive action on vessels registered under the flag of the sending state while they are located in the waters of the receiving state, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall, unless it is impractical to do so in view of the urgency of the matter, inform a consular officer of the sending state prior to initiating such action so that the consular officer may be present when the action is taken. Whenever it is impractical to notify a consular officer in advance, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall inform him as soon as possible thereafter of the action taken.

4. Paragraph 3 of this Article shall not apply to customs, passport, and sanitary inspections, or to action taken at the request or with the approval of the master of the vessel.

5. The term "vessel", as used in the present Convention, does not include warships.

ARTICLE 14

If a vessel registered under the flag of the sending state suffers shipwreck, runs aground, is swept ashore, or suffers any other accident whatever within the territorial limits of the receiving state, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer and advise him of the measures which they have taken to rescue persons, vessel, and cargo.

The consular officer may provide all kinds of assistance to such a vessel, the members of its crew, and its passengers, as well as take measures in connection with the preservation of the cargo and repair of the ship, or he may request the authorities of the receiving state to take such measures.

The competent authorities of the receiving state shall render the necessary assistance to the consular officer in measures taken by him in connection with the accident to the vessel.

No customs duties shall be levied against a wrecked vessel, its cargo or stores, in the territory of the receiving state, unless they are delivered for use in that state.

If the owner or anyone authorized to act for him is unable to make necessary arrangements in connection with the vessel or its cargo, the consular officer may make such arrangements. The consular officer may under similar circumstances make arrangements in connection with cargo owned by the sending state or any of its nationals and found or brought into port from a wrecked vessel registered under the flag of any state except a vessel of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 15

Articles 13 and 14, respectively, shall also apply to aircraft.

ARTICLE 16

[To be deleted. The remaining articles in the Convention will have to be renumbered accordingly.]

ARTICLE 17

The national flag of the sending state and the consular flag may be flown at the consular establishment, at the residence of the head of the consular establishment, and on his means of transport used by him in the performance of his official duties. The shield with the national coat-of-arms of the sending state and the name of the establishment may also be affixed on the building in which the consular establishment is located.

ARTICLE 18

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. Unofficial papers shall not be maintained in the consular archives.

The buildings or parts of buildings and the land auxiliary thereto, used for the purposes of the consular establishment, and the residence of the head of the consular establishment, shall be inviolable.

The police and other authorities of the receiving state may not enter the building or that part of the building which is used for the purposes of the consular establishment without the consent of the head thereof, persons appointed by him, or the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

ARTICLE 19

1. The consular establishment shall have the right to communicate with its Government, with the diplomatic mission and the consular establishments of the sending state in the receiving state, or with other diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the sending state, making use of all ordinary means of communication. In its communications, the consular establishment shall have the right to use code, diplomatic couriers, and the diplomatic pouch. The same fees shall apply to consular establishments in the use of ordinary means of communications as apply to the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. The official correspondence of a consular establishment, regardless of what means of communication are used, and the sealed diplomatic pouch bearing visible external marks of its official character, shall be inviolable and not subject to examination or detention by the authorities of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 20

1. Consular officers shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state in matters relating to their official activity. The same applies to employees of the consular establishment, insofar as they are citizens of the sending state.

2. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment who are nationals of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.

3. This immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving state of consular officers and employees of the sending state may be waived by the sending state. Waiver must always be express.

ARTICLE 21

1. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment, on the invitation of a court of the receiving State, shall appear in court for witness testimony. Taking measures to compel a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment who is a national of the sending State to appear in court as a witness and to give witness testimony is not permissible.

2. If a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment who is a national of the sending State for official reasons or for reasons considered valid according to the laws of the receiving State cannot appear in court, he shall inform the court thereof and give witness testimony on the premises of the consular establishment or in his own abode.

3. Whenever under the laws of the receiving State or oath is required to be taken by consular officers or employees of the consular establishment, an affirmation shall be accepted in lieu thereof.

4. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment may refuse to give witness testimony on facts relating to their official activity.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 shall apply to proceedings conducted by administrative authorities.

ARTICLE 22

1. Immovable property, situated in the territory of the receiving state, of which the sending state or one or more persons acting in its behalf is the owner or lessee and which is used for diplomatic and consular purposes, including residences for personnel attached to the diplomatic and consular establishments, shall be exempt from taxation of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments other than such as represent payments for specific services rendered.

2. The exemption from taxation referred to in paragraph 1 of the Article shall not apply to such charges, duties, and taxes if, under the law of the receiving state, they are payable by the person who contracted with the sending state or with the person acting on its behalf.

ARTICLE 23

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment, who is not a national of the receiving state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments on official emoluments, salaries, wages, or allowances received by such officer or employee from the sending state in connection with the discharge of his official functions.

ARTICLE 24

1. A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment who is not a national of the receiving state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments, for the payment of which the officer or employee of the consular establishment would otherwise be legally liable.

2. The exemption from taxes or charges provided in paragraph 1 of the present Article does not apply in respect to taxes or charges upon:

a. The acquisition or possession of private immovable property located in the receiving state if the persons referred to in paragraph 1 do not own or lease this property on the behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the consular establishment;

b. Income received from sources in the receiving state other than as described in Article 23 of the present Convention;

c. The transfer by gift of property in the receiving state;

d. The transfer at death, including by inheritance of property in the receiving state.

3. However, the exemption from taxes or similar charges provided in paragraph 1 of the present Article, applies in respect to movable inherited property left after the death of a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or a member of his family residing with him if they are not nationals of the receiving state or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and if the property was located in the receiving state exclusively in connection with the sojourn in this state of the deceased as a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or member of his family residing with him.

ARTICLE 25

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him, who are not nationals of the receiving state and who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt in the receiving state from service in the armed forces and from other types of compulsory service.

ARTICLE 26

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from all obligations under the laws and regulations of the receiving state with regard to the registration of aliens, and obtaining permission to reside, and from compliance with other similar requirements applicable to aliens.

ARTICLE 27

1. The same exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation shall apply in the receiving state to all articles, including motor vehicles, imported exclusively for the official use of a consular establishment, as apply to articles imported for the official use of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. Consular officers, and employees of the consular establishment, and members of their families residing with them, who are not nationals of the receiving state, and who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be granted, on the basis of reciprocity, the same exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, as are granted to corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

3. For the purpose of paragraph two of this Article the term "corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission" refers to "diplomatic officers" in the case of consular officers, and "administrative and technical staff" in the case of employees of a consular establishment.

ARTICLE 28

Subject to the laws and regulations of the receiving State concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, a consular officer shall be permitted to travel freely within the limits of his consular district to carry out his official duties.

ARTICLE 29

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State, including traffic regulations.

ARTICLE 30

1. The rights and obligations of consular officers provided for in the present Convention also apply to members of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the Contracting Parties charged with the performance of consular functions and who have been notified and approved in accordance with Article 2(7) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving State by the diplomatic mission.

2. Except as provided in Article 10(4), the performance of consular functions by the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not affect the diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to them as members of the diplomatic mission.

ARTICLE 31

1. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instrument of ratification thereof shall be exchanged at ____________ as soon as possible.

2. The Convention shall remain in force until six months from the date on which one of the Contracting Parties advises the other Contracting Party of its desire to terminate its validity.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Convention and affixed their seals thereto.

Done on ____________, 19___ in two copies, each in the Russian and the English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ____________
____

For the Government of the United States of America ____________
____

MINUTE

It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that the notification of a consular officer of the arrest or detention of a national of the sending state specified in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the present Convention shall take place within one to three days from the time of arrest or detention depending on conditions of communication.

It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that the rights specified in paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the present Convention of a consular officer to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment shall be accorded within two to four days of the arrest or detention of such national depending on his location.

Done at ________________ on ________________, 1964, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ________________

____

For the Government of the United States of America ________________

____

DELAY IN SUBMISSION OF CONVENTION

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand it, this is not submitted to us at this time for any action. You are simply discussing it with us?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is right. We are prepared to answer any questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. And on a confidential basis.

Mr. HARRIMAN. And we are prepared to answer any questions which the committee has.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no further questions myself. Thank you very much. Mr. Harriman.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you very much. I understand you are going to consider two ambassadorial appointments this morning?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I informally express the hope that you will give them a good sendoff. I think they are both very fine men for their jobs.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you. That is very good opening testimony for them.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee went into open session.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11:10 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol, following a public session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman and Lausche.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for report the nominations of Robert Gaylord Barnes, to be Ambassador to Jordan, and W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of William Attwood to be Ambassador to Kenya, and G. McMurtrie Godley to be Ambassador to the Congo (Leopoldville).

The committee approved, without objection, the nomination of James D. Bell to be Ambassador to Malaysia.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee voted favorably to report the Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1959 (Ex. S, 88-1); the Text of Amendments of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (Ex. C, 88-1); and the International Agreement Regarding the Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea (Ex. F, 88-1).

The next item of business was the bill (S. 2136) to amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the bill was ordered to be favorably reported to the Senate.

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and others testified on the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Austria regarding the return of Austrian Property, Rights, and Interests, signed at Washington on January 30, 1959 (Ex. A, 86-2). The agreement was reported without objection on motion by Senator Sparkman.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 12:45 p.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Humphrey.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee favorably reported the nomination of Fulton Freeman, to be Ambassador to Mexico, and to waive the 6-day rule respecting the Foreign Service List dated February 24, and to report it also favorably, as well as the Foreign Service List dated February 20.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee voted favorably to report the nominations of Carl Rowan, to be Director of the United States Information Agency; William S. Gaud, to be Deputy Administrator, AID; William B. Macomber, Jr., to be Assistant Administrator for the Near East and South Asia, AID; and Howard E. Haugerud, to be Deputy Inspector General of Foreign Assistance.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee reported favorably the bill (S. 2455) to amend further the Peace Corps Act.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:50 p.m.]

UNITED NATIONS FINANCING THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Throughout 1964 the United Nations struggled with financial debts and unpaid assessments. On January 7, U.N. Secretary General U Thant revealed that the U.N. owed $134 million. Half of this debt represented the amount that the Soviet Union refused to pay toward U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. The Secretary General pointed out that under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, a nation would lose its right to vote in the General Assembly if it fell into arrears for more than twice its annual assessment. The Soviet Union, however, insisted that only the Security Council could impose additional assessments, and refused to pay. When the General Assembly met in November, a compromise was reached to postpone any voting until the end of the general debates and the resolution of the financial crisis.]

[Senator Kuchel of California presented a statement in support of S. 944, To provide for the presentation by the United States to the people of Mexico of a monument commemorating the independence of Mexico, and for other purposes. Robert M. Sayre, Director of the Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State, also testified on the measure.]

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

[On motion by Senator Aiken, and without objection, the bill was ordered to be reported to the Senate.]

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive session and we hope the committee will be very careful with this, not because it is a matter of subversion or something of that nature, but the delicacy of negotiation is to try to get the Soviets in particular and certain others to pay up and to make arrangements for supporting the U.N. in the future.

Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you. Do you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON, AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS; AND HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM ZIEHL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND ABRAHAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I do have a little statement which I would like to read first, and then perhaps you have questions you would care to ask about it.

The **Chairman**. You may proceed.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Then if you wish, as we discussed on the telephone, Mr. Chairman, if any of the committee members care to, I could talk a little about the current state of negotiations in Cyprus, which is a very critical situation.

The **Chairman**. I thought after we finished this particular subject we would. I personally do wish to hear it, and anyone else who wishes to stay, of course, is welcome.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, if I may emphasize again the importance of security on this discussion, I should like to do so because of the delicate feelings of both our friends and other members of the United Nations about disclosure of plans of this kind before they have heard them themselves. I felt, however, that it was very important to bring our current thinking to the attention of the committee before we commenced any large-scale negotiations, to be sure that the track that we are following was fully understood, as we shall have to be back to you to talk about it again in more detail later.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY

The United Nations is approaching a significant milestone in its short constitutional history. Four problems related to the future peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations are coming to a head this year, and they raise the kind of constitutional questions that have not been raised seriously since the Uniting for Peace Resolution was passed in 1950. We, therefore, were anxious to canvass with you, on a preliminary and confidential basis, the current thinking of the executive branch on these matters and inform you of our negotiating plans with respect to them.

The four problems that come together this year are these:

One, the Soviets are now more than 2 years behind in their peacekeeping assessments, not their general assessments but their peacekeeping assessments, due to their refusal to pay for peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East, and are therefore subject to the application of article 19—loss of vote in the General Assembly—at the first meeting of the General Assembly in 1964, if they do not make up part of their arrears in the interim.

France will also be in default on the Congo operation next year.

The **Chairman**. A year from now?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. A year hence.

Two, the last General Assembly approved, subject to ratification by the members, charter amendments to enlarge the Security

Council from 11 to 15—with a constitutional majority of 9—and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27.

Three, there is increasing discussion about possible changes in the U.N's structure to make sure that the views of the larger contributors to the U.N.'s "capacity to act" are adequately taken into account in General Assembly decisions.

Four, a U.N. working group meets in April to recommend to the next General Assembly a way of financing future peacekeeping operations. In a formal sense, these discussions will be financial and technical, but they will be held against the political and constitutional background created by the issues I have just mentioned.

We have been talking with some of our allies, and propose now to consult more widely on a series of steps which, taken together, might constitute a reasonable approach to this set of problems. We propose to include in these consultations talks with the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are ready to talk constructively about the future of U.N. peacekeeping, but there are some indications that they may be.

U.N.-SPONSORED MILITARY OPERATIONS

The members of this committee are thoroughly familiar with the evolution of the U.N.'s peackeeping role in the changing context of world politics. I need only remind you in passing that the assumed cooperation of the great powers for keeping the peace after the war never materialized, so there has been no basis for establishing the international police force contemplated in the charter. Despite this, the U.N. has sponsored three military operations of significant size—in Korea, the Middle East, and the Congo. In addition, the U.N. has engaged in nine secondary peace and security actions, from the Greek border in 1947 to Yemen in 1963. These have included Indonesia, Kashmir, Laos, Lebanon, and West New Guinea.

The net result is that U.N. peacekeeping machinery, ranging from a lone representative of the Secretary General to battalions and brigades of U.N. troops, has increasingly come to be regarded as indispensable for maintaining some degree of peace and order in this contentious world of ours, in which nuclear stalemate seems to be releasing inhibitions on disputes among nonnuclear powers.

PROBLEM OF FINANCING FUTURE MISSIONS

But the evolution of the U.N.'s capacity to deal with peacekeeping tasks has raised formidable problems of how to finance future peacekeeping missions, and the great growth in membership has raised problems about how to authorize them in the first place. I hasten to add that both the financial and the administrative problems have political roots.

On the financial side, the refusal of the Communist bloc and of the French to pay peacekeeping assessments manifestly is not because they cannot afford to pay.

STATUS OF FRENCH PAYMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask to have Mr. Stevenson repeat the status of France with respect to payments. I didn't get what he earlier said.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. France will be in default as of next January under article 19, due to its refusal to pay its share, its assessed share of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo. It has paid up on UNEF; that is United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. It is not in technical default as of now, but if it doesn't do something between now and next January it will be. As of that time, it will be in default to the extent of what, about $16 million?

Mr. **Ziehl**. About that, yes, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. And subject to the application of the same rule that Russia is now subject to?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Exactly.

Senator **Lausche**. Thank you.

FAILURE TO PAY PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS

Ambassador **Stevenson**. On the financial side the refusal of the Communist bloc and of the French to pay peacekeeping assessments is not because they cannot afford to pay.

The resulting net U.N. deficit of about $130 million is principally in the form of accounts payable to governments. As long as these governments are prepared to wait for payment and to allow the amounts owed to increase, the crisis at the United Nations is more about politics than about money, though cash may become a problem later this spring.

As you know, article 19 of the charter provides that a member in arrears shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding 2 full years.

The 1962 advisory opinion of the World Court held that expenses of peacekeeping operations are included in the expenses which members are obligated to pay, and this opinion was overwhelmingly accepted by the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the Communist countries, as well as various other governments—I have mentioned France in the case of the Congo, and I could add the Arab countries in the case of UNEF—have refused to admit that these expenses are to be included in the article 19 calculations.

CUBA'S DELINQUENT PAYMENTS

The **Chairman**. Could I ask a question there? I saw in the paper this morning that Cuba has paid up its delinquent payments. What did that refer to, the Congo, UNEF or just its ordinary——

Mr. **Cleveland**. They paid up on their regular budget, but they paid up enough on their regular budget, just enough, so that their total arrears now fall just short of the 2-year rule.

The **Chairman**. So they won't lose their vote this year.

Mr. **Cleveland**. So they have guaranteed not losing their vote this year.

The **Chairman**. It was a right substantial amount. It was $400,000, wasn't it?

Mr. **Cleveland**. $364,000, I think they paid.

The **Chairman**. That is all to the good.

A FRESH LOOK AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I mentioned the financial side. On the administrative side, the growing number of peace and security problems being brought to the U.N. plus the increased size of the General Assembly has caused a number of members, including ourselves, to take a fresh look at the position of the Security Council in the U.N.'s scheme of things. To avoid paralysis of the organization by Soviet veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly in 1950 passed the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution (Resolution No. 377 V) to prescribe procedures for the General Assembly to deal directly with peacekeeping matters.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution did not, of course, give the General Assembly any authority it did not already have under the charter; it did not enable the General Assembly to do more than recommend measures to the membership. It did create procedures for emergency action by the Assembly. Under these procedures, as they have worked out, the Secretary-General has normally put together a peacekeeping force, bulwarked by a General Assembly recommendation to member states that they cooperate with the Secretary-General in so doing.

All of this is part of the background against which the General Assembly, during its last session and subject to ratification by the members, approved the first two amendments to the U.N. Charter in the constitutional history of the organization. These amendments call for enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to reflect the greater membership of the U.N. as a whole. They raise interesting and important questions for the five permanent members of the Security Council, and until all such members ratify, no charter amendment goes into effect. The intentions of the Soviets, the French, the British, and the Chinese are all unclear for different reasons.

The U.S. delegation abstained last December on both amendments, and while they came out in an acceptable form, the surrounding uncertainties are such that we do not plan to ask for ratification during the present congressional session. As of today, no member of the U.N. has deposited ratification of these amendments.

USEFUL CHANGES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

After reviewing all these problems, we have concluded that it would be useful to explore three kinds of changes in the U.N. All of them could be accomplished by resolution or by amending the rules without amending the charter.

Our suggestions are designed to increase the relative weight, in matters of peacekeeping and its financing, of those nations which contribute the bulk of the U.N.'s resources and who would find themselves with the responsibility in the event the U.N. fails to act.

First, we will seek agreement that all major U.N. peacekeeping proposals be considered first by the Security Council and then by the General Assembly, only if the Council had demonstrated its inability to act. Such a procedure would, in effect, confirm and emphasize the senior or primary role for the Security Council on peace and security matters and thus give some recognition to the Soviet viewpoint.

PEACEKEEPING FINANCE COMMITTEE

Second, we will seek agreement to the establishment of a peacekeeping finance committee, its composition weighted in favor of the major contributors, to recommend to the General Assembly the most suitable financing plan in each peacekeeping situation.

Senator AIKEN. Would this finance committee be entirely separate from the peacekeeping committee itself? Would one committee determine the peacekeeping policies but another committee be concerned solely with the financing?

Ambassador STEVENSON. The peacekeeping operation would be presumably determined by the Security Council. As the situation now is, the assessment for the expenses of the peacekeeping operation is determined by the General Assembly.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Ambassador STEVENSON. We propose to introduce between the Council and the Assembly a peacekeeping finance committee which would recommend to the General Assembly the means of financing a particular peacekeeping operation approved by the Security Council.

Senator AIKEN. But which would have no authority other than to recommend?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is correct. It would be weighted in favor of the major contributors to recommend the most suitable financing in each peacekeeping situation, as I said. Our idea is that the committee would be constituted under a new rule by which the Assembly would bind itself to act on peacekeeping assessments only on the recommendation of this special financing committee.

Senator AIKEN. And the Assembly itself would formulate that rule.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. In other words, Mr. Ambassador, the General Assembly could act favorably upon a recommendation of the committee or could reject it, but would bind itself not to amend the recommendations of the committee or alter it?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is what we have in mind, Senator, but of course this is preliminary thinking. Just how this will come out——

Senator CHURCH. This is the major proposal.

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is the objective.

Senator CHURCH. The objective you have in mind?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. What they would do would depend on the wording of the new rule, wouldn't it?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is right. We have to negotiate that out. That is why this matter is so intricate and why it takes such time and why we are anxious to avoid any premature discussion of it before we have it worked out.

BINDING FUTURE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES

Senator **Sparkman**. May I ask this, How would the Assembly bind itself to act on peacekeeping assessments? Would this peacekeeping finance committee be a continuing committee or would each General Assembly be expected to set up one? What I am getting at is this: How can one General Assembly bind a future General Assembly in that respect?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. It would be a standing committee of the U.N. Its membership would have to be elected in accordance with the rules that were adopted at the time it was constituted.

The **Chairman**. It would bind itself the same way the Senate binds itself? It binds itself, but subject to the power to change it, and they would, too.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Surely. They would always retain that policy.

The **Chairman**. The same way our continuing rule carries on.

Senator **Sparkman**. The difference is that the Senate is a continuing body. The General Assembly is not.

The **Chairman**. The rules can be considered to continue. They could adopt a rule that would continue until changed, couldn't they?

Mr. **Cleveland**. The legal adviser says he thinks it is a continuing body.

Senator **Sparkman**. That the General Assembly is?

Mr. **Chayes**. I say the issue has never been presented, but in the format you present it; that is, do rules adopted by one General Assembly operate in the next, the answer is "Yes, until changed." And they do so without a formal——

Senator **Sparkman**. They don't formally adopt the rules?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Without a formal reenactment of the rules at the beginning of each General Assembly. Whether that makes it a continuing body or not——

Senator **Sparkman**. I am in favor of that kind of an arrangement.

Mr. **Chayes**. But that is the practice of the Assembly.

Senator **Sparkman**. Fine.

FINANCING ALTERNATIVES

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Third, we think that the peacekeeping financing committee should consider in each case a range of financing alternatives which might include: (*a*) Direct financing by the countries most concerned in the peacekeeping operation; (*b*) an assessment on the regular budget scale; (*c*) a special scale of assessment under which the larger countries would pay more and the smaller countries less; (*d*) voluntary contributions; and (*e*) selective assessment by the General Assembly is another alternative, and this one I would ask you to note particularly.

Under this alternative the Assembly, while retaining its power to assess all the members, might decide not to assess a permanent member of the Security Council which is fundamentally opposed to the particular peacekeeping operation.

Our suggestions relating directly to the financing of peacekeeping operations will come up in the Committee of 21 when it meets a few weeks from now.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the Committee of 21?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is a standing committee of the U.N., Senator, which deals with the problems of financing the United Nations and will have to face this problem, the problems that we are presenting to you today when it meets this year, for the reasons that I have indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it differ from the proposed committee of finance?

Ambassador STEVENSON. It is differently constituted, and it doesn't have the same authority that we would now propose to——

The CHAIRMAN. Is it made up of the principal contributors or supporters of the U.N.?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No.

Mr. CLEVELAND. It has a pretty good composition from our point of view and it has most of the main countries on it. Actually it was set up to deal with the emergency problems resulting from the last 2 or 3 years of boycotts and so on, and it is supposed to work out a way of financing future peacekeeping operations and then go out of business. Our objective in effect would be to get that committee to recommend to the Assembly the kind of rule that we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Go ahead.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Do you care to have the list of the membership of that?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I don't think you need to take the time. I imagine the major countries are on it.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Plus some others.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why not put it in the record without reading the names?

[The document referred to follows:]

LIST OF MEMBER NATIONS APPOINTED TO THE WORKING GROUP OF 21

(Resolution 1854 B(XVII) of December 19, 1962)

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
China
France
India
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Mongolia
Netherlands
Nigeria
Pakistan
Sweden
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Arab Republic
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

A SPECIAL SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

Ambassador **Stevenson.** Our suggestions relating to the financing of the peacekeeping operations will come up in this committee very soon. There is no doubt that among the alternative formulas to finance peacekeeping, we shall have to agree that one alternative will be a special scale of assessments when the cost of major peacekeeping operations exceeds an agreed initial amount.

There is such widespread sentiment in favor of such a scale that we think this is one that will have to be considered. We shall insist that this initial amount be assessed on the regular scale. But, after serious study, long debate, extensive lobbying, and laborious consultation, we are persuaded that the wealthiest members, as in the past, should and probably will have to contribute—by special scale, by voluntary contribution, or both—something above the regular scale of assessments if these kinds of operations are to be carried on in the U.N.

In our own case, this need not be particularly onerous, nor even inequitable; the fact is that we produce nearly 40 percent of the total income of all the U.N.'s members, and the other members, of course, know it perfectly well. We shall be extremely stubborn about this. After tough negotiations last year, the United States share of UNEF and the Congo operation for 1964, financed by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions, worked out to about 37 percent, only 5 points above our percentage on the regular budget scale for the United States and considerably below what we had been paying in previous years of these operations.

At the present time, under Public Law 495 we are not permitted to make any commitment which would involve the United States in a budget assessment of more than 33⅓ percent for any U.N. operation.

[The information referred to follows:]

Extract From Public Law 495, 82d Cong., 2d Session

For expenses necessary to meet annual obligations to international organizations, the Government of Panama, and Gorgas Memorial Institute, pursuant to treaties, conventions, or specific Act of Congress, $30,484,749. No representative of the United States Government in any international organization after fiscal year 1953 shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ per centum of the budget of any international organization for which the appropriation for the United States contributions is contained in this Act: *Provided, however,* That this section shall not apply to the United States representatives to the Inter-American organizations.

Ambassador **Stevenson.** In discussing a special scale with the other members of the committee of 21 this spring, we would make this position clear.

APPLICATION TO SPECIAL AGENCIES

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Governor, that 33⅓ percent, that would apply to special agencies of the U.N. does it?

Mr. **Cleveland.** It applies to everything that is financed under that law, which is the law that carries the assessed contributions.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Under the assessments, not under the voluntary agency contributions?

Mr. **Cleveland**. No, it doesn't apply to voluntary, which are in the aid bill, so it doesn't apply. This was thrown into an appropriations bill one year.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, we wrestled with that at some length.

Mr. **Cleveland**. It is considered as continuing legislation.

Senator **Church**. Does it apply to the special peacekeeping missions? As far as the assessments?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. The United States delegation up there can never vote for an assessment of more than 33⅓ percent against the United States, so that everything we pay above that has had to be voluntary.

Senator **Church**. I see.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. We will make this position clear, of course.

ADDITIONAL U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator **Lausche**. May I ask, have we made any contributions in excess of 33⅓ percent under the voluntary contributions principle, and if so, where did the money come from? Somewhere it says one operation cost us 37 percent here.

Mr. **Cleveland**. The overage is funded in the aid bill. You remember really every year since 1957 these peacekeeping operations have been funded—except the one, the bond year—by a combination of assessed contributions in the State Department appropriations and chapter 3 money in the aid bill, which is the international organization share.

The **Chairman**. You remember there is a special group of these agencies outlined. As I recall it, they all totaled about $156 million.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They are trying to get a list of them here. Have you got it?

Mr. **Holt**. It is being gotten.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. If an equitable special scale were to be agreed upon by the working group, we would not, of course, expect Congress to act on it until we could submit a specific proposal against the background of the need to finance a U.N. peacekeeping operation.

MINIMUM ASSESSMENTS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let me ask you this: Have you given any thought or consideration or study to a device which manifestly would have its almost impossible facets, but to a device where a minimum assessment would be mandatory, and then a yardstick of some kind to determine an assessment over and above that on the part of nations that are directly interested?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I know the difficulty. It is like saying how far back do you assess property for street improvements, how many blocks do you go back.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. This, as you well know Senator, gets extremely complicated when you begin to discriminate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have got almost insurmountable difficulties in it, I can understand that, but the basic idea being that everybody should contribute something, on the idea of the general benefit of peace to the world and a little harmony and so on, and then on top of that the countries most directly affected, if there is some yardstick by which a measurement of assessment dependent upon their interest could be devised. I don't know that it is possible to do a thing like that. I can imagine all kinds of difficulties.

Ambassador STEVENSON. One thing that I have tried to indicate here—let's assume a proposed operation cost $10 million, the estimate, $2 million, for example—would be assessed at the regular budget scale so that everybody would contribute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Ambassador STEVENSON. The remaining $8 million or a portion of it would be assessed at a differential scale. The countries with greater capacity would pay more.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, or something along that line.

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is exactly what we have in mind.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL NOT DEPRIVE RIGHT TO VOTE

Senator AIKEN. Haven't we got to face the problem that the General Assembly would not approve depriving Russia and France of their vote whether they paid up or not?

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is what I am coming to, sir. I think this is one reason we have come here today. We don't believe that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It strikes me that that is the major obstacle in the road.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I think this is a major consideration that perhaps we are going to have to face. Actually, we believe as of now that we can sustain article 19, but there will be a considerable minority that will be against automatically——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You couldn't get a two-thirds vote any way to sustain it, but if they had to get a two-thirds vote to set aside article 19, they might not be able to get it right now, but they would come awfully close to it.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Let me remind you that the Assembly last year approved the advisory opinion of the World Court with only 17 negative votes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Ambassador STEVENSON. And there were eight abstentions, I believe, so it got a very overwhelming endorsement of article 19.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But when it comes to saying to France and Russia, "You can't vote," you have got another problem.

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is why we have been struggling with this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is why you are here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Ambassador.

LOSS-OF-VOTE ISSUE

Ambassador STEVENSON. Let me now, in conclusion, return to article 19, the loss-of-vote issue, which Senator Aiken has just raised, which will be hanging over the negotiations in the Committee of 21 and which is perhaps the most critical part of this whole complex of issues.

We feel it is absolutely essential that article 19 be scrupulously enforced according to its terms. It is essential to maintaining the integrity of the charter and, in particular, to maintaining the force of law behind the Assembly's power to assess members for expenses of the organization. We shall stand firm for the strict application of article 19 to any member with more than 2 years' arrearages.

We are doing, and shall continue to do, everything possible to see that we go into the next meeting of the Assembly with the votes lined up in support of article 19. We believe we can do so. We are already beginning to lobby intensively in the capitals of the world outside the Soviet bloc, and simultaneously with their missions in New York.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you registered as lobbyists?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Maybe we will have to have a U.N. registration for that purpose. We are trying to convince other governments of both the correctness and the firmness of our position.

Our purpose, of course, is not to deprive the Soviets of their vote. Our purpose is to get them to pay up. The most likely way of persuading them to pay up is to confront them with the clear determination of a majority of U.N. members to apply the loss-of-vote provision to any country falling within its terms.

THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.N. CHARTER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would suggest one other purpose in addition to not depriving them of their vote on the one hand and getting them to pay up on the other, that the integrity of the United Nations Charter is at stake.

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. It is indeed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which is more fundamental to me than whether they pay the money or not. We want them to pay the money, but it is the integrity of this organization that is at stake.

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is the point we have made, Senator, that if we don't have financial responsibility of the members here to achieve the purposes of the charter, we very soon will have no charter and will have no organization.

AGREEMENT OF UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.

Senator AIKEN. Actually, nothing can be done without agreement between the United States and Russia, isn't that about what it simmers down too?

Ambassador STEVENSON. I put it the other way around. We think we can win on this, but we know we can win if the United States and Russia agree.

Senator AIKEN. Suppose Russia says, "We are going to stand on principle," as they see it. "We are not going to pay our back dues. We will contribute $50 million to the future." Would you be inclined to accept that proposition?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I have felt personally that we ought to try to clear up the arrears, even if it doesn't constitute payment in full, and then start fresh on the new program, such as I have attempted to outline here this morning.

Senator **Aiken**. They are pretty well out on a limb now, and in the United Nations, as it is in the Congress, about half our time is spent on getting people back off limbs that they have walked out on.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. They are out on one now.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. This is precisely what this is designed to do, to enhance the power of the Security Council, to create an opportunity through a special committee to enable that committee not to assess a power that does not want to support a particular peacekeeping operation, and to afford to them or create some inducements to persuade them to pay up.

Clearly the best results on the article 19 issue would be Soviet payment of its arrears, which might be coupled with an agreed solution for the problem of the financing of future peacekeeping operations. This is what we are trying to do.

We believe the suggestions we have discussed with you today will be of some interest to the Soviets. They should be interested in the suggestion that the peacekeeping finance committee could recommend that a great power not be assessed for an operation of which it disapproves. Some such realistic arrangements could also be advantageous to the United States.

So we think we have some ideas that may be an inducement to the U.S.S.R. and France to remedy their defaults and start fresh to ensure the future effective functioning of U.N. peacekeeping, which has become such a vital part of the emerging international security system.

WAYS IN WHICH SOVIET UNION COULD PAY

There are a number of ways in which the U.S.S.R. can pay up if it becomes convinced that it is in its interests to do so. Whether it will do so remains in doubt.

The **Chairman**. I don't understand that. What do you mean a number of ways?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. By a number of ways, I mean that under the language of the charter your default makes you vulnerable to the penalties provided in article 19 only if you are in default for 2 years. Now, they could make a partial payment which would reduce the amount of their default so that it was not the equivalent of 2 years. It is possible that they might make payments to other aspects of the United Nations' work, and through some bookkeeping, offset that. This would be tantamount to paying up for this purpose, if it relieved the U.N. to that extent.

The **Chairman**. Could this be credited? When you bring this question of the integrity of the charter, the major aspect of it—if they made a payment to some other activity which doesn't go to the actual charge here for peacekeeping, would this maintain the integrity of the charter even though the amount was the same?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I agree with you that it wouldn't be in strict compliance.

FACE-SAVING BY THE SOVIETS

Mr. **Cleveland**. I think that the most likely way I suppose is if the U.N. were to merge a number of the accounts that the fighting has been about, put the Congo, UNEF, and some other of the stuff and pile it all together as a U.N. debt problem, then the Soviets could make a contribution to the U.N.'s debt problem without admitting that it was wrong on the Congo, probably some kind of face-saving arrangement.

The **Chairman**. This is what I meant. Some of the delegates to the meeting in Bermuda distinctly said they had heard—I don't recall that they gave the source, but they had heard—that the Russians were interested in saving their face and paying up, but not admitting they were wrong in refusing to pay this particular assessment. I don't know whether that is true or not.

Mr. **Cleveland**. I wouldn't say that we had any hard indication that they were willing to pay, but we have had some indications from the satellites that if they were willing to pay, they would require some kind of face-saving device. The line we have taken is that if they want technical assistance as to how to save their face, we would be glad to be available, but it first requires their intention to pay.

The **Chairman**. These people didn't say they had heard information. They had nothing in writing; they just heard this said. Maybe they had the same source from some satellite, that if they could find a way to save their face, they might be willing to do it.

Senator **Aiken**. Has Czechoslovakia paid?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Yes.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Very much like Cuba.

Senator **Aiken**. So they are not in arrears 2 years?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. No.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Actually they are still slightly over the line, because they weren't able to, nor rather they didn't want to, credit any of their payment to the Congo or UNEF. The Secretary isn't prepared to handle it the way the Czechs want to handle it, so it is still being argued about.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. It is very much the problem that Senator Fulbright just raised.

Senator **Aiken**. That is right. It is face-saving.

SOVIETS MUST SHOW INTENTION OF PAYING

The **Chairman**. But you think you can develop a formula by bookkeeping and merging of accounts and so on to save their face, is that right? That is what you are working on?

Mr. **Cleveland**. If they are prepared to put up the money, they will do their homework and come up with their own face-saving device, is my guess. Our inclination isn't to offer them a face-saving device before they have shown any intention of paying.

The **Chairman**. I see.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Our intention is to say, "Now, let's clean up the books. Let's pay up, remedy the defaults, and start afresh for the future."

The **Chairman**. Let them find it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let me ask you this: If the United States and Great Britain got into arrears, the same situation that Russia and the satellites find themselves in today, do you think Russia would busy herself trying to find ways to save face for us?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I doubt it very much. This is the world we live in. I don't know that really we have to worry too much about the face-saving. I think our big job here is to make the Russians realize that they are going to lose on article 19, if we possibly can, and because they don't want to break up the United Nations, they don't want to be charged with the responsibility for the failure of peacekeeping operations, which are demonstrably becoming more important year by year, that they will find some way to do it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If that is the case then, Governor——

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Especially, sir, if they can look forward in the future to a system which is more agreeable than the previous one.

STAND ON ARTICLE 19

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If we assume that they don't want to break up the United Nations, that they feel this is an advantage to them, and if there is—and there probably is—a genuine or some real reason to believe they don't want to break this up, why not let them find their own escape hole out of this thing? Why not just stand on article 19? Sure, we don't want to be so hardnosed we cheat ourselves on the thing, but why not just stand on article 19 and let them find their own way out?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Sir, this is exactly the problem we have been confronted with for a long while now and that we have been working on for 4 or 5 months.

I have felt more and more that we have to face the possibility that a great many members of the United Nations might feel that the organization would be enfeebled in the event that article 19 was applied, and that the Soviet Union, France, and others lose their vote. We also face a somewhat unrealistic situation in assuming that in the future we can impose assessments on major great powers for the support of peacekeeping operations that they disapprove.

All of these things combine to make it desirable for us to at least explore the possibilities of while insisting upon the automaticity of article 19, also providing machinery that rationalizes peacekeeping for the future. This is for our benefit, creates machinery for suitable consideration of means of financing each peacekeeping operation that restores somewhat the primacy of the Security Council. All of these things are of mutual advantage, not only to the Soviet Union in affording them any escape from the impact of article 19, but that it would strengthen the organization as a whole and its structure. It is therefore desirable not to leave this in the alternative of article 19 or nothing.

There is the possibility of course, too, as Senator Aiken indicated, that we might conceivably lose on article 19, if so many members would feel that its application in this situation was calculated to destroy the effectiveness of the organization, that they would rather sacrifice the integrity of the charter as drafted than they would risk this consequence.

UNITED NATION'S SELF-POLICING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does an organization remain effective that proves it has lost its effectiveness to police its own regulations and provisions?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No, but somebody else might move to provide alternatives to the clear implication of article 19 uniformly, and that we had better come up with one that is satisfactory to us. That is also the British view.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not advocating our taking our shoe off and beating the table with it and screaming that it has got to be this way, or anything of that kind. That isn't what I am talking about at all. But I think the integrity of the United Nations and the charter is at stake on this thing.

I am not so certain that that integrity will be served if we compromise the organization, find some way to avoid what seems to be clearly set out.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Bear in mind that anything I have said here today is in contemplation of——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Oh, I understand.

Ambassador STEVENSON [continuing]. Of curing the present arrears.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are just discussing this.

Ambassador STEVENSON. We are now trying to provide machinery to rationalize the peacekeeping operation and financing problem for the future.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not even assuming that you are committed to this program or these suggestions at all. We are just discussing it here.

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is where we start.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

CLEARING THE BOOKS

Senator LAUSCHE. You have stated a number of times that the objective is to induce Red Russia to enter into an operation that would clear the books as they are now, and then formulate a new policy. What do you define this "clearing of the books of the present problem" to mean?

Ambassador STEVENSON. They would cure their present arrears, pay up.

Senator LAUSCHE. Pay up in full?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Under the charter you don't have to pay up in full.

Senator LAUSCHE. You would say your answer is "No" to that question? What if they put themselves in good standing by bringing their aggregate indebtedness down below the assessments of 2 years. Would that clear the books?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, it would clear the books. It doesn't clear the books, but it clears the default.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would the net effect of that be that the United Nations would forgive any delinquent country from its past indebtedness?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. It would remain on the books.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, sure.

ABSOLVING THE SOVIET UNION

Senator LAUSCHE. The proposal is that either Red Russia pays up in full or brings its indebtedness down below the aggregate of 2 years' assessments, to explore the advisability, among other things, of making selective assessment by the General Assembly.

Under this alternative the Assembly, while retaining its power to assess all the members, might decide not to assess a permanent member of the Security Council which is fundamentally opposed to the particular peacekeeping operation.

My question is, Doesn't that mean that there will be adopted a new rule, which, while discretionary in its imposition, will in effect absolve Red Russia and these other nations from participating in the peacekeeping operations?

Ambassador STEVENSON. In the future?

Senator LAUSCHE. In the future.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, if this committee so decides.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, Mr. Ambassador? If we want to talk about Cyprus, we will have to move along if you have anything anything more on this.

THE KREMLIN'S INTEREST IN PREVENTING WARS

Ambassador STEVENSON. I just want to conclude this, and then I will turn to that if I may. Let me now summarize and say the chances of such a solution will depend: First, on whether the Soviet Union believes the members of the U.N. are determined to stand fast against any defiance of charter principles on the integrity of the charter; and second, on whether the Kremlin's view of the world has altered enough in recent times to persuade them that the capacity of the United Nations to keep the peace, at least as a buffer between the two major powers and a third-party instrument to help avoid confrontation, is sufficiently in the national interest of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to warrant a change in their stand on the exclusive rights of the Security Council in peace and security matters.

Within the past year, the Kremlin has at last agreed that we have a common interest in preventing a nuclear war. The unanswered question now is whether the Soviet Union will agree that we have a common interest in preventing conventional wars. This is what could conceivably make Mr. Khrushchev's New Year's Day message potentially important. What he said was that wars rooted in racial and tribal and religious and boundary disputes and animosities might begin with conventional arms but might also lead to nuclear war from which none could escape. Because of this danger. Mr. Khrushchev said, all such disputes must be settled by peaceful means, including recourse to the United Nations.

If the Soviets are prepared to extend their doctrine on nuclear war to cover conventional war, then the issues I have been discussing here this morning would become easier to resolve. If the Soviets are ready to concede that effective international peacekeeping machinery can serve—even may serve—the interests of both the United States and the U.S.S.R., then they should be able to devise ways and means of getting off the hook on article 19 quietly and without losing face in the process. This would clear away the greatest obstacle to the remaining pieces of the problem.

ELEVATE THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Soviets would, of course, welcome any new elevation of the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping matters. No doubt they will bargain extremely hard for exclusive control by Security Council. We could accept no such proposition because we must be free to seek U.N. peacekeeping operations over Soviet objections whenever necessary. Moreover, they are not likely to be able to sell this concept to the General Assembly. I think we, therefore, will come out about where we want to—if the Soviets want agreement. On this we cannot be too sanguine.

All this is why we intend to open our negotiations with the Soviets in the context of a followup to President Johnson's reply to Mr. Khrushchev's New Year's Day message. You will recall that President Johnson said we would be interested in discussing a more important role for the Security Council in pursuit of peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and some solution to the financing problem.

As you can see, there are many variables in the problems I have discussed with you. We cannot predict how they will all come out, but we did want to spread these policy questions before you, alert you to our intentions, submit to your questions, and commit ourselves to keeping you posted as negotiations unfold over the weeks and months ahead.

I need hardly point out to the committee the extreme delicacy of the matters I have been discussing. I earnestly hope that the committee will agree to the urgent necessity of keeping these ideas and these plans completely confidential until we have had a chance to explore them a little bit with some states at the United Nations and the Soviet Union.

I would add, finally, that in my judgment this matter is of such importance to the Soviet Union and to its image in the world, to use that abused phrase, that these negotiations will probably be extensive. They may very well end up in Moscow, but that something of this kind is desirable, we believe very strongly.

I think I have no more to say by way of a formal statement, Mr. Chairman. If there are some questions now that you care to ask me, I will attempt to answer them.

VERY DANGEROUS GROUND

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, there are 30 minutes until the Senate convenes. We can either ask questions here if you prefer or he offered to brief us on the Cyprus thing, which has been very interesting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I only have one observation I would like to make.

The CHAIRMAN. If we could quickly dispose of this, I think everyone would be interested to hear his observations on Cyprus. Go ahead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am very much disturbed—I don't know whether I am very much disturbed or not, but I am disturbed—by the suggestion that we let major powers off the hook on contributing to peacetime operations where they object. That is a continuation of the veto to that extent and I think it is a very dangerous ground for us to get into, to even indicate that we are for it. I don't like that proposal or thought at all.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Senator Hickenlooper, let me just say this about that, and Harlan has something he would like to add before we conclude.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is exactly what the Russians are doing today.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Exactly. I can't say that anybody likes this. I don't think they do. I think that the idea here springs from not only the present situation that we have been in as a result of the Congo, but also that we try to look at this very realistically from the long-term point of view.

We have lost our dominant position, speaking now of the United States and the so-called free world and the West, in the United Nations. Its membership has increased to 113; the absolute voting majority has passed from the West to the Afro-Asians. We have to think of this not solely in terms of the past, but also in terms of the future. It is conceivable that some peacekeeping operations might be approved, if not by the Security Council, by the General Assembly, which would be inimical to our interests, and therefore this works both ways. It is a two-way sword.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD GO ON

Second, to be absolved from the responsibility for contributing to the costs is perhaps an attempt at some realistic appraisal of the future and the difficulty of imposing the will of the United Nations on a great power against what it considers its best interests, especially if there are enough other powers who feel that the peacekeeping operation is desirable in their interest to make up the deficiency. I also point out that this would presumably be by the action of a committee, of a group, which we believe would be properly constituted to reflect the views of the contributing powers.

We have a third thing which I would like to mention, and that is how do we deal with this situation. A confrontation over article 19, while I rather think that we could win it, one can't be absolutely confident of it. The organization has demonstrated the utility of these peacekeeping operations. They should go on. If we don't have some machinery which makes it flexible, makes it possible to approve these peacekeeping operations as they arise, we will lose a good deal of both the celerity and the certainty of the effectiveness of the United Nations. We would be well-advised, therefore, if we tried to find some means by which we could have a practical system of financing them in the future.

This isn't to say that I don't share your misgivings as of now, at least about the possibility of any great power being exonerated from participating in the support of the peacekeeping operation which it disapproves.

The CHAIRMAN. Other questions?

Senator AIKEN. Just one observation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE

Senator AIKEN. I think a serious problem you have to face is that if Russia refuses to qualify under article 19 and the General Assembly refuses to enforce article 19 against Russia, it would be next to impossible to get appropriations for the United States assessments or contributions other than the affiliated organizations, which I think we would still go along with.

Ambassador STEVENSON. And for the general budget.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, for the general budget. I think you would have lots of trouble there. I don't believe you could get it, and I think you might as well tell them so.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I am not sure I quite understand.

Senator AIKEN. I mean if Russia refuses to pay up enough to qualify as a voting member of the General Assembly and the General Assembly refuses to disqualify Russia——

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. Then it would be next to impossible to get the Congress to appropriate the funds for our general assessment to the United Nations. I think we would go along with the F.A.O. and the World Health and those organizations.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, I realize that.

Senator AIKEN. I think we might as well tell them that we would be unable to get that.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes. This is another reason why it would break up the whole peacekeeping function.

Senator AIKEN. That is right, it would.

U.N. BOND ISSUE

Senator LAUSCHE. When the Congress was persuaded to approve the bond issue method of financing, it was argued that to ensure Russia's contribution, that under this rule 19 they would become expelled if their indebtedness aggregated more than 2 years of assessment.

Mr. CLEVELAND. They would lose their vote.

Ambassador STEVENSON. They would never be expelled.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is right, lose their vote.

Now, there were those at that time who argued that the United Nations cannot survive with Russia as a participant. My question is this: Aren't we completely abandoning the principle which dominated us at the time we approved the bond issue, if these new modifications are put into effect?

I know I argued on the floor that if Russia remains delinquent, you shouldn't expect that it will be disqualified because the United Nations, without Russia in there, would become impotent. That was my argument. If these proposals are executed, aren't we abandoning the position which we occupied when the bond issue was approved?

Mr. CLEVELAND. As far as the past is concerned, the situation up to now, we are moving very vigorously to try to make sure that there is a majority. It takes a simple majority, not two-thirds, to back up the President's ruling in effect on this matter.

We are campaigning in every capital outside the Soviet bloc at this moment with memorandums on law and a lot of other material. In effect we are saying to countries: "Look, you really have to decide, you really are going to have to choose between the Soviets and ourselves and some of the other Western countries as cooperating members of the U.N. if the Soviets continue to refuse to cooperate."

U.N. CANNOT OPERATE BY UNANIMOUS FINANCIAL CONSENT

We are determined that the loss-of-vote provision will be sustained by the General Assembly, because I agree with you that if it is not sustained, the shock effect back in the main contributing countries in Europe and the United States would be extremely damaging to the future of the United Nations. Now, with respect to the future, the problem is do we want to lock ourselves into a system in which we say the U.N. shouldn't do anything that isn't done by unanimous financial consent.

I think our view is that we would like to see the U.N. be able to operate in the world even in situations where the Soviets say, "We don't like it." But if you are going to do that, then you have to create a situation probably in which by a similar decision the Soviets are able to sit out the dance they don't believe in, because otherwise you give them a veto.

You say the U.N. won't do anything that the Soviets aren't prepared to pay for. It doesn't seem to me to our interests to lock ourselves into such a system as that.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOES NOT GAIN POWER

Mr. CHAYES. I think there is one thing to be added to that, and that is this: These proposals don't add anything to the General Assembly's power. The General Assembly under the charter is not under any compulsion to make assessments on an equitable basis, proportional basis, or anything else. Article 17 of the charter says, "The expenses of the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly." So the General Assembly has plenary authority now to say, "You shall pay and you not," if it does so by budgetary resolution, a two-thirds vote.

All this set of proposals does is to suggest some ways in which the General Assembly might exercise that plenary authority in appropriate cases, but even without any of these proposals being agreed to, the General Assembly could, acting under article 17, make this kind of an assessment. There is nothing which says that the assessment should be in proportion to income or proportion to population or proportion to anything else.

So there is no new addition of power here. The only effort here is to try to lay down some lines in which the General Assembly might exercise its admitted power on a rational and systematic basis.

Mr. **Cleveland**. And to make sure that the peacekeeping finance committee, the special appropriations committee that we are proposing here, is sufficiently weighted in favor of those who really are making the organization go or stop to come out with sensible solutions to particular problems, not all of which will be, my own guess is, not most of which will be the every member canvass-type of thing. Voluntary contributions, the Yemen kind of formula where the people most concerned actually put up the total amount and so on.

A KICKBACK REACTION

Senator **Church**. Harlan, may I say there is just one pitfall here. I think the proposal, and I think the discussion bears it out—the proposal that you make, which Ambassador Stevenson has detailed, is a very sensible one. It gives us hope for solving these problems in the future.

But there is a danger that if you make a proposal which contemplates selecting out certain powers for future contributions, and don't make it perfectly clear that we are going to stand hard and fast on article 19 come what may, you may get a kickback reaction. If you are going to exonerate these countries under your own proposal in the future, then why not let this have a retroactive effect so that it can contribute to the present solution of the financial dilemma facing the U.N.?

We must avoid that pitfall, because I agree that if article 19 is not upheld, the essential integrity of the U.N. will be destroyed.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I think we have made it emphatically clear throughout here that we don't relent on article 19 in any way whatsoever. Indeed, we are doing right now, both here and around the world, everything we can to insist upon both its interpretation and also its automaticity.

I think the question that Senator Hickenlooper raises, if I could take 1 minute more to supplement what Harlan said, is this, really: Is it better to give a great power the chance of getting out of a peacekeeping operation and keeping the operation, going ahead with the operation, or for a great power to have the unilateral possibility of destroying all peacekeeping operations, operations that are in the national interest of the United States?

I think this is the basic problem that we confront. If you leave things as they are now, and they go on refusing to pay, except when they want to, you are not going to contribute; that is, the U.S. Congress isn't, and this will crack the thing up.

THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN CONGRESS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Isn't that what we are proposing, that they only pay when they want to?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I am saying then the operation would go ahead, whereas if you crack it up you won't have any operations.

Senator **Sparkman**. What would the effect of that be on other countries? Wouldn't it be a gradual sluffing off?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. We were going to try to restrict——

Senator **Sparkman**. I notice you say a permanent member.

Ambassador **Stevenson** [continuing]. This to the permanent members.

Senator **Sparkman**. But how can you say to nonmembers of the Security Council that they have to pay up while a permanent member does not have to pay up?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. The reasoning would be this, John——

Senator **Sparkman**. I know the reason. I am thinking of the practical part of it.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. It is a problem.

Senator **Sparkman**. Furthermore, I am thinking of the practical problem right here in Congress, if Russia, just to name the one country for instance, is allowed simply to drop out because she wants to, from paying anything on peacekeeping operations. I see the sense of it, that the rest of us might deem it so important that we would want to carry on without her, but I can hear some of these voices on the Senate floor right now.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. They would have to be convinced that it was in our interest to go on with the operation.

Mr. **Chayes**. Also, Senator Sparkman, I think it should be clear that the proposal is not to permit any country to refuse to pay simply because it doesn't want to. It is to authorize the General Assembly in a particular case, if it decides the circumstances are right, to relieve a power of its obligation.

PRINCIPLE OF SPECIAL CONSIDERATION

Senator **Church**. Why restrict that to permanent members?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. The reason for that is this, Frank. Under the charter when it was rewritten, the permanent members were given the right of the veto. They were given special consideration.

Senator **Church**. Yes.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. What we are doing is applying that same principle, that same reasoning to this case that we did to that case, that the hope for maintaining peace in the world was going to depend in large measure on the permanent members.

Senator **Church**. But the special veto is a special privilege. Now you propose to enlarge the privilege by allowing permanent members not to pay, whereas you are not proposing to extend the privilege to other members.

It seems to me you are just throwing oil on the fire, not only in the U.N. but in Congress too. If the financing committee wants to make a special proposal, allowing certain countries not to pay who are objecting, I see no reason at all to limit this just to permanent members. That will merely aggravate the situation.

The **Chairman**. Of course, also, as a practical means they are the ones who pay a lot.

Senator **Church**. That is right.

The **Chairman**. The others pay very little and it doesn't make much difference as to the operations.

Senator CHURCH. But this is a psychological problem that I am talking about, a political one.

Ambassador STEVENSON. This is going to be a major difficulty, we apprehend this, restricting it to the permanent members. If we open it up to everybody, you can see that a lot of fellows will get out on the assumption that while they want the peacekeeping operation, they might as well let somebody else pay for it.

Now, we think that as long as the permanent members have the responsibility——

The CHAIRMAN. But in these actual experiences you have had, the little ones pay a minimal amount now, I mean almost nothing.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, except they don't consider it minimal is the trouble. You do have the problem, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a little. I think I saw one day the list. Some are $10,000, $3,000.

Senator AIKEN. Is there any spring session of the U.N. Assembly contemplated?

Ambassador STEVENSON. We hope not, sir.

Senator AIKEN. If you wait until September there will be some changes.

Ambassador STEVENSON. There has been talk that Cyprus might ask for changes.

SITUATION IN CYPRUS

The CHAIRMAN. How about getting on to Cyprus? We can talk about this forever. Go ahead, let's have a few words on Cyprus before we vote. We have got to vote pretty soon.

Senator AIKEN. At 12:30.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate convenes at 12. Then we have to vote. They will ring a quorum shortly thereafter and we will vote at 12:30. That is already determined by unanimous consent.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Perhaps we could have another talk about this problem later on.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have pretty nearly exhausted that. Go ahead and tell us about Cyprus.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Let me refresh your recollection.

What the Greek-Cypriots want is to modify their constitution. The basic provisions of this constitution are taken from the Zurich agreement which was signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, and the leaders of Turkey and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities.

These provisions of the constitution are not amendable unilaterally. On November 20, Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, handed a list of suggested changes to the Turkish vice president. His changes would have eliminated most of those provisions of the constitution which the Turkish community feels are their safeguards against arbitrary action by the Greek-Cypriot majority. The majority is four to one. Tension mounted after that, and then on December 21 large-scale violence erupted.

This has continued sporadically since then, with serious loss of life and property damage and grave danger, I am afraid, to international peace, with the possibility of a war between Greece and

Turkey which could escalate very rapidly with consequences that are unpredictable.

BRITISH PEACEKEEPING FORCES

On December 26 the United Kingdom, at the invitation of Cyprus, in cooperation with Turkey and with Greece, assumed the peacekeeping task in Cyprus. The United Kingdom now has something over 8,000 troops trying to maintain the peace. I think 7,000 of those are actively involved.

Concurrently the U.K. called a meeting in London, you will recall, a conference including Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities, in the hope of finding a political solution. This conference failed to resolve the political problem.

With violence in Cyprus continuing, the U.K. consulted the United States, Greece, and Turkey about broadening the base of the peacekeeping force. It asked us to participate in such a force. A number of NATO European states were also asked to contribute forces.

Senator Aiken. Who asked us?

Ambassador Stevenson. The U.K.

MAKARIOS REJECTED INTERNATIONAL TROOPS

Arrangements for an enlarged force were agreed to by Greece and Turkey, the United States and the U.K., and the Turkish-Cypriot leaders, but Makarios rejected these arrangements. An effort was made to accommodate his specific suggestions, but he also rejected the compromise proposal. In addition to the broader international force to keep the peace, the proposals included provisions for a neutral mediator to mediate the political dispute.

Makarios has insisted that the territorial integrity and the political independence of Cyprus must be protected against the right of intervention which Turkey claims under the treaty of guarantee, which is part of the constitution. He indicated that he would request the Security Council to take action calling on all of the states to respect the territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from aggressive action against Cyprus, directed clearly at Turkey and Turkey only.

Negotiations on peacekeeping having reached an impasse, the British on February 15 themselves requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Cyprus dispute immediately. On this same day Cyprus also requested a meeting.

The Security Council debate began on February 17 and it is still continuing. We have taken the position that the Security Council cannot be asked to modify, abrogate, or nullify an international treaty, and that the Security Council's primary concern should be the restoration of peace and security between the two communities on the island, and that for this purpose an international peace force is urgently needed.

AVOID TROUBLE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

Our greatest concern is to avoid serious trouble between Greece and Turkey, which would follow inevitably if Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus to protect its minority. All of our estimates and calculations are on the assumption that if Turkey did so, the Greeks would be compelled to take military measures to counter the Turkish intervention.

The proceedings in the Security Council were suspended last week in order to see what the Secretary General could do by direct negotiation with the parties. The Cypriots continued adamant, insisting on a resolution which affirms the territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus, with no reference to the treaties and any limitations or any rights that the Turks have under those treaties. The Turks in turn will not accept any such resolution that does not reflect their rights, so we have had a deadlock that is still unresolved.

Meanwhile the situation in the island is extremely precarious. There is in one place, the Paphos, said to be some 700 Turks surrounded in a school compound who have been without food and water for a week. If they break out, presumably a lot of them will be shot by surrounding armed Greek-Cypriots. This could start another conflagration, the consequences of which would probably be intervention by the Turkish forces which are all in readiness 40 miles away, which would follow just because politically they couldn't restrain them any longer.

U.N. CHARTER AND EXISTING TREATIES

Inonu, the Prime Minister of Turkey, has behaved I think with great restraint. Their press has been restrained and they have done their best to keep public passions, and especially the impetuosity of the army, under control. The Greek Government has become less and less influential on the island as time has gone on, because the Cypriots have begun to feel that the Greeks have not supported them all of the way.

I don't exclude the possibility that we may be able to work this thing out in New York, but I think you should know that we have not been able to do so so far, that any eruption on the island in the interval would provoke, would trigger these consequences that are so serious.

That is about the way it is. We now have another line of action, we are pursuing another line of action, which is separate meetings between the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council under the chairmanship of Bernadas of Brazil, a very accomplished diplomat. I met last night with the foreign minister of Cyprus again. Again, he asserted his implacable position.

The Turkish position is also for the obvious reasons, with which we sympathize, steadfast and rigid. What you have here for the first time, gentlemen, is an attempt indirectly of the Security Council to modify an existing treaty. The reason for it, the legal basis for it is that the charter of the United Nations, as you know, provides all member states must respect the territorial integrity and independence of other states, and that the charter of the United Nations, if in conflict with existing treaties, is the paramount treaty.

It is, I think, article 103. On this basis the Cypriots argue, and they are supported by several others, notably the Communists, that the charter of the United Nations is paramount to the existing treaties, and that it is proper for the Security Council to recognize, to affirm, to guarantee their independence and their sovereignty and their territorial integrity without reference to any limitations that exist by virtue of the Treaty of Zurich, which is incorporated in the constitution.

It is the first time we have really ever been confronted with a situation of this kind. Involving as it does the right flank of NATO, Greece, and Turkey, its implications are extremely serious. I think that is all I have to say, sir, but if you want to ask me about the details of the negotiations, I would be happy to answer.

DESIRABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE

I could say this if I may, just one further thing, Mr. Chairman. We have agreed as a result of these discussions in the Security Council that an international force is desirable.

We have agreed generally on the list of countries from which it would be drawn. We have agreed that the commander of the force should be British. We have agreed that a mediator should be appointed, once peace and tranquility can be restored to the island.

We have made considerable progress. What we have not agreed upon is a form of resolution that either excludes any reference to the existing treaties or to the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus or a resolution that mentions both.

The **Chairman**. I appreciate very much that account of the present situation. You say you have agreed on this peacekeeping force, et cetera. Have you agreed to the point or has Makarios accepted your proposal as to the peacekeeping?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. He has?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Do we participate in that peacekeeping force?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. No.

The **Chairman**. A British commander. This would presumably maintain peace under the aegis of this peacekeeping force, but as far as a solution to the difficulty, that wouldn't be a solution, you don't feel?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. No. A mediator would be appointed.

A TRANSFER OF POPULATION

The **Chairman**. Is there any prospect at all of a transfer of population in this case, as was done once before?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. It is very hard for me to foretell what might come out of a round of negotiations.

The **Chairman**. Do you know whether that is being considered?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. I am sure lots of people have thought of that, of trying to move the whole Turkish population out of there and to the Anatolia Plains somewhere. This, of course, is something that the Turks won't even consider. It's something that the Cypriots say is not what they want at all. They want a unitary state in which the Turkish community and the Greek community can live in harmony. The Turks say that historically they don't see any prospect of that working.

I don't know what the solution is, the political solution of the thing, the long-term solution. I wish I was an expert on it. I am not. I have been there and I have known Makarios very well now for 12 years, and I think he is an extremely difficult man to deal with.

His own control on the island is, as you know, insecure. I am not too clear about that. I always found in my past dealings with him that he uses this technique of diplomatic negotiation to serve his own purpose. This is also confirmed by Sir Hugh Foot, who worked out the Cyprus settlement when he was Governor General of Cyprus for the British in 1959. At all events it is quite probable, and George Ball has probably told you that, that he is under the impression that Makarios may have lost control of the island.

If we could persuade these two sides to accept a resolution constituting the peace force, the commander, the mediator, and not make any reference to the territorial integrity and independence, or the treaties, it would be a very happy solution. As of last night, they both refused again.

SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the language of the charter which gives that declaration superiority over treaties?

Ambassador STEVENSON. It is article 103, I think.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you read it please.

Ambassador STEVENSON [reading]. In the event of a conflict between the obligation of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail.

Senator LAUSCHE. A pretty drastic provision.

Ambassador STEVENSON. We don't feel that it applies in this case at all. It is irrelevant, because these treaties are not in conflict with their obligations under the charter at all, because the express purpose of them is to guarantee the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Cyprus.

Senator LAUSCHE. But the opponents to your view argue that sovereignty and independence is only existent when they have a right to determine for themselves what their basic laws shall be?

Ambassador STEVENSON. They take the position that the Treaty of Zurich, which says that in the event that consultation between the guarantors, which are Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece, breaks down or doesn't work, that then the parties after consultation among themselves can take "action"—that is the word, Senator—can take action to restore the status quo. What does "action" mean? The Cypriots say it does not mean military intervention. The Turks say it does mean military intervention. A close analysis of the legislative history of the Zurich agreements seems to reveal nothing as to what the interpretation of that language was.

CONCERN OVER PARTITION

Senator AIKEN. Why are the Cypriots jittery over possible partition? Who has proposed partition?

Ambassador STEVENSON. The Turks.

Senator AIKEN. The Turks have proposed it, but what provision, what agreement would authorize partition under any circumstances?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Only agreement of the parties after mediation.

Senator **Aiken**. This proposal is unilateral, then?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. That is right. You see, the thing as it is set up now isn't workable really.

Senator **Aiken**. No.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. It provides for two communities. It provides for a Greek president and a Turkish vice president and anything that the majority Greeks do that the Turks disapprove can be vetoed, and the result is that it has been———

Senator **Aiken**. But that was the principal fear of the Cypriots, isn't it, partition?

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Yes, the Cypriots don't want to contemplate partition under any circumstances, and of course it would be sort of a ridiculous situation. You would have a little independent state with a population of about 300,000.

Senator **Aiken**. I would hate to see 150,000 Turkish-Cypriots have a seat in the U.N.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Well, it is just hot as a firecracker. I don't know whether we will work our way out of it or not. If we don't, I should say quickly, in the course of this week, I think the British Government should immediately try to invoke a consultative meeting of the guarantor powers, and see if they can't act in concert, the three of them.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. It has been very interesting.

I wish you luck.

Ambassador **Stevenson**. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State, who has consented to come and brief us on some of the current affairs that he is acting on in the world's tension.

Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary **Rusk**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I asked for about an hour with the committee this morning to report on a number of things that are in the press and of interest to the committee.

First, there is a ticker that has just come in that in the World Health Organization the challenge to the Chinese Nationalist delegation was rejected by 51 votes to 21, with 22 abstentions. Now, this reflects—France, by the way, voted with the Soviet bloc in the 21. This reflects two ideas that we have been using for some time.

The first is that in these specialized agencies, they should not make a political decision themselves contrary to the decisions taken by the General Assembly and by the Security Council. There are a number of countries that recognize Peiping that accept that view and reject an attempt to change the situation in the specialized agencies when such an action has not been taken by the General Assembly.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. So it is not a substantive decision?

Secretary **Rusk**. This is not necessarily a substantive decision.

Second, in the General Assembly there are a number of countries that recognize Peiping but also agree it is an important question and that the matter could only be decided by a two-thirds vote. That is, for example, the British point of view.

There are some signs that the French are not going to support that, take that same position, but in any event that particular challenge in the World Health Organization was turned back.

[Discussion off the record.]

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

Secretary **Rusk**. If I may just report very briefly on the Cyprus situation, there is some prospect now that the Security Council will pass a resolution which will be generally acceptable to the Greeks, the Turks, the Cypriots, and the members of the Council, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union and the Poles, who are expected to abstain. The Soviet Union conceivably could veto.

This would provide for an international force composed of countries like Sweden, Ireland, possibly Norway, Denmark, Canada, Australia, and possibly Brazil. In other words, not strictly a NATO force, but nevertheless not the kind of Afro-Asian force that among other things would be obnoxious to the Cypriots, who have a very strong racial feeling apparently about the composition of such a force.

That does not mean that if the resolution passes that the Cyprus situation is going to be resolved. It is going to be difficult for some time to come, because there is every indication from intelligence and other sources that Makarios is determined to bring about a complete control of the majority over the Turkish minority, to abolish the treaty of guarantee in every practical way, and set up a constitution which would give the Greek-Cypriot majority full control of the situation. That is going to be highly disturbing to the Turkish minority on the island, and that will mean increased tensions or sustained tensions between Greece and Turkey.

Nevertheless, we feel that the first job is to get the shooting on the island under control so that political processes can go forward with the help of a mediator to try to find the solution to this problem.

From our own point of view it is much more satisfactory, of course, to have countries like Sweden and Ireland than for ourselves to be in there with troops in a highly emotional situation. Also, I think it avoids to some extent the implications of premature great power involvement, although we would have to take a very active part if this matter came to the possibility of real shooting between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members, which would really be a calamitous situation.

So, there is some glimmer there that the next step, anyhow, is within reach although the problem will be with us for some time.

BACKGROUND OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM

You may already this morning, Mr. Chairman, have talked with Mr. Bundy about the South Vietnam situation, but I might make a few comments about that, if I may.

I think we need to keep in mind the general background of that problem. After World War II with the growing Communist menace in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed that the security of Southeast Asia was vital to the security interests of the free world, and that the security of the Red River

Valley in North Vietnam was of crucial importance to the security of Southeast Asia.

During that period, we provided very substantial assistance to France for use in Vietnam, in Indochina, as it was called at that time. We accompanied that help with continuous pressures on France to try to work out some political arrangement which would resolve the major problems between France and the people of Indochina, who had been stirred by nationalist forces and during the Japanese occupation had reached the point where they were unwilling to see just a restoration of ordinary French colonial rule.

Unfortunately, those efforts by France were perhaps too little, too late, and it was not possible for them to work out an agreed solution of the problem with the local people. There came then the confrontation between France and most of the people of Indochina, who were determined to change the political structure.

In 1953 and 1954 this came to a military climax and although there had been in the background the agreement among the three Western powers that the Red River Valley was of crucial importance to the security of Southeast Asia, it was not possible in 1953 or 1954 to find a satisfactory answer to stabilize the position of the free world in that area. The consequent result was the Geneva Accords of 1954 which partitioned Vietnam.

That gave the Communists a major foothold in Southeast Asia and exposed Laos and South Vietnam to the infiltrations with which we have been living ever since.

U.S. POLICY ON THE MIDDLE TRACK

At the present time our policy is relatively simple as policy goes, I mean in terms of objective and purpose. That is, we are on the middle track—I will speak of the other two tracks in a moment—we are on the middle track of trying to support and assist the South Vietnamese in getting this job of pacification done themselves in order to try to stop this guerrilla-type of activity which has been going on there in an increased measure since 1959.

This basically has been the tactic that was used in Greece, in the Philippines, in Malaya. There are some special problems because of the exposure of South Vietnam to steady infiltration from the North.

Nevertheless, the purpose has been to throw behind them the support and the resources that would make it possible for them to do it. We believe that there is a reasonable chance that this course can, in fact, succeed.

INCREASED VIETCONG ACTIVITY

During the political difficulties in South Vietnam in the past, since November, two changes of government in that period, the Vietcong stepped up their activities in an effort to take full advantage of the political dislocations in South Vietnam. They did so after the coup against President Diem. They did so at the time of this latest coup.

Our most recent reports indicate that the numbers of Vietcong incidents have now dropped back to the pre-November number of incidents. We don't know whether the Vietcong are going to be able to sustain the higher level of incidents that they have attempted after General Khanh took over, as well as after General Minh took over in November, but nevertheless we do believe that basically the armed forces, the materiel that will be needed for this job are present in South Vietnam.

There is a job of organization, of tactics, of stimulation which is now in process. It is tough because the Vietcong have themselves learned how to respond to some of the new tactics that we used.

For example, they are much more adept now at taking action against helicopters. They have taken maximum use of the difficult terrain in the southern part of the country in their hit-and-run tactics. They have infiltrated a good many of the strategic hamlets, so it is a tough and difficult situation on the ground.

But nevertheless we think that this present course is the right one to pursue further. We do not believe it would be wise for the United States to pull out, withdraw, stop its support of Vietnam. The result of that would certainly be the communization of all of Southeast Asia. We don't see how that possibly can be accepted.

On the other hand, we think that it would be premature to face the other alternative, which is to escalate the war very substantially on our own initiative.

PROSPECTS OF ESCALATING THE WAR

We have tried to give certain warning to the other side about the possibility that this war could become more serious, because we do know that there are some elements in the bloc that do not like the prospect of escalation and that this may make it possible for some of those elements to have some influence on the situation there.

There is some indication that Hanoi is somewhat nervous about the prospect that the war could become more serious. Their mission to Moscow was not a success from their point of view.

Moscow has not given them flat and full commitments of support in this situation. We do have reason to think that the Soviets have been urging caution on Hanoi with respect to Laos and that there are some possibilities in the situation.

Neutralization, in one sense there is no problem; in another sense this is a phony idea.

In one sense this was the purpose of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the purpose of the Laos Accord of 1962. In other words, certainly the United States has wanted no military allies as far as Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam are concerned. We don't want any military bases there. If they were secure and safe, we wouldn't be interested in any military presence there.

American forces are there as a direct result of the violation of those accords and threats to the security of these states from and on the part of Hanoi with the backing of Peiping and for much of this period with the backing of Moscow. If Hanoi were to leave South Vietnam alone, that situation could be resolved, I think, fairly quickly, and the American military presence would become unnecessary.

So in that sense there is no particular problem; but on the other side to talk about the neutralization of South Vietnam, in the sense that we would simply pull out in exchange for another piece of paper pledging the sort of thing that was pledged in 1954 and in 1962, would seem to some of us to mean that this is nothing but a device to expose South Vietnam to even more penetration and to a takeover by the Communists.

LONG-RANGE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

We have tried to find out from the French what they have in mind. They had made some fairly general statements, at least President de Gaulle has. The French tell us this is a very long-range attitude on the part of France, that it does not relate to any immediate or short-run policy or activity on their part.

The French Ambassador came in the other day to tell me that France is not engaged in any conspiracies in Southeast Asia,[1] that France has not had any agreements with Peiping about Southeast Asia, that France does not wish the military effort in South Vietnam to fail, and that France remains anti-Communist, and that this also applies in Southeast Asia.

With this, we are glad to be told that that is their point of view. On the other hand, we can't help but be regretful that their statements and some of their actions do not seem to support everything that was said.

Our concern about French recognition of Peiping, for example, was not so much Paris, France, so much as what Peiping itself will think of this. We felt that this was a very bad time for anyone to give Peiping any reason to believe that a policy of militancy would be successful or pay dividends or that Peiping's prestige would be enhanced during a period when it is actively assisting aggression in Southeast Asia, refuses to renounce force in the Formosa Straits, keeps military pressure on India, and is engaged in mischief in the other continents such as Africa and Latin America.

But it is Peiping's policy that is the source of concern and is the most probable immediate threat of war in the present situation.

SITUATION IS SERIOUS BUT NOT HOPELESS

So that I would summarize, Mr. Chairman, by saying that our present policy is to support the South Vietnamese to get this job done. We think the situation there is serious, but it is not in any sense hopeless or desperate. We think that the resources are there to get the job done, and that we will, of course, be doing everything we can to ensure that it does succeed.

I must say that I think the next 2 or 3 months could well make it very clear as to whether this course will succeed, and if it does not, then we and all of us here at the table will be faced with some very serious alternatives.

I think those are the principal comments I might make by way of opening, Mr. Chairman. If members of the committee wish to take up any of these points, I will discuss them thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

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[1] Gen. Nguyen Khanh had justified his coup against the government of Duong Van Minh, on January 29, 1964, on the grounds that members of Minh's council secretly supported French proposals for South Vietnam's neutrality.

PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM

I will ask one or two. Will you be a little more specific about what the agreements of 1962 and 1954 were? Did the North Vietnamese specifically undertake not to sponsor or send in guerrilla warriors? What is the status of that legally?

Secretary RUSK. First, in 1962 in that agreement it provided very specifically that no foreign forces, except for the French, no foreign military elements, except for the French, would be present in Laos and that the French would be there as a military advisory group. So that clearly denied the Viet Minh the kind of presence which we know to be there at the present time.

Second, the Geneva Accord of 1962 on Laos contained a specific prohibition against using Laos as a transit area to move elements through Laos into other countries, and again Hanoi is violating that agreement by the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for infiltrating agents and cadres into South Vietnam. During 1963 it has been estimated about 1,800 personnel came into South Vietnam from the North, but those were cadres and worth considerably more than the actual numerical number would suggest. So there is no question about that.

There is also no question that the Geneva Accords of 1954 provided guarantees for those settlements as against the effort by a force or otherwise of the various signatories to upset that settlement through the use of force or violence.

The CHAIRMAN. So there is no question about their being in violation?

Secretary RUSK. None whatever sir. As a matter of fact, the I.C.C. in South Vietnam has accepted this view of the matter.

For example, when our own Armed Forces were increased in South Vietnam, many times beyond the numbers that were permitted to remain there under the Geneva Accords. The I.C.C. has not raised any issue about this because of the violations, the known violations on the other side.[2] I don't know whether the committee has this special report to the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina of June 2, 1962, at the I.C.C. in Indochina. But members may wish to—I will get some copies.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was North Vietnam a signatory to the 1962 understanding?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. South Vietnam did not sign, as you recall.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any indication of the attitude of the Soviet Union with regard to this particular problem? What I have in mind, is there anything to indicate they would not like to see the Chinese prevail completely in this area but prefer to have it stay as it is, or not; what do you think to that?

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[2] In 1964 the State Department suggested that these sentences should read as follows: "The I.C.C. also found the South Vietnamese Government in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 in receiving increased military aid from the United States and setting up a functional military alliance with the United States. However, it is clear from the dates cited in the I.C.C. report that these measures were taken by the South Vietnamese Government as a matter of self-defense against the hostile activities directed and supported by North Vietnam."

Secretary **Rusk**. At the moment, Mr. Chairman, I would have to distinguish between Laos and South Vietnam. I do have the impression that the Soviet Union has been taking some steps to try to influence Hanoi in the direction of better compliance with the Laotian Accords. I think this is because Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed on a settlement for Laos, and also because of the Moscow-Peiping rivalry.

On the other hand, there is considerable evidence as well as that Moscow's influence on the ground in northern Laos and in Hanoi has been substantially reduced. So Moscow from its point of view has got the problem to what extent it pushes Hanoi at the risk of losing any presence or influence whatsoever in Hanoi in connection with Laos.

The Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane has been more cooperative than most Soviet Ambassadors are in this situation in connection with these incidents and attempts to get the I.C.C. to investigate, but they have not yet taken the public view we have urged upon them that when the I.C.C. votes to investigate they should not be held up by a veto by the Pathet Lao. I don't want to leave the impression here that we think Soviet performance about the Laotian question has been exemplary or has been as much as we must expect from them.

I have talked to Gromyko about this more than once, and Ambassador Kohler [3] talked to him about it just two or three days ago. Gromyko has been rather defensive about the discussion of Laos [deleted].

How does one interpret that?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Kohler is on his way back here, isn't he?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, he is on his way back; he should be here in a day or two.

The **Chairman**. Senator Sparkman.

ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE LEADERS

Senator **Sparkman**. I find myself greatly confused and disturbed from time to time regarding this South Vietnam situation because of the conflicting reports and analyses that we see in the papers by various writers and the comments we hear by the commentators over the air.

I want to ask, Do you believe that a majority of the pro-Western Vietnamese leaders, especially the military, share our objective of achieving a military solution to the struggle there? Are they as strongly interested in it as we are?

I will say frankly that is a thing that concerns me greatly. It seems to me at times they have just almost reached a point of giving up.

Secretary **Rusk**. The South Vietnamese military leaders?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Secretary **Rusk**. That is not my impression, Senator Sparkman. General Khanh, when he took office, charged that some of the other leaders whom he supplanted were interested in a neutralist solution and that was the reason he took over. Quite frankly, we are inclined to discount this considerably because in our dealings with these earlier people, although there were some earlier tensions among them, we did not have the impression that General Dinh, for example, and General Don, were interested in a neutralist solution. This might have been more of a part of General Khanh's own claim to a takeover.

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[3] Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy D. Kohler.

I think the main problem really is, it seems strange to say it, in Saigon itself, the actual organization of the government, the matter of decisionmaking in the apparatus of the government, to get decisions made in time to give the field what it needs and to service the effort being made in the field.

PROBLEM OF MORALE

Now, it is true that there has been some drop in morale, particularly in the south, in the southern delta area.

I am not now talking about the central and northern areas.

But I think that this is something that was a direct result of the sharply increased Vietcong effort during these two, just after these two, coups. What is needed there—and Ambassador Lodge is very much aware of this and has been pressing on it—are some clear-cut victories to let the people get the feeling that this can be won on the present path.

I am speaking about the morale out there now and not morale back here at the moment.

We have had some problems in reporting. In the course of a particular week there may be several hundred operations, some of them, or many of them, might have no results; that is, no contact established.

Others might be in their own small way successful, but if there is one that is significantly tough, where the government forces did get a punch on the nose, that is the one that gets reports. That is, there is not a comprehensive reporting of the entire effort going on at any one time.

And then when Couve de Murville [4] says, according to news reports, to his own senate that he does not think the military effort in South Vietnam will succeed, that raises a question as to whether this is a prediction or whether it is an object of policy because it is rather unusual to make such predictions in situations where they don't have their own forces engaged.

But I think that General Khanh is aware of the importance of some clearing and holding operations that succeed, and there have been certain ones of those. He was out visiting one of those areas that was seized the other day, that was cleared and has been rid of Vietcong, but he spoiled the news reporting in terms of that particular operation by using that as the occasion for charging the French with trying to assassinate him, so, of course, that got the story and the success of that operation in that particular neighborhood got no play at all.

We need some signs of incidents that would restore their morale.

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[4] French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

UNITED STATES POSITION IN CYPRUS CONFLICT

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me jump to Cyprus for a very brief question.

Within the last few days there has been a flood of antagonism expressed toward us by the Greeks in Athens and elsewhere, charging that we were really lined up on the side of the Turks. I didn't recall any overt act that might justify any such feeling as that. Just what did they have reference to?

Secretary **Rusk**. When we get involved or drawn into a situation of this sort, it is customary for both sides to charge us with favoring the other one if we don't favor his own side, and we have not taken a view, we didn't think it was our place to take the view that the treaty of guarantee and the constitutional arrangements of 1959 and 1960 are no good, that they should be disregarded, that it is not workable.

We have not expressed a view on what could be a political solution to the problem on the island; mediators are going to work at this. As far as the United States is concerned, anything that is acceptable to the people on the island and to Greece and Turkey is certainly acceptable to us. It is not up to us to come up with a pattern of our own until a mediator has had a chance to see what the possibilities are.

Greece has had a good deal of excitement in Greece aimed at us simply because we haven't taken the Greek point of view. In Turkey, the Turks feel we have not taken the Turkish point of view 100 percent. We have tried to keep in close touch with both sides, but the problem, Senator, here is that Makarios has gotten the bit in his teeth and he is moving very hard.

The Greek Government is faced with the fact, apart from his own public opinion, that unless they come along with Makarios to a considerable extent they will lose control of him and the situation could become even worse, so they have been pulled by Makarios into what may be quite an extreme view of what the answer here might be.

But the Greek reaction is based on our neutrality, in effect, on the merits of a political result.

COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY RUSK

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me just say this one thing, Mr. Secretary.

I want to commend you for two recent speeches that you have made that I think have been of a kind of which we need more. I refer particularly to your lecture at Columbia University, the one that Harlan Cleveland delivered for you with reference to needed changes in the United Nations, and the one that you made here in Washington, I believe it was last Tuesday, with reference to some of the changes that are taking place in the foreign policy world and the varying degrees of our operating with the different Communist countries. I thought both the speeches were very fine presentations of practical matters, and I commend you for it.

Secretary **Rusk**. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will not take more time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper.

DEALING WITH GUERRILLA WARFARE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The discussion in the papers about the infiltration in the Mekong Delta and in through there of arms by the North Vietnamese, and the problems that are presented, does raise some very serious questions.

Senator MORSE. A little louder, Bourke.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say the reports of the infiltration of arms and so on by sea into the delta region south of Saigon, which for anybody who has ever flown over the area over there would seem to lend itself to that kind of operation, are really quite serious.

Now, how are we going to stop that business?

Secretary RUSK. I suppose there is no more difficult terrain in which to operate against guerrillas than in that kind of studded lake that makes up the southern part of South Vietnam. There is one possibility that we are working on as far as Cambodia is concerned. We think that it is possible that some of these arms sail into Cambodia through the international shipping and then are infiltrated back from Cambodia by small boats in this vast watery wasteland of this southern delta.

Now, Sihanouk has made some suggestions about four power arrangements with South Vietnam, Bangkok, himself, and ourselves in which he has offered to establish some more effective control activity along that border. We are trying to find a way to build something on that that might help interfere with this kind——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After he made those suggestions, didn't he run away from them?

Secretary RUSK. He was to make public today his actual text of what he had in mind. I can't tell you that he won't run away from them, but at the time I left the Department he had not done so. He can do so by the time I get back to the Department, [deleted]. But both Bangkok and Vietnam have been reasonably receptive to this idea, and we think it is possible that something can be done there that would help on the Cambodian frontier.

There may be other avenues from the sea, but we are sharply stepping up the water resources that are available to try to patrol some of that water country there and try to get at this problem.

THE JUNK PATROL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With the myriad inlets or outlets of the river delta area there, the impression is created anyway that these smugglers, or infiltrators of arms and munitions and so on, come down there and land almost anyplace along there, and unless we have a rather extensive network of sea control around these coasts, practically a blockade, there is no way of stopping them. We may catch one once in a while.

Secretary RUSK. The junk patrol has been greatly increased and certainly new type vessels are now arriving on the scene with high-speed capabilities that can do a great deal better job on patrolling this area, but it is a problem of running them down and, as you point out, in these thousands of different channels that are available to smugglers, to build up the intelligence resources that will help spot these fellows in a way that will make it possible to go after them. This is a problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are the South Vietnamese sea-minded at all? Can they operate on the sea?

Secretary RUSK. In the junk patrol, where we have been for some time operating in junks along the northern coast, we think the infiltration from the north by sea has been pretty much stopped, and this harassment of North Vietnamese junks by sea has been going on quite effectively.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE VILLAGERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as at least the delta region from Saigon south, or around Saigon or in the south is concerned, what about the attitude of the people there; that is, the people who live in these villages?

I get the impression sometimes that all those people want is just to be let alone, and they don't care much who runs them, who controls them, who governs them, or anything else, but just to be let alone. Therefore, they are susceptible to the control of any crowd that comes in with a gun or they are subject to intimidation. They don't really have anything to fight for much, I mean from their attitude.

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, to be realistic we should not overestimate the political attitudes of villagers. I think I have said to the committee before that when I was a small boy in Cherokee County, GA, we viewed with great suspicion any officer of the Federal Government who came up to the area where we lived. We didn't get up in the morning and beat our breasts and say, "What can we do for Woodrow Wilson today."

I think that the villagers have shown that where they can be given security and protection; that is, where it is safe to cooperate with the government, this attitude has been good. But they, when they are subject to the shuttlecock of terror and violence that occurs when the Vietcong are in on them one day and the armed forces of the South Vietnamese are in on them the next, and the Vietcong make it quite clear to them if they do cooperate the Vietcong will be back, until there is an effective answer to that problem, the attitude of the villagers is certainly going to be uncertain at best.

But in other areas, those who have been pacified and are well organized, it has been demonstrated that the villager will be responsive if he is given a minimum of security.

DIFFERENCES IN UPLAND AND DELTA REGIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My impression, which is only an impression, is that that probably is true to a substantial extent north of Saigon and in the upland regions where they have a little more latitude of movement and so on, but down in that delta region where they are confined to these villages for whatever protection or security they have, they have to depend upon the people who are in charge at the moment.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct. There has been, I think, one fairly important development that would be on the favorable side. The Cao Dai has particularly been drawn into the government. There is a minister from the Cao Dai secretary; there is a Cao Dai province chief where that secretary makes up the principal part of the population. There does seem to be some progress in this field, but basically, I think that the villager is going to have to think about his own neck. If he is reasonably secure he will cooperate, but if it is going to cost him his neck he is going to withhold his cooperation.

EXTENDING THE AREA OF SOLID CONTROL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So long as that may exist, that idea of just security regardless of who gives it to him, he will cooperate with whatever group seems to offer him, at the moment at least, the most security from raids and thievery and banditry and killing. It would seem that about the only hopeful procedure would be a stepped-up periphery control there, a sea control, together with additional security at that Cambodian border.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is being done, but the other tactic which I think may begin to show promise, is already beginning to show some promise, is to concentrate on extending the area of solid control from where you are. There was too much jumping around at distances there for a time.

Now, General Khanh's plan is to move from the areas that are well protected into the next peripheral area, so as you move out you begin to extend the area of solid control and enlarge the well-protected routes. This is being done in the delta area at the present time, and this is the main purpose of these clear-and-hold operations that are now in progress. But it is going to be difficult in this delta area because of the terrain and the infinite opportunities that guerrillas have of hitting and running.

VIETNAMESE RELIGIOUS DISPUTE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this question, which you can answer with discretion as far as you want to go, about the so-called religious dispute confusion over there.

Just from the composite of reading whatever you can read, and having been on the ground there a couple of times for a superficial look at this thing, and on one occasion I spent 8 to 10 days down there trying to trace down a lot of rumors, two or three of us down there trying to do this—what do you find about the claim that Diem was out to do in the Buddhists as against the idea that Buddhist uprising there was an induced uprising by political groups that were trying to overthrow the local government; in other words, using the Buddhists, where the Buddhists had no real complaint about any religious restrictions or the denial of religious rights broadly?

There may have been a few Buddhists who were conspirators, something of that kind. I never found any evidence, although this was, as I say, superficial—we never found any evidence of religious persecution down there, that the Buddhists were being put down as a religion or anything else.

Then suddenly this immolation business started, and there have been stories they used emotional hypnosis of one kind or another on some of these people to go out and burn themselves because they were deluded into the idea they were being put upon and so on.

Have you come to any conclusions on that yet?

Secretary RUSK. I couldn't, I suppose, support this this morning with details based on intelligence reports.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say, I won't press you to go any further than you think you should.

Secretary RUSK. My own personal view, having read an enormous number of these reports, is that this was very much of a mixed picture, that there was some religious tension but that this, some of these incidents, opened the door to political action, political effort, and before this thing was over it was heavily involved with political issues and not just the religious issue.

I think, sir, that one of the most serious——

IMMOLATION OF BUDDHIST MONKS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just ask there to clear this up just a little bit?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let's go back prior to the first immolation by a Buddhist monk or individual there. Prior to that time, and prior to the time publicity was given to claimed religious persecution there which suddenly just sort of flared up down there, did we have any reason to believe, from evidence or anything else, that the Diem government or the government in authority down there was engaging in a calculated restrictive policy toward religious freedom of the Buddhists?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe that this was——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As against the idea that some Buddhist monk might have done something that was contrary to law and then tried to say he was being put upon because of his religion?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. I don't believe there was an organized nationwide drive against the Buddhists. On the other hand, there were some incidents that could have been avoided, that were incidents with high religious sensitivity with them.

For instance, the incidents up in Hue, in connection with the flying of the flags, when the Buddhists tried to fly their own Buddhist flags and the police moved in very hard there. They took on the overtones of a very repressive, suppressive religious measure.

But then, as soon as two or three instances of that sort gathered momentum, it opened up the possibility of moving in, for political forces to move in, to try to take advantage of this. I think there were incidents that were not well handled in order to reduce the impact of religious feeling.

Senator MORSE. Why can't somebody go ahead and cross-examine the Secretary until we vote and get down?

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me say it is a live quorum.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a live quorum. We will come right back.

POLITICALLY INSPIRED INCIDENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know. It is a very confusing thing. I have not been able to form positive opinions when it is so confused and the evidence is so confused. I think there were incidents there that occurred, but I am wondering whether those incidents were in some ways politically inspired and not really based upon a policy of religious restriction and persecution.

Frankly, at the time I was over there—Mike was over there about the same time, 4 or 5 years ago—there were a series of articles run in the Scripps-Howard papers by some extravagant reporter, and I don't see him any more.[5]

Senator SPARKMAN. I remember.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We were on the ground there. We ran down every lead we had there, and he wouldn't give us any names.

I came to the conclusion he got them out of the bar gossip around Saigon. There wasn't any evidence to support those stories at all fundamentally or basically, and yet it created a lot of friction and a lot of speculation, but certainly, I have never seen any persuasive evidence that the government over there was indulging in any systematic suppression of the Buddhists in one way or the other.

Now, every once in a while some Buddhist zealot might think he was stronger than the government or something of that kind. From that, with political agitation, it would create incidents.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do think it continued to be a mixed picture, because on the religious side there was that Buddhist committee. Vice President Tuc had tried to work out an arrangement with them and with President Diem that would at least remove the religious aspect from the picture, and he was very disappointed that President Diem did not back his effort on that basis and Ambassador—both our Ambassadors who were out there during that period——

The CHAIRMAN. Nolting.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Nolting and Lodge both worked on that aspect, because they felt it possible to get that religious element out of that problem so if it continued it would be on a political basis.

So, it was a mixed picture. It wasn't clean one way or the other, Senator.

LOCAL LEADERSHIP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe that. It wasn't clean one way or the other, but I have been concerned about the inception of the thing, what started the whole business.

You can start a hassle here in this country or any other country with the insidious origins of the thing, or the things that one wonders about, and then people could get emotional and so on. I won't take more time.

Secretary RUSK. I think one of the more difficult problems was the failure to make use of as much local leadership as possible in the different provinces and districts. There was a tendency to bring in fellows from the outside—they might have been from a wholly different part of the country—who were strangers to the area.

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[5] In 1959 the Foreign Relations Committee investigated charges of corruption in the Aid Program to South Vietnam, based on newspaper articles by Albert Colegrove.

Many of them were charged with trying to exploit the local population from the outside, and this was a weakness. I think Khanh has done quite a good job in trying to get local leadership on board in these local provinces and districts.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Hickenlooper, may I put a question?

U.N. STUDY OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

Did the United Nations appoint a commission to make a study of the issue of religious persecution?

Secretary RUSK. They did.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did that commission repoort?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, they did. They reported.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did it find?

Secretary RUSK. Well, quite frankly, sir, I haven't refreshed my recollection on that, because the commission's work was pretty much overtaken by the events of President Diem's turnover, and their report gained very little attention at that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. My understanding is that the commission made its report and found that there was not religious persecution in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. I will have to look that up. I just haven't refreshed my recollection on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask if we have a copy of that U.N. report in our committee files?

Secretary RUSK. We can get you one.

Mr. HOLT. It has been published as a Senate document.[6]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator Mansfield?

THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I was interested in what you had to say relative to the Geneva Accords which set the boundary at the 17th parallel and which in effect guaranteed, at least on paper, the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.

I was also interested in what you had to say relative to the possibility, the good possibility, or at least the favorable possibility, of a four-power conference seeking to bring about a guarantee of the borders of Cambodia and the continuation of a neutrality.

Now, as far as the Geneva Accords are concerned we were not signatories, but we did not disappove it. As a matter of fact, I believe we gave our indirect approval to it, and if I remember correctly, [Walter] Bedell Smith, who was then the Under Secretary of State, was outside the conference rooms, I suppose, protecting our interests.

Secretary RUSK. At the table, Senator, if I may interrupt for a moment, at the table Bedell Smith said although we do not subscribe to them, we will conform our policies to them and would view as a very serious matter any infringement of these agreements.

Senator MANSFIELD. We were not a signatory to Geneva Accords.

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[6] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, "*Report of United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to South Vietnam,*" committee print, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964.

Secretary **Rusk**. Of 1954, that is right, sir.

Senator **Mansfield**. There was another addition to the accords, 2 years after they were signed, that there would be elections in both North and South Vietnam, is that correct?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

DE GAULLE'S POLICY OF NEUTRALIZATION

Senator **Mansfield**. That is something which I never personally agreed to because I felt it was pushing it too far. But when General de Gaulle made his proposal concerning neutralization of Southeast Asia, did he do so in specific terms or in general terms?

Secretary **Rusk**. In the most general terms.

Senator **Mansfield**. Did he say that Communist China would have to be brought into such a situation?

Secretary **Rusk**. In effect, he did, yes, sir.

Senator **Mansfield**. Did he say Communist China would have to be one of those people brought in or did he say that Communist China was a factor in that area?

Secretary **Rusk**. His position is, as we understand it, that Peiping's agreement is important to any settlements of Southeast Asia.

Senator **Mansfield**. Did he give you that in so much detail?

Secretary **Rusk**. No detail beyond just what I have given you.

Senator **Mansfield**. Did he mention in his proposal for neutralization of Southeast Asia that Communist China must be a signatory or a participant specifically?

Secretary **Rusk**. I would have to check his exact language but in our conversations with the French it seemed to us quite clear that they feel there is no solution for Southeast Asia without Peiping's participation.

Senator **Mansfield**. That may be their idea.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield**. But when he advanced this idea or this proposal did he state specifically that Communist China must be one of the participants?

Secretary **Rusk**. I would have to look to his exact language on that. I don't——

Senator **Mansfield**. I think you will find that he didn't mention any countries. There has been a good deal of talk going around when someone suggests that consideration be given to a proposal by De Gaulle, whether it is good or bad can be decided, that what he had in mind was that Communist China would have to be one of the participants. The reason I recalled what you said about Cambodia is that there you have a territorial guarantee being considered, a continued neutralization of a nation being considered, and the powers involved in it happen to number the four which you mentioned, the United States, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

That is correct?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is right, sir.

UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF SEATO

Senator **Mansfield**. As I understand it, our purpose in South Vietnam is to maintain the agreement reached at Geneva in 1954;

that is, to make sure that the 17th parallel is the border on the north, and that South Vietnam is not violated along the west through Laos or Cambodia or along the east by the sea routes which at the present time seem to furnish a means of access for arms and men, some men, and materiel, to the Mekong Delta area.

It has always been my belief that the reason we were in South Vietnam was to make sure that that guarantee was carried out, is that correct or incorrect?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. If that guarantee is carried out, does that mean that any special relationship exists between South Vietnam and this country or any other country except one which it itself desires to make?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. It is a protocol state as far as the SEATO Treaty is concerned.

Senator MANSFIELD. It is not a member of SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But that protocol could only come into operation at the request of the Saigon Government. The same would be true of Cambodia and the same would be true of Laos.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, it is under the umbrella of SEATO, and before SEATO could take any action there it would have to be at the request of the government in power at the time?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

INCREASING UNITED STATES FORCES IN VIETNAM

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you anticipate that in order to maintain our present position in Laos that it may be necessary in the future to increase our forces and our support considerably, to maintain the present position?

Secretary RUSK. In Laos?

Senator MANSFIELD. In South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. In South Vietnam.

It is possible, Senator, but we believe that the forces and the materiel that are required to do this job are present in South Vietnam.

Senator MANSFIELD. At least for the time being?

Secretary RUSK. If the other side—and there was some indication that the other side might be thinking of stepping up its activity very substantially—if the other side escalates then this changes the picture considerably.

Senator MANSFIELD. But the other side has escalated its activity and, according to the latest figures I have seen, the number of Vietcong in the Mekong Delta has risen from somewhere in the neighborhood of 20,000 to 35,000 and, I was surprised to read just lately, supplied mostly with American arms.

Secretary RUSK. I think you would have to distinguish between the armed hardcore and the hangers on. Our figures for the armed hardcore for the entire country remains about 25,000. In different parts of the country you have auxiliaries of various sorts and the figures could vary, go up and down a good deal, but I think those figures would be somewhat high as far as the armed element in the delta area are concerned.

Senator MANSFIELD. Isn't it true in the Mekong Delta area that the Vietcong now are operating on a battalion basis in part?

Secretary RUSK. There are battalion-sized groups in the delta area.

Senator MANSFIELD. And they have been identified by number or by name?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

GUARANTEEING THE 17TH PARALLEL

Senator MANSFIELD. Suppose that there was a means found by which the 17th parallel could be guaranteed, by which the inflow of arms, men, and materiel on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia, and by sea—suppose those factors came into being and the security and safeguarding of Vietnam was the result, so that it went back to the position exclusive of the elections which supposedly were guaranteed by the Geneva Accords of 1954. Would that be a satisfactory situation as far as this country was concerned, even though it meant the maintenance of American troops and/or other troops to protect, to guarantee those borders and to make sure that this infiltration of various kinds is not continuing; would that be satisfactory?

Secretary RUSK. That would be satisfactory, Senator.

As a matter of fact, I have said to Gromyko that there is no problem here if the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 were to be carried out.

Senator MANSFIELD. Right.

Secretary RUSK. In other words, the American military presence in South Vietnam is a direct result of action by Hanoi. That military presence would have no raison d'être if Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone. But we have got agreements spelling out exactly what you have said. Perhaps it would improve the situation if you would get everybody to say, "I really did mean these and we will perform on them."

We have got the agreements. The problem is to get performance on them.

A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION

Senator MANSFIELD. Exactly. But if you could guarantee those agreements by the stationing of American, Vietnamese, and/or other forces along those borders to make sure that this infiltration from the north did not continue, would that be satisfactory?

Secretary RUSK. That is what we are doing now.

The CHAIRMAN. Trying to do.

Senator MANSFIELD. We are not doing it because they are still shipping in enough by sea or over the trail.

Secretary RUSK. I say that is what we are trying to do.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you are trying to do. That would be satisfactory. That would be a satisfactory conclusion. If you could guarantee the integrity and the stability and the independence of South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the important thing is not the guarantee that is on a piece of paper.

Senator MANSFIELD. Oh, no.

Secretary **Rusk**. It is not that our forces are there to try to insist upon a guarantee. The important thing is performance by the other side.

Senator **Mansfield**. All right.

Secretary **Rusk**. And in the absence of performance by the other side, the agreement is worth nothing and the forces of guarantee have this very difficult and tough job.

Senator **Mansfield**. All right. The point is this: I realize that a paper agreement is worth just what the signatories think it is, but I am thinking of an agreement based on ironclad guarantees which would prevent and/or stop this infiltration from the north into South Vietnam.

THE FUTURE STATUS OF SOUTH VIETNAM

It is my understanding that we are in South Vietnam to restore it to the position which was accorded to it under the Geneva agreement in 1954.

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Mansfield**. And if that agreement is achieved, if that objective is attained, what is the status of South Vietnam then? Is it a neutral state?

Secretary **Rusk**. It is an unaligned state.

Senator **Mansfield**. Is it a neutral state?

Secretary **Rusk**. Oh, I think if you got the situation—it might be neutral like Austria or like Sweden. I am a little worried about the word "neutral" because that carries psychological implications that are not necessarily there. It would certainly be unaligned. It would not be allied to anybody.

Senator **Mansfield**. Not even to us unless it so desired?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir. And in the case of Laos, by the way, remember, Senator, in connection with the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos, the Laotian Government as a part of those accords said that it would not invoke the protocol of the SEATO Treaty.

Senator **Mansfield**. That is correct, and I think Sihanouk made the same declaration in behalf of Cambodia, if I am not mistaken.

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct.

FRENCH PROPOSALS ON VIETNAM

Senator **Mansfield**. The point I am getting at is this: Here is a man of the stature of De Gaulle, maybe you like him, maybe you don't. He has done lots of things that disturb us and worry us, but he makes a proposal, and judgment is made, well, maybe there is something in it. Let's look into it. If it is worthwhile, let's consider it and if not, let's throw it out the window.

The first thing you know you have people saying, "Well, this means that an advocacy is being made to bring about a settlement in that part of the world which must include Communist China." By the same token you are considering, at the request of Prince Sihanouk a neutralization, a guaranteed neutralization of Cambodia in which Communist China is not implicated in any way, but in which four powers have agreed, at least seem to be on the verge of agreeing through negotiations covering that particular situation, is that correct?

Let me ask, Are you willing to consider it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, but, Senator, there are overtones about the French attitude our there that are quite disturbing. In connection with Laos, for example, the French Ambassador——

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

Senator MANSFIELD. Of course, in South Vietnam there is no possibility of any French contact being reestablished as it might be in Laos and as it perhaps can be in Cambodia, as I submit.

Secretary RUSK. I would think not, sir. I think one of the problems there—well, there are two problems. One is to clarify the real attitude of the French Government. We have been trying to do that in the past weeks, and our Ambassador is trying to see the Foreign Minister to press this further.

NO SPECIFIC FRENCH PLAN

The answers we are getting from Paris are that President de Gaulle's statements are long term in character. They have nothing to do with the immediate situation. He has no French plan for Southeast Asia and this was simply a long-term policy objective.

But again, I go back to the point that the real answer is so simple, and I think it may be, Senator, that the new pressures which have been mobilized behind the scenes on the Laotian question, with which we think the French might help, could help a great deal in South Vietnam. If we could get Laos into a situation where the Geneva Accords of 1962 were being carried out, this would relieve pressure on South Vietnam overnight.

Senator MANSFIELD. To conclude, Mr. Chairman, what the Secretary has just said in part was the basis of a conversation of the French Ambassador during his earlier testimony, which indicates that what de Gaulle has in mind is a long-term general plan and no specific proposal has been presented.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. We have pressed him for weeks for more specific proposals, to enter into a conversation as to what is really on their minds, and we haven't gotten anything beyond a general statement of General de Gaulle.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. His objective is apparently confusion at the moment and long-range mystification.

Senator MANSFIELD. Not unusual.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have to affirm that if you don't want to, but you may.

Secretary RUSK. I think I will leave that. I could show other scars in this same direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, do you wish to ask questions?

Senator AIKEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I have a few questions.

DISAPPROVAL OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

First, I want to join with Senator Sparkman in commending the Secretary's Columbia speech. I haven't read the Washington speech, but I now assigned to Pat Holt the job of getting me a copy of it before the day is over. I don't know of any formal public pronouncements you make, Mr. Secretary, that I don't read and study very carefully because, although you and I differed on a good many matters of foreign policy in recent months, they have in no way lessened my respect for your position or your views.

Secretary **Rusk**. Thank you, Senator Morse.

Senator **Morse**. I want to say for the benefit of Mike Mansfield that he is quite wrong if he thinks there are those of us in Congress who don't disapprove of policies in Vietnam. I was opposed to going in and I am opposed to staying in. There are a number of us, as debates this year will show.

As long as we are there, I have in trust as a Senator to do what I can to strengthen the program of my country and at the same time do what I can to change the policy of my country, because I want to say, Mr. Secretary, I do not think this administration is aware of the grassroots of America on South Vietnam. Any talk of escalating our program in South Vietnam just makes me tremble as to what is going to happen in this country.

I am going to have a few questions to ask about the casualties before I get through and the cost, but the American people are not going to take American casualties in South Vietnam. You might as well face up to it now. The French Government fell on it, and the administrations in this country are going to fall on it is my prediction if we don't get some help to South Vietnam.

SOURCES OF VIETCONG SUPPLIES

My first question is: Doesn't the Vietcong depend for food on the countryside and for the most part on weapons that they take from their adversaries?

Secretary **Rusk**. Food almost entirely from the countryside, but we have had indications of medical supplies coming in from the north, and some weapons. As far as weapons are concerned, they come from a great variety of sources.

Now, a good many of them were weapons in the country from the French days. There are other weapons taken during the course of the fighting, from present South Vietnamese armed forces.

There have been others that have come in from the north. For example, 75 millimeter recoilless rifles and certain antiaircraft weapons certainly came in from the Chinese—we got 7 tons of weapons in the south made by the Chinese—and they have many homemade weapons, rather crude types, which they make themselves.

So the weapon situation is one of great—a mixed bag.

Senator **Morse**. Some of the information we have received in the past was that they were making great use of our own weapons that they have recovered, captured in some of the raids on the South Vietnam forces.

Secretary **Rusk**. In the daily operational reports, or on the operations I see every day, there is listed the number of weapons lost by friendly forces and the number of weapons seized from the Vietcong. It is true there is an interchange of weapons through capture on both sides.

A CIVIL WAR

Senator **Morse**. Is it true that a majority of the Vietcong are still southerners; that is, South Vietnamese?

Secretary **Rusk**. I would think so, sir.

Senator **Morse**. Therefore, is it true that we are dealing in part—the descriptive phrase may be inaccurate—but we are dealing in part with what amounts to a civil war condition among the South Vietnamese themselves?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, I think civil war in the sense that the Greek guerrilla operations were civil war, but in no less sense than that, or no greater sense.

These cadres do come in from the north.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Morse**. Back on the record.

INTERVENING IN INDIGENOUS REVOLUTIONS

The very asking of the type of question I am now asking, of course, can be misinterpreted. There is no one greater in opposition to Communist revolutions, but I think one of the difficulties we have with some of our allies, our allies around the world, involves this question of fact that I have raised, that in South Vietnam from the beginning you had a split in the population between the anti-Communists and the Communists. You have basically there a drive that was made within the population for changing their government into a Communist form of government. The United States intervened, and that raises a question as to whether or not outside of the perimeter of our defense necessities—and I will come to that later—we stand in a very strong position in world public opinion for intervening to prevent an indigenous population from conducting whatever kind of a revolution it wants, Chinese revolution, Fascist revolution, Democratic revolution, or whatnot.

This fact bothers me in the situation, which is this outside help from Hanoi, outside help from elsewhere, probably China, but basically it is a fight among South Vietnamese, with the United States pretty much unilaterally supplanting the French in the picture.

Is there any basis for that attitude on the part of the people elsewhere in the world?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, if one goes back to, say, the years 1957, 1958, along in there, things were moving very well in South Vietnam. There was not the Vietcong threat in anything like its present proportions. There were a good many political refugees from South Vietnam to Paris or other places, but there was not a broad-based nationwide coalition government present.

HANOI'S DECLARATION TO TAKE OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

In 1959, in Hanoi, they publicly declared their determination to take over South Vietnam. They stepped up at that point infiltration, direction, control, cadres, and all the rest of it.

This is, therefore, much more than a civil war. This is not just the internal processes of a country deciding what kind of government it will have. This does involve outside intervention in violation of solemn commitments undertaken by the parties who are conducting this outside intervention.

Had the situation in 1957 and 1958 continued, there would have been at the most nothing more than a few military assistance people who might have been there in connection with assisting them in some arms or something of that sort, but even there we would have been glad for the French to go ahead on that basis and not involve the United States at all. So this is like Greece; it is not just an ordinary case of a civil war.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I interrupt, would the Senator yield on that point? In 1958 you say they publicly announced their purpose to take it over?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The government did?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the government and the party. But I will get for the committee those 1959 declarations.

[The information referred to follows:]

EXCERPTS FROM DECLARATIONS BY THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN NORTH VIETNAM OF INTENTION TO TAKE OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

From an article by Ho Chi Minh in the Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, July 10, 1959:

"We are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

From an article by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Lao Dong Party journal Hoc Tap, January 1960 issue:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army * * *. The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

From the speech of Ho Chi Minh at the opening session of the Lao Dong Party's Third Congress in Hanoi, September 5, 1960:

"Our nation is one, our country is one. Our people will undoubtedly overcome all difficulties, 'achieve national reunification and bring the North and South together again.' "

From the political report of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party delivered at the Party's Third Congress in Hanoi by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Committee, on September 5, 1960:

"* * * the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South * * *"

From the Resolution of the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, adopted at Hanoi on September 10, 1960:

"In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam; second, to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other foward.

"* * * our people must strive to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification * * *

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: * * * to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Vietnam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Vietnam * * *".

The **Chairman**. Why didn't we react at that time more violently? There is this talk about escalation for the purpose of making them abide by it. I didn't recall the public statement of their purpose to violate the 1954 agreement and take over South Vietnam.

Secretary **Rusk**. From 1959 afterward, their effort has not been surreptitious from the north. They may have been very blatant about it, making public whatever it is they determine to do.

The **Chairman**. That is factually so, but I didn't think it was publicly stated. Pardon me.

Secretary **Rusk**. I will furnish that for the committee.

U.S. ROLE IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Senator **Morse**. I am a little confused, Mr. Secretary, as a result of the colloquy you had with the majority leader a few minutes ago about the accord of July 21, 1954, at Geneva, as to exactly what the position of the United States was. I agree it apparently appears to be the paragraph beginning: "Final declaration dated the 21st of July, 1954, on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China,"—in which the representatives of—"Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Vietnam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part."

I understood from the colloquy between you and the majority leader that the United States did not sign that accord.

Did any country sign it?

Secretary **Rusk**. Oh, yes. I think all of those named there, except the United States and South Vietnam, signed the accord.

Senator **Morse**. And Mr. Bedell Smith was our representative at the conference, in whatever capacity he served.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes. Mr. Dulles was our original representative and Mr. Bedell Smith took his place when Mr. Dulles left the conference.

Senator **Morse**. Would it be right to say that Bedell Smith sat there as an American observer?

Secretary **Rusk**. He was a participant. He was a participant in the conference. He was something more than an observer. You see, we were participants but did not sign the final act.

Senator **Morse**. We did not sign the final act?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Morse**. But after the act was signed, was it fair to say in general summary that the United States said that it would do what it could to enforce the commitments that were made in the accord?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, sir, I think he put it—he made two points. I don't know whether General Bedell Smith's statement is there in that particular report.

Senator **Morse**. It isn't.

Secretary **Rusk**. He made two points. One is that the United States would conform its policy to those accords, but that any violations of those accords would be looked upon as a very serious matter by the United States.

WHY IS THE UNITED STATES ACTING UNILATERALLY

Senator **Morse**. Now, getting that settled, the accord was entered into, and we are in South Vietnam, apparently to enforce the 17th parallel agreement that the majority leader referred to and to protect South Vietnam from being taken over by the Communists. I want you to discuss for a few minutes with us the most disturbing problem to me, and that is why this is so much a unilateral action on the part of the United States?

Assume now that South Vietnam should go down to the Communists. I am not so sure if she went down to the Communists she wouldn't be more trouble to the Communists than of benefit, but assuming she went down, what would be the danger of that loss to the United States in respect to the danger of its loss to Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain and other countries that have interests in Asia?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think, sir, that each government would make its own evaluation of that. I think that the British, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Thais, the other members of SEATO, the Philippines, would agree this would be a very serious development. It is true we have carried the very large proportion of the burden, almost 97 percent of it during this period. It came about largely because our role there has been one of military assistance and support rather than a SEATO decision to put in forces to carry out combat missions, and it has been a development from the military assistance role which the United States was in for good many years.

ASSESSMENT OF SEATO

Senator **Morse**. I will get back to my line of questioning in a moment, but your reference to SEATO again and your earlier reference in your discussion this morning causes me to ask you this question: Really what part does the SEATO Treaty play any more in regard to the Asian situation vis-a-vis the Communist world?

Isn't SEATO pretty much just a paper document? What is the life of SEATO at the present time? What does SEATO do? What can we count on SEATO to do?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, if I can be completely candid—and I hope complete discretion is entered in the record here for anyone who might read what I say on this point——

Senator **Mansfield**. Why don't you make it off the record then.

Secretary **Rusk**. I don't mind members of the committee seeing what I have to say, but if that is the extent of it, I think, sir, that if we were doing this over again, we would not put SEATO together today in the same way it was put together 10 years ago. We are celebrating its 10th anniversary in Manila in April.

At the present time, Pakistan is so fully preoccupied with other problems that you can almost rule it out of any active participation in SEATO.

France has for all practical purposes resigned from the security commitments of SEATO, but any French effort to support those commitments——

The principal purpose of SEATO in our view at the time, and in Mr. Dulles' view at the time, was that it offered protection to Thailand. The others are connected to us in other respects, but Thailand was the central member.

Now, in view of the French attitude and other things, we have our own military assistance arrangement with Thailand which from the Thais' point of view is at least as strong as SEATO, if not stronger. So that—and we have ANZUS with the Australians and New Zealanders; we have our own arrangements with the Philippines, and so forth.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEATO

An alternative which might have been better in the long run would have been to get the countries in the area itself, without the participation of any great power, to pull together in their own regional grouping which we then could give powerful support to in second reserve—in first reserve. This would have meant Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Philippines, those in the area, but that was not possible. We tried this, frankly, in 1950. That was not possible because the countries in the area weren't ready to do that for themselves, and there were commonwealth ties and other complications.

But I think the SEATO treaty is still well worth adhering to because of Thailand and because of the commitments which would make it possible for the members of SEATO to act if the governments decide they have to act under the circumstances that SEATO had in mind. It creates a legal structure for operation that may be activated even though at the moment SEATO is not the most—is not the liveliest organization I can think of.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for just information?

I am told by Mr. Dutton that you have an engagement for lunch at the White House at 1 o'clock.

Secretary RUSK. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure he will be glad to come back.

Secretary RUSK. I will come back at some other time.

ESCALATION OF THE WAR WILL BE OPPOSED

Senator MORSE. I know you will. I want to make this statement. I want to get on the record somebody, preferably you, or who may refute you, the cost of this operation, the casualties of this operation, what the future of it can possibly be without escalation.

I repeat, escalation, I think, is going to be vigorously, openly opposed here in the Senate and in the Congress and across this country. I shall be vigorously opposed to turning South Vietnam into another Korea. I don't think we have any business there.

That happens to be my view in the first place, but I think we have got to get the facts out to the American people about the cost and the loss. Then I want some questions answered as to why we are paying 97 percent of it. I know of no reason why we should be paying 90 percent of it.

Then I was going to ask you a line of questions as to when there was a shift in the American defense plans, because for a long time this part of Asia was beyond the perimeter of American defense. We didn't include it in the area that was vital to the defense and the security of the United States. Sure, you can say that it is vital to the defense of some of our allies, but if it is, let our allies start doing something about upholding their share of the burden.

It is along this line, Mr. Secretary, that I think we ought to get some facts out to the American people on South Vietnam. I am absolutely convinced that if you start a program over there that ups these casualties, and every casualty is resulting in negative comment across this country, this Government of ours is going to start being charged with murder. The American people are not going to stand for the murder of American boys in South Vietnam in a program that they are not convinced, as yet—this administration has not yet convinced American public opinion that this operation is vital to the defense of the United States.

I am far from convinced that it is vital to the defense of the United States. We had better start getting our allies in on it to join with us or get out. That is my position.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask about three questions? It will only take me about 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if the Secretary wishes.

Secretary RUSK. I will be very glad to come back to discuss this matter.

Senator MORSE. I want to be on the team, but I am not on this team. I want to tell you in my State the bitterness is increasing, and they are not going to buy the death of American boys in South Vietnam. You are going to get you—you are building up to the same public reaction in the United States that the French people developed on the Indochina matter.

You cannot at the present time sell the killing of American boys in South Vietnam to the American people. They won't buy it and I don't think they should buy it.

PULLING OUT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any change among the higher echelon officials of the Defense Department and the State Department about the need in the interests of our national security to pull out of Southeastern Asia?

Secretary RUSK. I don't know of anyone who is recommending that we pull out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any opinion expressed by higher echelon members of the Department of Defense that we cannot win this guerrilla-type of operation with the normal conventional course we are now following?

Secretary RUSK. I have not had that position put to me by anyone. There was a discussion of that in the closing stages of the Diem regime, as to whether the course he seemed to be embarked upon could win. But the position of the Department of Defense is, and the discussions that I hear, is that the men and the materiel, the Vietnamese armed forces and the materiel that are required to do this job are present in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is that it can be done?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that the opinion?

OPTIONS IN VIETNAM

Now then, I would like for my own information to get set forth in series the courses that we can follow. One, we pull out. Two, we can proceed to make the neutralization of South Vietnam effective as contemplated by the Geneva Accords. Three, we can escalate the operation, and four, we can adopt the same technique by South Vietnamese operating in guerrilla fashion in North Vietnam as the North Vietnamese are adopting in South Vietnam.

Am I reasonably—are those courses that can be followed and have they been considered?

Secretary RUSK. Those alternatives are among those—at the moment I don't——

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any one——

Secretary RUSK. I haven't—I think in the second course that it is possible to organize further political pressures and action to accomplish the second course, but this can only be done, I think, if the other side begins to get nervous about the consequences of their pursuing their present course.

NOT ANOTHER KOREAN WAR

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been any crystallization of judgment about our ability to engage in what you call a land warfare and emerge anywhere near victorious with the Chinese on the one side and ourselves on the other?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that if it became necessary to make a basic decision to do more, rather than the present track, that from a purely military point of view it would not be another Korea-type of situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The terrain, the geography, and the character of force would not be involved in that. But I do think we ought to face the fact that conventional war against China is not appropriate. With all that massed manpower, we just can't take that on. [Deleted.] Whether it means general nuclear war is something else, but these decisions to get off the track that we are on, is the point I wanted to make, to get off the track we are on will mean the gravest possible decision on the part of the United States, whether to pull out or to do a lot more, the gravest possible decision.

Senator LAUSCHE. To what extent have we considered this last course that I identified of having the South Vietnamese begin guerrilla-type of operations in North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I would prefer not to comment on the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

COMPARISON OF KOREA AND VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. This final question: What is the difference between South Korea, where we are not having any reports of Communist activities, and so many reports of Communist activities in South Vietnam?

Why is there that difference? Is it because of the barricades and the patrolling of the border?

Secretary RUSK. I think, first, sir, that the South Koreans do have, and have had from the beginning, a much stronger anti-Communist commitment throughout the population than was true in Southeast Asia. Remember that in Southeast Asia, the independence of Southeast Asia, the nationalist feelings of Southeast Asia, communism emerged in 1945 and 1946.

Looking back at it, I am not sure that we in the West, and I will start with France, handled Ho Chi Minh very well. He might have taken off on another track.

This is not true of Korea. Korea got its independence because the United States defeated Japan, and they knew right away they had a commitment there because they knew it. Also the forces in South Korea are able to seal off against any infiltration. There are 500,000 Korean forces and 2 American divisions there, so the other side doesn't have the same opportunity to infiltrate as they have had in South Vietnam.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I think that is all.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **RUSK**. I am afraid I will have to run, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much.

He will come back whenever we get the committee together.

[The committee then considered and favorably reported, on motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Gore, the nominations of William P. Bundy, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Elbert G. Matthews, to be Ambassador to Nigeria; Walter M. Kotschnig, to be U.S. Representative to the 19th Plenary Session, Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; and Kenneth T. Young, to be U.S. Representative to the 20th Session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The 6-day rule on nominations was waived by unanimous consent in the case of Mr. Bundy.]

[The committee then adjourned at 1 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International
Organization Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (subcommittee chairman) and Senator Lausche.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, testified on the staff of international organizations.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Humphrey, Long, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Fulbright.

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, John Bullitt, and others, briefed the subcommittee on the Inter-American Development Bank and other hemispheric monetary problems.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Fulbright.

Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, briefed the subcommittee on the situation in Latin America.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in informal session at 10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Long, Gore, Symington, Lausche, Smathers, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt. Senator Morse also was present.

Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and General Maxwell Taylor, Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed the situation in Vietnam with the Committee.

Because the Senate was in session at the time, and from a point of order raised by Senator Morse (who did not remain for the briefing), the committee was in informal session, and no official transcript was kept. The following notes were taken:

Secretary McNamara began by observing that the situation in Vietnam has grown worse since September. He cited a number of statistics to support this point of view. For example, 40 percent of the territory of the country is under Vietcong control or influence. He said further that large elements of the Vietnamese population appear to be showing signs of apathy. This he said is reflected in desertion rates in the army which have increased since September. Also there is draft dodging. Senator Smathers suggested that reports of desertions from the Vietcong had declined after the crisis in mid-1963 and the fall of the Diem regime. He had reference to a newspaper article by Marguerite Higgins. Secretary McNamara said that the trend toward defections away from the Vietcong fell to zero in late 1963, but that it is building back up slowly. However, he pointed out that the morale in the strategic hamlets is very poor. For example, in one province in the northern part of the country 17 hamlets turned in their weapons and refused to fight.

Secretary McNamara went on to say that a number of hamlets have apparently come under Vietcong control over the past year.

Senator Hickenlooper asked the Secretary to relate changes in the situation to the decline and fall of the Diem regime. Secretary McNamara replied that it was difficult to describe precisely those changes that had started to occur before last October and those that have since taken place. He did say, though, that the deterioration in the situation has largely occurred since the time of Diem's overthrow November 2.

He said that security in the fourth corps area south of Saigon was very serious, and that the Vietcong control all facets of peasant life in that area. He added that armed escort is required for travel in two-thirds of the area south of Saigon.

Senator Gore asked about freedom and safety of movement on the highways. The Secretary replied that hazards existed for government and military officials traveling 40 miles or so outside of Saigon, at least in certain directions, but that it is difficult to state with precision exactly where danger of Vietcong ambush might arise.

McNamara said that, since November 1, 35 province chiefs have been replaced, and that most of the major military commands had changed twice since that date. The peasants, he said, have been discouraged by the decline in security and leadership. He observed that support from North Vietnam for guerrilla activity has increased during recent months, and that communications between North Vietnam and its agents in the South have increased in variety and intensity. With respect to equipment he said that North Vietnam had introduced large weapons such as 75 mm rifles and heavy machineguns and 90 mm rocket launchers. There are some United States heavy machineguns on Chinese mounts. Government forces have intercepted large quantities of chemicals for explosives, and have captured 5 tons of ammunition, including 75 mm rifles of Chinese-Communist origin.

The Secretary said that the viability of the Khanh government is uncertain. Khanh's tenure might be stopped short by a coup or assassination. We are concerned about this and we must stabilize the Government of Vietnam, the Secretary said. McNamara said that he cannot look forward to effective action by the insurgents without a stable government. He believes that Khanh does have effective control now. He also said that Khanh is visiting the rural areas a great deal and spends a lot of time with crowds on these trips and that this is a very effective way for him to gain support. The Secretary said that he had confidence in Khanh's abilities to direct a government under the pressure of guerrilla activity. Khanh, he said, is 36 years old, has had no education or political or economic experience. He is, however, a perceptive and aggressive person. He is receptive in the sense that he accepts advice and acts on it.

With regard to American alternatives in Vietnam, he said withdrawal is not worth discussing. This would lead to rapid communization of other Southeast Asia countries such as Laos and Cambodia.

Senator Aiken asked whether the Vietcong had set up a Communist form of government anywhere. The Secretary replied that they have not done this in a formal sense. They have taken control of rural areas and have moved their own people into villages.

Senator Aiken also asked about the situation in Laos. McNamara replied that it was dangerous and unstable and would be worse if we withdrew from South Vietnam. He said Cambodia also would go quickly, and that it wouldn't be long before Thailand would go too. He added that India, Pakistan, and the Philippines and Malaysia would feel the pressure.

With respect to a negotiated settlement directed toward neutralization, the De Gaulle proposal, he said that this was very vague. He suggested that any such proposal would mean that South Vietnam would no longer have the right to call for external assistance in trying to maintain a neutral status, and that this in turn would mean a Communist takeover of the country.

Senator Gore asked why the Secretary assumed that General de Gaulle would want to deny South Vietnam the right to external assistance. He said that he saw no evidence of this in De Gaulle's proposal. Secretary McNamara said De Gaulle's representatives had so indicated.

Senator Symington asked whether General de Gaulle would "move in" to Vietnam if the United States moved out. Secretary McNamara expressed doubt that France would be willing to involve itself as we have in South Vietnam's affairs. He added that France lacked the resources to make the kind of commitment we have made.

Senator Symington asked whether France might be able to work out a solution which would not require military investment owing to its relationship with Red China.

Secretary McNamara said no. He said that De Gaulle has stated privately that he doesn't believe it is possible to negotiate a neutral status in Vietnam. He said France's private view is that negotiations under current conditions would not be possible. The Secretary said it is unfortunate that such statements are not make publicly since De Gaulle's public statements serve to weaken support for South Vietnam. With regard to the alternative of applying military force in various forms against the north, the Secretary said we have considered three categories of military pressure. At this point the Secretary asked General Taylor to explain these various options in greater detail. The General said that border control operations would be one example. A second category would be a selective program of retaliation against North Vietnam, and a third category would be an escalation of military pressure in various forms against the north.

General Taylor said that military action in closing the frontier is very difficult, but that considerable benefit could be gained if we claim for ourselves the right of hot pursuit. General Taylor acknowledged that the amount of cooperation we would get from neighboring countries would be limited, and that this option would create real political problems.

The Secretary explained the second option as kind of an-eye-for-an-eye program. If Vietcong guerrillas destroyed a gasoline supply depot, we could arrange to destroy one in North Vietnam. He said this could be done without direct United States participation, for example, through air strikes by the Vietnam air force. However, the Secretary added that we have a contingency program called "Farmgate" designed to give the Vietnamese air force the capability to make these air strikes by providing an American copilot who would be responsible for the accuracy of the mission. He said "Farmgate" would be a useful program if we decided to embark on aerial mining of North Vietnam.

The third and broader option would be escalating the conflict through air strikes, an expanded "Farmgate" program. This would mean hitting training camps, communications centers, et cetera. He emphasized, these would be American-supplied aircraft controlled by the Vietnamese, but with an American pilot or copilot.

General Taylor was asked about the consequences of such military activity. He seemed to think these were uncertain. He said we might expect some retaliation by air if China provided the military aircraft to the North Vietnamese. He said that it is a difficult possibility to evaluate—that it might lead to limited war in Southeast Asia.

Senator Hickenlooper asked whether if China entered the conflict with substantial numbers of bomber and fighter planes, would South Vietnam have the capability of meeting it.

General Taylor said no, that we would have to use our own Air Force at that point.

Senator Carlson quoted from an article in the Christian Science Monitor that said we are losing in South Vietnam because of our methods. He asked whether Americans were ordering air strikes. General Taylor replied that no American has ordered an air strike in South Vietnam. At this point Secretary McNamara, commenting on the article, said that the war cannot be won by military action alone—the support of the people is needed. This, he said, requires economic and political action, and there is evidence that the government is today or is soon going to take account of individual interests and problems.

On the question of air strikes, he described how the Vietnam guerrillas dig themselves into caves and rice paddies and store underground weapons. He said that in some cases they can only be rooted out with air strikes and the use of napalm bombs.

Senator Sparkman asked whether the decline in the security situation and the morale of the people was in an area that has been throughout the years occupied by the Communists. Secretary McNamara said that the southern area of the country has been under Communist control for 20 years, and that this control has increased during the past 3 to 5 months.

General Taylor said that most of the recruiting by the Vietcong is done by terrorist methods. Secretary McNamara said that figures for 1960–61 showed that the Vietcong assassinated 3,000 civilians and kidnaped 2,500.

General Taylor said that no military man thinks that military action against North Vietnam will win the war—that the war must be won in South Vietnam.

Senator Mundt asked whether there would be an effect on Hanoi if we moved jets into South Vietnam, but did not use them. General Taylor said this was possible.

Senator Fulbright commented on the high motivation of the Vietcong and their apparent determination to win, and contrasted this with the apparent low morale of the government forces. General Taylor agreed that they are highly motivated. He said that guerrilla activity is the only life they know—that there is no comparable class in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said that the high percentage of hardcore Vietcong are from North Vietnam or were recruited in South Vietnam and sent north for training and return. He said the bulk of the people carrying on the guerrilla activities are local South Vietnamese.

Senator Fulbright asked for an estimate of Khrushchev's attitude and his possible reaction to an escalation of the war. Secretary McNamara said this is an important factor in any decision to apply military pressure. He said the Soviets would be under pressure to support the Chinese-Communists because of the question of leadership of the world Communist movement. He said we simply don't know the answer, and this is something that must be considered.

Senator Aiken asked about the possible reaction of the Chinese to operations against North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we had intelligence estimates prepared, but nobody was certain how they would react. He said that if the "Farmgate" program were limited to mining harbors and possibly hitting training camps, the Chinese, he believes, would not react in any effective way. He said the Chinese air force is in a weakened position—that it is dependent on the Soviet Union, which cut off logistical support 2 or 3 years ago. He said the Chinese fuel supply is very low, and that there are only 68,000 men in the Chinese air force. He therefore expressed doubt that the Chinese would react to "Farmgate" pressure against North Vietnam. If so, he said, this would involve application of U.S. forces.

Senator Long asked about the size of the Vietnamese army. Secretary McNamara replied that there are 340,000 regular and paramilitary forces: 190,000 regular; 90,000 in the civil guard; and 50,000 in the civil defense corps.

Senator Lausche asked whether there has been any policy change with respect to our attitude toward South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said no, that our policy of support for South Vietnam would continue. With regard to General Khanh's position on the question of escalating the war, McNamara said that Khanh feels that we should not do so at this time, and that we should continue to concentrate on operations in South Vietnam. He said he might wish to reconsider in 6 months.

This is the alternative we have chosen—to increase our support of the current program in South Vietnam, and this is the recommendation that the Secretary said he is making to the President. Specifically, the Secretary said he is recommending development of a national mobilization plan to place South Vietnam on a direct war footing. This would include a national service law. The size of the military forces would be increased rather substantially. He said he is also proposing that the paramilitary forces be relocated, reorganized, and paid like the regular army. He is also recommending creation of an offensive guerrilla force. He is further recommending improvement in the equipment we are providing to Vietnamese forces.

Senator Gore asked how all this squared with a statement attributed to McNamara last fall that United States military forces in Vietnam would be reduced.

The Secretary said that in October he and General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on their September trip to Vietnam. He said they reported then that the major part of the expanded training could be completed by the end of 1965. He explained in some detail the rationale for this statement. He explained further that the expanded program in Vietnam should not require an increase in American forces. He said that a small number of highly trained personnel is all that would be needed. Secretary McNamara said that some additional actions can be financed by the Vietnamese themselves—that the money supply has increased six times in the past 2 years without substantial inflation. He added that the cost to the United States of the expanded program might be $50 million.

Senator Symington asked whether the final decision as to whether to escalate the military activity would be South Vietnam's or ours. Secretary McNamara said we would have a part in the decision, including the ability to deny South Vietnam the capability to escalate through air strikes, for example.

Senator Hickenlooper observed that China cannot possibly stand idly by and let North Vietnam go down the drain or be severely humiliated. He said they would be forced to make a major effort to prevent a setback to the Communist cause. He said therefore the danger of South Vietnam and Laos going down the drain is very great, and that the time is coming when there has got to be some program for bringing this situation to a conclusion.

With regard to escalation, Senator Fulbright recalled that France once had 200,000 men in Indochina, and asked whether we would contemplate in the event of escalation putting in large numbers of our own forces. Secretary McNamara replied that we would not put large forces in, that our major pressures would be from our Air Force.

Senator Lausche recalled that General MacArthur has said it would be unthinkable to engage in a manpower war in this part of the world with this disparity in population, and that we must contain the Chinese with naval and air power.

Secretary McNamara said the main test would be through air if it came to a showdown. General Taylor said he agreed heartily. He added that in Southeast Asia we have the great advantage of flexibility of our air and naval power. Senator Lausche asked about a report of a 60-percent attrition rate among the government forces. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor said they thought the attrition rate might be about 5 to 10 percent, not 60 percent.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met informally at 3 p.m. in executive session in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Williams, and Mundt.

George Ball, Under Secretary of State, briefed the committee on the situation in Brazil.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 3, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:25 a.m. in room S-116, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The chairman announced that the committee was meeting to consider and mark up the bills (S. 2660) to provide for additional investment guaranties and surveys of investment opportunities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and (S. 2662) to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After discussion, the committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 9:40 a.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and on a voice vote, the committee approved for report the nominations of Rutherford M. Poats, to be Assistant Administrator for Far Eastern Affairs, AID; Henry L.T. Koren, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville); and Katharine Elkus White, to be Ambassador to Denmark.

Senator Morse asked that he be recorded against the nomination of Mr. Poats.

On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee waived the 6-day rule applicable to nominations, in the case of Jack H. Vaughn, and approved for report without objection his nomination to be the Ambassador to Panama.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 9:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 27, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CANADIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Aiken (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Lausche and Symington.

Philip H. Trezise, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Julius Katz, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade, Department of State, Robert L. McNeill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Policy, and Edward Smith, Director, Transportation Equipment Division, Department of Commerce, discussed Canada's import and export trade policies on automobile parts.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 9:15 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Hickenlooper.

The committee took additional testimony from Charles P. English, of Miami, FL, in connection with the nomination of Covey T. Oliver to be Ambassador to Colombia.

Without objection, the committee approved for report to the Senate the Oliver nomination and the nominations of Taylor G. Belcher to be Ambassador to Cyprus, and Pauline Thompkins to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs.

A list of nominations for career Ambassadors and ministers dated April 3, 1964, was put over for another meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 9:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Symington, Dodd, and Hickenlooper.

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, briefed the subcommittee on the situation in the Far East with particular reference to Vietnam and Laos.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

BRIEFING ON LAOS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

[Senator Morse moved that the committee favorably report the bill (S. 2464), to establish the Roosevelt Campobello International Park. On the question being raised whether or not the bill involved a tax deduction for donors operating under it, the bill was put over to another meeting.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having an opportunity to talk informally to the committee.

First, I would like to make a statement on the discovery of the network of microphones in our Embassy in Moscow. Those were apparently built into the building prior to our occupation in 1953. There were 41 of them we dug out of the walls. A good many of them have been rusted over, but we have to assume that at least some of them remained in operation.

From the State security point of view this is nettlesome and troublesome, but it is, we think, not deeply damaging because for many years we have had to assume, based on modern techniques, that any conversations that are carried on in countries like that will be subject to bugging and indeed will be subject to bugging from a distance on line-of-sight techniques that are available from the adjoining buildings and so forth. We have had in our Embassy there some quarters, which some of you have seen, where we can have audioproof conversations, and some of our equipment also is handled in audioproof rooms, so that in general we think that this has not been a distressing, but is a sharply injurious security problem. We are making an assessment of that, and when we get the damage assessments completed I will be glad to report back to the committee.

The **Chairman**. Can I ask one question? Is it true that before you moved in, they didn't force you to move into that, but you chose to move into that?

Secretary **Rusk**. We had asked for other facilities, as I gather the story, and this building was designated and was remodeled for use by the American Embassy. In other words, the remodeling did have American Embassy tenancy in mind. So I would think that they were the target rather than that they had been there for a long time for use against the Russian occupants of the same building. I think there is no doubt in the remodeling process they put these things into the walls.

Now, we can anticipate, and this is the reason I mention this to the committee, we can anticipate a countercharge from the Soviet Union in this same field making various allegations about things that might have been done in the other direction. We just are not going to be able to deny all of them, because this is the kind of battle that goes on all the time regularly, persistently. We might not have announced this except that it was such an interesting point that we were quite certain that our own Government just couldn't keep its mouth shut anyhow, so we might as well announce it. In fact, that is what happened.

On the morning before we made our protest to the Soviet Union, there was already a story in the paper about it, and this——

Senator **Williams**. Excuse me.

Secretary **Rusk**. I am finished.

BUGGING EACH OTHER

Senator **Williams**. Have you actually bugged some of their Embassies or is this just propaganda?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, Senator, when I say this is a battle that goes on all the time in both directions, I would prefer not to be too specific, but there is no question that——

The **Chairman**. They do their best.

Secretary **Rusk** [continuing]. That each government in a situation of this sort does its best to get information on what is going on inside the other country.

We did have one that almost certainly is going to be thrown at us, but I hope that the committee would keep it until the Russians charge us with it.

A Soviet Embassy automobile was in a wreck here not long ago, and when they took it to the garage to get it repaired they found some equipment in there they had not known about before. We will undoubtedly have that charged to us, so this is a back alley fight that goes on all the time, and it has to go on in both directions, and does. This is a disclosure of something that I think everyone knows exists and has assumed exists, but there it is. We will be hearing further from the Soviets about it.

VIETCONG USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY

I would like to comment very briefly, Mr. Chairman, on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

The Cambodians, as you know, brought a case into the Security Council aimed at Vietnam and the United States about border intrusions along that common border.

We have known for some time that the Vietcong have been taking advantage of the Cambodian border to seek a safe haven when they are under pressures of attack from the Vietnamese forces. We also know from captured Vietcong documents that they have deliberately used Cambodian territory for certain of their operations, and that this is a nettlesome and continuing problem along that frontier.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say they have used these, does your information indicate they have used these with the information and connivance and consent of the Cambodians, tacit or otherwise?

Secretary RUSK. Prince Sihanouk has on occasion quarrelled with the Vietcong over the use of Cambodia. He has tried to insist that if they come across the border they leave their arms on the Vietnamese side of the border. That is completely ineffective. His own armed forces are not able to enforce that long border and have made very little effort to do so.

I do not believe that these activities have his blessing but they have his tolerance in the sense that whatever his attitude toward them is, he doesn't consider he is in position to do very much about it. We would prefer, of course, that he complain publicly and strongly about these abuses of the frontier rather than continue to tee off on the South Vietnamese when they find themselves chasing Vietcong and chase them across the border.

In any event I would say that Prince Sihanouk [deleted] seems to be consulting his fears, fears for his own position. He lives in a fair amount of terror about his own safety, and second, a fear that if the Communists succeed in taking Vietnam that he needs to have in advance commitments from them about the neutrality and independence of Cambodia, as though such assurances would be very valuable.

Now, in bringing this case to the Security Council, he opens up, we hope, an opportunity to get that border situation more stabilized. We will be trying to get the United Nations Security Council to move in with some sort of supervision of perhaps a joint border patrol from the two countries, to try to check on and report on and make a fuss about the abuse of the border by the Vietcong and try in that way to stabilize the frontier.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARD CAMBODIA

As far as the South Vietnamese are concerned, their attitude toward Cambodia has been quite forthcoming on the basis of being ready to sit down and discuss border problems.

The South Vietnamese are not making any claims on Cambodian territory. There are a few problems of demarcation in certain areas, but Saigon has been ready for a long time to sit down bilaterally with Cambodia to settle their problems. Indeed, they are prepared to make one or two concessions, on the basis of historical considerations, to the Cambodians with respect to one or two small islands down in the south.

So, we would like to turn this Cambodian initiative back into some machinery that might at least have a discouraging effect on the free use of those borders by the Vietcong, and at least clarify the point that if there seems to be a problem in Cambodia, it also is a problem in South Vietnam.

Mr. Stevenson will be making a speech this morning. He is probably making it right now, I got him, and he is working on it during the morning. We will get copies to the committee as soon as available, which will be sometime early this afternoon.

PATHET LAO INITIATIVES IN LAOS

In Laos, the situation there has caused some alarm because of the initiatives taken in the last week or 10 days by the Pathet Lao to push into neutralist-held areas.

Just to remind you of what had happened there, at the time of the cease-fire in 1962, the territory that was then under the control of the Pathet Lao-neutralist coalition extended throughout the Plaine des Jarres in the central part of the country, over to the main highway which runs between Vientiane and Luang Prabang and south of the Plaine des Jarres almost to the Mekong River. But the cease-fire and the following cooperation between the neutralists and the former right wing group in effect moved the Communist front line substantially to the north and to the east.

Now, the Pathet Lao in recent days have tried to take advantage of the so-called right wing coup in Vientiane, and have moved to try to push the neutralists out of their position in the Plaine des Jarres and have pushed down south toward the Mekong River, just south of the Plaine des Jarres.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PATHET LAO

The question is what they are after. We have tried to consult with our neighbors out there, as well as with our own intelligence community, and we see three possibilities. One is that they are simply going through at the present time a usual prerainy season foray to expand their holdings before the rainy season sets in and stabilizes the situation to terrain conditions. The Thais are inclined to think this is what they are up to.

We are inclined to think they are after more than that, that they are trying to destroy or to discount severely the so-called neutralist position in Laos to reduce it to complete impotence and to discredit Souvanna Phouma, and it may well be that they are going to try to push on to the original cease-fire line that was established in 1962. We are inclined to think they are likely, that they have in mind more than just getting a few more favorable positions before the rainy season sets in.

The third alternative would be that they are out to take all of Laos in this situation. Our intelligence community tends to discount this at the present time because they do not see the backup preparations and the other elements that would be indicators of that particular line of action.

But once again, we are in a situation where the Laotians do very little fighting themselves. There have been very few casualties in what has been referred to as the recent fighting.

We do know that the Viet Minh is in there from North Vietnam and that their forces have been increased in the last several months, contrary to the Geneva accords.

GET FOREIGNERS OUT OF LAOS

We feel that it is important to press the issue now very hard in terms of compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962, with the object still that of getting all of the foreigners out of Laos to let the Laotians muddle up their own affairs without foreign involvement. One of the reasons for this policy is that, left alone, the Laotians simply don't fight each other. The Viet Minh have come in with cadres and with units, and have been responsible for whatever fighting has occurred on the ground.

The government forces have responded to this latest Pathet Lao attack with a good deal of air action against troop units and supplies in the Plaine des Jarres area, using a number of T–28's which we had furnished them. We have supplied them with several more in recent days, and we think that they might be able to have some discouraging effect on the other side, but not any decisive military impact. They are being flown by Lao pilots.

I think there may be also some mercenaries in the Vientiane area who will be engaged in that. They are not at present being flown by U.S. military pilots. There may be some Thais involved in that flying before it is over.

RECONVENING A GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

Souvanna Phouma has proposed consulation under article IV of the Geneva accords. That consultation presumably would take place in Vientiane, where all of the signatories of the accords are present with the exception of Burma.

The French have come back and proposed the reconvening of a Geneva conference on Laos with the place left open and not insisting upon Geneva. We pressed the French very hard to tell us exactly what they have in mind, because we weren't quite sure what their policy was.

I saw the French Ambassador yesterday afternoon, and he, the French Government, has been very forthcoming in terms of stating their policy to be that of demanding exact compliance with the Geneva accords. The means the restoration of the neutralist position. That means the removal of Viet Minh military personnel from Laos, and that means stoppage of the corridor from North Vietnam to South Vietnam running along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos.

That was of some encouragement, because we weren't quite certain just what the French attitude would be. Their influence in Southeast Asia is still of some importance, and I think solidarity among the rest of us who would insist upon strict compliance would be important. If they were going to come there and take another view, this would be difficult.

We are not sure yet that it would be wise to go to such a Geneva conference. I think the consultations asked by Souvanna Phouma probably should come first in order to restore at least in part the situation of the neutralists, ensure that there would be a cease-fire, and prepare the way for any further discussion of the subject. I don't myself see how a conference could have any chance of getting anywhere if the fighting still continues with mounting of pressures on both sides.

In any event, it looks as though there will be a combination of pressures on the military side with political efforts to bring the fighting to a stop, get some pullback of the Pathet Lao, and try to take some additional pressures to get those accords complied with. The prospect there, however, is not very good.

SOVIET AND POLISH POSITIONS

You may be interested in our impression that the Soviet Union and the Poles just might be in the process of washing their hands of the situation entirely. The Polish delegate to the I.C.C. has been called back for consultation. It is not clear that his deputy will be allowed to function during his absence. The Pole in Vientiane has expressed some doubt as to whether Poland would continue to recognize Souvanna Phouma. We have indication that the Soviets have asked for advice as for what they call an evacuation contingency plan.

It is clear also that the atmosphere in Vientiane is not very friendly to the Communists. Therefore, they may be genuinely nervous, but it is entirely possible that the Communist side will withdraw its recognition of Souvanna Phouma and then leave the confrontation between the combination of the neutralists and the rightists on one side and the Pathet Lao on the other. In that case the Geneva Accords probably would dissolve in any event, and we all face the situation that that would create.

Thus far, as late as yesterday, both the Soviets and the Poles have said that they continue to be in full support of the Geneva Accords as a settlement of the Laotian question, and that strict compliance with it is necessary. But on the other hand, they use every pretext and falsification of fact to avoid facing up to their responsibilities for doing more about trying to get those accords carried out.

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY FOR HANOI

From Khrushchev's point of view he probably has an embarrassment there that we can't help him with and we can't sympathize with too much, and that is that his influence on the ground has undoubtedly diminished in the last 2 years. He is in rivalry with Peking in Hanoi for influence in Hanoi. If he were to take a strong line in support of the Geneva Accord against Hanoi, it would mean certainly that Hanoi would tie itself in completely with Peking, and the Soviet influence in Hanoi, such as it is, would completely disappear. I think this may be of some problem.

We are not taking any of these things in terms of acceptance at face value of what might be said to us, but the committee might be interested in knowing when I last talked to Mr. Gromyko about Laos—we had been pushing him on this for quite a long time—he said, "Well, we are doing everything that we can to support the Geneva Accords, and if that were not so the situation would be much worse." This was sort of an indication that he wanted us to at least believe that they were still supporting them, but there were limitations on what they thought they could do. I think there may be some truth in that, but I would not myself subscribe to necessary good faith on the Soviet side.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

So the next 2 or 3 days we will be consulting with the other signatories. We will be pressing for implementation of the Geneva Accords, and we shall be giving Souvanna Phouma some additional help through support for his effort against the Pathet Lao in order to try to bring this matter under some control, if it possibly can be done, on the grounds.

Kong Le's forces, the neutralist forces, have withdrawn to the western edge of the Plaine des Jarres and they are now combining with the Meo tribesman who have been among the more effective fighters in that area. I think there is some chance that the military situation is not likely to go significantly beyond where it is now, although we must look at the possibility that they will continue to press further.

TROOPS IN THAILAND

Now, you have seen a newspaper story or two about troops in Thailand. Actually this was a question that has been mentioned some weeks ago in connection with the confusion in Laos, and in connection with the possibilities of SEATO exercises.

The Thais at the present time do not believe that the fighting in Laos is going to develop in serious proportions geographically and they therefore are not asking for SEATO troops in Thailand at the present time. They have taken some other measures to help Souvanna Phouma in the air, some on the ground, and they are glad to see the further steps that have been taken in the last few days.

But they take the view that unless the situation becomes more serious, they feel that it is not necessary to bring SEATO troops into Thailand at this point, particularly in view of the fact that there is now assembling in the Philippines quite a substantial joint SEATO exercise involving there aircraft carriers from other SEATO countries, as well as two of our own, ground forces and naval units from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, even some French aircraft which we had not expected, the Philippines. That exercise will be present in the Philippines for the next, I should think, about 3 weeks.

Before it disbands we will, of course, be in close touch with all the governments concerned to see whether it should disband or whether it should remain in the general area and be available in case of need.

THE KHANH GOVERNMENT

In the case of Vietnam—and I spoke longer than I intended to—there is nothing substantially new there since we last talked to the committee.

The present effort continues to be to get the Khanh government more effectively in operation and in full control of its own situation in order to get on with the struggle against the Vietcong. The principal problems are still in the political field.

The Khanh government has not been able yet to gear the administrative machinery of the government to the requirements of fast action in the countryside. I think you may recall that in such places as India, Pakistan, certainly in Vietnam, these countries inherited a colonial-type administration, and that meant a procedure by which important decisions trickle high enough up to run into an Englishman or a Frenchman. This tended to make for cumbersomeness in decisions and the lack of delegation and timidity on the part of local authorities. General Khanh has been moving toward delegation of authority to provincial chiefs, and we are going to get some results from that in terms of ability to act without referring everything back to the top in Saigon.

But the Vietcong level of action continues high. So, also do the operations of the government forces. There has been an increase, a troublesome increase in the desertion rates among the army side on the government side.

They are beginning to pick up deserters and defectors from the Vietcong as well, but the desertion rate on the government side is running about in the neighborhood of 2½ percent a month, which is high by our standards. It is not strikingly unusual in that part of the world, but nevertheless it is going to make it difficult to keep units fully up to strength over periods of time in the field without a very heavy recruitment and training program in behind it. That is, I think, one of our most troublesome problems at the present moment.

THE RELIGIOUS CRISIS

The so-called religious crisis that has threatened has apparently temporarily been set aside. The Buddhists were quarreling among themselves chiefly through the effort of one Buddhist leader to try to whip up Buddhist sentiment against the government itself. That apparently has now been contained. The Buddhist leadership has announced solidarity, and for the moment that seems to be sidetracked.

There was a danger of some problems with the Catholics centering around agitation and high feelings about the trial of a major in the Hue area who himself was Catholic and whose trial was looked upon as an anti-Catholic movement. That trial has been postponed indefinitely now and it looks as though the Catholic group is more cooperative in its attitude than it was, say, three weeks ago.[1]

But there still is the problem of real solidarity on the political side, plus the administrative problems in getting action and getting things and men and money moving at the pace that is required to deal with the Vietcong effort.

PRESENT TRACK OF U.S. SUPPORT

The army, despite the defection rate I mentioned, is fighting in sharp contrast to the experience in Laos. They are taking and inflicting heavy casualties, but we cannot yet know whether we can guarantee success on the present track or whether the President and congressional leaders will have to be in touch with each other about additional decisions which have not yet been taken. But that is, I think, still for the future.

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[1] The Vietnamese Government subsequently announced that the trial of Major Dang Sy would begin June 2.

There is no doubt about the fact that if the situation can be straightened out on the basis of existing agreements and on the basis of the support for the South Vietnamese, that would be substantially more advantageous than expanding the war. It would certainly be more important to do that than any decision such as pulling out.

Senator **Lausche**. Would you repeat that, please, that last thing?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes.

I just said if it proves possible to assure the security of South Vietnam on the present track of our support for the South Vietnamese and on the basis of the existing agreements of 1954 and 1962, we feel that would be certainly more in line with our own requirements than extension of the war, with its unforeseen consequences, and the very heavy burdens that that would involve for everybody and also very large risks.

I cannot suggest to the committee any guarantee at this point that those decisions will not have to be faced, but we are looking at all of the contingencies very hard. Before any change in policy or attitude should occur, the President and the Congress would have to be in very close touch with each other.

I think as a comment, Mr. Chairman, I might stop there because members might wish to ask questions.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

I will ask one or two questions.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

One is, What is the reason why this matter is not submitted to the United Nations?

Senator **Lausche**. Which matter do you have in mind?

The **Chairman**. The violation of the Geneva Accords and the infiltration of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese. This is a matter which you could raise in the United Nations, I take it. What is the reason why you think this is not a wise course to follow?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think the principal reason for that Mr. Chairman, is that we don't believe that the United Nations in the first place could take effective action in terms of mobilizing forces or putting U.N. forces into what amounts to a war situation. We always believe that it is up to those who have signed the agreements themselves to face the consequences of those agreements, and that we would find ourselves there in a situation wherein the United Nations would be in no sense unified as it was in the case like Korea; that the membership would be trying to avoid responsibility and would probably run away from the situation and we would be back to the signatories, where we were before.

If the situation develops in a much more menacing way; that is, in terms of the escalation of the conflict, I think it would be very important that it come to the United Nations in that circumstance, because I personally believe that there is an obligation to bring such things to the United Nations before a major threat of large hostilities would appear. But we don't see at the present time any action that the United Nations could take, nor do we anticipate that there would be the kind of solidarity there that would make any difference politically to the other side.

NOT A CIVIL WAR

The **Chairman**. Do you feel this is in the nature of a civil war going on and that we are simply aiding one side?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, sir, I do not believe this is a civil war in the classical sense. The record on that, in terms of deliberate action taken by the north beginning in the first year after the accords of 1954, indicates that this is a persistent effort on the part of the north to take over the south. They made it publicly clear in 1959 and 1960 that that was their intention.

Their help from the north consists of three things.

One, the actual control of the operations in the South, the operational direction of the flight in the south is from the north. I mean the command is in the north, and that part of it is important.

Second——

The **Chairman**. Is that admitted or is that disputed?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, I think if you—I was referring to types of evidence that are not public, and perhaps shouldn't be gone into in great detail, but what the North says publicly about its role leaves no room for argument in that. They themselves say, "We are doing this, and this is our purpose and we are going to support it"; and so forth.

I can get some of those public statements from the north for the committee if you would wish it.

Second, cadremen have come in from the North steadily over the last several years. In 1963 alone we estimate that 1,800 cadremen came down into South Vietnam from the North. We have defector reports, prisoners of war reports, other types of information which can be quite specific on this matter. Broadly speaking, over the years since 1954, the estimate is that not less than 10,000 personnel have come from the North to the South as cadremen for this kind of an effort.

The third type of support from the north is in furnishing not large quantities of arms but key quantities of arms of the more sophisticated type, particularly antiair machineguns and such things as 75 mm recoilless rifles.

Most of the weapons of the Vietcong are picked up in South Vietnam. Some of them are homemade, but it is a country which over the past 20 years had been sprinkled with arms of all sorts. They have French weapons, American-made weapons, some Russian, some Chinese, so that their weaponry except for a few sophisticated items, tend to be pretty polyglot in character.

But those are the three probable, clear indications that the effort in the South was organized and stimulated and supplied and controlled from the North.

APPROPRIATE ACTION BY THE CONGRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that your statement about going to the United Nations is if it becomes necessary in order to save the situation, to escalate to some kind of restraining action directive on North Vietnam? Would this be submitted to the United Nations first or would this be submitted to Congress or is this a decision that you consider——

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, if such decisions had to be taken that the President would be in full consultation with congressional leadership, at which time the question of appropriate action with or by the Congress would be taken up. I don't anticipate this is a matter of the next few days or anything of that sort, or that this would occur.

The CHAIRMAN. This is hypothetical; we understand.

Secretary RUSK. I also would say if the situation got to that point where such action seemed necessary, that would be a time, then, for the United Nations to face the fact that this situation can explode in a far more dangerous way and that, as a matter of charter obligations, the members of the United Nations ought to have a chance in the United Nations to do something about it. But to take it to the United Nations now with the unknown attitude of President de Gaulle on South Vietnam, and with the veto of the Soviet Union, with the difficulties in having a meeting with the General Assembly, both because of the article 19 problem and because of the indifferent attitude of a large part of the present membership of the General Assembly, I would think it would not be a step that would add to the determination and the morale of the South Vietnamese at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

VIETNAM'S MISSING POLITICAL SOLIDARITY

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I hear repeatedly, and I am sure everyone else does, that the problems in Vietnam are not only military but essentially political.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. That the will to resist is eroded because of the political instability and political conflict.

Is that a fair statement?

Secretary RUSK. The will to resist has not eroded to that extent. What is missing here is the kind of political solidarity that turns the whole psychology around. I mean, they are still fighting.

Senator HUMPHREY. Oh, yes.

Secretary RUSK. I mentioned the desertion rate. That is the negative side. But I don't believe that this bickering that one hears about is at the present time aimed at stopping the war against the Vietcong. It is the kind of bickering that simply gets in the way of doing it more effectively.

LOSS OF FORTIFIED VILLAGES

Senator HUMPHREY. Are the reports accurate that I have heard and read that the present government, the Khanh government, has lost a couple of hundred of the fortified villages since January?

Secretary RUSK. No, since last fall.

Senator Humphrey. Last October, yes.

Secretary Rusk. Twelve percent of the villages have been lost in that period.

Senator Humphrey. And the rate of losses has been stepped up in the winter months.

Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think that it is quite clear that since May of last year, but particularly during the two changes of government, the Vietcong operations stepped up to new levels in terms of terrorism, sabotage, propaganda attacks, particularly in the delta area. In the central and northern part of the country the situation is less critical, but in the delta area, immediately south and west of Saigon, you have provinces that are in a very critical position indeed.

SOLVING THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Senator Humphrey. What we continuously hear from people who return from this area, both our Government people and newsmen, reporters, is the lack of political, not only stability but of political loyalty to the regime. There seems to be a kind of looseness of organization administratively and a lack of enthusiasm for the Vietnamese Government. At least somewhere within this description, what I have said, is the area of truth.

Secretary Rusk. That is right. There are some problems there, and they are serious ones.

Senator Humphrey. When we make recommendations or the President makes recommendations or the Secretary of Defense makes recommendations, it is always in terms of money and military weapons, military matters.

What, if anything, does the Government ever do about the political situation? What are we doing in reference to organizing the trade unions; what are we doing in reference to political organization? We have got a lot of colonels and generals that we can ship over there, but don't we have somebody who knows something about the political structure?

Secretary Rusk. This political problem is one in which Ambassador Lodge spends most of his time.

The trade union leader who is now here in Washington is a man who we think can exercise very important and strong influence to help develop this job. Fellows like that can make, could make, a very large contribution. But when I was out there, when Secretary McNamara was out there, I think 60 or 70 percent of our time was taken up with trying to find ways to improve this political atmosphere, particularly in Saigon.

Saigon is a city that has not really been caught up in the requirements of the war, as a whole. It tends to be a snakepit of gossip, intrigue, and therefore in Saigon this has been a very difficult problem to keep with.

Ambassador Lodge has been seeking all of the leaders he can get hold of to try to press them toward a greater sense of unanimity and solidarity in the country. I think in some cases there has been some success, but the performance is still not as good as is going to be required if this thing is to succeed.

ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the Pope removed the bishop, or cardinal over there that was quite significant to our attitudes and our policies?

Secretary RUSK. The principal transfer that we regretted was the movement of his representative there.

Senator HUMPHREY. The nuncio?

Secretary RUSK. Asta, the nuncio. He is assigning him to another post. We felt this was a loss of experience, but the Vatican said that they felt that they had to do that for other reasons. They are putting in a good man and they also are very active with the Catholic community out there in terms of solidarity with the war effort, but we would have been glad to see Mr. Asta, Monsignor Asta, stay.[2]

Senator HUMPHREY. Did they really find out why this man was removed? Do we have any suspicions?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure that we know.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think this is quite important. I have talked to some churchmen about this and I just wondered what was behind it, whether this related to the problems of the Buddhists and the Catholic community, whether this related to the activities that took place with Diem and his assassination.

GENEVA ACCORD SIGNATORIES

I only have one or two matters that I would like to ask just as a point of information that I can get it clear.

Who are the signatories to the agreements?

Secretary RUSK. Of the Geneva accords.

Senator HUMPHREY. Geneva accords.

Secretary RUSK. There are two sets. There are 14 who signed the accord on Laos.

Senator HUMPHREY. For Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. There were nine participants in the negotiations. Let's see, it was France, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China——

Senator HUMPHREY. Did we sign?

Secretary RUSK. We did not sign the 1954 accords. You will remember that Mr. Dulles elected not to sign, and General Smith made a statement that, although we were not signing, we would adopt our policy to support those accords and that if there were violations of those accords we would consider that a serious threat to the peace.

UNITED STATES LEGAL POSITION IN VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't one of the reasons we didn't go to the United Nations, Mr. Secretary, is that we, too, are violating the accords?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, no, sir; I don't think that is a problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. I mean in terms of manpower, in terms of military personnel, in terms of military operations.

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[2] The State Department later reported that the Vatican had reversed its decision to replace Monsignor Asta.

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, we don't have the slightest problem in our own minds about the legal position with respect to the accords of the effect of either Vietnam or Laos, because the other side so persistently, over such along time, systematically violated the accords in respect to manpower, arms, and so forth that we feel they are not entitled to raise the question.

Senator **Humphrey**. I agree with that, but I think they would raise the question whether they are entitled to or not.

Secretary **Rusk**. No, this doesn't bother us.

Senator **Humphrey**. This isn't one of the reasons?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, this is not one of the reasons we are not taking it to the United Nations. We feel the legal position on that is very strong indeed, that the notion that the particular article applies only to one side is just not acceptable in a matter of this sort, and I don't think we would have much trouble on that point. That has never been raised with us by any of our friends or it has not been raised with us by anybody in the United Nations.

COVERING OUR TRACKS

Senator **Humphrey**. The only reason I have raised this point, Mr. Secretary, is because I am not sure we have always had complete candor in this Vietnam situation. This is an executive session, so I am very executive about it.

Secretary **Rusk**. Please.

Senator **Humphrey**. From time to time over the years, I have heard that the reason we didn't put in any more manpower, or we withdrew manpower, is because we were limited by the Geneva accords; we knew it and we wanted to sort of cover our tracks.

Secretary **Rusk**. That was true, up to—perhaps I could furnish you the months—but that was true up to a good part of 1961.

Senator **Humphrey**. That is right.

Secretary **Rusk**. After the evidence became clear as to the scale of the other side's intervention from the North in South Vietnam, we, with the full knowledge and, I might say, quite sympathetic support of two of the three members of the I.C.C.——

Senator **Lausche**. Who are the three members?

Secretary **Rusk**. India, Canada, and Poland. India and Canada were aware from the beginning of the action that was taken to break through the technical ceilings that were established under the Geneva accords, and have raised no problem about it because of the violations of the other side which they themselves had reported and about which the Communist side did nothing.

FRENCH PLAN FOR NEUTRALIZATION

Senator **Humphrey**. Did you see Mr. Lippmann's article this morning?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, I did.

Senator **Humphrey**. Did you have time to read that?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, I did. There was one interesting point there that the French Ambassador confirmed yesterday, and I am taking full advantage of the executive character of this session. He said that any ideas that France had about the possibility of neutralizing

Southeast Asia depended crucially upon the presence of the United States power in that area.

Senator **Humphrey**. Mr. Lippmann makes that point.

Secretary **Rusk**. Mr. Lippmann apparently makes that same point in that article.

Senator **Lausche**. Somebody must have told him about it.

Senator **Humphrey**. The feeling gets across the country, Mr. Secretary, that whenever anybody else suggests any remedy in this area, like Mr. de Gaulle—and I don't happen to feel, I am not one who feels, that everything Mr. de Gaulle suggests is wrong—there is a tendency in the press and sometimes in official circles to react almost automatically. If Charles de Gaulle suggests something, it must be the old man getting out of line again.

I think he is a pretty clever, an astute and, of course, very egocentric type of individual. But the French are rather intelligent people, and I had a feeling that the reaction, that the attitude in the United States was one of just open rejection of the de Gaulle initiative on neutralization.

I don't want my position to be misunderstood. I don't think you can just neutralize just South Vietnam by just proclaiming you want it neutral. I think any neutralization would require some tough international guarantees and also would have to affect North Vietnam, but the exploration of neutralization in the area seems to me a cause every bit as worthy as trying to continue to pour in hundreds of millions of dollars of resources and more manpower.

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, there is no real issue on this point, I assure you.

Senator **Humphrey**. How come we never hear about that?

WHAT NEUTRALIZATION MEANS

Secretary **Rusk**. Let me state it this way. In the first place President de Gaulle, with this word "neutralization" didn't have any idea whatever about what it means or how you would go about it. We have pressed him from the very beginning: What are your proposals, what are your plans, what are your ideas, what is you notion about timing? How can you get the other side to leave their neighbors alone and make it possible?

Now, remember please, sir, that the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 were settlements looking toward the neutralization of Southeast Asia. There they are. There is no problem about the political doctrine. When Mr. Lippmann talks about, or the Washington Post this morning talks about, a negotiated settlement, there they were.

Is this a case of what is mine is mine and what is yours must be cut up again in some sort of negotiation?

Senator **Humphrey**. No, all I am saying, Mr. Secretary, is that first of all I am not bucking your policy.

Secretary **Rusk**. No, no.

Senator **Humphrey**. All I am saying is that the general image of the United States about Vietnam is that we don't talk about anything political or diplomatic. We are just going to win the war and, very frankly, we are not winning the war. Every time we sit in there and listen to it, we are losing more and more every time we hear the President.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order that the Senate is in session. I am sorry the Secretary was not here at 9:30.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 27, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:15 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright.

Without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of William Witman II, to be Ambassador to Togo, and William McCormick Blair, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Philippines.

Without objection the committee approved for report the tax protocol with Greece (Ex. A, 88–2), and the protocol to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention (Ex. B, 88–2).

Without objection, the committee approved for report the list of nominations and promotions in the Foreign Service, dated May 16, 1964.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:25 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MONDAY, JUNE 15, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: William P. Bundy, Department of State; Mr. Holt, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The Chairman. We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State to brief us on Southeast Asia and anything else that he thinks is of significance this morning.

Mr. Secretary, will you start?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I will try to make my introductory remarks quite brief because we talk about this subject of Southeast Asia a good deal and I have a feeling we haven't had enough opportunity in the committee for a thorough discussion of it, and therefore I would like to leave some time for that.

Starting with the situation in South Vietnam, it is apparent that South Vietnam ramifies into the problem of Southeast Asia as a whole. There are two neighboring countries that directly affect what is happening in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. If the situations in those two countries could be straightened out, it would substantially help the problem in Saigon, and therefore I would like to comment very briefly on the problem with Cambodia and then turn to the Laotian question and comment briefly on South Vietnam.

THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA

The essential problem in Cambodia is that Prince Sihanouk seems to think that communism is the way of the future in Southeast Asia and he would like to get commitments, particularly from Peking, on the independence and neutrality, territorial integrity of Cambodia. Now, in other words, he seems to be consulting his fears of a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia at this point.

His call for a Geneva conference to reaffirm the neutrality of Cambodia should be seen against this background. But, on the other hand, his real problems are with his own immediate neighbors, South Vietnam and Thailand.

We have felt that since the atmosphere of a Geneva conference on Cambodia would be one of hostility toward South Vietnam and Thailand—and that is the atmosphere which Prince Sihanouk's own demands for such a conference have created—that it would be very important for Cambodia and its own two neighbors to work out their problems on a bilateral basis or, say, in a conference with the three, and if Prince Sihanouk wants us there, since he attributes some of the blame to us, a conference of four, but that a Geneva conference with South Vietnam and Thailand there as defendants would be unproductive and from our own point of view would be quite negative.

The committee should know that Great Britain and France agree with us as to the urgent importance of agreements between Cambodia on the one side and Saigon and Bangkok on the other. We have been trying to persuade Sihanouk to take a more forthcoming attitude toward bilateral possibilities.

In Saigon, they are quite receptive to the idea of bilateral discussions to resolve their problems. Bangkok would be prepared to reestablish relations and take up bilateral discussions if Prince Sihanouk were ready to move in that direction.

VIETCONG'S USE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA

The principal problem arises because the Vietcong have been using the two neutral countries of Cambodia and Laos as supply bases, as areas in which their forces can use as safe havens in the event of attack, places to group and launch attacks from. This has led to fighting along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border between Vietcong and South Vietnamese armed forces, and on occasion that fighting has reached across the border as Vietcong elements under attack have retreated across the border. That has created serious incidents.

BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Prince Sihanouk on that basis brought that to the United Nations. Although we appear in the role of a defendant, we rather welcome this because we thought the U.N. should try to resolve in some way the border question between Cambodia and South Vietnam and to deny that border to the Vietcong. Were such effective, it would reduce the border incidents to zero because Saigon has no interest in creating those incidents.

When the matter came before the Security Council we proposed among other possibilities a substantial U.N. presence along the border of some 1,200 men who would be able, we thought, to keep the border under surveillance and to bring it to a state of peace.

This ran into not only Soviet and Czechoslovak opposition, but it also ran into Prince Sihanouk's opposition. President de Gaulle did not think much of this U.N. peacekeeping operation, any more than he has thought of other U.N. peacekeeping operations, and under those circumstances it became apparent that that kind of U.N. presence did not at this time anyhow, have a sufficient number of votes in the Security Council to permit that course to go forward.

The result was to establish a commission made up of the Ivory Coast, Brazil, and Morocco, to go to the area—they plan to leave, I believe, at the end of this week—to investigate the border situation there and to make recommendations. We hope that their recommendations will open up again the question of a more adequate U.N. presence there along that border.

One thing we have to be a little careful about is that if there is a very small U.N. presence of a sort that could only bring to light an occasional, say, attack by South Vietnamese forces across the border but isn't large enough to dig in and find these Vietcong operations and camps and activities, then it would—it could have a one-sided effect. But we still are pursuing the track of trying to get a sufficient U.N. activity along that border to pacify, and were that to succeed it could be of substantial benefit to South Vietnam.

VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA ACCORDS IN LAOS

Now, in the Laotian question, the principal issue remains the discussion of the Geneva accords of 1962. There have been several violations from the other side. The Viet Minh have continued to lead military personnel in Laos and in recent months we believe they have build up that personnel, taking the form both of individuals used as cadre for Pathet Lao forces, as well as a considerable number of Viet Minh battalions actually in Laos. So, the first important violation is the continued presence of Viet Minh military personnel contrary to the agreements.

A second direct violation has been the continued use of Laotian territory for infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail in the so-called panhandle of Laos continues to be an area under Pathet Lao control and an area used for such infiltration.

A third violation has been the refusal to permit the Government of National Union and particularly Souvanna Phouma, its Prime Minister, to exercise any authority in those areas of Laos which are held by the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces combined. There was some discussion a few weeks ago at the time of a rightwing disturbance or takeover or whatever you like in the city of Vientiane, that this had undermined the position of the Prime Minister, and that this itself was a violation of the accord.

Well, it was true he was restrained for a period of 24, 36 hours but action by some of the signatories, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, brought that situation back into conformance with the Geneva accords and sustained the position of the Prime Minister, and the cooperation between the so-called rightwing and the Prime Minister is now in reasonably good order.

Charges from the other side that somehow Souvanna Phouma is not being permitted to serve as Prime Minister by the rightwing are pretty hollow in view of the fact he has never been permitted to exercise any authority in those areas held by the Pathet Lao.

POLISH DELEGATE ON THE I.C.C.

A fourth failure has been the attitude of the Polish delegate with respect to the I.C.C., the International Control Commission. I believe members of the committee may have in front of them copies of the Laotian Accords.

Mr. **Holt**. They are in the folders.

Secretary **Rusk**. I call your attention to the protocol to those accords, article 11 of the protocol. This seems to be relatively technical but nevertheless it is quite an important point, because in this article it was agreed that the commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of article 4 has occurred. But the next sentence, "It is understood that in the exercise of this function the commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos"——

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Secretary, will you pause just a moment for me to catch up with you?

What page is it?

Mr. **Holt**. It is page 28.

Secretary **Rusk**. It is article 11, the first sentence of the second paragraph of article 11, "It is understood in the exercise of this function the commission is acting with"—those are the important words—"the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos."

It was our agreement with the Soviets at Geneva that in carrying out investigations the I.C.C. was given permission by the Government of Laos in this document; that is, in advance. There was difficulty in getting that absolutely and completely spelled out in Geneva as far as the wording is concerned, but there was no misunderstanding at Geneva between ourselves and the Russians as to the meaning of this article. The Poles on the commission, however, took the view that the Pathet Lao have a veto on investigations by the commission under the arrangements whereby all three factions participated in important decisions of the Laotian Government.

Now, in a practical sense they had that veto on the ground in the sense that a Commission cannot go into a territory and investigate if the armed elements in that territory tell them they can't. But the legal position, the political position is that the commission does not require the permission of the Pathet Lao to make an investigation. That permission was given by the Government of Laos when it signed, when it agreed to these settlements of 1962, so we have pressed the Poles very hard on that.

We think we have made some headway with them on that point because I have the impression that the Soviets have confirmed this understanding, perhaps to the Poles as well, and that we may see some improvement in the Polish role on the Commission, although it is a little early to hope.

But anyhow, you have had these four substantial violations of the Geneva Accords.

SUPPORT FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA

There has been a plethora of proposals about how to deal with this present Laotian question politically, starting from our own point of view and how we see it. When Souvanna Phouma, about 3 weeks ago, asked for consultation under article 4 of the accords, we felt that it was important to support his position and to support those consultations.

At the present time several of the signatories, the United States, United Kingdom, Thailand, South Vietnam, India, but not France, not Peking, not Hanoi, are now engaged in those consultations. We think that about all that will come out of those consultations is to clarify for the benefit of the two cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., the nature of the violations of these accords by the Pathet Lao. That itself won't move very much toward an agreement.

POLISH PROPOSALS

Meanwhile, the Poles have proposed that there be consultation among the two cochairmen, the three members of the Control Commission, that is India, Canada, Poland, and the Laotians. The Polish proposals said the three factions of Laos.

Now, if the position of Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister is clearly recognized, we can see some benefit from the Polish formula. It may give the Soviet Union a chance to support the Geneva accords without seeming at the same time to support the United States with the Chinese sitting there.

Peking and Moscow are clearly divided on this subject. Peking has objected to the Polish proposals, called them illegal. Hanoi seems to be objecting to the Polish proposals. But Souvanna Phouma has indicated his support for them, provided his own position as Prime Minister is reaffirmed.

Our thought is that if these Polish consultations occur, their task then would be to support the preconditions for a Geneva conference as laid down by Souvanna Phouma. Those preconditions are a withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the areas in the Plaine des Jarres which they have occupied since May 16, moves which have pretty well removed the neutralist position in the Plaine des Jarres; second, to have a cease-fire on that basis after the withdrawal; third, to reaffirm the position of Souvanna Phouma; and fourth, to clarify this obligation of the International Control Commission to investigate charges of violations.

CHANCES OF SUCCESS

One would be a tremendous optimist to suppose that those four objectives could be accomplished in the Polish proposals, but nevertheless that would be the purpose. If those succeed, then presumably there would be a Geneva conference, where the object then would be to move to the other two points of violations, the presence of the Viet Minh forces on the one side and the use of the corridor into South Vietnam, and on that there is solidarity among the Western countries.

France has agreed that if there was a Geneva conference these would be the two main objects, to bring about compliance on those two points and try to bring the situation back into control. If the Polish proposals do not succeed, then the chances seem very high that this matter would then go to the United Nations to give the Security Council a chance to intervene in the matter, to get some presence there, to call for the preconditions for a meeting of the Geneva conference, or whatever other steps might be possible.

PARALYSIS OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I would like to mention one problem about the U.N. for the members of the committee to think about, and that is we have assumed the General Assembly was temporarily paralyzed by the article 19 problem.

The CHAIRMAN. That is this payment of dues?

Secretary RUSK. That is the arrearages and the matter of voting in the Assembly. Because the Communist bloc countries and France, among others, are in arrears, we feel that it has been important for us to keep that point very clear. Among other things, we have had a very strong commitment to the Congress as well as a matter of policy in the executive branch that article 19 must not go by default, that it should be automatically applied. That means that the normal process which has been used in the past to go from, say, a veto in the Security Council to the General Assembly is complicated by this issue. We have——

The CHAIRMAN. You don't want to press that at this time?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. We have held open the possibility that before the regular meeting of the General Assembly in November, after, U.N. forces have left the Congo; that is, after there is no great issue of principle of further expenditure of funds, that the Soviet Union and France, possibly others, might find a way to make some contributions to the U.N. budget which would not acknowledge the principles of the Congo operation but might make contributions which would bring them out from under the penalties of article 19.

But that is not likely to occur in time for any special session of the Assembly called on Southeast Asia. So, I think that this is a point that the committee members might wish to think about to see whether there are some possibilities there, what we ought to do in that situation.

I personally believe in the case of Laos, where there is a recent agreement, a very specific agreement, specific violations, and where the principal signatories, particularly the United States, have as their object the faithful compliance with the accords of 1962 that there would be very strong support in the General Assembly for Laos in that situation. So, here is a potential resource that is complicated by the article 19 problem. Perhaps we could have some discussion on that before we adjourn this morning.

PATHET LAO ACTIVITIES

Now, in Laos, at the present time, there still is some military operation going on. The Pathet Lao continue to probe somewhat, although for the last 3 weeks there has not been much significant action pressing further.

I could be wrong about tomorrow morning but we do not expect the Pathet Lao—we are inclined to think the Pathet Lao will not make a dash to the Mekong. They seem to be trying to root out the Meo tribesmen in areas that are behind their most advanced posts and to push the neutralists out of the Plaine des Jarres.

They have moved somewhat to the south in the Thathom area but they have withdrawn somewhat from there. It does not take on the appearance of preparations for a major drive to the Mekong which would precipitate some very grave issues very quickly should they do so.

KEEPING THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE SEPARATED

One of our central objectives here in this Laotian question is to try to keep Moscow and Peking separated, at least in order to hold Khrushchev to his personal commitment to President Kennedy that the solution there ought to be to get all the foreigners out of Laos, let them be neutral, and let the big powers leave them alone and the country be independent.

Thus far their statements to us and their public statements seem to be in that direction, but that is for what it is worth. We can't tell yet, but we do have a very definite impression their influence on the ground with the Pathet Lao has become quite limited and that in the struggle in Hanoi for influence between Moscow and Peking, Khrushchev's problem may be that if he were to push Hanoi too hard to get them to comply with the accords of 1962 he would push Hanoi into the arms of Peking, whereas if he thinks he still has any competitive position there with Peking he might be inclined to play it more cautiously.

So, we have first the problem of intent, the problem of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union. We have to keep reservations on that point to support these accords. Second, is their ability to do so even with their willingness to do so, and we have to have some qualifications in our mind about their ability to do so on the ground.

I don't know, Mr. Chairman, it might be before we get to South Vietnam in a little more detail we might just pause here and talk about the Cambodian-Laotian aspects of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Questions, you mean?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

SOVIET AND CHINESE OBJECTIVES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one question, Mr. Secretary. Are we basing our view or attitude vis-a-vis Laos and South Vietnam and Cambodia on any substance of assumption that the Russians or the Chinese really want peace in that area?

Secretary RUSK. We certainly have no such idea at the present time as far as Peking and Hanoi are concerned. We have seen nothing in their proclaimed doctrine, nothing in their general attitude to lead to that conclusion.

As a matter of general policy, one would say the same thing about the Soviet Union. But I think that has to be qualified with the possibility that where the Soviet Union has made a very specific agreement with the United States, personally at the top, and where a lot of other issues are involved between the Soviet Union and the United States, that there is a possibility, at least, that the

Soviet Union would be willing to see the Geneva accords carried out as intended.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is the very point.

I merely approach that historically. I don't know of any major agreement that Peking or the Kremlin has ever kept in the interests of what we believe to be mutual peace when it has become inconvenient for them to keep it.

Now, I realize that the Soviet Union will support certain peace moves on occasion when it serves their specific purpose to do so. That is far different from any moral persuasion toward genuine peaceful settlement of these things, and I doubt very much that they have any such thought in their mind. I just wondered whether we are basing, in part anyway, our assumption that they do have any genuine sincere desire for a real peace in the mutual interests of everybody rather than a peace which could only redound to the benefit of Communist expansion in that area or confusion or disruption.

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, I certainly wouldn't use myself words such as "sincere" and "genuine" in regard to Soviet policy unless there is a very strong and practical and pragmatic base for what they would undertake as a commitment. Now, in this situation, I think there are two elements at work which in my mind keep open the possibility that they might want to see the Geneva accords of 1962 carried out.

One is that if Peking overruns Southeast Asia, is allowed to overrun Southeast Asia, this would give enormous impetus to the Peking side of the struggle going on inside the Communist world, and this would prove to the Communist world that Peking's theory, doctrine, is right and that Peking is right in its controversy with Moscow. That one element I think that has become more important as the Moscow-Peking dispute has advanced.

A second element is that Moscow itself must be concerned about the problem of escalation just as we are, just as anyone would be, and I think it is rather unlikely that Moscow wishes to be drawn into a major confrontation or certainly a major war with the Soviet Union over Southeast Asia. So, I think that quite apart from——

Senator **Symington**. You say Moscow drawn into war with the Soviet Union?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes.

Senator **Symington**. Moscow with the Soviet Union?

Secretary **Rusk**. Moscow with the United States.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Moscow with the United States.

UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET POSITION

Secretary **Rusk**. Look at it this way. There was some indication that one or two Soviet officials expressed this concern that, if North Vietnam is hit and China comes in and China hit, then this presents Moscow with a very great problem. As a socialist country they would say to themselves, "How can we let our socialist neighbors down, even though we have had this big family quarrel, but on the other hand, why should we be drawn into a major confrontation with the United States over an issue of this sort?"

Well, we are looking at these things partly through fog. We can't be sure of what is in the mind of the people in the Kremlin, but we think that one of the ways to find out is to give mild encouragement to these Polish proposals to see what could happen there in a forum in which China, that is, Peking, Hanoi, the United States, France are not present, and let those who are officially responsible for carrying out the 1962 Geneva accords, the two I.C.C. members, sit down and try to figure out a way to bring them into compliance.

We can't offer any guarantees or assurances on these at all, but this is the purpose, this is the probe that is now underway. So, Senator, the real answer to your question is, I think, We just can't be sure at the present time, and certainly in terms of historical record one wouldn't want to bet on it.

CHINESE REJECTION OF POLISH PROPOSAL

Senator AIKEN. Hasn't Peking already rejected any agreements or decisions which might be reached at a meeting from which they and the United States were excluded?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, in effect.

Senator AIKEN. I am just going by newspaper reports.

Secretary RUSK. They have rejected the Polish proposal, but that needn't stand in the way. Peking can't stand in the way of the meeting, because the others can go ahead. But they are calling for a meeting without preconditions and the problem in our mind is that, unless there is some assurance that the enforcement of the Geneva accords of 1962 would be the purpose and object, such a conference would either break up in complete disagreement, thereby perhaps making the situation even worse, or that there would be great pressures to somehow ratify the violations which have already occurred which are no profit to us certainly and no profit to anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

DISAGREEMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I shall not take but 3 or 4 minutes. I wouldn't take that except there is a record being made, and I wouldn't want this record to indicate that my silence meant that I agree with anything that the Secretary of State said here this morning.

I completely disagree with the State Department's position expressed here this morning, and I incorporate by reference every word of criticism of the past several weeks I have made of State Department policy in Southeast Asia.

I join with Senator Hickenlooper's clear implication that I think if we have any thought that Russia is going to support us very long in Southeast Asia, we couldn't be more wrong, if she is supporting us. I think she is standing on the sidelines with a smirk on her Communist face, well counting her continuing stakes in Southeast Asia and sooner or later will descend upon us like a hawk, and that this policy that the Secretary has outlined here this morning will pave the way for an ultimate rapprochement between Red China and Russia.

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am at a complete loss to understand why we are not calling for a Geneva conference, why we are dealing with this kind of manipulation on the sidelines. You can't brush off the rightist coup of a few weeks ago that played into the hands of the Communists. You can't brush it off by saying it lasted for 24 to 36 hours. The fact is it involved a violation of the accords, and we ought to have gotten the violation, I think, before the United Nations immediately. We are violating the accords all over Southeast Asia, and if we ever get on trial you will find that was the verdict against us.

I have never bought the argument that just because somebody else commits a wrong that justifies our committing a wrong. The fact is we have our treaty obligations, and we haven't lived up to them. We ought to be getting this whole matter before the procedures of the United Nations for some time past, and I completely reject this observation of the Secretary of State this morning that the United Nations is immobilized because France and Russia are in arrears under article 19.

What an argument, Mr. Chairman.

PUT RUSSIA ON THE SPOT

Listen, if you can put Russia on the spot in the Security Council by getting her to reject a complaint filed by the United States which we ought to have filed weeks ago, that the Geneva accords were being violated and peace is being threatened in Southeast Asia, we ought to put her on the spot.

Next, may I say if she does veto it, certainly we ought to call for an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly and in our calling say as far as article 19 is concerned, because we are calling it for a purpose to face up to a question of threat to the peace in the world, we are not going to insist upon the application of article 19 for a discussion of that particular extraordinary issue. The world will applaud.

You certainly cannot justify not taking this threat to the peace before the United Nations simply because France and Russia are in arrears under article 19.

UNITED STATES NOT USING PEACEFUL PROCEDURES

Now, this adds up, in my judgment, to just one thing. The United States is not using the peaceful procedures available to it to try to bring peace to Southeast Asia. We apparently have decided on a military course of action, and it is my deep conviction that as long as we continue that course of action we will ultimately be faced with a rejection by the people of the world of our policy. Because we are undercutting the United Nations by our failure to live up to our ideals, we are the ones, in my judgment, who are threatening the United Nations, and we are also becoming now a serious threat to the peace of the world.

That is my position. I am sad about it, but I reject completely my State Department's position, and I do not intend, may I say, to support this warlike program of the U.S. State Department.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on it?

The Chairman. Yes, you may.

Secretary Rusk. I regret the width of the gap between the distinguished Senator and myself on these matters, but I do feel that I would like to comment on the key points that he raised.

NOT SEEKING A MILITARY COURSE OF ACTION

We are not ourselves seeking a military course of action, Senator. We have made it very clear to everybody on both sides of the Curtain, in the free world as well as in the Communist world, that the United States has no military interest in Southeast Asia.

We want no bases there; we want no military presence there. If Hanoi and Peking would leave their neighbors alone, our people would go home and those countries could live at peace.

Now, this is just an elementary attitude of this country over the past 10 years. If we have substantial numbers of military people in Southeast Asia today, it is because that in 1959 and 1960 Hanoi publicly proclaimed they were out to take over South Vietnam, and they sent men and materials and arms in there for that purpose.

The problem of showing up the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council is the problem of coming there with a case, finding ourselves with, say, three or four votes, if it isn't handled at the right time and in the right way, because of the reluctance of not only the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, but of France, with its influence on the Ivory Coast and Morocco, to let the Security Council take a significant role there. So we have to keep an eye on the voting situation.

In article 19, the Senator's suggestion that if there needs to be a special meeting of the General Assembly that it would be possible to hold such a meeting in the interests of preserving the peace, at the same time deferring the issue of article 19 until the regular session of the Assembly. That is, of course, a real possibility, but we would want to consult on that matter very carefully with the key committees of the Congress, because we in the executive branch have made some very strong commitments to the Congress in connection with the Congo matter, that we would do everything that we possibly could to insist that article 19 be applied automatically and specifically and firmly in the General Assembly.

But I think that is an interesting point that, quite frankly, we would be glad to have the judgment of other Senators present on, if they wish to express one.

THE RIGHTIST COUP

Now, the rightist coup of 2 months ago was not itself the stimulation of the violations of Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos. Our present estimate is, looking back over all the evidence, that at no time did the Viet Minh have less than 5,000 or 6,000 of their military personnel in Laos, and at no time have they ceased using that corridor through Laos into South Vietnam. It was frustration over these two points that had a lot to do with the stimulation of this reaction on the so-called rightist wing in Vientiane.

In any event, the rightist action in Vientiane did not change the situation on the ground adversely to the Pathet Lao. What did occur to change the situation on the ground adversely to the arrangements of the Geneva accords was the Pathet Lao attack on the Plaines des Jarres.

Now, the question—I hestiate to engage the Senator in a legal argument, because I am the amateur and I would be reluctant to do so, but I don't see how the signatories of a treaty of this sort, not a treaty, but an accord of this sort, can be in a position where one side can persistently and grossly violate the arrangements and hold the other side specifically to full compliance with them. I should think that would create a situation that would become literally intolerable and is becoming intolerable.

The purpose here is to get full compliance by everybody, and if we are in a position of supporting the Government of Laos at the request of the Government of Laos, and are prepared in 5 minutes to quit doing anything that we are doing if the other side will quit violating the accords, I should think that is a well-established attitude and position under general principles of international law and is something that is remedied, can be remedied, immediately if the other side would bring themselves into compliance with those accords. This is in the nature or sort of effort, if you like; that is, I would suppose, covered by the self-defense notions in the charter and elsewhere that the Royal Laotian Government is called upon to protect itself against these persistent violations.

Senator, I don't think we have closed the gap, but I have respect for your view, sir. I do feel that I had to comment on those particular points.

ACCELERATING TO WAR

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I don't propose to engage in a debate here with the Secretary of State, but I am going to debate this issue across America with anybody who wants to debate it, including the Secretary of State.

I only want to say that this last argument of his is completely unacceptable. If somebody violates the accords and uses force, and because they violate an accord we say we are going to meet that force with force and so we keep accelerating the force, the first thing you know you are at war.

Now, you have got all these procedures of international law to prevent that very thing, and instead of meeting that violation of the accords by using those procedures, the United States is using force. That means we are making war, and I don't like to see my country a warmaker, and that is exactly what we are doing.

Secretary RUSK. The accords themselves provide the machinery for remedies. The International Control Commission in the first instance and the two cochairmen who have special responsibilities under the accords, that machinery has been frustrated by those who are favorable to the violations, so that machinery was written in and has been rendered ineffective.

Now, the U.N. side of it, yes, as I have explained earlier, this might, with the exhaustion of the remedies provided under the existing arrangements, this might very well go to the United Nations. I think the Laotian case is a very strong one for the general membership of the United Nations in view of the background and nature of the violations that have occurred.

RETURN OF AMBASSADOR LODGE

The **Chairman**. Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?

Senator **Aiken**. Yes.

When is Mr. Lodge coming home?

Secretary **Rusk**. I don't know, sir. I gather he denied this morning the report in the New York Times.

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche, do you have any questions?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA ACCORD

Secretary Rusk, did the North Vietnamese Government at any time fully conform with the provisions of this accord of 1962?

Secretary **Rusk**. We do not believe, sir, that they did.

Senator **Lausche**. All right, sir.

Will you identify the aspects in which the accord has never been fulfilled?

Secretary **Rusk**. From the point of view of Hanoi, there were two major violations from the time that the ink was put to paper.

One, the retention of Viet Minh military personnel in Laos.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

In what number were those personnel permitted to remain in Laos? Did you say 5,000 or 6,000 a moment ago, never less than 5,000 or 6,000?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is our present estimate putting together——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Are you talking about the Vietnam or Viet Minh?

Secretary **Rusk**. Viet Minh.

The **Chairman**. Viet Minh.

Secretary **Rusk**. North Vietnamese military personnel we have been referring to as Viet Minh.

Senator **Lausche**. One, the North Vietnamese personnel were never removed from Laos in accord with this plan?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

What is No. 2?

Secretary **Rusk**. No. 2 is the continued use of the corridor of the panhandle of Laos for infiltration of personnel and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam to the support of the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Senator **Lausche**. And the proof is there that the Laotian lands were used to send North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam?

Secretary **Rusk**. No question, sir, and we have very extensive information on this, based upon interrogation of captured Vietcong who have used that trail themselves; the information directly out of Laos itself, documents captured in which the Vietcong specifically said that the neutral countries offer them opportunities to establish bases.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

What about article 6?

INFILTRATION THROUGH CAMBODIA

Senator **Sparkman**. Frank, before you leave that, may I ask this question?

Did it involve any use of Cambodia or did they come back into Vietnam north of Cambodia? Here is a better map.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, we think there may have been some infiltration through Cambodia, but not on any extensive scale.

The problem in Cambodia has been that Prince Sihanouk, given, shall we say, an honest effort on his part—let's assume that for the moment. There have been moments when we have had some doubts on that, but Prince Sihanouk has not had the armed forces to enforce his own neutrality.

We think, for example, that some illegal arms may have gone into Cambodia by international shipping, and then smuggled back into South Vietnam by sampans through that network of vast waterways there in the delta area. For example, some of the Chinese and Russian weapons may have come into South Vietnam that way.

Senator **Morse**. Could you have someone point out where the corridor is?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes; Mr. Bundy, would you point that out?

Mr. **Bundy**. The most active area, gentlemen, is the area here coming down through road nets across the border here, entering Vietnam at various points, principally in here but also further down in some degree.

Secretary **Rusk**. Would you point out the new road in South Vietnam and where that big supply dump is?

Mr. **Bundy**. The main supply dump is just west of Tchepone.

Senator **Morse**. In Laos?

Mr. **Bundy**. In Laos, and the road that has been built up in recent months runs from just Route 9 directly parallel to the border and very close to it to a point called "Muongnong."

Senator **Morse**. There is another new road from North Vietnam?

Mr. **Bundy**. I see, yes. We believe there are extensive roads in this area and also one running right down roughly here.

Senator **Sparkman**. They enter Vietnam north of Saigon.

INFILTRATION THROUGH WATERWAYS

Mr. **Bundy**. Very much to the north, so far as the Laos infiltration corridor. The other one that the Secretary was speaking of was that supplies reached Cambodia through the major river—that goes up the river, in a major degree which is an international waterway, and then is transshipped into sampans and comes down through the whole myriad of waters that comprise the Mekong Delta in this area where you virtually can't do a really effective job of interception.

Senator **Lausche**. Why don't they cross in this area here instead of coming down here?

Mr. **Bundy**. It is a matter of terrain in part, sir. The terrain is very difficult here, and also the Vietnamese forces are better deployed along here. The only good passes are across right here where you do have the I.C.C. for Vietnam watching.

There is one over here which may be used to some extent, but the rest is extremely rough country.

Secretary **Rusk**. We are doubtful, Mr. Chairman, that very much is coming down along the coast by junk, because the South Vietnamese have organized a very extensive junk patrol operation. They have served tens upon tens of thousands of junks along the coast there with almost no evidence of personnel or arms being infiltrated that way.

NOT AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY

Senator **Sparkman**. May I go back a question? You stated here that the Mekong River is an international waterway, is that what you said?

Mr. **Bundy**. That is correct.

Yes, sir, I may have stated that in an international law sense, but anyway it's provided in the 1954 accords that shipping could proceed up the Mekong up to Cambodia and in effect it is free transit.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is limited to that accord?

Mr. **Bundy**. That may be, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. I am only asking.

Mr. **Bundy**. I think you are right; I am sorry, I misstated that. In strict international terms it is not an international waterway but it is a locally guaranteed one. That is the way to put it.

Senator **Lausche**. What about article 6, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions of war, materiel, generally shall be prohibited; that is in substance what it says.

Has that been violated?

Secretary **Rusk**. There is no question about that, sir. The convoys by truck that have come in from North Vietnam have been clearly identified on the roads in the border area, and we know from other sources that that violation has occurred.

I think there is an important difference here that so far as I am aware, the arms that we have furnished the Royal Government of Laos are permitted under this article. For example, we recently gave them an additional 14 T-28's at their request.

Senator **Lausche**. Where is the language that authorizes us to provide the arms?

Secretary **Rusk**. Article 6, the very same article.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

Except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos?

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct, sir.

ROLE OF THE I.C.C.

Senator **Lausche**. Under this protocol have we called upon the Commission to check into these matters? Have we called its attention to these violations?

Secretary **Rusk**. Repeatedly, sir, but the principal effort, as is appropriate under the protocol, is for the Government of Laos to do so, and the prime minister has repeatedly called complaints to the attention of the I.C.C.

The I.C.C. at the present time has been drafting a report on these violations that I have been talking about. The Pole has been temporarily absent. We do not yet know whether the Pole has withdrawn permanently. We understand he is returning to the I.C.C. and we have taken the position insistently with the help of Canada that the withdrawal of the Pole does not destroy the I.C.C., that the other two members must continue to carry out the obligations of the Commission.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do recall that under the original Geneva Accord we were somewhat hesitant about the Commission because we did not feel that we could trust the Indian and Polish representative, especially while Krishna Menon was in charge.

Are we at all now doubting the propriety of relying upon this Commission in finding the facts?

Secretary RUSK. The problem is not so much, I think, Senator, one of propriety as in the willingness and the ability of the Commission to function in fact.

Senator LAUSCHE. We are wanting it to function?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, we would like it to function.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Polish man has not been present, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. And when he was there, the Pole accepted the vote of the Pathet Lao as restraining the commission from carrying out its duty.

Senator LAUSCHE. How has the Indian acted?

Secretary RUSK. In recent weeks and months the Indian has been quite helpful.

Senator LAUSCHE. Prior to that time?

Secretary RUSK. Rather unenthusiastic.

LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY AID

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, this question, on what theory do you now take the position that we are within our international rights, legal rights, and that the Hanoi Government is not?

Senator AIKEN. In doing what, Frank?

Senator LAUSCHE. In sending out military help.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the principal idea—and I am perhaps not the one to put this in legal language—the principal idea is that we are acting at the request of the Royal Government of Laos in the face of gross violations of the accords by Hanoi.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, again you are coming back to article 6 which says that the material shall not be shipped in except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think article 6 and our legal adviser would also put it on general principles of international law.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Merely to show my position, under article 4 our course of action in Laos is completely illegal.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS

Senator **Lausche**. What has been the effect of our military operations, reconnaissance and otherwise, on the Laotian situation?

Secretary **Rusk**. As far as our own planes are concerned, the principal matter there has been uncovering information about what was happening in those parts of Laos that were not available to the International Control Commission.

As far as any military effect of our plans is concerned, that has been negligible. But the Laotian Government, with a total now of what, 14 plus 6, 24, the T-28's——

Mr. **Bundy**. I think it is higher than that, 26 or 27.

Secretary **Rusk** [continuing]. With 26 or 27 T-28's has been carrying on active attacks on Pathet Lao and Viet Minh elements in the Plaines des Jarres area, and we have reason to think this has become painful for the other side and that this is entering into their calculations somewhat.

The T-28's and air action alone in a large territory in a country as large as Great Britain, with few people, won't do this sufficient job. Nevertheless it has been, we think, discouraging to the other side and has helped considerably the morale of the neutralist and government forces.

Senator **Lausche**. The only Americans that have been in the planes were in the planes that were shot down.

Secretary **Rusk**. The reconnaissance planes and their escorts were Americans. The T-28's are flown by Laotians and some hired people. I think there are no Americans on those planes.

LAOTIAN BATTLES

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Doesn't it shock the Laotians when somebody gets killed in one of these battles? That is kind of not the rules of the game over there, is it?

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, this is the great tragedy of the situation.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They got to shoot in the air and then run and say, "We had a big battle."

Secretary **Rusk**. If you could get all the foreigners out of Laos, the Laotians don't want to kill each other and I am not convinced it doesn't apply to the Pathet Lao as well. It is these stiffening elements of Viet Minh who come in there and become the problem. If you leave the Laotians alone, I assure you it is very hard to get them to lower their rifles from a vertical to horizontal to shoot anything. There have been very few casualties.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Didn't the old king who died a few years ago say they like to drink wine, make love, and attend festivals?

Secretary **Rusk**. I respect them for it. The Laotians, we tend to think they are primitive. They are highly civilized people from their point view, if you would leave them alone.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think they have some pretty good ideas.

Senator **Lausche**. It is said of my ancestors that they always conquered by playing the accordion and the stringed instruments, and never seized the sword or the gun.

Senator **Church**. That is the best way, Frank, it is much more enduring.

Secretary **Rusk**. Two years ago there was something that was described as a considerable battle going on. Both sides took 10 days off for a water festival, and they were there together in the water festival. When it was over, they went out to the woods.

CONTINUATION OF A REVOLUTION

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary, as I view this situation, it seems to me that we have had in both South Vietnam and in Laos pretty much a continuation of the revolution that commenced much earlier and did not end with the defeat of the French. To be sure, that revolution is being aided and abetted by North Vietnam in Laos and in South Vietnam, but by the same token it has been resisted with even larger aid and assistance from the United States in both areas.

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, would you——

Senator **Church**. The point I want to make is this.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Church**. I recognize that as the revolution is being pushed by forcible means, it must be resisted by forcible means as long as this situation continues. But it seems to me that the very character of the fight necessarily means that it will either be won or lost by these people themselves. It cannot be won—we cannot win it for them.

Now, when you began your discussion you made a statement about Sihanouk's views which seems to me to be an exceedingly wise statement.

Sihanouk recognizes that the great force in Asia is China, and in the long run the white man is not going to prevail out there. The Asians are going to ultimately determine what happens in this archipelago. When he says in the long run the neutrality, and you might add the independence, of his country will depend on Chinese assent, I think he is right.

INDEPENDENCE FROM THE CHINESE

Therefore, it seems to me to be nothing short of disastrous if we permit our policy to proceed in such a way as to ultimately invite the Chinese down. If there is one thing that these people can all agree on, even the North Vietnamese, it is a desire to remain independent from Chinese dominion.

What I want to know, Mr. Secretary, I have heard reports that there are now developing a sizable concentration of military forces in South China which would indicate a mobilization. Is that so? Is there any basis for that?

Secretary **Rusk**. Let me start with the last item and work back from there just for a moment.

There are substantial Chinese forces in South China where they have been for some time. We do not have information, and I think we would have information if it occurred, of any displacement of Chinese forces to the south.

Now, this could occur but we do not have that. There are Chinese forces in South China and some of them in the border area who have been in there all along. We see nothing. We see nothing special in regard to this most recent situation.

TWO DIFFERENT REVOLUTIONS

May I just comment on the revolution, because I think it is quite important that we keep two different revolutions separate.

Senator **Church**. Yes.

Secretary **Rusk**. One is the revolution of modernization, economic and social development, education and all these things, the rising expectations, that kind of thing. I think it is important to recall that South Vietnam was in the full stream of that revolution in the decade of the fifties, and they were making very good progress, say, from 1955 to 1958 or 1959, along in there.

Now, we have reason to believe from intelligence sources that progress with that revolution in South Vietnam was one of the reasons why North Vietnam decided in 1959 and 1960 that they had to do something about it, that they were being outstripped by the south, and that this was of concern to them.

Senator **Church**. It is the second revolution I have reference to.

Secretary **Rusk**. The other revolution, the Communist world revolution, is the dynamic force that concerns us all. You spoke of assent, Senator. Stalin assented, if you like, to leave Western Europe alone because he was confronted with an alternative he couldn't face.

Now, in that sense Peking must assent to leaving Southeast Asia alone. They aren't going, it seems to me, to sit down and out of the generosity of their hearts cancel the world revolution by saying, "Well, of course, this doesn't apply to Southeast Asia; we are not going to do something about Southeast Asia." They may come to the same kind of assent that Joseph Stalin came to about Western Europe, that if they persist in trying to engulf Southeast Asia, the alternatives that face them are unacceptable to them.

ASIAN NATIONALISM

Senator **Church**. I am not in disagreement with anything you have said, Mr. Secretary, but the critical point, the critical point, and I wanted to stress it, is that we can give as much aid and assistance as they can possibly use in helping them resist this effort, this forcible Communist assertion against them. It nevertheless remains that in South Vietnam the great bulk of the revolutionaries are South Vietnamese. The same thing is true in Laos. If they are going to prevail, then they have got themselves to find the will and political organization and stability and the leadership to prevail.

If the time ever comes when we permit ourselves to be sucked in and make their wars our wars and use our forces in that area, we are going to find that the Chinese will come down just as we found that out in Korea. We are going to find that we can provide no solution there ultimately and we will be faced with an impossible situation. All of the Asiatics will regard our intrusion as an attempt on the part of the Western white world to reestablish a beachhead in Asia.

That is the thing we must avoid. Yet political forces keep sucking us further and further in this direction. That is the thing that concerns me.

The **Chairman**. I wonder if the Senator would clarify his position. I am interested in what you are saying.

Is it your view that these indigenous Communists are primarily nationalists rather than Communists?

They are just opposing the regime and they are utilizing the Communist support or not. I think this is a very interesting aspect of it.

Senator CHURCH. It is my view, Mr. Chairman, that the principal revolutionary force that brought independence from the French was of Communist character. Ho Chi Minh, I am afraid, is still looked upon as pretty much the George Washington of this area as the authentic architect of independence.

I think the Communists from the start never intended to abide by the original Geneva Pact. They saw that as merely an opening by which they could extend communism southward and ultimately unify this whole area under Communist control.

But the fact they are Communists does not mean they are not first and primarily nationalists, just as I think that Mao Tse-tung is first and primarily Chinese. The thing that most concerns these people down here, and has for centuries, is Chinese hegemony.

If we allow ourselves to get drawn into this war further and further until we make it our war, first we provide them with no solution, we involve ourselves in a hopeless, endless bloody quagmire, and we also force China's hand and invite her down. That would be pure disaster, and if we don't keep this point clearly in mind, I think that is where we are headed.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON LAOS

I disagree that there is going to be any peaceful resolution of this thing, because I think the Communists are going to continue to persist. We have got to have the guts that President Kennedy had when it looked like they were going to take over Laos, when he said it is their war. If they are unwilling to fight the Communists in Laos, then there is no way we can save Laos for them. We have got to do that in South Vietnam if it ever comes to that.

Secretary RUSK. President Kennedy said a lot more than that.

Senator CHURCH. I know that, but nevertheless——

Secretary RUSK. He said we must get all the foreigners out of Laos and leave that country alone.

Senator CHURCH. That is right and I don't disagree with that, Mr. Secretary, but what I am saying is that we must not allow this war to go so far that we assume primary responsibility with American forces, because that is going to lead to an involvement with China that is going to pull China down. That will destroy any hope for independence or neutrality in this area.

CONTAINING CHINA

Secretary RUSK. Given what you have said about the purposes of China, what will make them stop? Why should they stop?

Senator CHURCH. There are two things. If you are going to have a successful containment policy, the last place in the world to look for it is in this area. If it is going to succeed there, the only chance is by beefing up the South Vietnamese in the hopes that they can get sufficient popular support and sufficient muscle to stop them. I am for that, but if that collapses, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary **Rusk**. That is the track we are on now.

Senator **Church** [continuing]. If that collapses, I am not for this next step which is going to be thrust upon us; namely, American occupation of that peninsula. I am not for bombing North Vietnam as a solution to the South Vietnamese revolution. It won't solve the problem but will only worsen it, and it will only draw us in further.

If it comes to the point where they do not resist, then let's for heaven's sake draw our line of containment in an area where American military power can sustain it. American military power is essentially aerial and naval, and we can sustain it at the shoreline, but this area is not so vital to the vital interests of the country——

Senator **Symington**. This peninsula?

Senator **Church** [continuing]. The peninsula—as to justify our making an American war. I am for fighting our wars where our vital interests are concerned.

Senator **Morse**. May I take a second to answer the Secretary's question?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes.

MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator **Morse**. If we have Great Britain, France, every other peace-loving nation of the United Nations to take jurisdiction over there and get the United States out of this situation as a unilateral nation fighting a war, I think you have got a chance of containing the Communists. You are never going to contain the Communists if you give them the propaganda we are giving them to build up world hatred against the United States and to say the United States claims it is not a colonial and imperialistic power, but it is exactly the tactics we are following. I think the only hope of maintaining peace over here and stopping the Communists is to get all the other free nations of the world working with us under the canopy of the United Nations and not under the canopy of the United States.

Now, I agree with Frank Church if you continue this program you are going to end up with war, and a major war at that. There is no other end of the road but a major war between Red China and the United States.

Sure you can bomb her out and you can destroy millions and you will be hated for 500 years.

The **Chairman**. We will recess for 5 minutes.

That is a vote and we will be back. I want to personally hear your comments to Mr. Church's and Mr. Morse's last comments.

[Short recess.]

CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order.

Will you respond to the comments made just before we recessed, please?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the question—there are several questions there.

One is what will stop China in this pressure toward Southeast Asia. I would strongly reinforce what Senator Church said about the attitude of the Southeast Asians to China, to the Chinese; this is a historical fear. Indeed, this may reinforce his argument at one point, but our information is that there are relatively few Chinese in North Vietnam, technicians and people of that sort. In other words, the North Vietnamese show some sensitivity about Chinese presence even in North Vietnam.

But I don't quite see what will stop China in Southeast Asia unless they come to realize that continued pressures into Southeast Asia or an attempt to overrun Southeast Asia will be a disastrous course for them. This is the elementary doctrine of the world revolution.

CONCERN ABOUT DRAWING A LINE

We did as a practical matter produce an assent, to a degree, on the part of the Soviet Union about Western Europe, but it took some time and a great deal of effort and major military expenditures, major military presence, and sweating through the first Berlin blockade and all sorts of measures. The elementary situation there was that the Soviet Union was confronted with the fact that continued pressures would mean war.

Now, I am concerned about the question of drawing a line, as to where that line should be. I don't think it is necessary to speak in terms of a domino theory, because we have another theory that I think much more clearly explains the problem, and that is the theory of world revolution, the insatiable appetite of the world revolution on the Communist side.

If they pick up one country, they will immediately take another country as a target, to try to keep going as far as they can go until they can't go any further. I don't envisage that there would be in any event a Korean-type engagement on the Asiatic mainland. It is true that the tactical and strategic situation is quite different than it was during the Korean war——

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you comment on this——

Secretary RUSK. May I just add one further word?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

GUERRILLA TACTICS OF DISRUPTION

Secretary RUSK. I am not now in my remarks trying to anticipate some inevitable decision, because I think you did emphasize very properly the importance of the job being done by the people in the area. I think this is especially true in the case of South Vietnam, where the contest is not between two armed forces engaged with each other.

The Vietcong rarely attack the South Vietnamese armed forces as such. There are occasional ambushes, but the object of their attack is the civil structure of government in the countryside. They go after the undefended district chief or they go after the families of men who are in the armed forces or they try to disrupt the public services, health, education, or whatever it may be. Their tactics are the guerrilla tactics of disruption. This imposes upon the forces of law and order the problem of dealing with the shadowy enemy, the gangster-type who can pick his own time and place to strike and pull away and vanish.

Under those circumstances the weight of one guerrilla is many times the weight of one man in the security forces. It is in the nature of the kind of warfare that the initiative inevitably is with the guerrilla. This is why we feel that the central part of the effort must be South Vietnamese and that is why we have been trying to build that into, help them build that into their situation.

We get no impression that the South Vietnamese population is attracted to Hanoi. The problem there is that the villager who cooperates with the government has to decide whether, if he does cooperate, his throat will be cut at night.

In the areas that are provided reasonable security there is no problem about eliciting cooperation from the population. The problem arises where the villagers dare not cooperate because they will be terrorized by the Vietcong striking by night.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I might take just 4 or 5 minutes and ask Mr. Sullivan to comment very briefly on the situation in Vietnam with respect to the critical provinces, to illustrate what the primary problem is.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. SULLIVAN. Gentlemen, this is a map which is primarily geared on the location of the density of the population of the country.

There are roughly 15 million people living in South Vietnam. As you can see, they live primarily along the coastal plain and down through here in the delta regions, south of Saigon and down into the Camau Peninsula.

The concentration of population is indicated by these dark brown areas. This is the city of Saigon, these are the concentrations in the rich delta region, the Mekong and the Bassac Rivers.

This whole region that is so lightly colored here is the Annamite Chain, heavily forested mountains, and in through here very few people live.

This region down through here is a region which is primarily the Plaines des Joncs, heavily reeded, soggy area which at this time of year, starting from now until October, will be under water all the time.

VIETCONG FORCES

The Vietcong themselves in this country, where there are, as I say, 15 million people, number some 22,000 to 28,000. We would say 25,000 to 30,000 is the range in which we would put them, hardcore fully trained military men, most of whom have received training in the North.

These people, most of them, originated in the south, went back north at the time of partition, and were infiltrated in again. Some of them remained underground in 1954 and formed cells here.

The bulk of them however, are people who have had training with the Viet Minh forces. They have recruited to assist them 60,000 to 80,000 people locally who assist them as ricegrowers, coolies, porters, and provide them some degree of communication and protection. They are located as best we know from our intelligence in 44 different units which are scattered throughout the country.

There are a few places where they do concentrate. There is a jungle region down here, very heavily forested, where they do occasionally concentrate, form themselves up in battalion groups and make strikes out on the population.

They also have an area in here where they concentrate and occasionally lapse back and forth across the Cambodian border, another one here, and this is the area from which we believe the general direction is given the operations in this country under direct orders from Hanoi. There is another area right through here which is up again into the hills which is another concentration point, and finally this is an area here.

VIETCONG TARGETS

Now, the country itself is subjected to the type of attack which the Secretary described. That is to say, there are not deliberate military clashes by this small force, scattered as it is, against the Armed Forces of the Government of South Vietnam.

The armed forces of the government number about 200,000 in the regular army; another 90,000 or so in the territorial civil guard, provincially based units; and another 95,000 in the self-defense corps, quasivolunteer units that protect the families.

Again, the essence of the fight is that the Vietcong attack the population. The essence of the combat by the Vietnamese Government forces is to protect the population.

Naturally, where they can pick the targets and the Vietcong have a tremendous advantage in the initiative and in the actions they can take. The protection to be afforded to the population, even with the number of armed forces and the paramilitary forces that the government has, is a tremendous undertaking.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ANTIGUERRILLA TACTICS

Now, General Khanh, largely from the experience that the British had in Malaya and from other experience in this guerrilla warfare, has developed since he has come into office a pacification plan which is based upon local initiative starting in areas that are secure and moving outward from those areas to attempt to encompass the protection and security for great degree of population.

He has broken this down and given the initiative basically to the four corps commanders. The first corps is this area up in here and, except for this one area in through here, this is a relatively secure pacified quiet region. Over back in the hills here, in this region, has been one of the major military headquarters and it, we believe, is the headquarters that control the infiltration groups through here.

That headquarters has been recently attacked by the Vietnamese armed forces in a very successful operation, successful not in the sense that they killed or captured any number of Vietcong; they did disrupt the headquarters area. They captured a number of weapons. They destroyed factories where weapons are fabricated. They destroyed and captured a number of documents. They did take a few prisoners and they do have some intelligence gains from that operation, but primarily they set them off balance. They were able to make these people scatter into the hills so that they haven't been able to reinitiate some of the attacks they had in through here.

This is the second corps' region. Again, the security is quite good. Quang Ngai province is an ancient revolutionary province, the former home of Ho Chi Minh. It is a province that still does give trouble because there is an infrastracture of many years standing of Vietcong who are in this area, but primarily there is a pacification and security line which is down in the Piedmont regions through these two large areas of the country.

AREA CAUSING GREATEST PROBLEM

Down through here is the area where we have the greatest problem at the current moment. This is an area which, as you see, may be attacked into from these sanctuaries here in the Plains of Reeds, the Plaines des Joncs, to be attacked in here from this area over here and tying in along the area of the Cambodian border.

Harassment goes on constantly, mining of roads, destruction of newly built schools, tearing down of hamlets that are set up for defense of these people, harassment and kidnaping, assassination of village officials; this is the constant sort of terror tactic that goes on in this area. To provide protection for it, the army is more mobile, the territorial guard has expanded itself, but in general, this is an area in which we get the bulk of the incidents.

They are not incidents in which the Vietcong come to grips except defensively with the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam. They are incidents in which the targets are civilians and the targets are generally picked out to be people who are associated in one form or another and known to be loyal to the central regime. In recent weeks, in the past 3 or 4 weeks, the rate of incidents by the Vietcong has dropped significantly. There has been no major military engagement in nearly a month except for the Do Xa operation.

COMPARISON TO DIEN BIEN PHU

There has been, however, an increase in terroristic actions, kidnapings, and propaganda attacks. On the whole, I would say what we see in this country is an inability on the part of the Vietcong to engage militarily or to defeat militarily the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. I think this is a very significant difference that we must see between the situation which existed, for example, in 1950, 1951 in the Red River Valley, culminating in the Dien Bien Phu, where the North Viet Minh would put 15,000 men into the field with conventional forces with artillery and could actually take on the cream of the French establishment in pitched battles.

There is nothing like that that now exists. The Vietnamese Government armed forces can march and move anywhere in this country. There is nothing that they can encounter in this country which will resist them in terms of their actual movement through it.

VERY WEAK BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE

But the problem of holding it and the problem of giving the infrastructure to the population, a civil structure which can then form some degree of security behind their passage, is the problem that General Khanh faces, and that is a problem which is complicated by the fact that he inherited from France a very, very weak bureaucratic structure. The people who were in that structure were the ones who had been over the years the primary target of the Vietcong so that there have been targets of assassination. The winnowing of those he actually had cut the total and there is naturally some reluctance on the part of people to go out and expose themselves unarmed and undefended against that type of terror when they know they are the targets of attack.

Secretary **Rusk**. Mr. Sullivan, would you put your finger on the area where the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao are?

Mr. **Sullivan**. Yes, down here, down through here in Angiang Province, which is this province here, are the areas which have in recent months, because of a reassociation of the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao sects there, quasireligious sects, with the regime, there has been a marked improvement in the security and protection of those areas. These people who formerly gave some solace to Viet Minh and Vietcong now associate themselves with the government.

VIETNAMESE MUST WIN THEIR OWN WAR

Senator **Church**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this one further observation and I won't say any more.

It seems to me what has been said here both by the Secretary and this gentleman tend to reinforce the points I tried to make earlier. The nature of the war is a guerrilla war, just as Communists undertook a guerrilla campaign down in Malaya. There is a way to win a guerrilla war but it has to be won by the people themselves.

The Malayans won it, not with massive assistance from the United States. I think it is winnable here if they find the resolve and the will, and if this government can achieve a degree of confidence and degree of loyalty that is required.

But the very fact that the Communists and South Vietnam cannot directly contest with the government forces is due to the fact that the North Vietnam army is not there. Yes, they have revolutionary cadres down there but it is essentially a guerrilla war. They are insurrectionists.

There is no way we can win that war for them with our Navy and air power. It has got to be done by those people in the paddy fields. I hope it can be won. I think we must do all we can to assist them in winning it, but the last thing we want to do is to pursue a policy which will have the result of turning this area into a Korea either by inviting the North Vietnamese army down, which is bigger than the South Vietnamese or at least comparable to it, and last of all, do anything which will result in inviting the Chinese down.

The Secretary has said that to date we do not have evidence that the Chinese have thus far concerned themselves sufficiently to directly intervene in any big way.

Now, these are the things, keeping our eye on the bigger consequences that could flow from an incorrect policy and the disaster that could result is what we must do, because the pressures here could easily cause us to make that kind of mistake. That kind of mistake also might seal the schism that now exists between the Soviet Union and Red China.

Secretary **Rusk**. May I comment briefly on that, Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

Secretary **Rusk**. There is one important difference between this situation and the situation in Malaya or the Huk problem in the Philippines and that is the extent of direct external support for the guerrilla operations. This is more comparable to the Greek problem before Yugoslavia broke off and sealed its border.

I accept everything you have said about the importance of the effort in South Vietnam, but what I am concerned about is the powerful stimulation that this insurgent guerrilla activity gets from across those long exposed borders by land out of Laos and out of Cambodia and from North Vietnam. This umbilical cord is important politically and psychologically to the Vietcong. It is important practically in terms of the highly trained cadres that are furnished. It is important in terms of the more sophisticated weapons that come from that direction.

If that umbilical cord were broken by a decision from Hanoi to leave their neighbors alone as they were doing from along 1955 to 1958, along in there, then the Vietcong problem would be rolled back very fast. So, the external problem is a very important one indeed and this is the thing that causes such great concern.

MAKING THE UNITED STATES THE COMMUNISTS' WHIPPING BOY

Senator **Morse**. I would like to take 1 minute to answer Mr. Sullivan to reinforce what Senator Church has said.

If 15 million South Vietnamese can't control 30,000 Communist Vietcong, we are not going to be able to solve that problem for them. We certainly cannot justify 16,000 American boys over there because 15 million South Vietnamese can't control 30,000 Communist Vietcong.

After all the billions we have poured in there—and I am for giving them the material assistance, the economic assistance that they want, but I was in the United Nations in 1960, the so-called shoe-thumping session, when Khrushchev thought he was going to take the new nations with him both on this troika proposal and his Congo proposal. When those Communists found those new nations lining up with the freedom nations of this world for peace and found that only by taking that stand in support of the United Nations which stood between them and possible Russian domination, did Khrushchev start pulling in his horns.

Senator **Lausche**. Is that on the Congo?

Senator **Morse**. It was on the Congo and on the troika issue.

I want to say to my Secretary—and I think he knows my difference with him is professional and not personal—I want to say that until you stop making the United States the Communist whipping boy, and that is what we are, by this unilateral warmaking policy in Southeast Asia, until you stop making us a whipping boy, and bringing in support of the position that we are taking for maintaining peace over there, the other free nations of the world throughout the United Nations action, we are bound to lose.

We are going right down the road toward war just as fast as we can march on a unilateral basis, and you say it can't be done. You don't know it until you try it. The fact is we haven't tried to take this matter either before the Security Council or an extraordinary session of the United Nations, and Sullivan's report here this morning just makes me more convinced that we had better stop this unilateral action.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The Senator from Missouri.

Do you wish to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

AVOID THREATENING CHINA

Secretary **RUSK**. I just wanted to ask the chairman, or remind the chairman, that I would be very glad to have any comments that other members of the committee might have on the idea of deferring the article 19 points in a special session, letting it wait over until the general session, the ordinary regular session, if it did become possible or desirable to bring, say, the Laotian question which is a very powerful position before a special session of the General Assembly. Quite frankly, the thing that has been central in our thinking on this has been some very specific flat commitments which we have made on that article 19 point at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Second, Senator Church, I do hope you would be a little cautious about the concept of our inviting these people in, because the other side always says anybody who dares defend himself is the aggressor. I think we have to—to me, it has in it many disturbing elements. We are not inviting anybody to do anything except leave their neighbors alone.

Senator **CHURCH**. I didn't mean it in that sense. I think you know how I meant it. The phrase has connotations that I didn't intend.

Secretary **RUSK**. Yes, I just wanted to call it to your attention.

Senator **CHURCH**. There came a time in the Korean war when the Chinese came down. We have a situation now where the Chinese are out, even the North Vietnamese armies are not engaged. I just don't want to take the kind of turn that results in a feeling in China that they are being threatened in such a way as to move the Chinese armies south, because once they move you are going to have to have an awfully powerful force to stop that.

Senator **AIKEN**. You were referring to Washington policemen anyway, weren't you? If they protect themselves they are brutal.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Symington.

Senator **SYMINGTON**. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

AMERICAN PLANES OVER LAOS

First, Mr. Secretary, if I gathered correctly, no American troops have been in battle over Laos, no fliers.

What was your observation along that line?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, I didn't say that. I said that American planes over Laos have had no appreciable military effect. There was some firing back on at least one instance, at least one instance, but Prince Souvanna Phouma has asked us not to comment on a particular operation while he is in this effort to help us find a political solution to this problem.

Further, Hanoi and Peking are uncertain about what is happening on the ground. They are confused about it and we are reluctant to clarify them by ourselves spelling out in detail exactly what happened on each occasion.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we been strafing their ground installations with American fliers?

Secretary RUSK. No, there was one occasion on which we fired back when our planes were fired upon.

Senator SYMINGTON. Only one.

Mr. BUNDY. I think there were two, two missions on which that took place, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Two.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only asking; I am not criticizing. I have some thoughts about this, but we don't have you down here very often.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

SUPPORT OF WESTERN EUROPE

Senator SYMINGTON. On the question of getting other people in to help us, why can't we get some help from the West Germans, for example, and if we can't get it before the United Nations, how long do you think the American people are going to, you might say, bank it in Korea and bank it in South Vietnam and now start banking it in Laos?

We always had for many years banked it in West Germany. How many years do you think you can sell this concept of our shoring up these various problems all over the world militarily?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, the South Vietnamese themselves have not been asking for foreign combat forces.

Now, in connection with what others might do, in the first place, President de Gaulle——

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean by that they ask only for ours?

Secretary RUSK. Well, ours—we have the helicopter people for transport.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have got 15,000 people in South Vietnam in uniform.

Would they be satisfied to have some of those West Germans, for example?

Secretary RUSK. Let me comment on the individual countries if I may just for a moment, sir.

In the case of France, President de Gaulle has made it very clear he is not going to put French military back into South Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. I specifically omitted France because I think he sold us out in Vietnam as he sold us out in NATO.

WEST GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN

How about West Germany?

Secretary RUSK. West Germany has not thus far been willing to send its military formations outside of Germany. This is based upon some of the historical background, the commitments of all of their forces are to NATO. They have no non-NATO forces. They are stepping up their other forms of assistance to South Vietnam, economic and technical.

In the case of Great Britain, who is working very closely with us on this Southeast Asia situation, they have been committing forces in a number of situations of great interest to us as well as to them, and are at the moment pretty thin in terms of Cyprus, East Africa, Aden, Guiana, and Malaysia. They are pretty well involved in situations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let's go back to West Germany, because I understand the British position.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who is involved, so I get it clear?

Secretary RUSK. I say the British have recently put forces in operation at situations.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand the British situation. They have Yemen and Aden and Cyprus. I understand the French problem, because they have walked out of everything and they are in arrears in payment in the United Nations and so forth and so on, as you pointed out this morning.

Now, West Germany is one of the most prosperous countries in the world today. We have 935,000 people in Europe that the American taxpayer is paying for, counting dependents, that are defending West Germany, and we have the problem of the wall and West Berlin. Why don't we ask somebody else in here so that we don't have to take the rap in South Vietnam year after year, the same way we take it in Korea and the same way we take it in Germany? Especially it is true because they are so prosperous, regardless of what they say—what they are going to do about where they are going to put their troops—it seems we should have a little to say about it. I think if we are not careful we are going to break the American economy if we are going to carry out all the programs that we have from the standpoint of social betterment and so forth and at the same time bank the world from the physical and military standpoint.

WHY DO WE GO IT ALONE?

Actually, the briefing that Mr. Sullivan gave, while very interesting, could have been given to me 2½ years ago in Saigon. There would have been very little difference between what he said today and what he said then. These forces that come up, like the Catholics against the Buddhists and the Buddhists against the Catholics, it seems to me it is like somebody comes down to breakfast and says, "My cancer is better today." Then it gets worse and then it gets better and gets sideways.

Can't we get some of these countries that are so prosperous because of the $182 billion we put into foreign aid to come in the take some of this physical resistance we are constantly utilizing all over the world?

That is my question. I can understand why this country can't and that country can't. Perhaps there is a reason for Sweden and Norway or Spain. But a country like West Germany that we have literally saved, without any reservation nobody would argue about that, from communism and which is exporting more and importing more behind the Iron Curtain countries than any other country in this world today, why don't we get them in to back us up?

Why do we have to go it alone, you might say, in place after place all over the world? Doesn't it deny to a great extent the whole concept we have had of the United Nations in the formation of it, which was one for all and all for one for freedom?

Everybody seems to be all for freedom except they don't spend anything. We are busting our country trying to carry out what we are doing.

I am not one—but I realize the tremendous serious portent of this constant continuing unfavorable balance of payments.

Secretary **RUSK**. We are in touch with about 14 other countries at the present time to step up their help to South Vietnam. Australia has responded very quickly and well, with both personnel and materiel.

Senator **MORSE**. Increasing 30 to 60 is responding well, is that what you mean?

Secretary **RUSK**. I am talking about, again, they are in part tied down in Malaysia at the present time, Senator.

Senator **MORSE**. And we in West Berlin.

Secretary **RUSK**. That is right, sir.

A UNITED FRONT

Senator **SYMINGTON**. Let's shift, if I may, just to the psychological question.

Why isn't it possible for us to do something that makes it possible for the world to think that there are more people involved in Southeast Asia with people in uniform than just the United States, because the concept of the United Nations as I got it, regardless of the syllogistic reasoning that you can develop a situation why we can't go there and maybe we can't go there because of some various rules, clause this, article this, paragraph that—why isn't it possible for the free countries to put up a more united front? To me, it is an economic problem, it is a military problem, and I am beginning to think it is a psychological problem.

Just let me finish to be sure you get my point and then I would like to listen to you.

You have three things to do. You can move north, you can stand pat and put in more treasure, or you can get out; one, two, or three, I don't see any other.

There was a time I was ready to move north, but when De Gaulle ran out of the situation here like he did in NATO, and like I think he is going to continue to do, I changed on that. Apparently a lot of reasons exist for not pulling out and I can understand those.

But my point is if we are going to stick in here and continue to throw the treasure of the United States into this picture to defend freedom, why can't we get somebody like West Germany who isn't involved all over the place and who is more prosperous than they have ever been in this history to come in here and stand up with us psychologically, militarily, and economically so that this is not just our unilateral defense of freedom in the Far East?

A DOZEN MORE FLAGS IN VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. We do hope to get a dozen more flags in there one way or another for the total political and psychological effort. It is an effort to help us out in helping the Vietnamese win this battle.

We have not thus far pressed the Germans to put elements of their armed forces in there because they have been fully committed to NATO. We have felt it was important to build up the forces in NATO and in terms of worldwide deployment, their most appropriate role was in the NATO area. I must say in light of your remarks I will take another look at that problem to see whether at least in part there cannot be some people in there to fly helicopters and so forth. I will look at that.

The Germans, because of historical background, have been very reluctant and others have been reluctant to ask them to put their forces outside of Germany. It creates a good many political problems of other sorts when the Germans start going abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. It is somewhat like asking——

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. I realize the underlying concern.

HOLDING ACTIONS AROUND THE WORLD

Senator SYMINGTON. Then you get to all the other places like Cuba, where we are almost alone in our policies. What worries the people where I come from is that they don't understand why everywhere we are the ones who do the primary physical job, invariably in the major places.

For example, we have the same number of troops in Germany today that we had when there were no Germans under arms, and I think they have got some 400,000 under arms now. If we are going to just have a holding action, which, correct me if I am wrong, but which it looks like you want to talk about—it, in frank terms, is what we plan. We don't plan to attack. We don't plan to quit. We plan to hold.

Secretary RUSK. Where now?

Senator SYMINGTON. In South Vietnam, and I would say Korea, too, and I would say West Germany and so forth, where we have these holding actions spread out over the world.

If we do just plan to hold, it is getting increasingly difficult for me to defend that policy at the same time—and I don't mean to be corny about it—but at the same time Americans get killed. You get back to the same type and character of arguments that you had in the Korean situation.

EITHER FIGHT OR GET OUT

In other words, if we are going to fight, let's fight. If we are not going to fight, let's get out. We say we can't do that. We can't fight and we can't get out, so we are just going to hold.

I would think that one of the most important things to carry out, and not talking politically at all, in the months to come, is I don't think the people understand this South Vietnamese thing any more. I think that is complicated by this cocky little fellow in Cambodia, who has been, to the best of my knowledge and laying it right on the line, helping the North Vietnamese for years, helping the North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese. Now you have got the further disintegration of the Laotian situation, which has always been, at best, questionable, as you know.

I just don't see how we can go on this way without raising protests unless we pull in some of our allies, friends, and become more frank about what our problems are. I just think we should consider that for what it is worth.

Secretary **Rusk**. The committee might be interested in knowing that at the last NATO meeting I made your speech, Senator, on the first day.

[Discussion off the record.]

USE OF SEATO

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the Secretary a question?

You said earlier in your testimony this morning, Mr. Secretary, and I have heard you say it before, and it disturbs me very much, of course, the South Vietnam Government hasn't asked anybody else to come in. I don't buy that for the simple reason——

Secretary **Rusk**. I was limiting that to combat forces, organized combat forces.

Senator **Morse**. Forces similar to the United States.

I don't buy that, because in my judgment, with our relationship to this regime in South Vietnam, they would ask them to come in if we would encourage them to make use of SEATO, and come in in substance. I don't buy this facade of Australia; in fact, it insults my intelligence. They talk now about increasing some material help and personnel from 30 to 60 men. I just do not understand why we haven't tried to use SEATO as a holding operation for the United Nations.

We have some spokesman over at the State Department who talked to Scali [1] the other day, and I answered him on the floor of the Senate the other day, advocating that we get out. I have made clear all the time we ought to get SEATO in there to help us hold for peacekeeping purposes until we can get the United Nations in. That has been my position from the very beginning.

But we are not using SEATO, and my suspicion is we are not using SEATO because they won't be used. They are not even the paper type. They are worthless. I don't know why we don't try to get some help in there, as the Senator from Missouri is talking about. I completely agree with him.

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[1] John Scali, diplomatic correspondent for ABC News.

MEMBERS OF THE 1962 ACCORD

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, what is the appraisal of your men concerning the attitude of the members of the protocol of 1962? How does the balance lie with respect to friendly or hostile attitude to our position?

I noticed that both North Vietnam and South Vietnam are in that. Begin with Burma, how does Burma feel about this?

Secretary **Rusk**. Burma——

Senator **Lausche**. Just briefly, is she friendly to us?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes.

Burma has really taken no part in the Southeast Asia situation since 1962. I think she would support the accord.

Senator **Lausche**. But she has taken no part?

Secretary **Rusk**. She has taken no real part.

Senator **Lausche**. What about Cambodia, she is against us?

Secretary **Rusk**. Not insofar as the 1962 accords are concerned.

Senator **Lausche**. I am not going to go down through these one by one. You undoubtedly have appraised what you can expect from these countries, and what is the appraisal?

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, the attitude of Hanoi and Peking is very clear.

The attitude of the Soviet Union, subject to the reservations I have already expressed, continues to be officially to support the accord of 1962, but they have not been willing or able, whichever the combination of the two one would read into it, they have not been willing or able to restrain Hanoi and the Pathet Lao.

President de Gaulle——

Senator **Lausche**. What about the Polish Republic?

Secretary **Rusk**. Poland has continued to say that they support the Geneva accords but have not been willing to make investigations by the Commission without a Pathet Lao consent.

DE GAULLE'S POSITION

Now, President de Gaulle's view on this——

The **Chairman**. I think we had better adjourn this morning.

Finish whatever you are saying.

Secretary **Rusk**. I was just going to say that President de Gaulle is a considerable problem for us because he apparently wants to stay in a position to take some future, and thus far unknown, political initiative to try to help settle this matter. He says that he is opposed to the communization of Southeast Asia, but he is not going to put any forces in there. Therefore France has not been particularly helpful here lately.

Senator **Lausche**. The reason I asked this question is because I know that in meetings within the last 3 years intermittently there was discussed the advisability from the standpoint of our country of calling upon SEATO, of calling upon the United Nations. Frankly, Wayne, I don't have the confidence in the United Nations that you have.

Senator **Morse**. But you don't know until you have tried.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, I know, but the way it is out of balance since 1945 is what causes me great apprehension.

Senator **Morse**. Look at your alternative.

THE POSITION OF CHAMPION

Senator **Lausche**. I would like to say this, when we talk about the United States being in the forefront, we are unfortunately the champion. When Great Britain was the champion, it was all over the world, and the best way I suppose to get out of it would be to lose our position as champion.

Senator **Sparkman**. Sure, if we could.

Senator **Lausche**. As one of the strong powers of the world.

Senator **Sparkman**. Great Britain got all the brickbats and we are getting them now.

Senator **Morse**. I want to thank the Secretary. He has been very helpful.

The **Chairman**. We will have another opportunity.

Senator **Morse**. I hope so.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1964

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff, Gen. Robert J. Wood, Director of Military Assistance, Col. Clyde Dillender, Department of Defense; John Finari and John Zentay, AID.

[This hearing was published in 1964 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.

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STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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ACTIVITY OF AMERICAN PILOTS IN CONGO [P. 294]

The CHAIRMAN. Were the Americans members of our Armed Forces?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were they, just bystanders?

Secretary RUSK. There are a number of so-called mercenaries in there.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that what they were, soldiers of fortune?

Secretary RUSK. I could elaborate a bit off the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. How long since our Air Force boys have been mercenaries?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, there are a good many fellows who are not in the Air Force who do this kind of thing.

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DISCUSSION OF LAOS SITUATION CONTINUED [P. 295]

Secretary **Rusk**. Laos has been literally held together by foreign assistance primarily from the United States but also from other free world countries. Without our financial aid the economy would have crumpled. Without our project program no progress could have been made to meet basic needs of the people and provide community development.

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INDIA [P. 296]

Secretary **Rusk**. I know this committee shares our concern about disputes between India and Pakistan and their adverse effect on the development and the security of the subcontinent. It is encouraging to note that Pakistan and India have on their own initiative responded to the situation created by Nehru's death.[1] They are attempting to create a climate of goodwill and are undertaking to discuss their differences in hope of paving the way to Indo-Pakistan amity.

President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri[2] will be meeting in London at the time the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting. The path to a settlement may be a very long one, indeed, because the obstacles are great. It is encouraging, however, that both sides have recognized the importance of trying to reach an accord and have seen in the present situation hope for making progress.

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BRAZIL [P. 297]

Senator **Gore**. I have known of official representatives of other Latin American countries making off-the-record comments that the Alliance for Progress was dead, and that the United States killed it in Brazil. I want to know how much validity there is to this.

There seems to be a feeling that with our blessing those who had advocated the kind of reforms which the Congress set as a prerequisite to Alliance for Progress aid have been stripped of citizenship and, in many instances, imprisoned in Brazil.

If that be the case, then that is a poor example for reform leaders in other countries.

Secretary **Rusk**. Well, Senator, I don't know just who those officials might have been, but this is not the general reaction in the hemisphere to recent events in Brazil.

I believe there was concern at first in some countries about whether this new government would move forward toward constitutional government in the fullest sense, and I think there is little doubt now that this government is doing so, and is prepared to do so. But the issue was the constitutional system as it affected the Congress, the governors of the states, and the armed forces, and it was pressure on those three elements from the point of view of constitutionalism that led to the disturbances.

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[1] Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru died on May 27, 1967.

[2] Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.

But let me get detailed information on this for you.

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NEW GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN BRAZIL [P. 297]

Senator **Gore**. The imprisonment of those who had advocated reforms and the stripping of political rights, even a former president, is most disturbing. You talk about a regime which is returning to constitutional processes. Just last week I read where a former president had been stripped of political rights for 10 years.

Mr. **Bell**. I don't mean to say I am easy about that, Senator. I agree with you, obviously all of us would have been happier if that hadn't taken place.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this is something about which I have heard the most disturbing reports and the Secretary has agreed to submit a full report, I hope not in defense of the situation but an objective analysis of what has happened.

Thank you for permitting the interruption.

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, I can tell you that our interests in moderate constitutional process have been made clear throughout the situation. There may have been some things that were done that we would have preferred not be done, but I think there is no question about the direction of the influence we have tried to exert in the situation.

The **Chairman**. For the information of the Senator, Mr. Gordon is scheduled to appear before the subcommittee of this committee on Latin America tomorrow afternoon. He should be qualified to testify specifically on this.

Senator **Gore**. Fine. Mr. Chairman, in view of that fact, I don't know that I need burden the Secretary of State with that.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of the record I do think that we ought to be reminded that about a year ago testimony was given establishing by name the identity of the Communists who were in the Government.

An examination of the past transcripts will show that that situation was getting worse and worse.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Frank, if you will pardon an interruption, I think it was Communist, and strong Communist, particularly inclined people, too.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes. Relatives of the man in charge.

PROBABILITY OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER

If I may, I would like to have you elaborate on this statement, "The new government is determined to combat corruption and subversion, to prevent a return to the kind of politics and political leadership which had carried Brazil so far to the left that a Communist takeover had become a serious possibility." I would like to have you elaborate on what those conditions were and why it was possible or probable that there would be a Communist takeover.

Secretary **Rusk**. Senator, one of the specific things that caused great concern in Brazil as well as outside Brazil was that the man who was in charge of military personnel for President Goulart seemed to be himself a Communist, and that he was using this position to undermine the armed forces of the country by shifting around of appointments, and by such things as encouraging the lower ranks of the armed forces to defy their officers and to act with indiscipline in the situation.

Second, there clearly seemed to be a threat by President Goulart directed against a number of the moderate and rightwing governors, threats to takeover their particular states through martial law, and that had created very great concern. The fears that were created in the Congress by threats to displace the Congress and base executive power on some sort of plebiscite as a prelude to the exercise of real authoritarian movement was another major impetus in this concern about the Goulart government.

But these things combined to create a highly explosive situation, and the Congress, the Governors, and the Armed Forces moved together to prevent what they feared would happen and, I am convinced, to shore up the longer range prospects of constitutional government in Brazil. In the process some things happened that one could prefer had not happened, but I have no doubt at all about the longer range purposes and the course on which Brazil is embarking.

ENCOURAGED BY NEW GOVERNMENT

I was encouraged, for example—and I may wish to delete a personal reference of this sort from the record before its publication—I was encouraged when the new government made former Ambassador [Roberto de Oliveira] Campos here the Minister of Finance.

Senator **Gore**. Is this record to be published?

The **Chairman**. This is an executive record. If it is to be published, it would have to be deleted. This is an executive record.

Secretary **Rusk**. I see. I didn't know whether this record was to be a part of your open record.

The **Chairman**. If it is, the committee can always do it, but it will be edited. It has to be edited.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, we do have a procedure whereby later the committee can vote for it to be released.

The **Chairman**. That is correct.

Senator **Sparkman**. In that event would the Secretary still have the right to edit it?

The **Chairman**. Well, the custom——

Senator **Sparkman**. I think he would want to protect himself.

The **Chairman**. The custom is on executive records they do have a right to look it over on these sensitive matters.

Senator **Sparkman**. Even before we file it in our committee files?

The **Chairman**. No, for publication.

Senator **Sparkman**. All right.

The **Chairman**. Isn't that the custom?

Senator **Sparkman**. That is just what I wanted to inquire about.

Secretary **Rusk**. It would make our discussion much freer here if we had that understanding.

Senator **Sparkman**. If it is to be published, he would have the right at any time to take it out.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

When we have an executive session he would feel freer to talk about these personal things.

Secretary **Rusk**. Mr. Campos, who had been the Ambassador here for Mr. Goulart, is now Minister of Economy in Brazil and very much in charge of the development programs and the Alliance for Progress aspects of it.

He had been personally very deeply committed, Senator, to the Alliance for Progress concept. He resigned because he was fearful of the directions Goulart was taking and he judged that Goulart was moving not down the line of the Alliance for Progress but toward a totalitarian regime and that Goulart had failed to perform on the agreement we had made the year before through much diligent work, Campos' work, between Mr. Bell and San Tiago Dantas, the Minister of Finance.

Here is a man who is a democrat, and his inclinations are constitutional in his orientation, committed to the Alliance for Progress, who has been given this key role in this new government in economy and economic government.

Senator **Williams**. Mr. Secretary, Senator Gore suggested you furnish a list of those who had been jailed, Members of Congress who had been supporting this Alliance for Progress.

Could you go back to last year's record then and take the list of those who were identified as either being Communist or of communistic leaning and tell how many of those who are presently affiliated with that government and the positions they are holding in the new government?

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, I would be glad to.

The **Chairman**. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

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ELECTIONS IN CHILE [P. 303]

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary, how do the elections in Chile look?

Secretary **Rusk**. This is our key concern at the present time. In the most recent weeks, within the last 3 weeks, the moderate and center parties seem to have turned their curve upward at the expense of the far left, but if I looked around the hemisphere today and looked at the situations ahead that are a matter of great concern I would say the Chilean election is No. 1. We always will have that cesspool of Haiti to be concerned about, but the Chilean election is the touchiest one at the moment.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

ATMOSPHERE FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Secretary **Rusk**. I think the committee would be interested in knowing that in the first quarter the private investment has turned upward.

The **Chairman**. You mean by Latin Americans or North Americans?

Secretary **Rusk**. By North Americans—$25 million in the first quarter compared to a minus net a year earlier.

Senator **Aiken**. In what countries?

Mr. **Bell**. I don't have it in my head but it is scattered fairly widely.

Senator **Aiken**. Scattered?

Mr. **Bell**. Yes. On the west coast.

Secretary **Rusk**. When you look at the situation in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, the atmosphere for private investment clearly has been improving and is, I think, pretty good.

The situation in Panama has been disturbed and disrupted by the events which the committee knows about. We hope that will steady down now after the elections and the normal economic development efforts can resume. But I think on a country-by-country basis there are important countries where there is considerable hope although there are immediate situations in some countries that are still a matter of considerable concern.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. So far as American investment is concerned and the climate for American investment, my own impression is that it has been in Mexico improving for some years.

Secretary **Rusk**. That is right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In Venezuela it has been on a fairly stable basis. In Colombia it is a kind of touch-and-go proposition but probably more on the encouraging side rather than the discouraging side.

Secretary **Rusk**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In Peru my impression is that it is most precarious.

In Chile it is just very uncertain, very dangerous.

Secretary **Rusk**. I think investors are going to wait until after the elections.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The operations in Argentina would certainly not encourage private investment in Argentina. I suppose American investment is going to have to wait a little bit longer in Brazil because of the situation which they have there. I don't know that one swallow makes a summer and I don't know that 3 or 4 months of this new administration would necessarily lay the basis for somebody putting capital into permanent investments there as yet.

Secretary **Rusk**. It is my impression, Senator, that, for example, the business community in New York is very much encouraged by the prospect in Brazil and that their interest is going to be registered shortly in the form of a new inflow of investments.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I suppose they will get a little investment but I think it is a long way from stabilization.

Secretary **Rusk**. But I do think there are a number of countries where the investment climate is improving.

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Chairman, if I may interject at this point, Senator Ribicoff and I spent an hour with Mr. Prebisch[3] in Geneva. We discussed investments in these Latin American Countries and this is a fact, at least he admitted this is a fact, that their own money is going out of the country instead of investing it there.

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[3] Raul Prebisch of Argentina, Secretary General of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development.

He regretted it very much. They are sending their money to Geneva, Switzerland and other banks instead of making investments because they don't trust the future. He illustrated, and I thought very aptly. He said Mr. Prebisch has a gardener and in a few years he had accumulated a little money and he goes to Mr. Prebisch and he asks him where to invest it. He said, "I had to be honest and told him he had to get some U.S. investments."

This probably should be off the record.

Senator Ribicoff and I spent an hour with him. He mentioned several countries down there and he told me some of the foreign countries are pulling their investments out of there. So it is a real mean situation.

Secretary Rusk. We are trying to emphasize this point to our Latin American friends.

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SWISS BANKS [P. 307]

Senator Lausche. What reliable means do you have of getting this information because if you go into Switzerland you are just stopped from learning anything from those banks?

Secretary Rusk. It is not possible to get exact figures but it is possible to make some broad estimates.

We don't, of course, have access to the accounts in Swiss banks. They are brilliant in keeping their mouths shut on these matters. But I have seen some estimates, Senator, that I would be glad to insert in the record. But, Senator, there is another problem that is quite important in this regard, and that is that there are fairly limited numbers of quite wealthy people who do have disposable capital at their command.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS [P. 311]

Senator Sparkman. Do I correctly interpret your statement here regarding India and Pakistan to mean that you may feel somewhat optimistic?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, it is just possible, and in this situation you just have to keep your fingers crossed, it is just possible that something quite new has entered into the India-Pakistan relationship.

I think the first new element was the release of Sheikh Abdullah who had had very thoughtful and good conversations both with Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub. According to the press he has been very forthright and frank in saying to the Indians:

> Now, you can't get everything you want in this situation. There is an interest of Pakistan in Kashmir. We have got to think about what the people of Kashmir themselves want.

In the case of Ayub he apparently has taken the other side of the coin to a degree that "India does have an important interest in this situation. But let's sit down and see if we can't find an answer."

Nehru's death led to a, shall we say a, moratorium in Pakistan of the bitter Indian feelings and expressions. Ayub's own statements on that occasion were very generous and warm, given the background of the controversy. He has tried to maintain a public position since then of being ready to hold out his hand to the new Indian leaders to see if they can't work out some agreements.

Prime Minister Shastri has been a moderate on this subject inside the Indian Government, and the influence of the south of India in the new Indian Government has been increased, and the south of India is less interested in Kashmir than the leadership of the previous—than Mr. Nehru had been, for example.

Now, these two men are going to the Prime Minister's conference in July in London, Sheikh Abdullah[4] may be going to be there at the time. It is just possible that at least a conversation can get started, which has been missing through so much of this period since 1948.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it true that Nehru was a Kashmiri?

Secretary RUSK. His people were Kashmiri.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have seen that.

Secretary RUSK. One valuable thing, Senator, was that before his death Nehru responded in rather positive terms to Sheikh Abdullah. There seemed to be some Gandhian influences here. Sheikh Abdullah had been in jail for 12 years, and yet when he was released his attitude toward Mr. Nehru was generous and friendly and understanding; it wasn't bitter, and Nehru himself seemed to respond very considerably to Sheikh Abdullah's attitude.

He said some things before his death which now make it possible for his successors to say Nehru was moving in this direction, if they can find a settlement.

So, I think there is an opportunity; it may pass as so many in previous years have passed; but there is an opportunity which we are watching with great concern.

We are quite clear and our Indian-Pakistani friends are also clear that for the present we should stay out of it. We should let Sheikh Abdullah, Ayub, and Shastri, try to solve the problem. They are very clear on some sort of autonomy with some sort of link or condominium or some sort of situation which would ease the situation with both countries. But there is perhaps a new stage of possible discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. You consider Shastri a first-rate leader. Do you think he is permanent or is his a caretaker government?

Secretary RUSK. I don't look upon it as a caretaker government. Perhaps we can have this completely off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

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GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AID ACTIVITIES [P. 313]

Senator SPARKMAN. I may say that we had Chancellor Erhard up here for luncheon, and I had hoped to ask him a question with reference to the appropriations difficulty that I understand they have been having in Germany.

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[4] Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, imprisoned for his advocacy of a plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir, had been released from prison in India on April 8.

We were so interrupted by phone calls and quorum calls we didn't get to ask many questions. Later I did discuss the matter, I don't remember whether it was the Foreign Minister or with the Ambassador here, and they recognized it as a problem and said they hoped that they could straighten it out.

My understanding was that while the commitment had been made in the past, actually the appropriations called for in the next fiscal year did not meet that commitment and that it resulted in a lessening of German participation.

Mr. BELL. Prospectively.

Senator SPARKMAN. And having an influence on other countries.

Mr. BELL. Prospectively, sir, not yet.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is what I mean.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Next year's budget.

Mr. BELL. Exactly.

Secretary RUSK. This is the reason we put in our communique a commitment on this subject, and somewhat to our surprise the Chancellor took it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was just going to say that I understood the subject was discussed between the Chancellor and the President as well.

Mr. BELL. It was.

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Secretary RUSK. What the balance will be on the other side, the political side, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know either. We automatically seem to assume——

Secretary RUSK. I might say, Mr. Chairman, we did not press the Indians to reject this Soviet offer.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Secretary RUSK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you were wise in not doing it.

Secretary RUSK. In the first place we were not in position to do it.

SOVIET FINANCING OF BOKARA MILL [P. 342]

The CHAIRMAN. When this committee and this Congress and the country are not willing to do the project, it seems to me it is a dog-in-the-manger attitude to say we don't want to do it and we don't want anybody else to do it.

I don't just see the justification for that, frankly. You remind me of a letter I had once from Jerome Frank who is a great psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins that one of the best ways to bring about some reconciliation between hostile groups is to undertake common projects no matter what they be.

He used the example of two boys in boys' gangs who fight each other. The best way to cure this is to engage them in a common project, where they both try to accomplish something. Maybe this might be applied in the case of India.

Do you think it might or do you think that is too juvenile a project to use psychology in?

Secretary **Rusk**. I don't think it is juvenile at all, sir. I think it might be worth experimenting on a certain limited basis. For example, in connection with cooperative space probes involving other countries.

The **Chairman**. Yes, that is one.

Secretary **Rusk**. Or meteorological reporting involving a number of other countries.

The **Chairman**. The Geophysical Year as an example.

Secretary **Rusk**. Yes, sir, with rather limited contact at the beginning just to find out, and I don't exclude the possibility, the capacity of the Soviet Union on occasion to take part in these joint things without heavy ideological overtones.

Mr. Chairman, in that connection, you might be interested in a poll, it is a confidential poll, taken recently in India. It shows that there has been a very sharp increase in, shall we say, public appreciation of the relations of the United States in the most recent period, but also a similar sharp increase with respect to the Soviet Union.

Now, in the case of the question, "Do you think that on the whole the United States helps India in its economic developments or hinders it or neither, and what about the same with the Soviet Union," 80 percent, United States helps; 70 percent, the U.S.S.R. helps.

In the case of which country most economic aid comes from, in Delhi, 81 percent said the United States; 4 percent said the Soviet Union; Bombay said 74 percent and 4; Madras, 80 percent and 4.

The **Chairman**. That was before the Bokara?

Secretary **Rusk**. No, this is very recently. So there has been, I think, a sharp increase in understanding of the United States relationship, but it is also true that the Soviet Union———

GHANA SITUATION

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Secretary, could you discuss the Ghana situation a bit? We had the trouble of the burning of the Embassy. How much money did we send in there and what is the attitude of the people?

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[Whereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, June 19, 1964.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, and Aiken.

David E. Bell, Administrator, AID, testified on the bill (H.R. 11380), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.

Following his appearance, the chairman raised the question of reporting the bill (S. 2464) to establish the Roosevelt Campobello International Park.

On motion by Senator Aiken, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the bill was favorably reported on voice vote, and without objection.

For a record of the proceedings, see the published hearings.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 4 p.m. in room S-116, Capitol, in executive session.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

Lincoln Gordon, Ambassador to Brazil, discussed the situation in that country. He was accompanied by Harry Ackerman of AID.

No notes were taken nor was a transcript kept at the meeting.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1964

TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Long, Lausche, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1964 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENTS OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; AND GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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TAIWAN [P. 512]

The **Chairman**. Before you leave that table, why is the only one I see increasing the Republic of China? Why is that?

Secretary **McNamara**. We have cut it very substantially in the last 2 years. It was running, for example, in 1961, $153 million; in 1962, $175 million. You see it was cut to $82 million in 1963, just about a 50-percent cut between the $175 million in 1962 and the $82 million in 1963.

We did that because of the very substantial cuts in the total program, and the result has been we have not been able to maintain a satisfactory level of modernization of their forces, and there had to be this increment of $10 million planned, therefore, between 1964 and 1965. But we are running at a level, and we are planning to continue to run at levels of something like $90 to $100 million, which is 40 percent less than the levels we ran in 1961 and 1962.

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MILITARY BASE RIGHTS [P. 513]

Secretary **McNamara**. Now, at the top of the next page of that table you will see the third category, "Military Base Rights." In this category there are four countries for which about $28 million is proposed, Ethiopia, Libya, Portugal, and Spain, and in each of which we have important military base rights that are vital to the global operation of our forces.

GRANT-AID PHASEOUTS

Now, the fourth category in fiscal 1965 contains three countries. This is a category of "Grant-Aid Phaseout" countries.

In fiscal 1965 we propose to spend $61.5 million on Norway, Denmark, and Japan. The number of these countries in 1965 is down dramatically from the number of 12 that were in that category in fiscal 1964.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, do these amounts for Portugal, Spain, Libya, and Ethiopia include the costs of the bases or are the bases paid for?

Secretary **McNamara**. No, sir. The bases are paid for out of our regular Department of Defense appropriations.

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INFRASTRUCTURE AND MISCELLANEOUS [P. 515]

Secretary **McNamara**. This is part of an agreement negotiated some years ago.

The **Chairman**. It runs out in 1965?

Secretary **McNamara**. That is right. We have already stated—it runs out in fiscal 1965—and we have already stated to the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Council that we will not agree to pay a similar percentage in future years.

The **Chairman**. That is good.

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FREE WORLD ORIENTATION [P. 515]

Secretary **McNamara**. Guinea did turn around, and Mali has avoided ties as close as she would otherwise have with the Soviet Union, and these are such small amounts, $300,000 and $600,000 a year, we thought it was justified.

Senator **Lausche**. What about Indonesia?

Secretary **McNamara**. In Indonesia we have cut out all of our military assistance except only the material in the pipeline and only a small training program.

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POSSIBILITIES OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ALLIES [P. 516]

Secretary **McNamara**. Setting aside Pakistan and India for a moment, in Greece and Turkey, I would say 100 percent of the men are properly deployed against the Communist border, the Bulgarian border, and the Soviet Union border.

In the case of Pakistan and India, particularly the Indian forces at times have been deployed in position that are unrelated to a Communist threat and are more related to a possible move by Pakistan.

Senator **Aiken**. And vice-versa.

Secretary **McNamara**. To some degree vice-versa; more in the case of the Indians, I think, than the Pakistanis.

We have pointed out to both nations that we will not allow our military assistance program to be used as a means of arming one against the other, and we have sought or asked them to rearrange their deployments accordingly, and they have made moves in that direction.

Senator **Aiken**. I see you are planning the same amount for Chile and Peru, that is about $10 million apiece.

Secretary **McNamara**. We are trying to prevent any arms race in Latin America, and I think with considerable success. There is not any comparable large area in the world where there are fewer men under arms in relation to the total population and the gross national product.

Senator **Aiken**. At least we have prevented an increase against each other.

Secretary **McNamara**. Yes, sir; and we have used our relations with them through the MAP Program to hold down their total expenditures as we are, as a matter of fact, in India.

I negotiated an arrangement with [Yeswantrao Balwantrao] Chavan, the Minister of Defense for India, while he was here a few weeks ago under the terms of which we encouraged them, and I mean literally forced them, to cut back the foreign exchange which they had planned to spend on equipment from $1.95 to $1.45 million for a 5-year period, which is a cut of about 30 percent.

We use our power and leverage to hold down expenditures in many, many areas of the world. I should say in general that is the direction in which we encourage the nations rather than the reverse. We asked the Iranians, for example, in return for a 5-year agreement which I negotiated with the Shah 3 years ago, to cut their military forces from a strength of 200,000 to 160,000.

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GREEK-TURKISH SITUATION [P. 517]

Senator **Aiken**. Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that a conflict between Turkey and Greece will be avoided?

The **Chairman**. That is a good question.

Senator **Aiken**. I should, perhaps, ask our chairman, who made a recent visit to that area.

Secretary **McNamara**. Well, I believe——

Senator **Aiken**. What are the prospects?

Secretary **McNamara**. I believe it would be disastrous to each of those nations and to the Western alliance.

Senator **Aiken**. That isn't the question.

Secretary **McNamara**. I believe it would be disastrous, and I believe that the President is making it perfectly clear to the leaders of those nations and that, as a result, the chances are good for avoidance of conflict between them.

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GREECE AND TURKEY [P. 518]

Secretary McNamara. Recently I received another communication from Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, again expressing his concern about the situation on NATO's southern flank with regard to equipment deficiencies which have been caused by reductions in military assistance funds. He says, "The current and projected lack of adequate mobility and armor for Hellenic and Turkish M-Day army units in Thrace is considered to be so acute as to raise serious doubts about COMLANDSOUTHEAST's capability to carry out his assigned mission."

Lemnitzer went on to state that, "In view of serious deficiencies in each of the three services, the current capability of Hellenic and Turkish forces to perform assigned NATO missions is extremely limited."

IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA

Iran, Pakistan, and India form the bastion of the free world's defense against Communist encroachment in the Near East and South Asia. The Chinese Communists' attack on the northern province of India in October 1962 provided a classic example of the danger of military weakness in the nations bordering the Sino-Soviet bloc. Here was clear proof that military weakness tempts Communist aggression and that neither neutrality nor political accommodation ensures security against the Communist threat. The military inadequacies of the Indian armed forces permitted the Chinese Communists to attack without risk of military retaliation or even of sustained combat.

This attack brought home to the Government of India the importance of maintaining strong military forces along their northern borders. The United States and the British Commonwealth nations responded to India's urgent request for assistance with a program of $120 million, of which the United States provided half from fiscal year 1963 military assistance funds. In fiscal year 1964 we have programmed $50 million and we have included another $50 million in the fiscal year 1965 program. We plan in fiscal year 1965 to continue the modernization of eight mountain divisions and to provide some support for an additional division, some additional communications equipment for air defense, and some support for defense production.

We believe that the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries will also continue their support of the Indian armed forces.

The Chairman. In that connection, didn't I read in the paper that the Russians have withdrawn their offer of a MIG plant within the last week?

Secretary McNamara. This allegedly occurred during recent conversations with India. We haven't received any official word of that.

The Chairman. It was in the papers.

Secretary McNamara. I read the report in the paper, but I haven't seen anything from Ambassador [Chester] Bowles that he was informed of that. We are rather inclined to think this would occur for the reasons the papers stated. The Indians are not technically qualified to undertake the production of a supersonic airplane. As a matter of fact, we have strongly discouraged the program. I talked to Chavan myself about it. I talked to Krishnamachari[1] when he was here, and I pointed out it was a waste of their resources to try to produce a supersonic airplane.

Senator Aiken. I think you might perhaps tell the Secretary that when Harold Wilson met with this committee, or part of the members of this committee, he told us that England would contribute mule saddles to the defense, that they had them in great surplus and, after all, they were an important part of the Indian defenses. What has been the proportionate contribution on the part of the United Kingdom?

Secretary McNamara. They have contributed, they and their Commonwealth partners have contributed, 60 million dollars' worth of useful equipment to offset our $60 million in fiscal 1963, and their contributions in 1964 and 1965 are continuing, but at a lesser rate. The equipment they are contributing is of value in the defense program of India.

But I do want to go back to the MIG plant for a moment. That is that kind of action we consider quite inappropriate to an economy faced with the problems that India faces, and we try to use our leverage with India to push them toward sound rather than unsound actions.

We have asked them to reduce their defense budget; we have asked them to reduce force plans; we have asked them to avoid supersonic aircraft. They have agreed to cut the planned expenditures on foreign exchange on defense items by over 30 percent, and we made our proposals for military assistance contingent upon their agreement to that reduction.

Senator Aiken. Do you know whether the Chinese are producing any of these modern weapons or not?

Secretary McNamara. To the best of our knowledge, they are not producing modern aircraft at present, certainly not MIG–21's. They are undoubtedly trying to establish a production base for that type of item, but I do not believe they have had much success.

Returning to the prepared statement, our military assistance to India has deeply troubled Pakistan, as you are well aware. Nevertheless, it is important to the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India be able to defend itself against Chinese-Communist aggression. The United States has taken great pains to assure the Government of Pakistan that our aid to India will not be at the expense of Pakistan's security to which we are committed under our mutual defense agreements.

We have included for Pakistan a total of $39.8 million in the fiscal year 1965 Military Assistance Program, about $5 million less than fiscal year 1964. While much has been done to improve the capabilities of the Pakistan army, equipment deficiencies still exist.

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[1] Indian Finance Minister Tiruvallur Thattai Krishnamachari.

The units are short 10 percent of their required artillery, 17 percent in tanks, 86 percent in armored personnel carriers, 10 percent in vehicles, and 18 percent in signal equipment. To meet some of these deficiencies, the fiscal year 1965 program emphasizes ground force improvements. Some air force improvements are also included.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAMS [P. 519]

Secretary McNAMARA. Our military assistance objectives with respect to Thailand are closely related to those for South Vietnam. The loss of either country to the Communist bloc would endanger the independence of neighboring nations and seriously jeopardize U.S. security interests. The buildup of the Thai military forces has been substantially completed under prior year programs. Therefore, our military assistance effort now is limited generally to the maintenance of those forces, and the Thailand program has been reduced from $73.5 million in fiscal year 1963 to $32 million in fiscal year 1965, as shown on the attached table. The 1965 program includes primarily light tanks which were deferred from previous programs, armored personnel carriers, a few C-123 aircraft, and the construction of airfields and troop facilities which would be of great value to United States forces in the event we had to deploy them to Thailand.

For Laos, we have included $15.6 million in the 1965 program, compared with $23.5 million in fiscal year 1963. In the last month we have increased the fiscal year 1964 program from $17.9 to $27.9 million due to the very critical situation brought about by the renewed aggression of the Pathet Lao.

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SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN [P. 520]

Secretary McNAMARA. Adequate military assistance to the armed forces of South Korea and the Republic of China not only helps to protect our security interests in the Far East, but far more important, it substantially reduces the risk of an emergency requirement for direct intervention by the United States. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that our fiscal year 1965 program for Korea, $145.8 million, represents approximately 1 percent of the direct military costs we incurred in the Korean conflict in 1950-53.

Senator AIKEN. Pardon me, but what is the cost of maintaining our own forces in South Korea, which would be added to this?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is hard to say because we would maintain those forces in this country if they were not in Korea.

There is a gold expenditure which we incur by the fact that they are located in Korea which we would not incur if they were back here, on the order of, I would say, about $70 million a year.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

PROGRAM FOR TAIWAN

Secretary McNamara. The 1965 program for the Republic of China is $97 million. It would be highly imprudent of us not to ensure that the troops on the free world side of the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Straits have conventional weapons at least as effective as those of their opponents.

As members of this committee are aware, the Chinese Communists have never given up their goal to add the offshore islands, Taiwan and the Pescadores to their empire. They can be prevented from achieving this goal only by a combination of the strength of the United States and Nationalist Chinese forces defending the Taiwan Straits——

Senator Lausche. At that point, may I ask a question?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. There has been a rumor that all of our problems in Vietnam, Laos, and that whole area could be cured if we would give up the islands and, I think, also Formosa.

Is there any substance or truth to that rumor? I have heard that such a proposal has been made to our Government.

Secretary McNamara. No proposal has ever been made to our Government of that type that I am aware of, and I know no foundation for that rumor.

Senator Lausche. Have you heard of the rumor?

Secretary McNamara. I have read some columnists' comments to that effect in the press, but I know of no foundation whatsoever for it.

Senator Lausche. That would also mean that no consideration is being given to the proposal?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

In my prepared statement, I point out that military assistance to the Republic of China has strengthened its forces to the point where we now believe that the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to breach the sea and air defenses surrounding Taiwan and the Penghus and defeat the ground forces on those major islands. However, substantial military assistance expenditures are required if this capability is to be maintained.

Nearly two-thirds of the value of the fiscal year 1965 program for the Republic of China will be required to maintain these forces, leaving only about $33 million for new equipment and training. Thus, the $97 million requested for fiscal year 1965 will permit only marginal improvements in force capabilities.

I believe I can sum it up very briefly by turning to the conclusion of my prepared statement.

Senator Aiken. Apparently, Mr. Secretary, you anticipate the Chinese Communists are going to develop better aircraft.

Secretary McNamara. I do.

Senator Aiken. Otherwise the F-86 would not have become obsolete.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I do, and there is evidence they are trying to do that, but they have not progressed very far as yet.

Senator Aiken. And they are doing it without Russian help, for the most part?

Secretary **McNamara**. That is correct.

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COMMENTS OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF [P. 532]

General **Taylor**. I would now like to skip to the bottom of the page and read some typical specific comments by our unified commanders overseas with regard to the 1964 problem. Secretary McNamara has already referred to General Lemnitzer's views:

> The capability of the Hellenic and Turkish forces to accomplish their mission will decrease while the threat opposing them continues to increase. It appears extremely doubtful, under these conditions, that the Hellenic and Turkish forces will be able to maintain their current limited capability to perform their mission.

From CINCPAC:

> Reduction of MAP funds for fiscal year 1964–65 has severely curtailed the procurement of force improvement items for ground, naval in particular, and air defense forces. I anticipate that combat effectiveness of these forces will slowly but surely decline and will result in a serious setback to our forward defense strategy of augmenting U.S. forces with MAP supported forces.

Senator **Lausche**. To what area does this statement apply?

General **Taylor**. Pacific area.

Then USCINCSO, General O'Meara:

> Support for the politically potent Latin American navies has been out below the danger point. The navies are feeling the impact of these cuts now and we must expect their resentment as they realize we are treating them as a service of secondary importance.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN VIETNAM [P. 532]

General **Taylor**. The financing of this program depends largely upon the availability of Military Assistance Program funds. This is an awkward and, in many ways, undesirable way to finance a paramilitary operation, but it can be and is being made to work insofar as fiscal procedures are concerned. However, since precise requirements are hard to anticipate in advance, there must be considerable flexibility in funding to permit us to meet emergencies arising out of the development of military operations.

There are still many steps to be taken before we can feel that the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam has reached optimum effectiveness. There is need to increase the size of the South Vietnamese regular armed forces above its present strength of about 207,000 to 238,000 and to expand and improve the civil guard and the self-defense corps from 183,000 to 208,000. The clear-and-hold program will never be more effective than the quality of the army and of these two paramilitary forces. It is the task of the army to clear and of the civil guard and self-defense corps to hold.

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DEFICIENCIES IN MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT [P. 535]

Secretary **NcNamara**. One of the greatest criticisms made by the GAO was related to the inability of certain NATO nations to maintain on operational status the NIKE units that had been supplied prior to 1961. At that time they pointed out in one of their recent reports, the report issued during the past year, that only 17-of those units of some 30 or 40 were operational, and this was a typical example of supplying sophisticated equipment prior to the time that the receiving nations had received the training in operation and maintenance for that equipment.

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WHO DECIDES WHAT EQUIPMENT TO SEND? [P. 536]

The **CHAIRMAN**. As I recall the figures were quite large—for Portugal it was about $15 million, I think, of equipment.

The amount of the equipment which the GAO reports as being neglected and not utilized, I think, was in that amount.

Secretary **MCNAMARA**. Yes; it was substantial in the case of Portugal.

The **CHAIRMAN**. There is a great deal of modern equipment that goes there but they have no people to maintain it, and the GAO reports it, more or less, deteriorates from nonuse and is wasted.

I believe you stated here that you are giving Iran some F-5 supersonic aircraft. Can they maintain them?

Secretary **MCNAMARA**. Yes; we believe they can. As a matter of fact, the F-5 was chosen specifically because it is a much simpler airplane to maintain than the F-104 which had previously been planned for application to the Military Assistance Program. But about 2 years ago, after considerable analysis inside the Department, we concluded we should substitute the F-105 for the F-104 in most of the countries receiving MAP aid for exactly this reason, that the F-105 is a simplified type of airplane compared to the F-104 and much more likely to be maintained effectively than is the F-104.

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NAVAL EQUIPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA [P. 542]

Senator **MORSE**. Mr. Secretary, what I am referring to is General Taylor's comment on page 3:

> Support for the politically potent Latin American navies has been cut below the danger point. The navies are feeling the impact of these cuts now, and we must expect that resentment as we realize we are treating them as a service of secondary importance.

That is what he said in his statement.

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POLICY ON ACTION OUTSIDE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM [P. 559]

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Then the followup on that question is, If the pursuit of our policy now to victory there, which is the establishment of a reliable independence for South Vietnam, if that results in action in the north of a military nature, are we prepared to combat that action in the north with whatever power is necessary to put it down?

Secretary **MCNAMARA**. I should say we are prepared physically in the sense that we have a military organization capable of applying such power. The decision to carry out such action, of course, is a

Presidential decision and the President, I believe, has stated that he, of course, would wish to consult with leaders of the Congress before initiating such action. But I think we should draw a distinction between a position that may lead eventually to the other side forcing military action, on the one hand, versus a decision to initiate such action, on the other. The decision to initiate such action must be a Presidential decision, and the President has stated to the leaders of Congress he would wish to consult with them before taking such position.

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IMPORTANCE OF WILL AND POWER TO RESIST [P. 560]

The Chairman. Senator Aiken, do you have a question?

Senator Aiken. Assuming that there is an understanding or at least a belief that the Russians will not object to China getting her ears pinned back, and I am inclined to agree with that, what compensatory action would Russia be likely to take in some other areas in order to maintain her position in the Communist world?

Have you considered that while Russia might not intercede in a quarrel, an all-out fight with China, that she might take an opportunity to move in other directions?

Secretary McNamara. Yes; the best possible estimate we can make is that she will not so move.

Senator Aiken. I think she would like to have China get her ears pinned back, but it also occurs to me she also would probably make moves in other directions so that she would be economically moving in, whether to take over markets which we or the western world might find ourselves unable to handle or even go farther than that.

Secretary McNamara. It is, of course, sheer speculation on our part, Senator Aiken, to comment on the moves that Russia might make under those circumstances, but the best estimates we can make is that she would not do anything under those circumstances she wouldn't do otherwise.

Senator Aiken. She would probably give token support in some way or maybe not even that.

Secretary McNamara. Through public statements?

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Secretary McNamara. But not in any material way, we believe.

Senator Aiken. The kind of support we gave Batista during his last few months.

Secretary McNamara. Without commenting on that, it would be limited to words, we believe, rather than acts.

The Chairman. Is that all?

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CONSTANCY OF UNITED STATES POSITION IN VIETNAM [P. 562]

Senator Symington. That is what I have tried to develop. It is asy to say "move out," but based on your experience wouldn't that ave tremendous repercussions throughout the world?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

I think if South Vietnam were to accommodate to Communist pressure certainly Laos would be under Communist domination within a short time. Cambodia, which despite the actions of Sihanouk in recent months, is still an independent nation, would shortly become a member of the Communist bloc.

Thailand would be under great pressure to modify its policies. Burma, not today a member of the Communist bloc, would shortly become so. Malaysia would be under great pressure. Indonesia, again not today a member of the Communist bloc, would shortly accommodate itself to their programs.

The effects would be felt in the Philippines, Okinawa, Korea, and surely in Japan. I am not suggesting that Japan at any time in the near future would have a Communist government, but I am certain that they would be less receptive to our bases, they would be less responsive to our requests for aid and assistance in protecting the interests of the West.

The ripple effect would be felt in the other direction in India, Pakistan, Iran, and over a period of years, and I think perhaps it would extend over years, perhaps 2 to 5 years, we would see a complete realignment of that portion of the world extending from the Philippines and Japan on the East through to the Middle East on the West. Beyond that, almost certainly certain of the Western European nations would reappraise their relationships with us and the Soviet Union.

Senator SYMINGTON. There have been many people who feel that we should move forward; we should, for example, attack North Vietnam. But if we do that, that will have major repercussions around the world, would it not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It increases the risks associated with the program to achieve our objectives. It may be necessary, it may be forced on us, as I tried to indicate in my March 26 speech, but it is an action that we should postpone and not undertake if it is possible for us to accomplish our objective without doing it.

Senator SYMINGTON. It might involve us in a general ground war with the Chinese Communists, would it not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I wouldn't think it would involve us in a "general ground war" in the sense that term is generally understood, but it might well lead to military intervention by the Communist Chinese which would lead to a very rapid escalation of military conflict.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wasn't using the word in a nuclear sense in any way. Let me rephrase the question.

It might involve us in a war comparable, if not similar, to what we found ourselves in in Korea, might it not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It might lead to combat with the Chinese in which they, their ground forces, might move. I would not anticipate any ground combat involving United States forces as extensive as the United States ground force participation in the Korean war.

POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator SYMINGTON. You have the National Security Council, including the members of the Joint Chiefs, who have given more of their lives to the study of this subject than all the rest of us put together, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, one of the more experienced men in Government; the planning people; and the President. There you weigh very carefully whether you should move forward, or get out, or maintain the current situation. As a united group all of you make a decision, which at the present is to do exactly what you are doing; is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. And I know of no major disagreement among the policy formulators in the Government on this course of action.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I interrupt with one question that follows your questioning?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your opinion as to our ability to win the conflict in South Vietnam on the basis on which it is now being fought without expanding it beyond the lines?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't really answer the question. I can't see the future clearly. The situation in South Vietnam has worsened in the past several months largely because of the instability of their political institutions. They have had three governments in a period of 6 months. This has introduced inefficiency, chaos, disorder, in both the upper echelons of the political institutions and the military forces.

The Vietcong have taken advantage of this instability by increasing the frequency and the intensity of their attacks. The percentage of the population and territory under the control of the government has declined as a result.

The program of action that General Khanh currently has underway, we hope will stop that decline and gradually lead to an increase in the percentage of governmental control. But whether that program will lead to that objective, I can't predict. It is our hope that it will.

If it does, it may not be necessary to enlarge the area of military operations. If it does not, it may be necessary to do so.

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GETTING NATO ALLIES TO SHARE BURDEN [P. 565]

Secretary McNAMARA. In the case of the United Kingdom, their total defense program is fixed at roughly 6½ percent of their gross national product in current market prices.

We want to be certain, however, they do not fail to properly deploy their forces to fulfill their traditional role in the Aden to Hong Kong area.

We will continue to urge West Germany to raise its defense budget. We have discussed the matter with Chancellor Erhard during his visit here a week or two ago.

They have, as you know, entered into so-called offset agreements with us. I signed the most recent one with Minister Von Hassel[2] last August and confirmed it again with him in May of this year under the terms of which they agree to purchase from us equipment and services which substantially offset our defense exchange expenditures in Germany.

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[2] West German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe Von Hassel.

This amounts to a total of about 650 to 675 millions of dollars' worth of purchases from us a year.

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CONTRIBUTION OF WEST GERMANY [P. 566]

Secretary McNAMARA. We have told Chancellor Erhard and Minister Von Hassel without any qualifications whatsoever, this Nation, our public and our Congress, will not support continued participation of U.S. forces in Western Europe unless the West Germans continue to increase their defense budget, unless they continue to make a greater effort in defense of the West.

They have, as I say, in the past 2 to 3 years increased their defense budget about 40 percent, a tremendous increment, and this has represented a political penalty inside West Germany.

There is tremendous pressure inside West Germany for greater governmental expenditures for welfare and educational purposes. But we have made it very clear to them if they yield to those pressures, if they place a lid on the defense budget, if they fail to continue to increase their military strength and the expenditures on military forces, they cannot expect this Nation to continue to defend them to the degree we are today.

Senator LONG. Is there some hope of gradually phasing down—I know it has been phased down—the troops in West Germany?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't know of any plan for reducing the number of combat divisions that we have in West Germany, nor would it aid us particularly if we did. If we withdrew a combat division from West Germany, we would not wish to deactivate it, we would bring it back to this country and hold it in strategic reserve and hence our total defense budget would not be reduced as a result. It would reduce our foreign exchange expenditure.

However, that foreign exchange expenditure today is being offset completely by German foreign exchange expenditure of an equal amount which amount of German foreign exchange expenditure would fall if ours fell.

Senator LONG. You say it is being completely offset?

Secretary McNAMARA. Completely offset. Our foreign exchange expenditure for United States forces assigned to West Germany is about $675 million, between $650 and $675 million a year, and the Germans have signed with us and over the past 2½ years have complied with an agreement under terms of which they buy an equal amount of United States produced goods and services.

Senator LONG. Now do we have a favorable monetary balance to the extent of this $600 million we are sending over there to pay for those troops?

Secretary McNAMARA. There is an exact offset. Our foreign exchange expenditure in West Germany for military purposes is exactly equaled by their foreign exchange expenditure in the United States for military purposes.

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ASSISTANCE FROM AUSTRALIA AND PHILIPPINES [P. 569]

Secretary **McNamara**. You undoubtedly have seen the public statement made by the Australian Defense Minister within the past week in which he stated Australia fully, completely supported the United States objectives and policies in Vietnam, and also his statements that Australia would increase their military representation in South Vietnam.

The basic problem in Australia is not one of support of our policy but rather the need to substantially increase their defense expenditures. They have been running at about 2½ percent of their gross national product. That is less than one-half of what I think would be reasonable under his circumstances.

We have on a number of occasions during the past 3 years made it clear to the Prime Minister and to his Defense Minister that we felt it absolutely essential they raise that defense budget. The Prime Minister in turn has pointed out that up until very recently he had a margin of one vote, and it was impossible for him to raise the defense budget.

As a matter of fact, his opposition was so strongly opposed to defense in general that they nearly succeeded in forcing him to cancel our agreement for construction of a Polaris facility in Australia that was absolutely vital to the operation of our Polaris fleets in the Pacific.

Recently the Prime Minister achieved about a 20-vote margin. He is using that to substantially increase defense expenditures. He plans to increase them by between 50 and 100 percent.

Until those expenditures have been translated into additional men and equipment, he actually doesn't have a capability to spread his forces to both support the British effort in Malaysia and at the same time greatly increase his contribution to South Vietnam.

Senator **Smathers**. How about the Philippines, are they——

Secretary **McNamara**. The Philippines are very much in the same position. They face a very serious threat from Indonesia on their borders. Their own defense expenditures and defense forces are small. They are as large as that country can properly carry at the present time, but while they would put a token force in South Vietnam with advisers and medical teams, they can't be expected under current circumstances to place any large numbers of men there.

POSSIBLE CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator **Smathers**. In answer to Senator Symington's and Senator Lausche's questions, you said you might feel it necessary to attack North Vietnam, presumably with air power, and so on.

The question then, would we not be involved and the Chinese Reds would respond? Militarily speaking, is there a way that you can stop the Chinese Reds if they start moving their troops short of finally putting some manpower in there, and would they not have to be our manpower or could they be Republic of China's people or—I am just curious as to how would you do it.

Secretary **McNamara**. I think you would like to hear from General Taylor on this one.

General **Taylor**. First, we would depend very heavily on air power and we could consider punishing the Chinese Reds very drastically. It is quite true, however, that I assume on the ground they won't move forward.

My own judgment would be to put in some U.S. forces; it probably would defend at the Mekong, to hold that line, out in the open. Our weapons are very applicable, whereas they are not applicable in the jungles.

So there would be a defensive action along the Mekong while we are fighting the air battle, and by that combination I would feel the Chinese could be detained.

Senator **Smathers**. Are Chiang Kai-shek's forces sufficiently trained to be of any help to us in that area?

General **Taylor**. That is always the possibility. He does have some good divisions. Conceivably, they could be moved around into Southeast Asia, or again they could be moved in amphibious landings across the straits. However, the latter would be quite difficult for us to support.

The **Chairman**. George, will you carry on? That is a vote.

USE OF U.S. FORCES

Senator **Long**. Let me see if I understood your question. I heard you but I wasn't listening. Did you say that it might be desirable to put some U.S. forces against the Mekong?

General **Taylor**. We would certainly make a contribution. I would hope we could get other SEATO forces in that area, but we would certainly have to be the backbone of the strengths there.

Senator **Long**. If you make a military effort it seems to me we will have to do at least 90 percent of it. I am not sure whether the other troops will do much anyhow.

Are you thinking of perhaps calling for one or two U.S. divisions over there to hold that line?

General **Taylor**. The total strength would probably be something over that. Of course, you have the Thai forces. Thailand is their homeland they are defending and you certainly would depend on them.

Unfortunately our lines logistically would be our own and we would have to provide the backup.

Senator **Long**. That was Thailand you were talking about?

General **Taylor**. Yes, the Mekong is pretty near the Thai frontier.

Senator **Long**. But you weren't speaking of holding South Vietnam by United States forces, I take it?

General **Taylor**. They could be. Whether or not American ground forces would be necessary I am not quite sure because they are very substantial forces, of course, we have raised and trained in South Vietnam. On the other hand they would continue to have the insurgency problems, so there might be some stiffening required on the ground.

Senator **Smathers**. General, on the assumption that the Chinese Reds were rather profligate with the use of their manpower, even though you could bomb and so on, sort of nuclear war, assuming they would be pouring men, and assuming that we would have to have some manpower along the lines to do it, are we in a position to do it with one or two divisions and other help that might be coming from the various areas involved? Do you think that would be sufficient?

General TAYLOR. We have contingency plans, Senator, which call from almost anything in the practice of time and space, conditioned on the time of arrival for any forces that come in. But we have incremental practices which we just add on whatever the situation calls for.

I would make this point, however, that the Red Chinese have serious problems of their own. For one thing, for a Chinaman to walk down the Mekong, someone has to get him some ammunition, some equipment lighter in comparison to ours. We have studied this problem especially in the rainy season, and the logistic factors favor us rather than them if the Mekong is the line of engagement.

Senator SMATHERS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry I missed that.

PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

Just one further question as to the further step of escalation. Before any such step is taken, of course, it is assumed, is it, that the Congress would be consulted?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The President has indicated that he would wish to discuss with the congressional leaders any action that would involve combat operations on any substantial scale outside the borders of South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted it on the record. They ask me this all the time. So it is on the record. Before any decision for combat outside of the present scope of the activity, the Congress would be consulted.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else you would like to say?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir.

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[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned to meet at the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

The committee began the markup of the bill (H.R. 11380), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Long, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (H.R. 11380), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (presiding) and Senators Morse, Long, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt. Senator Fulbright later attended.

The committee began markup of the bill (H.R. 11380), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee proceeded into an afternoon session as well, and finally adjourned at 5:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

The chairman proposed that the committee use proxies even though there would not be a very good attendance. Senator Morse criticized the use of general rather than specific proxies as not good legislative process but said that he would raise no objection to it. Senator Lausche agreed that at some time the committee ought to stop the use of general proxies but not at the moment. The chairman said that it was always a problem but that no committee could hardly function in its procedural or preliminary stages on a bill without the use of proxies. By consent, it was agreed that proxies would be acceptable.

The committee then proceeded in its markup of the bill (H.R. 11380), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee recessed at 12 noon.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In June 1963, President Kennedy appointed Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to be U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. Lodge arrived in Saigon in August, convinced "that an exclusively military solution to the Vietnam problem was impossible." He concluded that President Diem's administration was entering a "terminal phase," and worked unsuccessfully to convince Diem to send his unpopular brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, out of the country. Ambassador Lodge also maintained contact with the South Vietnamese generals who were plotting Diem's overthrow, but he insisted that American policy was simply "not to thwart" a coup.

[In March 1964, Lodge won the Republican Presidential primary in New Hampshire, and was under increasing pressure to return to campaign. However, he remained in Saigon until June, when he resigned "for a number of reasons, foremost of which was that my wife had not been well," he wrote later in his memoirs. Lodge joined forces with those Republicans seeking to stop the nomination of Senator Barry Goldwater. In 1965 President Johnson asked Lodge to return to Vietnam as Ambassador, a post he held until 1967.]

TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present, Committee on Foreign Relations: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Present, Committee on Armed Services: Senators Stennis, Thurmond, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Young, Saltonstall, Beall, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee is very pleased this morning to have Ambassador Lodge, who used to be a distinguished member of this committee some years ago. We are very pleased to welcome you, Cabot.

We have read about you of course, and we have heard and read your speeches. In a very brief exchange with Mr. Lodge before, he suggested that since he has made one or two statements and speeches, it might be more useful if we proceed to question him immediately rather than having an introductory statement, if that is the desire.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE

Mr. LODGE. I will be glad to bring the committee up to date on the most recent things just before I left, if you would like.

Senator MORSE. I think that would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Take a short time and then we will start with questions.

Mr. LODGE. I will do it either way, but I just happened to think there are some really last minute things that you might not have been briefed on from the State Department because they hadn't had time to do it.

Just the day I was leaving, these young provincial reporters whom we have—we have seven or eight excellent young Foreign Service officers with a very encouraging quality, seven or eight of them who speak Vietnamese and who travel around the country. They are around in the villages in the evening listening and picking up the situation. For the first time they are getting the report that the people are stopping feeding the Vietcong. Now, if there should be a trend to that effect, that would be very fundamental, and this is the first time that we have had reports like that. They also get reports of increased terrorism of the Vietcong against the ordinary people, shooting up busloads of women and children and putting infernal machines under railroad trains and that kind of thing.

Again they have been trying to be more clear than the government and trying to be nicer than the government and keeping the people adhered toward them rather than to the government. So that is a new development.

IMPROVEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Then the taxes, the financial burden that they levy in the communities has gone up. All those things indicate a change of attitude on the part of the Vietcong and the attitude of the people toward the Vietcong.

Then they report our economic aid is really getting out into the countryside where it counts. That is, we have these pigs and schools and agricultural things of all kinds, and there has been a big problem to get the distribution of them and get them out where they mean something, and I think that is happening.

Then they report an improvement in the junior officer leadership. The thing about the Vietnam soldier is that anybody I have ever met who has had a contact with the soldier says he is a brave, determined little man who is not afraid to die for the things he believes in. I must have interviewed 40 of our young American officers who are out in the field with the Vietnam battalions. The thing that has been varying a lot is the caliber of the officer leadership.

There has been in past years a tendency to select officers on the basis of connections and political considerations in Saigon and all that. Well, now General Khanh is really going after it. He is weeding out the drones and he is engaging in battlefield promotions and decorations and so on, and we have got these confidence-building, courage-building corps that are being given to these officers. That, I think, is a consequence of the fact that they have had two really successful military engagements lately, one at Tangen and one at Dien Huan.

That is the first item I wanted to cover. The second is brief.

CIVILIAN COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION

We have got a complete meeting of minds within the United States Government and between the United States Government and the Vietnamese Government on how we are going to proceed once the military has cleared an area, because to have the military go in and go through an area and the Vietcong go and hide out in the bushes, you never come to grips with them. Then the military goes out and the Vietcong come back in again.

All you have got to show for it is the 12 bodies on the ground. You are better off not having had the sweep at all. You have got to have something that you do after the army has been in in order to make the accomplishment of the army durable, and so agreement has been reached on this. This is a classified paper, but I would like to read from it on the understanding that this is an executive session. This is very short:

> The first priority after the military have cleared an area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area who will, in turn, go about creating a basically civilian counterterrorism organization on the precinct level or the equivalent thereof.

I don't have to tell any of you gentleman what a precinct is, but I did out there. They didn't know what it was so I explained a precinct is the smallest practicable political subdivision.

This committee will be created from among the young elite which exist in every country in the world; that is, the young man who has a stake in the community because he has family, because he owns a house or a piece of land, he is ambitious to get ahead in business, profession, or application with heavy help from the police.

VIETCONG INTIMIDATION

Their purpose will be to create security for the local government. The thing that is the curse of the Vietnam is that the Vietcong will intimidate the whole government. They will cut off the head of the local chief and march it around on a pole, and it has a very, very demoralizing effect. You make the local government free from intimidation, and you do it by a census, by identification card, by a curfew. Anybody who is out after 9 p.m., or whatever it is, is subject to questioning, and you comb the Vietcong out. Their great security is that they are mixed in with the ordinary rank and file of people, women, children, and so on.

Once you isolate them and get them out, you have accomplished a great deal. Now, once the local government feels safer, it should move energetically to promote public safety for the people. The people should then rally more to the government. This should create an upward spiral, and God knows we need an upward spiral, we have had so many downward spirals. Then the economic aid effort should be given through these counterterrorist precinct committees, so as to build up the people who are in them, make it attractive to be in those organizations, and make it difficult to withdraw.

This is the type of counterterrorist organization which has worked in many other places. It means building a net with a very fine mesh. It is painstaking. It is not a thing you do quickly, but it is very sure. It works if you have the patience and the application to do it, and this explains why you can't expect quick flashing results in Vietnam.

SELF-DEFEATING TACTICS

Then agreement was obtained on the proposition that the military should take special precautions in their operations not to injure in any way the noncombatants. We have had certain operations at times which have been self-defeating. When you go in with napalm, and women and children feel the effects of it, of course you are defeating your purpose, because the purpose in Vietnam is to create the proper political atmosphere. Once you have done that, the whole thing is over, and the military is an aid to achieving that purpose. It is a very important indispensable aid, but it is an aid nonetheless.

Now General Westmoreland[1] and all the people involved have agreed to this. It does complicate things for the military, and I think they are to be commended for having agreed to it, but they have, and this I think is a forward step.

Then the army is to behave itself so well that the people like the army. In the Philippines when they had the trouble with the Huks, one of the great things Magsaysay did was to get the army to behave itself so that the people liked them. The minute they did that, the struggle in the Philippines began to go better.

POSITIVE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

Finally, there must be a program of positive political indoctrination, with every soldier a propagandist. When you make a soldier into a propagandist, he convinces himself and he becomes more enthusiastic himself. I have talked to many people who have been stopped and detained by the Vietcong on the roads. I talked with a Catholic nun just the other day who was traveling along in a bus and was detained, and they always give them a lecture. When the Vietcong get into a place, before they bring in economic aid, before they bring in weapons, they try to saturate the minds of the people.

We have prepared some short, I think quite well-expressed arguments in favor of the free system which I believe will be effective.

Now, on Friday morning I circulated this paper, translated it into French to get it absolutely right, and let them have a week with it. On Friday we sat down. I was on one side of the table with the heads of the U.S. agencies and General Khanh was on the other with his people. Everybody understood it. We took it up line by line. He said that some of this was new for them, that they never believed in building an organization around young people, that always the elders there were the ones with the long whiskers.

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[1] Gen. William Westmoreland became Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on April 25, 1964.

But he thought obviously you couldn't do counterterrorism with old men. You have to have young men to do it. They all understood it and are going to do it. That by itself isn't going to defeat the Vietcong, but it is going to deny him the settlements where he goes for rest, recreation, and security, and it is going to keep him out in the brush where it is going to be much easier to get. If we do this all over the country, why, the days of the Vietcong, I think, are numbered.

So these are the developments of the last 2 or 3 days just before I left. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

DIEM GOVERNMENT'S TERMINAL PHASE

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Of course we have invited the Armed Services Committee to sit with us, and I will try to keep questions as brief as I can. I only have a couple of short ones.

Do you think the conditions today are better or worse than when you went out there in South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. When I went out there, Mr. Chairman, the Diem government was very clearly in its terminal phase, and things were in a very unstable and bad state. There was a great deal of police measures being used. The things had reached a virtual standstill and paralysis. Today we have a government, while it is not stable the way ours is, nonetheless it is headed by a man who is a clever, intelligent man, and who is working at the job very hard, who has got some of the best people in the country around him. I think the general situation is better today than it was then.

Last fall, if the Diem government hadn't come to an end and had gone on for another month, I think we might have had a Communist takeover. I think it had become that important.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this better than the first coup, the Big Minh government?

Mr. LODGE. The Big Minh government did some good things, and I was very upset at that coup because I thought we were getting somewhere. I had put a lot of work in with them and everything. But I must admit that General Khanh is an abler man with a lot more drive. He is one of those rare orientals who is in a hurry. That is a trait you find among Americans but you don't much out there. He really is in a hurry.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is hopeful?

Mr. LODGE. I think it is hopeful, yes.

COOPERATION FROM THE ADMINISTRATION

The CHAIRMAN. Second, have you had adequate cooperation from the administration? Have they cooperated with you, sent out the people you like and so on?

Mr. LODGE. I have had very good relations indeed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense both, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have no complaints to the committee about the cooperation of the Government?

Mr. LODGE. No.

The **Chairman**. Do you think the policy objectives in South Vietnam now—is there any difference in the Government about our objectives?

Mr. **Lodge**. I don't think so.

The **Chairman**. Are they clear and are you satisfied with them?

Mr. **Lodge**. Yes. I think over the past few years within the U.S. Government there has been some natural trial and error and discussions as to the emphasis that ought to be placed on this and on that, and the relationships between the different U.S. agencies hasn't always been clear. But I think that has all been clarified now.

The **Chairman**. It has been clarified.

WORKING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

Mr. **Lodge**. One of the last things I did after 10 months of reflection was to create an organization to carry this program into effect in the three worst provinces in Vietnam, the ones just outside of Saigon. I created an organization with General Westmoreland as the executive manager for these three provinces on the ground. The situation was so bad in these provinces that the military requirement was predominant. Then he would decide when to bring in AID, when to bring in USIA, and the other things.

The **Chairman**. You think well of Westmoreland?

Mr. **Lodge**. Oh, I do, I do. When the things get safer and the military phase ends, then I would not put the military in charge. It is a hard thing with American agencies abroad to get a disciplined structure. I said, "I take orders from the President and the Secretary of State and I am glad to do it, and General Westmoreland takes orders from me. Why aren't you willing to take orders from him?"

There is that, particularly in an organization composed of people that are not career people. There is somewhat of a resentment against doing that. But they all finally agreed to it. Let me say that the personnel in USOM, which is the overseas word for AID, somebody has done a wonderful job of recruiting in the junior levels. Wherever you travel around in Vietnam, the USOM representative is almost always a man of whom you can be proud.

The **Chairman**. You received credit for some of these improvements in the personnel out there. Don't you take credit for it?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think we have got some very good people out there.

The **Chairman**. Senator Morse.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Ambassador, what is our objection to going to a 14-nation conference on the Southeast Asian problem?

Mr. **Lodge**. When, Senator?

Senator **Morse**. Immediately.

Mr. **Lodge**. Oh, no, I think it would be most imprudent.

Senator **Morse**. Why?

Mr. **Lodge** [continuing]. To go immediately, because the Vietcong is right in the midst of an intrusion on to the territory of South Vietnam. It wouldn't be a conference. South Vietnam would go there simply to capitulate. I would have no objection to a conference under the provisions, but it would be like bringing France to a conference in 1943 when the German army was occupying half of it. You would be lost before you began.

Senator **Morse**. I don't see why. We have American unilateral military action over there now and intend that we should demonstrate we are perfectly willing to have other nations join in trying to prevent a Communist takeover.

Mr. **Lodge**. Well, you have got the question of how you apply American power. It is not a simple matter to apply American power. You can have the world nibbled away from right under the noses of your guided missiles. Sometimes we are in a position of somebody who owns a big battleship that is all-powerful in the middle of the ocean, but you have got a problem in the middle of the desert. And how do you apply the power? I think before you go—as Churchill once said, "We arm to parley." We ought to get into shape to go to the conference.

UNILATERAL AMERICAN ACTION

Senator **Morse**. I think that is one of the greatest fallacies. We first take over with American military might and then we tell the world what to do. Apparently that is our policy.

Mr. **Lodge**. That is what the——

Senator **Morse**. It is obvious what we are doing. I should think that we would welcome an opportunity to get into a 14-nation conference and get some other people in there with us instead of getting ourselves separated from the rest of the world as the one country that proposes unilateral military action. What is wrong with putting Russia on the spot and going to the Security Council and asking them what they are willing to do about this? They are supposed to have some influence over Communists. I doubt that they have it in Asia any more, but let's prove it. Why don't we go to the Security Council. Why don't we go to SEATO?

Mr. **Lodge**. We did go to the Security Council on the Cambodian question.

Senator **Morse**. We were dragged in. We didn't go. We were kicked into the Security Council and then we wanted to limit it just to the Cambodian border. We haven't offered to put the whole thing before the United Nations. Why don't we?

Mr. **Lodge**. I have no objection to having the United Nations take an interest in the frontier problems between Cambodia and Vietnam, Laos and Vietnam, but the Cambodians won't adhere to what the United Nations wants. They won't allow inspection.

A SEATO PEACEKEEPING MISSION

Senator **Morse**. Why don't we prove it? Why don't we lay the whole Asian crisis either before a 14-nation conference or before the United Nations? I think our first step should have been, and as you know, I have said this for months, our first step should have been to get SEATO into this. Why don't we ask SEATO to come on in and help with a peacekeeping mission?

Mr. **Lodge**. Because, Senator, France is a member of SEATO and France is totally opposed to what we are doing, and SEATO has to proceed by unanimous consent.

Senator MORSE. Let's get them into a SEATO Conference and get them to turn it down.

Mr. LODGE. That is what practically happened at Manila.

Senator MORSE. Not formally and officially. We filed no formal application for SEATO to come in.

Mr. LODGE. And if we had, it would have been a body blow to the morale of the Vietnamese army, if we had.

Senator MORSE. I should think not.

Mr. LODGE. There wasn't any question of anybody who was present at the SEATO conference at Manila that the French were totally opposed to our policy and that nothing could have been expected out of SEATO.

Senator MORSE. It wouldn't have been a body blow to the American people. I have great respect for your judgment, but I couldn't disagree with you more, and I disagree with your suggestion as to how to handle this matter. I think we are outside the framework of international law. I think we are using American military might on a unilateral basis. It never can be justified, whether we do it or Russia does it. There is where I part company with you and now the President. I think this is a horrendous historic mistake for us to not be going through the framework of existing international law procedures.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

VILLAGE SECURITY PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Cabot, you have got so many titles I don't know how to address you.

Mr. LODGE. I have none. I am without title.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say that in all due respect. The question of the pacification or the consolidation of the political situation over there seems to me to be——

Senator MORSE. Bourke, may I interrupt you a minute? Mr. Ambassador, I apologize to you for leaving the meeting but they want me for a quorum call on the poverty bill, which I happen to think is more important for my country than unilateral military action in South Vietnam anyway, so far as my country is concerned, but I apologize to you for leaving.

Mr. LODGE. Not at all. I am delighted to have seen you here this morning, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you find any spots that are prosperous, can you create them into a poverty spot?

Mr. LODGE. I am going to try to get $5 million for Tongue Point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will begin again. The political pacification or acceptance of stability in South Vietnam is the objective for any permanent successful solution there, but the thing that concerns me is this. The village security program and others, regardless of the good intentions of the military there; that is, the South Vietnam military, seems to me to rest, at the moment anyway, upon this simple matter of security. How are people in these villages expected to stand up for their rights, or will they stand up for their rights, when they know that the minute the Vietnam military pulls out the Vietcong are going to come rushing in from the jungle and chop off the heads of those who assume responsibility?

That is one of the things I think we have been up against all along there. How will this so-called agreement that we have now—what hope do we have that people will literally put their heads in the guillotine in these villages, regardless of their good intentions, so that the native villagers will have a determination to defend themselves.

Mr. LODGE. That is an absolutely fundamental point. What is proposed is that the regular army doesn't leave until there is a paramilitary force, a militia-type of thing, which in that country is called a civil guard and self-defense corps, which are there, well organized, and functioning and on call. An area is not considered to be pacified until that paramilitary force exists. Of course, that is recruited from men who live in the locality. The point you make is absolutely fundamental.

ARMED VILLAGES EXPERIMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did try that though some time ago didn't we? We armed villages?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We had these paramilitary forces in there, and that rather collapsed on us.

Mr. LODGE. It collapsed. They didn't pay them enough. They didn't give them the status that they should have. I think in the long pull this is much more of a problem to be solved by the militia and by the police force than it is a problem for the regular army. In March, I think it was, the program was begun to compensate the men in the civil guard and the self-defense corps to put them on a par with the regular army, which is definitely how it should be.

INDIFFERENCE OF POPULATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a third question, and then I will pass on. Of course, there are dozens of questions we could ask. I have one other short question.

I have been told by people who at least know more about it over there than I do that it is almost accepted among the people there and in other Asian countries, the philosophy, "What is the difference? If we do set up a government, those who are apt to take over are going to be worse than those that are in, and the corruptionists and so on will just move in and we will change from one master to another."

That philosophy has been ingrained in these people because they have lived with it so long, not only in South Vietnam but in some other countries in that area. Therefore the people are not particularly disposed to support one group as against another because they will say one group is about as bad as the other when it comes to any protection of rights, and therefore we will live to ourselves, get along the best we can, and accept any master who comes along.

Do you find that existing in many of the villages in South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I think there is a substantial number of people who are indifferent. I think there is a small number who are enthusiastic for the Vietcong. I think there is a larger number enthusiastic for the nationalist idea. But I think there is a large number of people who are waiting to see which way the thing is going to go. Of course, all you need to make a thing like this succeed is a really well-organized and determined minority. At the time of the American Revolution you didn't have anywhere near half the people who were for independence. If you get 20 or 30 percent who are really strongly for achieving and then maintaining the independence of Vietnam, you have really got enough to make it go.

I think you have certainly got that much. But the idea of nationalism and of the flag and all these things that are well established here and that move us are relatively new ideas in an oriental tropical country, particularly a country that is as rich agriculturally as that is. A man can live in a place and he gets everything he needs to eat within 300 yards, not just things that grow in the ground but ducks, pigs, chickens, coconuts, everything you can think of. Fish, the fish are in the rice paddies. Why should he look outside.

So the loyalties, the things that disturb people in those countries are usually religious. They belong to these religious sects, the Hoa Haos, the Caodais, and that type of thing, rather than the idea of the flag and nation.

Now, progress is being made to make Vietnam into a modern 20th century nation-state, and they are much nearer to it now than they were. But compared with us, for instance, there are still many divisions in the country.

FEARS OF THE VILLAGERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one other thing. I have been told, and I think this is quite evident, the people have a feeling that the so-called nationalists are the governmental groups which we work with, that they are not going to come into the villages and chop the head off of the head man. But they are pretty well set on the idea that the Vietcong, if they come in, are going to chop the heads off. Therefore they will be nice to the people that are going to chop off their heads and try to keep them from doing that, when they don't have very much to fear from our side. So they are very careful not to offend the people——

Senator LAUSCHE. The choppers?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The head choppers.

Mr. LODGE. That has been true, but I think this plan that I outlined and the general lift that General Khanh has been giving is changing that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I shan't go into the military aspects of the campaign there, and I have taken more time than I should have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

SYMPATHY FOR THE VIETCONG

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I will just ask a couple of questions along this line. I have been told by some of the military men over there that in South Vietnam about 50 percent of the people were for that government and about 50 percent sympathize with the Vietcong, and these military men really didn't know where they were when they went into these places. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. LODGE. I would say about 10 percent—it is very hard to generalize about this country. It is cut up into 43 provinces and there isn't much communication between them. You have 43 different situations really.

But I would think in the delta, the part around Saigon there, there would be 10 percent for the Vietcong and 20 percent for the government and the rest waiting to see which way it is going to go.

Senator STENNIS. It is from those that you have to get your soldiers, the Vietnamese.

Mr. LODGE. Yes. Well, they get the soldiers all right.

TRAINING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator STENNIS. You said that you were impressed with the loyalty and spirit and all of these little men, as you call them, these soldiers. That is nominally it seems, from where they come from, there is this division among the people, unless they are very susceptible to the training and indoctrination.

Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. LODGE. Take a young man, particularly in a country where there is a lot of poverty, a lot of bad health, very few doctors. Put him into the army, where he gets some medical attention and he gets fed and he gets clothed and equipped with American clothing and equipment, and you can change his outlook. You do change his outlook.

Senator STENNIS. That is one of the encouraging things. These military men who come in contact with the better type of them say the same thing you do about this little Vietnamese soldier. Once he is given a chance and is trained——

Mr. LODGE. It is very moving what these men will do.

Senator STENNIS. Now, the military men we have, the Air Force, the Army, the equipment, and everything, is it your idea that we have what is needed there? Are we short on anything? Do you feel in the need of more Army, more Air Force, or what?

Mr. LODGE. I don't. I think we have enough of the military.

Senator STENNIS. I beg your pardon?

Mr. LODGE. I think we have enough military, doing it the way we are planning to do it.

PROBLEM OF FAULTY EQUIPMENT

Senator STENNIS. There has been a lot said and I know you have to be brief on this. I mean for you to be brief—there has been a great deal said about the faulty military equipment over there. I want to add that I don't think that is substantiated so much by the real testimony that we have been able to get, but do you want to comment on that? Is that a morale factor in any way? There is a great deal in the press over here about faulty planes and so forth.

Mr. LODGE. Of course, that is a military matter, and the Ambassador doesn't command the military.

Senator **Stennis**. I just wanted to know if that was a factor, because it was played up over here considerably.

Mr. **Lodge**. I asked about it when I heard about it, and I was told that they were getting the very best.

Senator **Stennis**. We have had some reports about the military command over there being at odds in a way, and this is just off the record, not to start anything. I don't think there is anything substantial to it, but there are the usual stories about a conflict between the Air Force and the Army and all. Did you have any trouble that way?

Mr. **Lodge**. No, I don't think so.

Senator **Stennis**. Was there anything like that?

Mr. **Lodge**. I don't think so. Of course, there again, that is primarily a military matter, but I tried to keep in touch with all that. I think General Westmoreland's command has a very good attitude and they all cooperate well together.

Senator **Stennis**. The reason I mentioned it to you is I thought you would know about it if there was anything to it.

Mr. **Lodge**. I would know about it, I certainly would.

Senator **Stennis**. That is all I have at this time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INFILTRATION FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Mr. Ambassador, may I ask two questions or possibly three very brief questions? Following up on the military that Senator Stennis has asked you about, what about infiltration from Laos and from Cambodia, where apparently they can come in and bring in assistance to the Vietcong, and so on.

Mr. **Lodge**. There is no doubt that there is more infiltration now. There is no doubt in my mind that there is more infiltration now than there was when I got out there a year ago, infiltration of weapons, infiltration of supplies, infiltration of what we would call officers, and it is a serious thing. If we could stop the infiltration, more important than that, if we could stop the central direction that comes from Hanoi, if we could do all those things, we would really end the Vietcong menace, and you would have a bandit situation such as they have had for 100 years, with which the local people could cope. So this is a very important matter.

Now, there is a complexity to it. If you were to seal off the borders, if it was physically possible to do it, the Vietcong south of Saigon could go on for a long time, because it is so rich and they can live off the country and eat and so on. The Vietcong north of Saigon in the high plateau would be affected very quickly. If you were to cut off the central direction from Hanoi, I think it would affect the Vietcong everywhere. So it is an important matter.

TAKING THE WAR TO HANOI

Senator **Saltonstall**. That leads to the second point. Do you believe that we can win over there without going into North Vietnam, without going into Hanoi?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think there are all sorts of pressures that can be brought to bear which will very much reduce this infiltration.

Senator **Lausche**. What are they?

Mr. **Lodge**. It is classified, it is so secret that I don't feel justified, but I think there is a range of pressures short of war which I think could be quite effective, particularly as all the information that I got when I was there, and I knew people who were going into Hanoi every 10 days, indicates that they have plenty of problems themselves.

Senator **Saltonstall**. So you feel, as one who has just been out there in a very responsible position, that our policy of staying within Vietnam, South Vietnam, and carrying on as we are carrying on, can be ultimately successful, if we carry out the suggestions that you are making, and so on?

Mr. **Lodge**. Yes. I think reducing this infiltration, reducing the outside influence, is a very important thing to do and would ease the problem very much, but I don't think you can solve the problem just by doing that. I think you still have to make a big effort within Vietnam.

I read a book by the first American who ever went to Saigon, it was in 1819, and the place was teeming with bandits then, and there were pirates out on the ocean just the way there are now. That is a place that has been given to banditry for a long time.

THE RELIGIOUS ROW

Senator **Saltonstall**. One question that interested me was this religious row, the Catholics and the Buddhists, is that going to injure the prestige of Khanh?

Mr. **Lodge**. It is possible for that division to become very serious.

Senator **Saltonstall**. It did before.

Mr. **Lodge**. It did before. That is what really was the immediate cause for bringing down the Diem government, and in theory it could do it again. But there was a very difficult situation in the month of May, and by dint of a great deal of effort they got through the month of May without any serious trouble. I think General Khanh realizes it is a thing you have to watch and work at all the time. But the other night at the farewell dinner they gave for me, the principal Buddhist and the Archbishop of Saigon posed for a photograph together with General Khanh, which was really a historic development and an extremely healthy development.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The **Chairman**. Senator Long.

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Senator **Long**. Mr. Ambassador, as I understand it, you feel that if we don't stay right in there inside and hold the hands of the Vietnamese while they fight this thing, that government will definitely go under?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think the government is quite capable of contending with local banditry. I think when you have a conflict that is of an international character, which this is, they are just not strong enough for that. They need outside help.

Senator LONG. In other words, confronted with the pressure they are up against from North Vietnam, with the Communist infiltration from all directions, standing alone that government could not overcome those pressures and the government would go under if we didn't stay there and help them?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, we have to stay there and help them. They couldn't successfully resist the internal pressure alone.

COMMUNIST SWEEP ACROSS ASIA

Senator LONG. In the event that we should decide to pull out there, are you convinced that would be the beginning of a Communist sweep across Southeast Asia, and if so, to what extent do you think it would go unless we had American troops to meet that sweep?

Mr. LODGE. If we were so thoughtless as to abandon Vietnam to the Communists, which would be a tremendously imprudent thing to do, particularly considering that the effort we are making there is not a major effort for us at all, you could certainly expect that Cambodia would immediately line up with Communist China. Laos would too. Thailand, where the government doesn't at all want to do that, would realistically feel that it would have to.

The Tong Ku, the head of Malaysia, has stated that if Vietnam falls, the outlook for maintaining Malaysian independence isn't good. The Philippines would be very seriously affected. Indonesia would put up no resistance at all, and both the Australian and New Zealand Governments consider that they would be in serious danger, that you would have the Chinese right down on the northern coast of Australia.

Senator LONG. What would the situation be in Burma?

Mr. LODGE. It would be very serious for Burma. It would be a most imprudent thing to do, and as I say, we are not making a major effort for us when you consider what we are capable of doing. We spend $1.12 million a day, which is less than the cost of an airplane carrier.

Senator LONG. You mean less than the cost of maintaining and operating an airplane carrier?

Mr. LODGE. No, building one. Casualties, June 15 figures, 135 Americans were killed in action, 101 died from accidents, natural causes, and disease. That is in the 2½ years since 1951. But in the same period of time, 8,273 American military lost their lives in the continental United States, soldiering.

The military is dangerous work. We all know that. I pay tribute to the heroism of these men, many of whom I have known and some of whom I have visited in the hospital when they were dying. It is an inspiration what they are doing for our country. But the outlay that we make in terms of human sacrifice and treasure is not a big thing for us, when you consider what is at stake.

THE WORLD IS A DANGEROUS PLACE

Senator LONG. My reaction to these legal arguments has been that the Communists don't have much respect for them, and that as a practical matter, even though I am a lawyer by training, this is a situation where somebody is going to have to fight and die, and someone is going to have to spend his money if you don't want the Communists to take that whole area over. It is just about that simple from my point of view.

Mr. LODGE. Well, that is it. I am perfectly willing to concede that the danger of atomic extermination between the Soviet Union and the United States has diminished somewhat. But out there, anybody who has been stationed in Southeast Asia knows that the world is a dangerous place, and they don't use atomic bombs because they haven't got them, but they disembowel and they decapitate and they torture and they kidnap and they are given to every kind of violence. You can have the whole thing taken away from you right under the nose of your guided missiles if you are not prepared to meet force with force.

There are still situations in the world where you have to use force. Of course, they are in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords. If they were to withdraw from Vietnam I don't doubt that we would seriously consider withdrawing our military effort.

RESOLUTION FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator LONG. Suppose we had a resolution from the General Assembly of the United Nations. Do you think that is going to make a substantial impression on the Vietcong, that that would persuade them to withdraw, or do you think the fighting would go on anyway.

Mr. LODGE. A resolution calling on them to withdraw?

Senator LONG. Yes, from the General Assembly.

Mr. LODGE. They wouldn't like that, and I bet the Communists at New York would fight it and try to stop it. It would embarrass the North Vietnamese.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LODGE. It is an element in the game. It is very hard to evaluate what effect it would have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

SKEPTICAL OF AMBASSADOR'S OPTIMISM

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, as usual I am pretty well mixed up.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not usual.

Senator AIKEN. Ambassador Lodge has told us that when he went out there last August, things were at a pretty low ebb, and subsequent events proved that statement to be correct. He seems considerably more optimistic now, although he tells us that it will take quite a while in coming.

I recall that just before Ambassador Lodge went to Vietnam, Ambassador [Frederick] Nolting, the retiring Ambassador, sat right where Cabot does now and told us when he went out there things were kind of bad, but he had a very rosy picture for the future. In fact, it was so rosy that most of us didn't believe it. And Secretary McNamara was talking very optimistically of getting all our forces home in a very short time. The only conclusion I can draw is that

South Vietnam looks much better to an Ambassador when he is leaving it behind him.

I don't believe I have any questions unless the witness wants to comment.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to comment.

Senator AIKEN. You are telling us almost exactly the same kind of story——

Mr. LODGE. I didn't mean to.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. That Ambassador Nolting told us when he was retiring.

Mr. LODGE. I didn't mean to.

Senator AIKEN. You didn't hear. We did.

Mr. LODGE. No, I didn't, but I heard what you said about him. There is no clearly established favorable trend. There is nothing spectacularly good that has happened. There are some encouraging subsurface indications. Certain things have been started which are promising if they are carried out effectively and persistently. We have got an able Chief of State and we have got a good American team. But I don't think it's a good situation. I think it is a dangerous situation.

DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE

Senator AIKEN. His picture of the future was painted in much brighter colors than yours.

Mr. LODGE. No, I didn't say that.

Senator AIKEN. In fact, I think you are telling us a straight story.

Mr. LODGE. I think so.

Senator AIKEN. It is going to be long, hard, and difficult.

Mr. LODGE. Difficult, but not impossible.

Senator AIKEN. We hope not impossible.

Mr. LODGE. Not impossible. I don't think it is impossible.

Senator AIKEN. We hope not. That is all.

Mr. LODGE. I have a good deal of faith in these people. I have gotten to know them very well. I have never met a race of people in the tropics, where life is easy and so on, who are quite as dynamic as they are.

Senator AIKEN. I don't want to be cynical, but it was not until November that the officials of the executive branch came before us and told us that things were worse and not better.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

FATE OF BIG MINH

Senator SYMINGTON. First, Mr. Ambassador, I want to congratulate you on your statement this morning. It is clear and understanding. I also want to congratulate you on the magnificent job you did out there.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just have two questions. First, what has happened to Big Minh? I got pretty fond of him. Has he disappeared to a house of rest?

Mr. **Lodge**. Big Minh was very disaffected for a while after General Khanh took office and he didn't make his trips around the countryside laying cornerstones and that sort of thing, but he does very well the things needed to do in order to make the people realize they have a government and a flag. I am happy to report in the last week he has finally changed his attitude and he is circulating around the country and it does a lot of good. He is one of the men that the people know and like, and they have got very few people like that.

One of the problems of that country is they haven't got real good politicians. You need politicians in the country. He gets out and he cultivates the people and they like him. He was tortured, you know, by the Japanese, had all his teeth pulled out.

Senator **Symington**. All but one.

Mr. **Lodge**. All but one, yes, and everybody knows that about him. So he is back at work now.

Senator **Symington**. He was very worried a couple of years ago about the infiltration of the politicians into the military. He talked very frankly about it and predicted off the record the fall of the Diem government.

Mr. **Lodge**. Because of officers being selected on a political basis; yes.

Senator **Symington**. That is right.

Mr. **Lodge**. That is what General Khanh is in the process of correcting.

DE GAULLE'S EFFORTS

Senator **Symington**. My next question, one that worried me—I was for going north on some basis, bombing, carrying a task force to the marshalling yards and so forth. I changed my thinking about it as a result of General de Gaulle's attitude. In effect, that is a French country; all the educated people speak French. What is behind what De Gaulle is now doing out there? Is it just his dislike—I read the article by Stewart Alsop, which impressed me a lot, in the Saturday Evening Post this week, emphasizing De Gaulle's dislike of the English and Americans. What is he trying to do out there now? Is that it or is it something that he has on his mind that we don't know about, or what is the French political picture toward the South Vietnamese today?

Mr. **Lodge**. Of course, the answer to that really, ideally ought to come from somebody who has been in Paris rather than from somebody who has been in Saigon.

Senator **Symington**. What is your impression of it? You have had vast experience.

Mr. **Lodge**. Where I sat in Saigon, it looked to me as though the French Government was blocking everything or trying to block everything we were trying to do. It looked like a personal attitude of General de Gaulle. The few French businessmen who were left in Saigon were hoping we would be successful, of course. Their best interests lie in our being successful. And when I left, there was a big group of the French colony who came out to see me off. So the French people who live there don't agree with the De Gaulle policies.

But to the man sitting in Saigon, the De Gaulle policy looks as though he is trying to block the American effort, and as though it rested on two fundamental misconceptions. One, they say the Americans want an exclusively military solution. Of course, the Americans don't want an exclusively military solution. The American military doesn't want an exclusively military solution.

We know that this has got to be done with the military on the security side, but then economic, social, civil, political, propagandistic, and the whole thing has to move along together. That is what makes it complicated.

The second thing they say is how can the Americans expect to do with 16,000 men what we couldn't do with 200,000 men. Of course, the answer to that is that we don't. We are not trying to do what they were trying to do. We are not trying to hang on to a huge great colonial empire in Southeast Asia. We are trying to get this country so that it can stand by itself and we can come home. It is totally different proposition.

Those are the two statements that are constantly repeated. What the motivation is from General de Gaulle's attitude is very hard for me to answer.

Senator **SYMINGTON**. What do you think?

Mr. **LODGE**. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **SYMINGTON**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Beall.

Senator **BEALL**. I have no questions.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Gore.

NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH

Senator **GORE**. Mr. Lodge, I have listened with interest to your testimony this morning and thank you for coming. If I properly assess your view, it is as follows, and I would like for you to check me as to whether I am right or wrong or how I vary. It is your view that we should persist with variations of present policy and such innovations as are possible until by military action, economic aid, political indoctrination we achieve a negotiating position, a position from which we could enter negotiation.

Would that be a reasonably correct statement?

Mr. **LODGE**. Yes. I would like us to help get Vietnam strong enough so that it could have a conference without fear of entering it as sort of a whipped dog. I would. I am not afraid of a conference under the right circumstances.

Senator **GORE**. But as I gathered from your answer to Senator Morse and other statements you have made, you do not think that the situation there now as such would permit of negotiation?

Mr. **LODGE**. Not now. I do, that is right. I think this is not the time. I think this is not the time.

NEUTRALIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator **GORE**. Now what would be your view as to the objectives of negotiation should this stature and status be attained?

Mr. **LODGE**. I think the first objective ought to be the neutralization of North Vietnam; that is, the detachment. North Vietnam ought to cease to be a satellite of Communist China, and it ought to become sort of an Asian Yugoslavia, that kind of thing. Once you do that, then I think one could consider the question of a unified Vietnam as an independent state. But certainly you couldn't hope to have an independent state as long as North Vietnam is, in effect, a satellite of Communist China.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is South Vietnam a neutralist state according to treaty?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, it was legally. It has been neutralized. But the Geneva Accords, of course, have not been lived up to.

Senator GORE. You note so far as this morning is concerned, when you say the first objective should be the neutralization of North Vietnam——

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I believe that is so.

Senator GORE. This mystifies me a bit. How do you think we could achieve that by continuing, essentially continuing the present policy in South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I think if you are going into a conference on the proper basis, in the first place South Vietnam ought to be rid of this invasion and ought to be strong enough to enter as an equal. Then I think one of the things that would be brought up at the conference would be the neutralization of the north so that you could look for a state that was not the satellite of anybody and that was a really independent truly neutral state.

These are long-range objectives. I am not sure there is ever going to be such a conference, but you in a very interesting way have invited the speculation. That is the way I would speculate. You can't have a really independent Vietnam united as long as North Vietnam is as much under the thumb of Peking as it is.

Senator GORE. The reason I raised this question——

Mr. LODGE. And more so than it was Senator, if I may just finish the sentence, since the Sino-Soviet split, because for 10 years, since 1954, Ho Chi Minh has very cleverly been playing Moscow off against Peking. They say his heart is in Moscow and his stomach is in Peking. Now the Russians have pulled out. They have taken out their technicians from North Vietnam, and when the question of the nuclear test ban thing came along, which put him right on the spot, he, after great anguish, decided with China. So he is more of a satellite to Communist China now than he ever has been.

UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AS NEUTRAL STATE

Senator GORE. I ask these questions in order that I may profit as much as possible from your very useful experience out there and your valuable service. You no longer have experience there. You are a private citizen, but you were kind enough to come here and give us your experience. So as I gather, you want to continue with such innovations and variations as logic and circumstances will permit under present policy, until a status is attained from which South Vietnam can negotiate on an equal basis with North Vietnam. Then the first objective of such negotiation, once that position is attained, would be the neutralization of North Vietnam. Now, would it follow then that your ultimate aim is unification of Vietnam as a neutral state?

Mr. Lodge. Eventually, if North Vietnam were truly independent of Communist China, it is obvious that North and South Vietnam are a national unit. They are very much the same, they always have been in history. They are racially very much the same, and if it could be done without being a satellite of Communist China, and under the proper conditions, it could be very desirable as a long-range aim.

STAY IN VIETNAM FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES

Senator Gore. I have but one more question. There are many that I would love to ask.

Mr. Lodge. That is a very interesting subject.

Senator Gore. Thank you. Your answers are very interesting, too. Do you have in mind any possible time element—I am not speaking of number of months but in terms of years—do you have any particular time schedule in mind as to which of these objectives might be attained.

Mr. Lodge. That is always very hard.

Senator Gore. I am not trying to ask you to be specific at all. I am just wondering what your views are.

Mr. Lodge. I think our attitude ought to be that we are going to stay with this thing for as long as it takes, and the Communists ought to feel that about us. If they have an advantage over us, it is that they think we are impatient whereas they don't care how long the thing takes.

Well, I believe we ought to show that we don't care how long it takes either, and we ought to determine to stay with it, watch for the breaks, take advantage of the mistakes of others, and so on. Having said that, I believe that these measures which I have outlined, if persistently and effectively applied—and I think that they will be, because we have an American team and a Vietnamese team now that are aggressive and we have got something almost for the first time, something with really sharp focus and really concrete and limited instead of generalities—you might get the provinces around Saigon, which in my view are the key provinces, cleaned up in 2 years.

Now, if you got those cleaned up in 2 years; that is, Long Dun, Tra Vinh, Binh Son, and so forth, you would have broken the back of the snake. That doesn't mean there still isn't a lot of work to do, but it is mopping up work. As you know, mopping up work is just a much more cheerful occupation. Everybody feels better, but it is still troublesome. You have the situation down in Cau Mau Peninsula, the situation in Kank Ni and so on, but still you are mopping up.

So I would put it that way, that you might clean up these provinces right around Saigon in 2 years.

CHINA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I wish to violate my own injunction just for one other observation rather than a question. Should Red China achieve nuclear weapons, this would have or would possibly have a cataclysmic effect upon the whole Southeastern Asian situation, would it not?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think it would. That is why I advocate doing things now when we can do them.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Lodge**. I would like to express the hope that talk about a conference won't get out to the press, because nothing has a more demoralizing effect on the Vietnamese army. Now, you and I have talked about a conference at some remote date in the future under conditions that don't exist today. But if the word of a conference gets out, it has a very demoralizing effect on the army, so I would hope that could be kept within the room.

Senator **Gore**. It will so far as I am concerned.

Mr. **Lodge**. Thank you.

AN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE POLICY?

The **Chairman**. Senator Thurmond.

I must say our time is running short, but I would like to give everybody an opportunity that we can. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I agree with you that we ought to stay in South Vietnam, but I am not too sure what our staying there means. Are we going to win over there and leave the Communists out of South Vietnam and North Vietnam so we won't have any trouble, or are we going to just oppose Communist aggression?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think we are trying to get South Vietnam strong enough to stand on its own feet so we can go to the conference table as an equal, so that it can protect itself from being taken over by Communist aggression.

That is what I think we are trying to do.

Senator **Thurmond**. In other words, our policy then is a defensive policy of opposing Communist aggression rather than an attempt to clean out the Communists and the source of the trouble in North Vietnam so that there can be security and stability there?

Mr. **Lodge**. No, I don't think that is quite right. This is partly a political proposition and partly a military proposition. The way you know you have won in South Vietnam is when there aren't any more Vietcong.

Now, the way you create a situation in which there aren't any more Vietcong is that they are killed if they continue to be there. That is one way. The other way is because life has become so pleasant on the farm and it has been made so nice with the rice, fish, pigs, the coconuts, production, and everything else that the Vietcong decide, "Hell, I would rather sit down and be a part of them."

This is what happened in Malaya, and that is what happened in the Philippines, and you have done away with the Vietcong that way. Well now, one of these is done by the military, that is scaring him into thinking he will be killed if he keeps on. The other is done on a political-economic-social basis.

So it isn't like Korea, it isn't like World War II. The military is an indispensable phase, but it is only one phase.

IS IT WORTHWHILE TO NEGOTIATE?

Senator **Thurmond**. I am just wondering how much longer we are going to be in there and whether we are going to spend hundreds of millions of dollars and then bring about a neutralist state which will go Communist, and we will have spent all that money and will have gained nothing.

Mr. **Lodge**. I hope not.

Senator **Thurmond**. Nothing for the free world. Suppose you go to a conference and negotiate. Do you think the Communists are going to keep their word?

Mr. **Lodge**. No, I do not.

Senator **Thurmond**. Then what is worthwhile to negotiate?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think if you could detach North Vietnam from Communist China, make it an oriental Yugoslavia, I think it is conceivable that the north and the south could reach agreement, the understanding being with the United States right there on call in case of need, that could work out. But from the experience I have had in dealing with the Communists, which is more than 8 years, I don't believe in any agreement which you can't watch the endorsement of and that you can't check on yourself.

But I think you can make some agreements that you do check on that are quite practical.

PRESSURE ON THE NORTH

Senator **Thurmond**. Don't you think if we are going to free Vietnam of the Communists, that you have got to go into the North Vietnam to do it, to clean the country out of communism and not just defend and not just oppose Communist aggression, because it is going to still be there, even if you clean them out of South Vietnam completely, you have still got the source of your trouble in North Vietnam? And, of course, as you say, maybe that assistance is supported by China.

How can you ever win victory over communism over there and how is this country ever going to be free from communism until it is cleaned out completely of communism?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think you have got to. I agree you have got to put very effective pressure on the north. I think it can be done. I believe there is a lot to be said for retaliation against the north every time that they commit some brutal action against their own people.

I think that is part of it. I agree. It is partly a military thing, partly a political thing, and you have got to do both.

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF CHINA

Senator **Thurmond**. Are we scheduled to have a confrontation with Red China in the next few months, and if China backs down on the condition that we accept them into the United States and we recognize them diplomatically and so forth, is there any such attempt as that to solve this problem?

Mr. **Lodge**. I haven't heard of that. Recognition of Red China, the admission of Red China to the United Nations—to both of which I am opposed, incidentally—are matters that didn't come before me in the job I was in.

Senator **Thurmond**. You still oppose the recognition of Red China?

Mr. **Lodge**. Oh, yes.

Senator THURMOND. And you would continue to oppose their recognition?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

PULL OUT OR CLEAN THEM OUT

Senator THURMOND. I think it is worth a lot of thought, and some people feel like we ought to pull out entirely.

Mr. LODGE. Pull out of Vietnam?

Senator THURMOND. Pull out entirely.

Senator Morse, I believe is of that opinion, and a good many people feel that way, because they feel we are not winning and that we are not going to win, we are just defending. We are saying we oppose Communist aggression. We don't say we oppose communism. We say we oppose Communist aggression, and as long as we just defend, it is just like it was in Korea. We defend and we are still there, and we are going to be in Vietnam the same way if we follow this same policy.

Mr. LODGE. I agree with you we ought to put pressure on the north, and there are all kinds of pressures that can be put on short of war.

Senator THURMOND. Why not adopt a firm policy over there of cleaning the Communists out of South Vietnam and cleaning them out of North Vietnam, too, and rid the country of the entire snake of communism, so to speak, so that they can really be free? What is negotiation worth at the table when the Communists don't keep their word?

Mr. LODGE. I think that could be effective. I don't think you want to tell everybody what you are going to do. I think you want to keep them guessing somewhat. You know as a military man yourself, surprise is a very important part of warfare.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions?

DETACH INDOCHINA FROM CHINA

Senator CASE. Just two questions, Mr. Ambassador, if I may.

[Hans] Morgenthau has expressed the view that our policies should be more specifically aimed at detaching Indochina from China, that we should attempt consciously and obviously and clearly to draw the line above Indochina that would prevent the Chinese—try to get them to be antagonistic to Red China, and on our side, whether presently Vietcong, Viet Minh, or anything else. I take it from what you are talking about, that so far as you think this is possible to be done, and it is possible to work toward this general objective, this is in a sense our objective, but that you would go no further, I take it, in the direction that he is talking about. It is very hard for me to read these various experts and find out what exactly they do in an operational way.

But have you any comment on this position of his, which must have come to your attention?

Mr. LODGE. I think it is highly desirable for our diplomacy to do whatever it can do to try to detach North Vietnam from Communist China. As I said to Senator Gore and Senator Thurmond both, I think that is a very constructive thing toward which we should work.

Senator **Case**. As far as it is possible to be done or operationally, we are working in that direction?

Mr. **Lodge**. Our diplomacy ought always to be trying to accomplish something. Now, there will be days when they aren't very successful, but we ought to always be working in certain directions, and that is one direction in which I think we should work.

SINGLE CONTROL OF AMERICAN OPERATIONS

Senator **Case**. The only other question is one about operations. When Roger Hilsman,[2] who worked for the State Department one of the points he made to us was the absolute essentiality of having single control of the American operations in this part of the world. I had the impression that you were the guy who was doing this and that you had control of not only AID operations but the political side that you ran yourself, the mission, and always the military in a broad sense. Something you said here before made me have some question about whether the military was not still operating on its own. I wish you would make any comment, first, on the desirability of a single strong control, and second, whether it is in effect.

Mr. **Lodge**. During the time that I was Ambassador, the military assistance command was not under the Ambassador. For ceremonial purposes, of course, the Ambassador was ranked No. 1 as the representative of the President. The military assistance commander had the right of independent access to the Chief of State.

The other agencies; that is, USOM, USIS, and CAS, were under the Ambassador. That is the paper of it. As a practical matter, I had a good personal relationship and we got along all right. But that is how it was.

SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE

Senator **Case**. Do you have any comment as to the desirability of any further concentration?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think you have got to have one head. All through our history, you go back to the time when Benjamin Franklin and John Adams and Rush were in Paris and you remember how [Benjamin] Rush left the war, in St. Petersburg in 1917 there were three, maybe four people who could speak for Woodrow Wilson. We always have a national tendency to be represented by a lot of people abroad, and of course it is almost an invitation of the government concerned to play one off against the other. It is almost impossible for them not to.

I think we should speak with one voice. I think when the military commander or the economic aid chief, whoever it is, sees the Chief of State, that he ought to tell the Ambassador what he is going to say, why he is going. When he gets through, he ought to tell the Ambassador what was said, because the Ambassador is held responsible for the overall attitude of the Chief of State, and so he ought to know what he is being told by Americans and what he is telling Americans. To me that is absolutely fundamental.

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[2] Former Director of Intelligence and Research.

Just before I left, I set up an organization to handle these three difficult provinces, with General Westmoreland as the executive manager under me. Then under him came the economic aid and the propaganda thing and all that, because you can't get anything done in life unless somebody is giving orders to somebody else.

I think in these difficult countries where things are under pressure and you have to make a lot of hairline decisions and it is moving fast, you can't have a lot of sort of semiautonomous potentates.

Senator CASE. Is this being handled as well as it should be?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I think it is. I think that General Taylor—and, mind you, I have no complaint to make. I worked it out on a human commonsense basis, but I think it is going to be still further clarified for General Taylor, and I think it should be.

GENERAL TAYLOR AS AMBASSADOR

Senator CASE. One of the things Hillsman thought, just speculating that a military man might be the best man to have in the top spot for this very reason that the military was most difficult to get into a unified military operation, and there might be more confidence. This was not said in——

Mr. LODGE. I am strongly in favor of General Taylor as Ambassador to Vietnam, but not because he is a military man. The thing you need—you need two things in Vietnam. You need the development of the military, which we have placed an enormous emphasis on. You need an equal emphasis on the civil-political, which we have placed very little emphasis on. That is the glue that is going to hold the whole thing together.

This scheme that I outlined, not only is it a good counterterrorist scheme, but it is the basis of creating a healthy political life in an oriental country that has never had any. You do the country a tremendous amount of good if you create a healthy energetic political life, and that we haven't done as much of.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just a comment. A man by the name of Aragne, the Shakespeare of the Hungarian people, wrote a lengthy epic poem on King Buddha. King Buddha decided to divide his throne with his son, and King Buddha had an advisor by the name of Detrich, and Detrich said to Buddha, "You are making a mistake, King. You are placing the country under two heads. When the Lord created man, he didn't give him two heads but only one. When the crane leads the cranes in the sky, it is one that does the leading. And have you ever heard of a horseman leading a horse that allowed two persons to hold the reins?"

I think there is great wisdom in that.

Now a question. Do you imply by the development of this new plan which you outlined this morning that what was done in the past did not work efficiently and successfully?

Mr. LODGE. No. I think a great deal has been accomplished in the past. I think under General Harkins a fine organization was built with Americans all over the country in positions of advisor and so on. I think they got in the materiel. They got the economic operation started. I think there has been some trial and error.

Senator **Lausche**. And you think this will improve it?

Mr. **Lodge**. Yes, I think this gets the thing concrete, in sharp focus, specific.

OPPOSITION TO A GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator **Lausche**. Mention was made about going to the 14-nation Geneva conference. Did you at any time with members of the State Department decide that it was inadvisable to go to the 14-nation conference because we did not have enough friends as members of that conference?

Mr. **Lodge**. I have been consistently opposed to going to a 14-nation Geneva conference on Cambodia, or Laos, and on Vietnam during this last year.

I have been opposed to it. The fact that I was opposed to it last year doesn't mean that 5 years from now I won't think differently, but in the light of the circumstances that existed I was opposed to it.

Senator **Lausche**. My question is, Did you ever discuss the inadvisability of going to the Geneva conference 14-nation body because we had hostile members there? There is Red China, North Vietnam, Laos doubtful, India doubtful, Poland against us, the U.S.S.R. against us. Did you ever try to evaluate how these people would vote in the event we went there?

Mr. **Lodge**. I did.

Senator **Lausche**. What did you conclude.

Mr. **Lodge**. I concluded that they would be against us, and I would add that the French Government makes it very clear that they would be against us.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, that is right.

Now then, with respect to SEATO, that is an organization in which there must be unanimity of judgment before they can act.

Mr. **Lodge**. That is right.

Senator **Lausche**. And France is a member of SEATO, and thus we can't go to that body.

Mr. **Lodge**. That was made very clear, Senator, at Manila, at the SEATO meeting in Manila.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator **Lausche**. With respect to the United Nations, does there abide with you any feeling of doubt about going to the United Nations since it has reached a membership of 120 and the balance has so completely changed from what it was in 1945?

Mr. **Lodge**. I have no objection to going to the United Nations for certain specific things such as the Cambodian border, for instance. If you could get real United Nations inspection of the Cambodian border, that would be a constructive thing. But the Cambodians themselves won't agree to it. As far as the overall question of getting Vietnam prepared to defend itself is concerned, of course I wouldn't turn that over to the United Nations. We are providing the advice. We are providing the materiel. There is no earthly reason why we should introduce the Russians and the Czechs and so on into the question of how we dispense our advice.

FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE

Senator LAUSCHE. Just two more questions. On what theory do you interpret our presence in South Vietnam to be legal and within international law?

Mr. LODGE. First, let me say I am not a lawyer and you could get a better opinion on this from the State Department than I can give you. But we are, as I understand it, invited in by the Government of Vietnam, which was neutralized by the Geneva Accords of 1954, and whose neutrality has been flagrantly violated. It seems to me, without going into petty legalisms, that certainly on grounds of fair play and justice we are doing the right thing.

COPING WITH THE GUERRILLAS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, this final question. Has there ever been any doubt in your mind about the ability of an existing government with its military forces to be able to cope with guerrillas in areas such as you have in Laos and in South Vietnam, with jungles and dense forests and so forth?

Mr. LODGE. Senator, that is one of the most fundamental things about the modern world. You have a type of fighter who is just as distinct in characteristic as a cavalryman, an infantryman or an aviator, and that is the terrorist. The terrorist is a new kind of fighter and he has to be met with an entirely different kind of organization. The type of infantry division, armored divisions that we had in World War II or in Korea, as it is constituted and with its doctrines, is totally incapable of contending with the terrorists.

The terrorist can be contended with. He can be defeated. But to do it you have to organize the entire civilian population with the help of the police, with the military in the background to be on call, so as to get a net with a very fine mesh, and to go through the thing with a fine-tooth comb and get the Communists out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. It took Britain 10 years to clean up——

Mr. LODGE. Twelve years.

Senator LAUSCHE. Twelve years in Malaya.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smathers said he had no questions.

Senator SMATHERS. Senator Mansfield asked me to ask two questions for him. He had to leave. Are you ready for me, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Senator SMATHERS. I may not have another opportunity.

I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here and commend you for a fine job out in Vietnam.

ENCOURAGING INDICATIONS IN VIETNAM

The questions Senator Mansfield asks are these:

Mr. Ambassador, the press reports of yesterday stated that conditions are better now than they were 10 months ago. Is that a correct statement of your view?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think the condition is better now than it was 10 months ago, because 10 months ago the government was obviously entering its terminal phase and everything was in a state of paralysis, and had it gone on I think you might have had a Communist takeover. Now at least, while we have lots of problems, we are not out of the woods, no clearly discernible favorable trend has yet been established, we have an able man running the government and there are some encouraging subsurface indications and we have got some very promising programs underway. I wouldn't put it any stronger than that, but I go that far.

Senator **Smathers**. Let me ask the second question. Senator Mansfield has three.

WHAT IS OUR POLICY IN VIETNAM?

What is our policy in Vietnam?

I think that you have already frankly covered that, so I will skip that one. Then he asks, Is it to furnish military and economic aid to Vietnam to stop aggression from the north?

Presumably you have said "Yes." You have said it is a military program, a social program, an aid program, and several others.

Mr. **Lodge**. Yes.

Senator **Lausche**. Let him answer that question.

Mr. **Lodge**. The broad policy, to help the Republic of Vietnam to achieve and maintain its independence. That is, I guess, the official broad policy. Now, to do that you have to move ahead on the military and the civil-political at the same time and to the same degree.

The best thing that has been said about Vietnam I think was said in 1954 by Bedell Smith, whom you all remember well, at Geneva, when the French Prime Minister Georges Bidault said he was going to fire General [Henri] Navarre because General Navarre had been defeated in Dien Bien Phu. Bedell Smith said any second-rate general should be able to win in Indochina if you have the proper political atmosphere. It is that simple. If you have the proper atmosphere, the terrorist is out of business.

Senator **Smathers**. This other question, the last one, Is that a new policy or a continuation of an old policy?

Mr. **Lodge**. The policy to help the Republic of Vietnam achieve and maintain its independence is the policy we have had ever since 1954, to the best of my knowledge.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, we have General Taylor waiting. I didn't realize we would have such attendance. Yesterday we had four. Today you can see what we have, and I have run overtime. I don't want to cut anybody off. Senator Church, do you have a question, a quick one?

We have got to get to General Taylor because he has got to leave.

PERFORMANCE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT

Senator **Church**. Yes. First of all, Mr. Ambassador, let me say that we are all indebted to you for having undertaken a very hard choice.

Mr. **Lodge**. Thank you.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I may add that he drew a much bigger attendance than I expected this morning by a long shot.

Mr. **LODGE**. Thank you very much.

Senator **CHURCH**. Two things you have said that struck me as being particularly important. One, that the Diem government was about to fall, and the country might well have fallen into Communist hands at the time you went out. That is important to me personally because I sponsored a resolution in the Senate last year directed toward trying to force performance by that government.

Mr. **LODGE**. I remember it well, and it was extremely useful to me.

AMERICAN OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator **CHURCH**. The second thing you said is that this is essentially a political war, which I think we must not lose sight of. In that connection, do you believe that it would be advisable for American officers to take actual command of the South Vietnamese units in the field?

Mr. **LODGE**. Well now, you have got to make up your mind whether you want to be colonial or not. Obviously in terms of efficiency, there are certain advantages in being able to get in and give orders, but I believe that you lose much more psychologically. I think you arouse the latent xenophobia which is there.

I think they tend to just stop trying and lay it all onto you. I think the tendency is to blame you for everything that goes wrong. My effort has been right along to make them feel we were depending on them, we were looking to them. I never tried to foist anything on them. I waited to have them ask for it, and it is surprising how often they have asked for it, when they would have resented it if you had asked them to do it. When the time comes that Americans start taking command, then that is a brand new phase and a totally different phase and one which I don't think is promising.

Senator **CHURCH**. I agree.

Mr. **LODGE**. You could have a disappearance of all government. That could happen, and you might find yourself there with your U.S. forces in a country with no government. Then what do you do? You have got to be mentally mobile, but this is not a thing that you want to do unless you agree to it.

REBIRTH OF COLONIALISM

Senator **CHURCH**. As a matter of fact, if it were to come to that, isn't this really the kind of war we can't win for them? They have got to win it for themselves with all the help we can give them?

If we make it our war, won't it be regarded by other Asiatics as a rebirth of colonialism, if this becomes essentially an American military effort?

Mr. **LODGE**. I think there is no future in it. When I arrived many people said to me, "Now that you have come, everything is going to be all right." I said, "I am not the government and what is more I don't want to be, and this is a thing that you have got to work out yourself."

I can remember when I was in Cairo when the British Ambassador at that time in the 1940's sent a column of tanks into the palace, the King of Egypt's palace, to insist they do certain things, that they get rid of the Prime Minister. That is the kind of thing that used to be done. I don't see the United States doing things like that.

Senator CHURCH. I agree, and I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon, would you like to ask a question?

ROLE FOR BIG MINH

Senator CANNON. Mr. Ambassador, in visiting with a number of Arab military people who have returned from over there, there were certain suggestions that I gleaned from them. One of them was that Khanh give some responsibility to Big Minh and let him take a more active part. Do I take it from what you have said that he is doing that now?

Mr. LODGE. Yes. Khanh wanted him to, and Minh has sort of been sulking in his tent until just last week.

Senator CANNON. But he actually has started?

Mr. LODGE. Now he is out and around and handshaking and so on, which is a very valuable thing to do.

IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Senator CANNON. For their own military I am told that the living conditions are extremely bad. One is by reason of very low pay and second a lack of adequate medical facilities.

Is Khanh trying to do anything along this line?

Mr. LODGE. One of the first things Khanh did was to try to bring about an increase in the pay of the army in which the United States is helping, and also they are starting a housing program. There are 700 doctors in the whole country and 450 of them are in the army, and the rest are in Saigon.

God help you out on the farm if you have a tumor on the brain or something like that. You are just dead, that is all. So the army has better medical care than anybody else has, but they very much need doctors. A lot of them want to found a medical school, and they certainly could use one.

DEFOLIATION PROGRAMS

Senator CANNON. Another point that was made is that the attacks that are made into Vietcong areas are the aircraft and bombs to try to destroy the farming area. I am told that with much less effort and much more effect defoliation programs could be carried out in these areas. Is this a decision that has been determined, that it should not be done?

Mr. LODGE. We do a great deal of defoliation. We defoliate along on both sides of the roads, and in the delta, where most of the travel is by canals, along both sides of the canals. The purpose is to broaden it out so that you can't be ambushed so easily. We do that a great deal. One of the things I had to do was sign the order each time.

We also use this weedkiller on crops in the areas which are exclusively Vietcong areas, in order to destroy their food supply. I have signed some of those when I have had a written request from the Government of Vietnam to do it. I wouldn't do it otherwise, because it is a very serious thing to do. But, of course, there is no early reason to use atomic bombs to defoliate. We have been doing it for years with weedkiller.

Senator CANNON. I wasn't suggesting certainly the use of atomic bombs. I was suggesting that weedkiller. The story that I got was that in many instances they were attacking Vietcong areas with conventional bombs to destroy the farming area when it was not a very effective method.

Mr. LODGE. I quite agree with you, and we have to be very careful not to use our military force in a way that is self-defeating. The Vietcong gets in with the civilian population. If we start in our effort to get the Vietcong, we kill women and children, then we are defeating our own purpose, because our purpose is to get the people to adhere to the government.

VIETNAMESE AIR POWER

Senator CANNON. The only other point that I have, Senator Stennis touched on somewhat. I am told that there is a considerable difficulty, let's say, between the ground forces and the air forces over there, principally by reason of the air forces not being called on to do jobs that they could do. I am referring to the Vietnam air forces on which we have MAAG advisors.

Mr. LODGE. That they don't use air power enough?

Senator CANNON. That they don't use it because of this difficulty between air and ground forces. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. LODGE. I am just not able to testify on that.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

DISCOURAGING STATISTICS

Senator MUNDT. You made three statements which to me are sort of discouraging, and I want to relate them to you to see if I understood them correctly, because we live on optimism in the West and I would like to have some optimism in this picture.

Mr. LODGE. I like it too.

Senator MUNDT. First you said, and this is new to me, that the Communists have 10 percent of the population, 70 percent of them indifferent, and 20 percent are loyal to the government.

Mr. LODGE. This is in the delta.

Senator MUNDT. This is in the delta; what would the percentage be in the country of South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I don't know. Nobody has ever taken a census, you know. A Gallup poll has never been taken. This is the roughest kind of a rough guess.

Senator MUNDT. The statistics are discouraging at least wherever they are, when you have got only 20 percent of the people.

Mr. LODGE. This is in the strongest Vietcong country. This is really quite encouraging, because this is right down there in the strongest Vietcong country. You still have twice as many people who lean toward the government.

Senator MUNDT. This is in South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. Yes; it is south of the delta there. There is the Mekong Delta. It is below that, south of that, which is their strongest area. Yet our USOM people tell me that.

LACKING A SENTIMENT OF NATIONALISM

Senator MUNDT. Whatever kind of Gallup poll you made to arrive at those statistics there, what would you say the situation is in the rest of South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, it is hard to tell. You see, they haven't got a sentiment of nationalism. Many people out in the countryside, you ask them what they are, they don't say they are Vietnamese. They say they are Caodais, Hoa Haos, ethnic Cambodians. They are moving toward the creation of a national spirit. Under the colonial days, the colonial administrators used to try to foster these divisions and keep them apart. There has been a lot of unifying work done since 1954, but it isn't still anywhere near where we are.

Senator MUNDT. That is a long pull. This isn't a 2-year job or an 8-year job or a 10-year job to inculcate that attitude in the people.

Mr. LODGE. There has been progress made since 1954. In 10 years there has been a lot of progress, from everything I can gather. It is not hopeless but, of course, it isn't rapid. Supposing you had to start in this country creating a precinct organization all over it from the start. It would be quite a lot of work.

WEDGE BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. The second discouraging thing, if I understood you, you said that we were not going to get the job done in South Vietnam until we had driven some kind of an effective wedge between China and North Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I didn't mean to say that Senator. I said when, as, and if the time comes that you go to a conference—that is Senator Gore's question—certainly one of the things that you want to strive for is the detachment of North Vietnam from Communist China. I believe you can get South Vietnam on a strong footing without detaching North Vietnam from Communist China, but I think you should stop the direction of the war effort which comes out of Hanoi.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, and the question asked you on that, you said the answer to that was classified, but that there were some things that could be done.

Mr. LODGE. I think so, yes.

Senator MUNDT. You point out that the infiltration now is greater than when you went there.

Mr. LODGE. I think so. Everything I learned leads me to think that.

INCREASED EFFORT ON BOTH SIDES

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you two questions because those are very discouraging, whatever the facts are, and not encouraging. Is there any evidence that the Communists from outside of South Vietnam, wherever they come from, are increasing or decreasing their effort in South Vietnam, or is it just staying static?

Mr. LODGE. That the Communists are increasing their effort?

Senator **Mundt**. Yes, from the standpoint of the Communists from outside South Vietnam. I would take it since the infiltration is greater that they are increasing their effort to help the Communists in South Vietnam?

Mr. **Lodge**. I think there has been some increase on both sides. I think the Government of South Vietnam has stepped up its activities since General Khanh has been in power, and I think there has been some increase on the Communist side.

WITHDRAWING AMERICAN TROOPS

Senator **Mundt**. You were in Saigon, I believe, when Secretary McNamara was at this table telling us that they expected to get the American troops out by Christmas or some optimistic date he gave us.

What is the basis for that? What has changed since then to make it so much worse than was reported?

Mr. **Lodge**. I don't know, sir. I can't give you that.

Senator **Mundt**. I think he made that statement shortly after a trip to Vietnam.

Mr. **Lodge**. Maybe he did, but I have never either overtly or in my own mind fixed a date. I just can't see clearly enough.

Senator **Mundt**. Here it is. The statement says that McNamara and Taylor expressed October 25, 1963, the belief that:

> The major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel thereafter. They reported that by the end of this year the United States program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 United States military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn.

What has happened to so seriously deteriorate the situation since then when the Secretary of War, after a trip over there, told this committee those facts?

Senator **Humphrey**. What date was that?

The **Chairman**. Last year.

Senator **Mundt**. October 25, 1963, less than a year ago.

Mr. **Lodge**. I don't know the basis for that. I have told you what I think about time.

Senator **Mundt**. In all events it was a bad prediction, and in all events the infiltration is getting greater. The South Vietnam effort is getting greater, so the status quo is being continued with tougher guys on both sides.

Now, let me ask you this question. What do you think should be done differently?

STRENGTHENING PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON

Mr. **Lodge**. I described the system that has been agreed to for an effective counterterrorist organization in the country. I think that is what has to be done and it has got to be started in the provinces right around Saigon.

Senator **Mundt**. But that can't possibly succeed, can it, Cabot, until and unless we stop the infiltration? You can build up a stronger village unit, but if the Communists step up their effort they can still move in the force enough to decapitate the young men recruited by the government.

Mr. LODGE. I think we can be overwhelmingly strong in these three provinces around Saigon for instance. I think that we can unquestionably do. They can't hold anything, you know. They can go anywhere but they can't hold anything. They have never been able to do that.

Senator MUNDT. This ruckus they are kicking up is within about 10 or 15 miles of Saigon, isn't it?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes. You hear the gunfire every night. We used to hear the gunfire every night from where we lived.

Senator MUNDT. Don't you think there's something we have got to do in a military manner to toughen these defenses and to make it more——

Mr. LODGE. I think this counterterrorist organization that I speak of will be effective militarily. I think it will be constructive politically. I think the pressures that can be put on the external influence should be put, and I think that consistent application of those will bring victory. But you are not going to see anything quick and flashy.

RECRUITING A SEATO ARMY

Senator MUNDT. Do you believe if we were able to recruit a SEATO army—it would have to be mercenaries I presume, American mercenaries, a considerable number of seasoned troops to use as border patrols along Cambodia and elsewhere—we could decrease this infiltration, whether or not Cambodia let us move them within their boundary?

Mr. LODGE. I favor a really effective patrol of the Cambodian border and of the border with the Laos panhandle. I don't think you can look to SEATO for it, because France is a member of SEATO and France is opposed to what we are doing and would certainly veto it.

I would like to see the United Nations—as a matter of fact, when the Cambodians brought their complaint against Vietnam in the Security Council, a decision was made on the Cambodian border, but it involved sending three diplomats. You are not going to get much of a patrol of that border with three diplomats.

I quite agree with you. I think a really thoroughgoing patrol of that Cambodian border would be very fine, very constructive.

Senator MUNDT. If we stepped up the pay——

Mr. LODGE. Stepped up what?

Senator MUNDT [continuing]. Stepped up the pay of the army to make it a little bit more attractive, with American money, are the men available in South Vietnam that they could recruit into the army so they could get an army large enough to provide their own patrols?

Mr. LODGE. I think the army as it will be with the increase that has not been provided, as I recall it, is about as big as a country of that population can take, what with the paramilitary forces, the police, the self-defense corps, the civil guard, and all that. Of course, we have provided money for increasing the pay of the army, and the army is considerably better. Just last week they had two really very fine actions that were very good. And there has been recently—not enough to make a trend—there has been a change in the behavior of the Vietcong.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey.

FALL OF DIEM

Senator HUMPHREY. First, I want to say to you, Mr. Ambassador, and after that, Cabot, we are very proud with you and pleased with your good work. I have watched every report that I can get out of Vietnam, and I think you have performed an invaluable service for our country.

Second, I wanted to get your evaluation—maybe this has been answered in the discussion, and if it has, there is no need to reply further. You came when Diem was the President.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Then there was the group after the coup, and now there is Khanh.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you find the situation now in reference to Khanh better than it was under President Diem?

Mr. LODGE. When I arrived he was in his terminal phase, and things were in a very perilous state. I believe if it had gone on you might have had a Communist takeover. It was that bad. They were heading for assassination. Before I left Washington last summer, a very prominent Vietnamese said here, said to me, "If Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu don't leave the country, nothing can prevent their being assassinated."

It turned out to be exactly right. And so, of course, now, while the situation is far from ideal, and it is still dangerous, nevertheless you have got an able man at the head of the government, and you have got some really practical plans and people who understand them and some reason for hope in the future.

I wouldn't put it any stronger than that.

KHANH'S GOVERNMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you feel that Khanh is making any impact on the population? Is he gaining political support?

Mr. LODGE. Some. He is a professional soldier and a very bright one. When I got there last summer people spoke to me about him and said he was the cleverest specialist soldier in the country. He appreciates the importance of application. He works at it, and he has got a good clear mind, but he is not a national political leader.

He appreciates the importance of economics and finance and he studies that, but he is not a financier. The ideal way to get him organized is for other people to take these things so as to free him for the work classification. On that he is really quite brilliant. If you could hear him stand up in front of a map and talk about that which is his specialty, he is really very, very good.

Senator HUMPHREY. And has he been able to bring, in cooperation with our Government, better people into the government to meet some of these political and financial and economic needs?

Mr. LODGE. Yes. He has got a very good man on finance and economics. Of course, they haven't got politicians in that country in the sense that we mean it, because they haven't really got democratic institutions and never have had them. That is all in the future.

He needs a really sagacious politician on a lot of these divisive things that are there on the surface all the time to deal with them on a day-to-day basis. He gets in on them on a crash basis every now and then, which isn't fair or good, and those are very hard to find.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think it is advisable for our advisors to take a more firm position, almost to the point of sharing in the decisionmaking?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, not unless he asks you to. We don't want to become colonial. One of the most hopeful developments happened last week when he said he wanted twice a month to meet with us.

Senator HUMPHREY. At his request?

Mr. LODGE. At his request. I have been wanting that for a long time, but I don't want to foist it on him. Now it has come at his request. He has found that these meetings were so useful, helped him so much. I sit on one side with the four or five principal Americans. He is on the other side with his people, and he has linked it and it gives him a chance to blow off steam and tell us things that he wants to tell us, and of course we use it to tell things we want to tell him. I think that could be a real breakthrough in the relationship between the United States and Vietnam.

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IS POLITICAL

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. You mentioned here a while ago your views in reference to how an operation such as in Vietnam that is a critical area, highly explosive, how our diplomatic organization ought to be staffed and the type of power structure or command structure there ought to be.

You have made those recommendations through regular channels through the Government, is that correct?

Mr. LODGE. I think this is all being attended to now. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, these recommendations have been made and they are being attended to at the present time?

Mr. LODGE. I think there is substantial agreement that the principal objective here is political, the military is the principal aid to that objective, and that the Ambassador ought to be the Chairman of the United States Mission, and that other American officials should go to the Chief of State only through the Ambassador.

Senator HUMPHREY. My point was that these recommendations have found a receptive ground in the Department, is that correct?

Mr. LODGE. I think so. You had better ask General Taylor. My understanding is that this is all being taken care of in the instructions that he is getting, but I think you had better ask him about that.

CONTINUITY OF POLICY

Senator HUMPHREY. You said a while ago that you thought that since 1954, which is really the beginning of our assistance to Vietnam, there had been the development of some national spirit in South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you consider that the policy and the program that we are following in Vietman is essentially one of continuity since 1954?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I think broadly speaking ever since 1954 we have been trying to help this country to stand on its own feet, get strong enough to stand on its own feet. Broadly speaking, yes, I would say so.

Different methods have been used and there has been trial and error and all that, but I would say broadly speaking that is what the American effort has been.

COOPERATION FROM STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. In your role as Ambassador, Cabot, were you able to—I will put it directly. Did you get cooperation when you needed it?

Mr. LODGE. I have very good relations with the State Department.

Senator HUMPHREY. Military and Defense?

Mr. LODGE. And the Defense Department, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, you, being on the field there——

Mr. LODGE. I wanted a certain man in the press relations field. Well, they got that very man who was on duty in Paris, France, and brought him out there. I have had good relations with the executive branch.

GROUNDS FOR HOPE

Senator HUMPHREY. You feel that your efforts have produced some constructive results?

Mr. LODGE. That is not for me to say.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is your general view of it? I know that you went there at the most difficult time. It couldn't have been a more difficult time for a person to be assigned to this task. Do you feel that since then, after the assassination, going through three changes of government, that there are hopeful signs?

Mr. LODGE. I think there are grounds for hope. I don't think you can say that we are out of the woods. I think it is dangerous, but I think there are grounds for hope, and some pretty solid grounds for hope. I put it that way.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to say that I am for sticking it out. I want you to know that one Senator feels that way, and I appreciate very much the suggestions you have made. I have read a great deal about them and this matter of the balance between the military and the political-economic pressures and forces that need to be brought to bear, and I am hopeful that that formula will be followed. I think it will yield results.

Thank you.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We are very pleased. I am sorry we kept you so long.

Mr. **Lodge**. I am very much flattered.

The **Chairman**. We had 20 Members here. Yesterday we had two or three, and I had no idea you would attract such an audience.

Mr. **Lodge**. I am very pleased and very flattered. It has been a very interesting morning for me.

The **Chairman**. We kave kept General Taylor waiting. Now, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee stay here. Don't you run off. We will excuse everybody else, but we have got to have General Taylor.

AMERICAN CAPTIVES OF THE VIETCONG

Senator **Lausche**. Maybe I ought to ask this question. I have a letter stating that seven soliders were captured by the Vietcong and our American troops wanted to go in and liberate them and they were stopped. Are there seven of them that have been taken?

Mr. **Lodge**. There are and we are out there every day. That is at the top of the list. We have agents. We have nets of agents. We have tried rescue strikes. We will continue to try it until we get them. We have seen them at various times and once we almost got them and they got across this big river, but it is a thing that the American command out there is very, very mindful of.

I have many letters on those and, of course, I have answered them all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Humphrey**. Good to have you safe and sound.

[Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, nominated to be Ambassador to Vietnam, appeared and testified before the committee. He was followed by Samuel Gilstrap, nominated to be Ambassador to Malawi.

[On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of General Taylor to be Ambassador to Vietnam and Samuel Gilstrap to be Ambassador to Malawi. The committee also approved the nomination of U. Alexis Johnson to be Career Ambassador.]

[The committee then adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Long, Lausche, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (H.R. 11380) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: David E. Bell, Administrator, AID.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (H.R. 11380) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

On motion by Senator Lausche to report the bill favorably to the Senate, the roll was called, and the Senators answered to their names, as follows:

Yeas: Senator Sparkman (by proxy);
Senator Humphrey (by proxy);
Senator Mansfield (by proxy);
Senator Lausche;
Senator Church;
Senator Dodd (by proxy);
Senator Smathers (by proxy);
Senator Hickenlooper;
Senator Aiken;
Senator Carlson (by proxy);
Senator Mundt (by proxy); and the chairman.

Nays:
Senator Morse; and Long (by proxy);

On poll, Mr. Gore was recorded in the affirmative and Mr. Williams in the negative.

So the bill was reported, 13 to 3, with Senator Symington abstaining.

Senators Morse, Lausche, and Mundt were given time to file individual views.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 3:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Humphrey.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of Mercer Cook, to be Ambassador to Senegal; Randolph A. Kidder, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia; Robert J. Ryan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Niger; Franklin H. Williams, to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council; and Clinton E. Knox, to be Ambassador to Dahomey.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee also approved for report the nominations of Frank Stanton and Dorothy Chandler, to be members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee approved for report an original resolution authorizing the Senate to send a delegation of observers to the next meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Kingston, Jamaica.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee acceded to a request of the President to return certain tax treaties with India, Israel, and the United Arab Republic, and approved for report a resolution accomplishing same.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, and without objection, the committee approved for report taxation treaties with Japan, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

The bill (S. 1917) to provide authority to protect heads of foreign states and other designated officials, was approved for report, as amended in a like bill in the House of Representatives, by unanimous consent.

The bill (S. 260) to authorize the construction, maintenance, and operation of certain toll bridges across the Rio Grande, was passed over without prejudice.

Mr. Holt of the staff reported that the staff, in accordance with the direction of the committee, had investigated the practicability of preparing omnibus legislation which would lay down certain standards for the approval the construction of international bridges, and had concluded that the redtape involved in formulating and passing such a bill was greater in the sum than the difficulty of passing individual bridge bills.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and without objection, the committee approved for report the bill (S. 2905) to provide for the appointment of a Commissioner General for the United States participation in the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition.

The committee approved for report the bill (H.R. 11754) to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, without objection.

The committee also approved for report the bill (H.R. 7419) to authorize the conclusion of agreements with Mexico for the joint construction, operation, and maintenance of flood control works on the lower Colorado River, in accordance with the provisions of the Article 13 of the 1944 Water Treaty with Mexico.

The committee suspended the rule of 6 days in regard to the nomination of Cecil Burton Lyon, to be Ambassador to Ceylon, and on motion of Senator Hickenlooper, and without objection, approved the nomination for report.

The committee then considered the bill (S. 260) to authorize the construction, maintenance, and operation of certain toll bridges across the Rio Grande. In passing, the committee discussed proposed provisions of a proposed general bridge bill affecting the construction, operation, and liquidation of all international bridges, without any conclusion for a report. The bill (S. 260) was then put aside for further consideration.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1964

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

William J. Crockett, nominated for promotion to Class of Career Minister, testified before the committee.

Senator Morse raised certain questions concerning the nomination of James L. Greenfield to be Assistant Secretary of State.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Charles W. Yost to be a Career Ambassador.

Senator Sparkman then moved the favorable report of the nominations of Lucius D. Battle, Wymberley DeR. Coerr, William J. Crockett, Armin H. Meyer, George A. Morgan, and William J. Porter as Career Ministers. The chairman noted that the nomination of Murat W. Williams as Career Minister had been withdrawn on June 16, 1964. Senator Sparkman's motion then carried without objection.

Senator Hickenlooper gave notice he desired to raise the advisability of the appointments of Career Ambassadors and Career Ministers at the next Congress.

On motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for report the bill (S. 3074) to give the consent of Congress to the construction of certain international bridges, and submitted a report thereon.

The committee discussed correspondence to be undertaken by the chairman in regard to the proposed Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee favorably reported the bill (S. 284) for the relief of Ethel R. Loop, widow of Carl R. Loop.

All other business on the agenda was put over and the witnesses excused.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcripts.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:10 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Harry C. McPherson, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs.

Senator Lausche called for the production of certain information on all nominations on the routine list of FSO promotions and appointments before the committee.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and on voice vote, the committee tabled the bill (S. 2521) to consent to an agreement between the State of Minnesota and the Province of Manitoba, Canada, providing for an access highway into the northwest angle in the State of Minnesota, et cetera.

On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and by voice vote, the committee tabled the bill (H.R. 491) vesting in the American Battle Monuments Commission the care and maintenance of the original Iwo Jima Memorial on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands.

The committee approved for report, without objection, the supplementary convention to the extradition convention of October 26, 1901, and the supplementary convention of June 20, 1935, between the United States and Belgium (Ex. C 88/2).

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:25 a.m.]

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION[1]

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On August 2, while conducting electronic surveillance of North Vietnam, the American destroyer *Maddox* was attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats. President Johnson sent the destroyer *C. Turner Joy* to support the *Maddox* in its continuing operations. On the night of August 4, in poor weather conditions, the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* reported radar soundings of enemy warships, although there was no evidence that the American ships had been fired upon. Believing that an attack had occurred, President Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes against the North Vietnamese.

[The President also called upon Congress for a resolution authorizing him to take all necessary measures to repel enemy attacks on U.S. forces and to prevent aggression. This resolution, drafted before the Gulf of Tonkin incidents had taken place, was modeled after the Formosa Resolution of 1955, the Middle East Resolution of 1957, and the Cuba Resolution of 1962. During the brief debate in the Senate, defenders of the resolution denied that it was a declaration of war. On August 7, the Senate passed S.J. Res. 189 by a vote of 88 to 2 (with Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voting in the negative). That same day the House passed the identical H.J. Res. 1145 unanimously. President Johnson signed it as Public Law 88-408.

[In later years, Senators objected to President Johnson's expansive definition of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and raised questions whether an attack had taken place as described, or at all. In 1970 Congress repealed the resolution.]

THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present, Committee on Armed Services: Chairman Russell and Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Byrd of West Virginia, Young, Inouye, Saltonstall, Smith, and Case.

Present, Committee on Foreign Relations: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Cooper.

[This hearing was published in 1964 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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[1] See app. A.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE [P. 5]

Secretary RUSK. In Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 have been consistently violated by Hanoi and in May of this year the situation took on a more critical character when a Communist military offensive drove neutralist forces from the area of the Plaines de Jarres they had held in 1962. Our responses to these events, including the provision of additional T-28's to the Government of Laos and the carrying out of reconnaissance flights, with the incidents resulting therefrom, are well known to you.

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STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [P. 7]

Secretary McNAMARA. Torpedoes were launched, automatic weapons fire was directed against the vessels. They returned the fire. Aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* and by this time the *Constellation* which had been brought down from Hong Kong to support the *Ticonderoga,* were sent over the vessels and returned the patrol boat's fire.

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ROLE OF RED CHINA [P. 12]

Secretary RUSK. It is our impression that the Chinese would give at least very strong political and public support to the North Vietnamese in this situation. We just frankly do not know whether they will translate that into action of any sort. It is our impression, and there is some reason for it, that the Soviet Union is not closely associating itself with this action in North Vietnam. Their representative in the Security Council yesterday had not had full information. He had not had instructions. That suggests that perhaps the government is not in the most immediate and closest touch with the other two governments concerned here, and the Soviet statements seemed to indicate considerable caution and expressing a hope that this matter will not escalate.

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[P. 12]

Secretary McNAMARA. They were off the two carriers, the carriers at the time of launch were not in the position shown on the map: the *Constellation,* having come down from Hong Kong shortly before, was not in, as far south as is shown there.

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U.S. ACTION OPPOSED [P. 13]

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, my views are pretty well known. I am unalterably opposed to this course of action which, in my judgment, is an aggressive course of action on the part of the United States. I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated.

I think our whole course of action of aid to South Vietnam satisfies the world that those boats didn't act in a vacuum as far as the United States was concerned. We knew those boats were going up there, and that naval action was a clear act of aggression against the territory of North Vietnam, and our ships were in Tonkin Bay, in international waters, but nevertheless they were in Tonkin Bay to be interpreted as standing as a cover for naval operations of South Vietnam.

I think what happened is that Khanh got us to backstop him in open aggression against the territorial integrity of North Vietnam. I have listened to briefing after briefing and there isn't a scintilla of evidence in any briefing yet that North Vietnam engaged in any military aggression against South Vietnam either with its ground troops or its navy.

Sure, there was all the vicious infiltration of Communist technique, but the first act of open territorial aggression by way of military operation was South Vietnam naval boats against two North Vietnam islands with American naval vessels conveniently standing by as a backstop.

I don't think we ought to have been sucked into that kind of an operation. I shall vote against the resolution.

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NO RELATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS [P. 14]

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to cover three points. First, our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any. I want to make that very clear to you. The *Maddox* was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times. It was not informed of, was not aware, had no evidence of, and so far as I know today has no knowledge of, any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands that Senator Morse referred to.

I think it is extremely important that you understand this. If there is any misunderstanding on that we should discuss this point at some length.

Senator MORSE. I think we should.

Secretary McNAMARA. I say this flatly; this is the fact.

Senator MORSE. What was your testimony the other day, Mr. Secretary, on the record as to where American naval ships were in Tonkin Bay at the time the attack was made on the two islands?

Secretary McNAMARA. I testified the other day that the American vessels were, or the American vessel was—it was the *Maddox* at that time—was operating on a southerly course in routine patrol in international waters in this area, and that vessel had absolutely no knowledge of any actions of any kind by the South Vietnamese, in South Vietnam or outside of South Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. Didn't you, as Secretary of Defense, have knowledge that the attack on the island was going to be made?

Secretary **McNamara**. I did not have knowledge at the time of the attack on the island.

Let me just make one point. There is no connection between this patrol and any action by South Vietnam.

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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REGULAR TROOPS AND INFILTRATORS [P. 15]

Senator **Morse**. I am not going to go over it again—I covered it, in my judgment—other than saying that a colossal mistake was made when we backstopped this open naval attack of South Vietnam on two islands of 3 to 5, 6 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. That is where I think we got ourselves clearly implicated and South Vietnam got herself implicated in an aggressive attack on the territorial integrity of North Vietnam.

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SCOPE OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION [P. 16]

Secretary **McNamara**. In the first 7 months of this year, they have searched 149,000 junks, some 570,000 people. This is a tremendous operation endeavoring to close the sea coasts of over 800 miles. In the process of that action, as the junk patrol has increased in strength they have moved further and further north endeavoring to find the source of the infiltration.

As part of that, as I reported to you earlier this week, we understand that the South Vietnamese sea force carried out patrol action around these islands and actually shelled the points they felt were associated with this infiltration. Our ships had absolutely no knowledge of it, were not connected with it; in no sense of the word can we be considered to have backstopped the effort.

Senator **Morse**. And when you acknowledge that this kind of an operation was going to take place, naval operation, you joined escalating the war into North Vietnam in spite of our oft-repeated statements we are going to try to avoid it. We didn't avoid it.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Mr. Secretary, we had no advisers aboard any of those junks?

Secretary **McNamara**. To the best of my knowledge—we had none aboard any of the junks going north or vessels going north of the 17th parallel. I don't believe we have any advisers aboard any of the junks south of the 17th parallel.

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COMMUNIST ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS [P. 17]

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Secretary, do our preparations take into consideration the possibility of war with Red China?

Secretary **McNamara**. We have contingency plans, Senator Aiken, which take account of that. We have forces either moved into position or alerted for movement that also take account of that.

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Senator **Aiken**. May I add, she asked if they had knowledge of the South Vietnamese attacks that were made on North Vietnamese islands. Don't the South Vietnamese keep your forces informed as to their plans?

Secretary McNamara. Well, the destroyers, as I said, had no knowledge of it, and I had no knowledge at the time or the exact character of the attacks.

Senator Aiken. Did our Embassy know that the South Vietnamese were going to attack?

Secretary McNamara. Our Embassy is aware of the efforts of the South Vietnamese to prevent infiltration, and to attack the sources of infiltration when it is possible for them to do so and I assume they had knowledge of the exact time the attack was to take place.

Senator Aiken. I see.

That is all.

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U.S. ATTACK A SURPRISE [P. 18]

Chairman Fulbright. Senator Jackson.

Senator Jackson. Secretary Rusk, could you enlarge—I am sorry I was not present earlier when you made your statement—on the position of the Soviets in all of this, based on their statements and the best view of our Kremlinologists as to their position?

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire will this record be published as it stands or will we get a chance——

Chairman Fulbright. This is an executive record. It will not be published at all without the approval of the committees and, if then, it will be sanitized.

Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Because there were certain things I would like to say briefly on that I shouldn't say in public.

Senator Morse. You can go off the record on that.

Senator Jackson. As long as the record is kept top secret.

Chairman Fulbright. This is a secret record.

Senator Jackson. It ought to be top secret.

Secretary Rusk. Looking first at the Russian general attitude toward Southeast Asia, they still are committed to the deliberate notion that, they are committed to the general idea of no ideological coexistence. This breaks up, however, in three different parts in Southeast Asia. They are competing in Cambodia for influence with Prince Sihanouk. When the U.N. Commission which has just come back recommended that U.N. observers be put along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam to try to stabilize that border and prevent its violation either by the VietCong or by the South Vietnamese who might be chasing the VietCong, there is indication that the Soviet Union is going to oppose that because they opposed it not only as a matter of U.N. peacekeeping activities but because Prince Sihanouk has been grumbling about this proposal.

In the case of Laos, they have made a very flat commitment to the United States with respect to the Geneva Accords of 1962. We have some evidence that they have been trying to give those accords substantially more support than have Hanoi and Peking. Their influence in the area, however, has changed rather rapidly since 1962, and our present feeling is that the Soviet Union would like to pull out of that responsibility as cochairman, but we are trying to keep them right in there in that picture, and to try maintain a division between themselves and Peking.

I would have to report that as far as South Vietnam is concerned, they have been in their public attitudes and propaganda supporting the line of Hanoi and Peking on South Vietnam.

In general I would say that the Soviet Union appears not to wish to have a major affair with the United States over Southeast Asia. There is some reason to think they are not very keen about the extension of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, they remain a Communist country, and we cannot yet say that if there is a direct confrontation between either Moscow or Peking and ourselves that the other would necessarily fail to give support of some sort.

All the evidence we have now and we have considerable evidence, says that the Soviet Union is playing this present situation with considerable caution indicating they are not a part of the North Vietnamese operation, and that they are hoping it will not escalate.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

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STATEMENT OF GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

LITTLE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR RED CHINA [P. 19]

Senator JACKSON. If they should desire to escalate, there is more probability that they would move from a ground point of view rather than air at this time?

Secretary MCNAMARA. My own personal opinion is that their initial moves would be by air. I would be surprised if they did not send some air into North Vietnam, for example, but I think you would want to hear from General Wheeler on both these points.

General WHEELER. That would be our expectation, Senator, that the first thing you would see probably would be ChiCom aircraft, perhaps with volunteer pilots. Perhaps later on if they decide to do something more substantial they might come in with volunteer ground units.

But the first action sure, I would think would be by air.

Senator JACKSON. In a limited way, but why wouldn't they push real hard on ground operations which would compound our problem all the more in South Vietnam.

General WHEELER. They could. This is certainly open to them, Senator, if they decide really to escalate the war.

Senator JACKSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Senator Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I have been interested in hearing these briefings as to our intelligence.

As I gather, this strike on the U.S.S. *Maddox* was a surprise. Press reports indicate there is a continuous infiltration of southern Vietnamese into North Vietnam and I assume we have some people here. How good is our intelligence in this area?

Secretary MCNAMARA. This is such a highly classified subject, Senator Carlson, it is difficult for me to answer your question fully.

Senator **Carlson**. I will not ask you to discuss it then.

Secretary **McNamara**. I would say certain forms of intelligence provide us with very important information. Agency infiltration is not a major source.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF AUGUST 2, 1964 [P. 22]

Senator **Lausche**. Now, you reiterate, Mr. McNamara, that we did not at all participate in this assault that was made by the South Vietnamese upon those two islands.

Secretary **McNamara**. We did not, we did not, and the *Maddox* was uninformed of it.

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SCOPE OF SEATO SUPPORT [P. 23]

Senator **Ervin**. Has the United Kingdom or France or the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan afforded any assistance?

Secretary **Rusk**. In the case of France, France's assistance in South Vietnam is basically in the field of investment and technical assistance.

They have, for example, a considerable number of teachers there and medical personnel, but they do not have military personnel there and it has been made very clear they do not contemplate putting military personnel in there.

In the case of Britain, they have had some personnel in there. They are pretty well occupied in other areas, in Cyprus, Aden, British Guiana, and Malaysia on their hands they believe they are stretched pretty thin. But they are looking again at what they can do.

Australia has been increasing their help. They have personnel in the field serving as advisors with the South Vietnamese units, as we do, not as much as we would like to see.

New Zealand is adding personnel. Thailand is coming in with substantially larger assistance in the very near future.

Pakistan is so preoccupied with its problems over Kashmir and with India that there is no indication that they are likely to put in any personnel, although they may find some way to be helpful in some other respect.

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U.S. PRESENCE TO DEFEND INDEPENDENCE [P. 24]

Secretary **Rusk**. Now, we have been trying to find a basis for establishing the security of these countries in such a way that we are not needed there. In the case of Cambodia we had supported over a period of some years their independent policy of neutrality in an attempt to build their country. Internally they have done a pretty good job; externally their policies have become very unreliable here lately.

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Chairman **Fulbright**. Senator Williams.

Senator **Williams**. Mr. Secretary, when did this attack on these two islands take place?

Secretary **McNamara**. It would have been—it would have been Friday night Washington time.

Senator **Williams**. How close was the *Maddox* at that time?

Secretary **McNamara**. I would say about 100 miles.

General **Wheeler**. Pretty well to the north. I would estimate at least 60 miles north of where the attack took place.

Senator **Williams**. And the timing of the two attacks was from Friday to Sunday?

Secretary **McNamara**. Yes.

General **Wheeler**. Yes, that is correct.

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AMERICAN WAR IN ASIA IS UNDESIRABLE [P. 28]

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary Rusk, we had very precise information on the military phase of this situation and I think you would want to give as equally precise information on the diplomatic phase and there is one other area here raised by Senator Morse to some degree.

Secretary McNamara has said these naval craft were neither connected with nor had any knowledge of the South Vietnamese patrols. I take it that our Government which supplied those boats to the Government of South Vietnam did not know that the boats would be used for attacks upon North Vietnamese targets, and that we had acquiesced in that policy, is that correct?

Secretary **Rusk**. I think in the larger sense, Secretary McNamara described the junk operations and the anti- and counter-junk operations. In the larger sense that is so, but as far as any particular detail is concerned we don't from Washington follow that in great detail.

Senator **Church**. We know that they are doing it. We have supplied them with the ships. They are doing it with our acquiescence and consent, is that correct?

Secretary **Rusk**. But within very limited levels as far as North Vietnam is concerned.

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ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. ACTION [P. 32]

Senator **Smathers**. What is their submarine capability overall?

General **Wheeler**. I can't give the number offhand. I can supply it for the record.

Secretary **McNamara**. It is limited.

General **Wheeler**. I was thinking in terms of 20 units.

Secretary **McNamara**. My recollection is that it is around five.

Chairman **Russell**. It is more than that, Mr. Secretary. It is around 40. Of course, some of them are very limited in their operational area.

Secretary **McNamara**. That is right.

Chairman **Russell**. But the last statistics were 40-some-odd, and 5 or 6 of them are long range.

Secretary **McNamara**. That is correct.

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U.S. CRAFT TO RESPOND TO FUTURE THREATS [P. 32]

Senator **Morse**. Are we taking the position of the 3-mile limit, which has to be right, disputed by some? When you reestablish these patrols how close do these ships come to the North Vietnam ports?

Secretary **McNamara**. Mr. Chairman, perhaps General Wheeler can stay for a few minutes and answer any questions.

Chairman **Fulbright**. General Wheeler.

Secretary **Rusk**. Eleven miles.

General **Wheeler**. Eleven miles is the answer.

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[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committees recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

James L. Greenfield, nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, appeared on his own behalf.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, the appointment of Mr. Greenfield was approved for favorable report, by unanimous consent.

On motion of Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the routine list of foreign service promotions and appointments was approved for report.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and by unanimous consent, the resolution (S.J. Res. 162) extending recognition to the International Exposition for Southern California in the year 1968 and authorizing the President to issue a proclamation calling upon the several States of the Union and foreign countries to take part in the exposition, was favorably reported.

Leonard C. Meeker, Acting Legal Adviser and Fabian A. Kwiatek, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, presented testimony on the bill (H.R. 12259) to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to provide for the determination of the amounts of claims of nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Church, Carlson, and Aiken.

The chairman announced the first order of business was the resolution (H. Con. Res. 343) expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the enforcement of the provisions of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter. Senator Church pointed out that he had pending his concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 93) of identical title. Without objection, it was ordered that S. Con. Res. 93 be reported by the committee, and that the House concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 343) be substituted for it on the floor, after it too was reported.

The next order of business was the bill (H.R. 1242) to authorize certain retired and other personnel of the U.S. Government to accept and wear decorations, presents, and other things tendered them by certain foreign countries. On a vote, and without objection, the committee ordered the bill reported favorably to the Senate, with an amendment.

The bill (H.R. 12259) to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to provide for the determination of the amounts of claims of nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba, was considered and put over.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

UNITED NATIONS FINANCING

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Church, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We will make a record if you wish to go ahead, Mr. Cleveland.

STATEMENT OF HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD N. GARDNER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, we are about to come to another phase of the U.N. financing problem, and I thought it might be useful to discuss it briefly here before we do so.

Next Monday the Working Group of 21, which is of the nature of a select committee on U.N. financing problems up in the General Assembly, will be convening to consider the whole problem of U.N. financing. It is not directly concerned with loss-of-vote issue, although that, of course, is the overhanging issue—the question of the Soviet arrearages and whether they are going to pay up or not.

Just to remind you of the structure of the problem, it is called the U.N. financing problem, but, of course, it is really a political problem. In fact, the U.N. does not really have a very difficult cash problem at the moment. They have, for example, paid us now of the Congo operation 91 percent of everything they owe us for airlift, vehicles, and other goods and services, which is a big contrast to the situation a little while ago. They owed us about $25 million at the beginning of this year, and they have now paid all but about $4 million of that.

The overhanging problem is still that most of the Communist countries, some of the Latin American countries, and China and Yemen, are 2 years behind in their dues.

A PLAN ATTRACTIVE TO THE SOVIETS

Last February, you will recall, we were up here with Governor Stevenson and we laid out then an outline of the negotiating position that we were going to adopt. Essentially it was that we were going to try to work out something for the future of U.N. financing of peacekeeping operations that might be useful and might even be attractive to some extent to the Soviets since one of the elements of the future proposal that we made was that the Security Council should be the first port of call on any peacekeeping issue. In the General Assembly, a peacekeeping finance committee, a kind of special appropriations committee, could be formed with membership weighted in favor of the larger contributors to be the screening device for every peacekeeping assessment and to decide in connection with each peacekeeping operation whether the financing of that peacekeeping operation would be by direct financing of the countries most concerned, by assessment on the regular budget scale, by a special scale of assessment whereby the larger countries would pay proportionately more, or by voluntary contributions which is the way we have done it on the Cyprus operation, or in some other fashion.

In early March, we submitted to the Soviets and passed around to a limited number of other countries a memo embodying these ideas. Four months later the Soviets answered us, but it was not a very responsive answer. They dropped on us, as you will recall, and on everybody else in the world, a long note which did show some Soviet interest in participating in the U.N. The general tone of the memorandum was not very polemical, but took a very strong line on everything in the U.N. being done by the Security Council if it had to do with peacekeeping operations, including the financing of peacekeeping operations being handled entirely in the Security Council which has been their traditional position, but they copper-bottomed it on this occasion.

SOVIETS WOULD NOT LEAVE U.N.

Now, hanging over this issue is a growing Soviet campaign on the article 19 issue as such. They said on three successive days last week, I guess it was, in TASS and Pravda, that the Americans could not possibly be serious about holding their feet to the fire on this issue, how they certainly would never pay these illegal assessments, and implying that they would leave the U.N. if article 19 were enforced and their vote in the General Assembly were removed.

The unanimous assessment of the opinion of the experts on Kremlinology is that they would not leave the U.N. under those circumstances or any other conceivable circumstances, that it would be too disadvantageous to them to leave the U.N. as a club for cooperation between the Asians and Africans and Latin Americans on the one hand and the Western powers on the other. But in any case, they are making that threat, and the threat is credible to a very large number of small countries at this point in history. There is a growing sentiment, I think, around the U.N. that somehow, almost anyhow, this confrontation should be avoided.

There is also a dangerous tendency, I think, to think of it around the U.N. as a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States rather than as we, of course, think of it, a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the charter. We are trying very hard to make clear that the problem here is that the Soviets are zeroing in on the one mandatory power that the General Assembly has, which is its assessment power, and trying to destroy that prerogative of the General Assembly. If the thing is framed in those terms, it would presumably come out, if we came to the crunch, in the General Assembly. So as things now stand, we are about to enter into negotiations with a number of countries, including the Soviets in the Working Group of 21, on the future handling of U.N. peacekeeping in the presence of an approaching confrontation on the issue of implementing the provisions of article 19 of the U.N. Charter.

RECENT SOVIET PAYMENT

One footnote which is quite interesting that just happened this week. The Soviets made a payment on the regular budget. You will recall that in 1963 they failed to pay for certain special items that they regarded as connected with peacekeeping and therefore not payable, the Korean cemetery and some of the armistice teams and so on, interest on the bonds as well. I guess that was the biggest item, the principal and interest on the bonds.

Well, they have just made a partial payment on the regular budget for 1964. The U.N. Comptroller has taken the amount that they were in arrears on the 1963 budget, which were these items that they objected to politically, and taken that amount of money and spread it back to 1963, as he must do under the financial regulations. Any money that is paid has to be applied to the earliest debt. The Soviets have not objected to this procedure, somewhat to our surprise. So it will be interesting to see how that works out.

So what we have here is a draft of the note that we are proposing to send to the Working Group of 21, and this would become public early next week. We thought it would be useful for you to take a quick look at this—it is not very long—before we freeze it.

A PARTIAL PAYMENT

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I was listening most carefully and yet somehow seemed to miss the most important thing you just said. Did you say this year the Russians paid the full amount of their assessment?

The CHAIRMAN. Partial amount.

Mr. CLEVELAND. No. Normally on their regular budget payments, they do as we do, which is to make payments every quarter or so, and they in fact have made a payment of $4,864,130. This is just a partial payment, so that they have not crossed the bridge of whether they are going to object to individual items in the regular budget in 1964.

Senator CHURCH. I see.

Mr. CLEVELAND. They just have not said one way or the other. But part of this money, then, some $2 million of it, was spread back to 1963 by the comptroller.

Senator **Church**. And they have not raised objections.

Mr. **Cleveland**. This has been notified in writing to the Soviets, and the Soviets have not objected.

Senator **Church**. Thank you.

SOVIET BLOC ARREARS

Senator **Smathers**. How much total money are they in arrears? I should know, but I do not.

Mr. **Cleveland**. I have a table here on these matters which shows all the arrearages. Like most tables, it shows you more about penguins than you really want to know. But if you look at the next to the last column, you see the——

Senator **Smathers**. Assessments for 1962 and 1963 arrears.

Mr. **Cleveland** [continuing]. The arrears. The limit. This is the measure of how you tell whether a person is over or under the line. If you look at the third column from the right, these are the total arrears that they now owe, and as you see, the total arrears that they owe exceed the measure of what they were assessed over the last 2 years by $7.8 million.

Now, if they allow the comptroller's action to stand, the amount under regular budget, the second column from the left, the amount of $2.1 million, you see, $2,145,051 opposite the U.S.S.R.——

Senator **Smathers**. Yes.

Mr. **Cleveland** [continuing]. That amount has been wiped out now and would reduce the minimum payment they would have to make to get in under the wire by November 10, the opening of the Assembly, from $7.9 million, in the last column, to about $5.8 million.

A similar payment was made, and it was similarly treated by the comptroller, for the Ukraine and Byelorussia within the last few days.

CONGO OPERATIONS

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Secretary, I believe you stated that the $25 million that the United Nations owed the United States all has been paid now but for $4 million.

Mr. **Cleveland**. This was for the Congo, yes.

Senator **Carlson**. On the Congo operation, that payment made to us was taken from contributions made by other countries. The Soviet Union did not participate in that, is that correct?

Mr. **Cleveland**. That is right. This is paid out of the Congo account to which we and other countries have contributed. The Soviets are not paying into the Congo account at all.

The U.N. is cleaning up the debt, the accounts payable on the Congo, as much as it can. We actually have a somewhat larger proportion of payment to us now than most of the other participants in the Congo operation.

STRUCTURE OF THE COMMITTEE

You will note that in this note, the first page is simply the covering note that would be sent from Ambassador Stevenson to the chairman of the committee, who is a Nigerian. The only substantive item really on the first page is the last paragraph, which says these suggestions presuppose settlement in some manner of the arrears for past peacekeeping operations. This is the only reference in this note to the problem of past arrears. The note refers to how you handle these problems in the future.

Then in the draft working paper, the primary substance is under section C on page 3, C(1) being the provision that the Security Council would be the first port of call on any peacekeeping operation, C(2) being the General Assembly's Special Appropriations Committee for Peacekeeping which would act in paragraph 3 on a two-thirds majority of the committee's membership. Then over on page 4, the provisions as to how this committee would operate.

Our problem here is, you see, that we stand in a sense in between the Soviet position, which is that everything ought to be done in the Security Council, and what you might call the Algerian or extreme Afro-Asian position, which is that everything ought to be done in the General Assembly. What we are saying in effect is that it ought to be done in the Security Council to the extent possible, but since the charter gives the financial authority to the Assembly, we want to be sure that the Assembly passes a self-denying ordinance to operate only within the framework set by a kind of special rules committee on this subject.

I think one other comment that I may make——

A CARROT INDUCEMENT

The **Chairman**. Do I understand if they accept this proposal that you are prepared to find a way around their paying back fees, or what exactly is the purpose of this?

Mr. **Cleveland**. No.

The **Chairman**. Is this a carrot inducement to pay up the——

Mr. **Cleveland**. This was conceived as a carrot to induce them. This does in fact strengthen the position of big powers in the U.N. system somewhat; not as much as they would like to.

The **Chairman**. We ought to be for that regardless of their position.

Mr. **Cleveland**. That is the point. We are. So our interests and theirs coincide up to a point, and this is our feeling as to about where that point is. You get beyond this and you get a Soviet recalcitrance in the picture.

The **Chairman**. What are we going to do if they refuse to pay up?

Senator **Smathers**. That is the question.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Our present feeling and mood is that we should hold their feet to the fire, that we should bring the matter to a vote in the General Assembly and try to get the votes to enforce article 19.

The **Chairman**. How many votes does that take? Majority?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Our way of thinking about the procedure, it would take a majority. In any case, it takes a majority to decide whether it takes two-thirds. So that if you have a really solid simple majority, you have control of the parliamentary situation. The Soviets have begun to take the line that obviously this is an important question and should obviously take two-thirds vote, and they do not think we could get a two-thirds vote, and we are not sure we could either.

The **Chairman**. The International Court has already passed on these as being a legitimate expense of the U.N.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. And legally the same as the regular budget, is it not?

Mr. **Cleveland**. That is right, yes. And the General Assembly has accepted that opinion as its own rule, so it has converted the law into——

The **Chairman**. By a vote?

Mr. **Cleveland** [continuing]. By an overwhelming vote at the 1962 General Assembly, 76 to 17.

SOVIETS' LEGAL OBJECTION

The **Chairman**. My goodness, they really do not have any legal basis, then, do they?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Except that their legal objection goes back of the court case to the proposition that it was illegal for the General Assembly to be dealing with this matter at all because it really ought to have been dealt with by the Security Council, which is responsible for peace and security problems. They do not have much of a legal leg to stand on, but they are taking really a very hard line at the moment on this, not only in their own propaganda but diplomatically with the uncommitted countries.

A DOUBLE STANDARD

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Secretary, I believe you stated that you thought this was a poor time to have a confrontation with the Soviet Union on this matter. What do we gain if we begin to weaken on this? What about the future?

Mr. **Cleveland**. I do not know that it is a poor time.

Senator **Carlson**. I thought you made that statement. It was to be avoided, I think you said.

Mr. **Cleveland**. The purpose of the exercise from the point of view of U.S. interests, I think, is not to remove their vote but to get them to pay up. But our feeling has been that they will never pay up unless they are convinced that they would lose if they exceeded charter limits, and our problem is to get sufficient support for the charter in the General Assembly to make it stick. The difficulty there is the usual sort of double standard that you get from most of the countries in the world, the feeling, well, the Soviets are tough and they mean it, but the Americans—after all, they like the U.N. and they would not want to break it up, so they are certainly going to be willing to negotiate this, and so on.

And it is going to be extremely difficult, I think, to make fully credible the implied threat that if this thing comes out in favor of the Soviets, then they lost us. In other words, should we say that we would leave the U.N. if this vote goes wrong? Probably not. Well, where along the spectrum between that extreme statement and an extreme softness should we pitch our tent. That is really the issue.

U.S. LIEN ON U.N. PROPERTY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. How much is our lien on the physical property up there at the U.N. now? How much have they paid?

Mr. **Cleveland**. I cannot remember offhand, and I do not think I have the——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we have got a first mortgage on the property up there.

Mr. **Cleveland**. We have a kind of a mortgage on the property, I guess.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we have got a mortgage on the property. But I just do not know how much is left or how much has been paid.

Mr. **Cleveland**. It has been about 13 or 14 years now, and the total amount was——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Around $60 million, I think.

Mr. **Cleveland**. The loan for construction of the U.N. headquarters was in the amount of $65 million, with annual payments running from 1951 to 1982. So it is perhaps about one-half paid.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, they might default on it.

Senator **Aiken**. We get our payments right on the nose.

Mr. **Cleveland**. That is a first charge on the regular budget. The U.N. is not in default.

Senator **Aiken**. To foreclose on them now is like foreclosing on a man's farm because he shot a deer off-season, something like that. It seems like you have got two different subjects there.

Mr. **Cleveland**. True. The punishment does not fit the crime.

THE IMPLIED THREAT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I was just thinking, if the Russians say they will pull out and they do not have to pay their assessments, and we said, "Well, we will abide by the decision, then, if that is the will of the U.N., and we will get out," where will they get their money if the Russians won't pay and we won't pay?

Mr. **Cleveland**. I think this is the implied threat or really a prediction that we are already making. We are saying in effect, "Look, if you succeed in proving here that an assessment by the General Assembly is not the treaty obligation that we have always believed it to be and we have treated it as over the last 15 years, 19 years, then obviously a lot of people in the United States are going to take the same hint. This would be very bad business for the future of the U.N. as an operational organization in this peacekeeping business, and if you want the U.N. to be an increasingly important place for peaceful settlement and peacekeeping and for economic aid and technical assistance, then your first problem is to make sure that you maintain an adequate relationship between the organization and those countries which put in 70 percent of the regular budget and about 80 percent of the voluntary contributions; namely, the Western democracies essentially, of which, of course, we are by far the largest." And so this is the manner in which we have used that line.

DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOVIET DEBTS

Senator CHURCH. Do you think the Russians may be undertaking to differentiate between the obligation they owe with respect to the bonds and the obligation that they owe with respect to the special assessments for the Congo and the Middle East?

Mr. CLEVELAND. If they do not object to the way the comptroller has—if they maintain——

Senator CHURCH. This is the first indication that they may be making such a differentiation.

Mr. CLEVELAND [continuing]. They may think they went too far last year in trying to treat interest on the bonds and maintenance of the Korean cemetery and so forth, also as ultra vires. They do not have much of a legal case. That was really just a political ploy in the midst of the debate last year, and they may feel that they got out beyond where they can really make a legal case after studying it for a while.

Senator CHURCH. Have you counted your votes up there? What is your present assessment as to the voting situation?

Mr. CLEVELAND. We have consulted every country in the world about this over the last 6 months, but the difficulty is it is a little like counting votes on an important Senate vote 6 months before it happens. Not very many Senators are going to say exactly what they are going to do, not knowing what the parliamentary situation is going to be and a lot of other things, and this is the situation here.

Most countries say, "Oh, dear, no, let us not talk about the crunch. Let us talk about how to avoid this terrible confrontation that would destroy the U.N.," you see. So I do not think that any nose count prior to about a couple of weeks before the opening of the Assembly—the Assembly opens on November 10—is going to be very dependable in practice.

Senator CHURCH. If the General Assembly were to fail to invoke the penalty in article 19, would it not in effect be reversing a decision it has already made when by a very large vote is ratified or gave its approval to the decision of the World Court?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, we think it would. If it turned out that the votes were not available, what would probably happen would not be to uphold the Soviet view but to postpone the whole issue in some fashion, which would mean that they would continue to vote although 2 years in arrears.

COUNTRIES A YEAR OR MORE BEHIND

Senator AIKEN. How many countries are a year or more behind?

Mr. CLEVELAND. A year or more behind? There must be about 30 or 35, at least. Most of the Latin Americans would come under that.

Senator AIKEN. None of those would——

Mr. CLEVELAND. I have a table here showing the projection of the article 19 status next year, but, of course, this Assembly will still be going on January 1. It shows about 25 countries that would be subject to article 19, as things now stand, in the first General Assembly in 1965, which presumably will be the resumed session of this 19th Assembly.

Senator **Aiken**. What happened to Zanzibar's representation?

Mr. **Cleveland**. They just merged with Tanganyika into the new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Senator **Aiken**. And they have no representative there.

Mr. **Cleveland**. They have no representative at the U.N.

Senator **Aiken**. Did they ever have a representative?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Oh, yes, They had a representative and a delegation and a sign up, et cetera. But then the new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar notified the U.N. of the merger by using the same procedure that the U.A.R. had done at the time of the merger between Syria and Egypt, and this was treated as a straight successor state, not requiring any action by the General Assembly.

Senator **Aiken**. Is that 25 countries that would be in arrears sometime this coming year?

Mr. **Cleveland**. No. That would be—if they do not make some payments on their arrears, they would be over the article 19 limit on January 1, 1965.

Senator **Aiken**. Does that include all the Soviet bloc, Eastern European bloc?

Mr. **Cleveland**. That includes all the Soviet bloc and France.

Senator **Aiken**. Does that include Poland? Yugoslavia?

Mr. **Cleveland**. It includes Poland. It does not include Yugoslavia. They objected for a while on the Congo, really on political grounds.

Senator **Aiken**. They have paid it now.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Their man Lumumba had been murdered, et cetera, but they have now been paying since then.

Senator **Aiken**. I see.

CHINESE FAILURE TO PAY

The **Chairman**. Why has not China paid anything? Apparently——

Senator **Aiken**. We did not send them the money, Bill.

The **Chairman**. We did extend——

Senator **Aiken**. They spent it for something else.

Mr. **Cleveland**. The Chinese have just told us that they intend to liquidate or at least get this down below the 2-year line before the General Assembly. Their problem, of course, is that they are assessed on the basis of being China and they take the——

The **Chairman**. They certainly are.

Senator **Aiken**. They have been sticking to the 22-month line for a long time.

Mr. **Cleveland**. They cannot very well come in and say, "Look, fellows, we are really just a little old island off the coast."

Senator **Church**. This is getting to be like the Mad Hatter's party. I am going to leave.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

Senator **Carlson**. If I read this table right, if Russia pays $5.7 million now, they will be permitted to participate as fully paid up members for this 1964 session.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Yes. Until January 1. Then they will have——

Senator **Carlson**. A new assessment, yes.

Mr. **Cleveland** [continuing]. A new problem. In other words, on January 1 they would have to pay another $20.7 million in order to qualify.

The **Chairman**. Do I understand what you were hoping is that the proposal you have in the confidential memo would induce the Russians to at least enter into negotiations in which maybe you could find a way to save their face and yet in the future they would pay similar payments? Is that what you had in mind?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Well, the other angle is that if the Soviets really carry this right down to the wire, at least we will by this effort have convinced a lot of other countries that we are making a serious effort to negotiate, whereas they are not, and this will affect the voting situation on the article 19 issue when it comes up.

In any case, as you said before, we want for our own purposes to be sure that in future General Assemblies, peacekeeping assessments are made on the basis of prior clearance with the big contributors, in effect.

The **Chairman**. That I think—yes.

Mr. **Cleveland**. And we like the idea of the Security Council being the first port of call, although not having a monopoly. We want an escape hatch.

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ENFORCING ARTICLE 19

The **Chairman**. Yes, Congress has expressed itself in favor of the enforcement of article 19, has it not?

Mr. **Cleveland**. That it has.

The **Chairman**. That is about all Congress can do.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Well, I just want to be sure as we go along that the proposals that we are making in the U.N. are fully understood on this end of the avenue.

CUBAN ARREARS

Senator **Aiken**. Has Indonesia paid up?

Mr. **Cleveland**. Indonesia has not been subject to article 19.

Senator **Aiken**. Cuba has not either.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Cuba was and then paid up enough. Now Cuba is going to be once again in arrears in 1965 unless they pay up some more, but the Cubans came in a while ago and paid up enough. They were in a position where they could pay up enough on the regular budget to get under the 2-year line this year. So they did that. They did not have to make a payment on the Congo and break the question of principle.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions?

SOVIETS CANNOT BE LET OFF THE HOOK

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I do not have any questions except an observation. I think this is a critical thing. I appreciate the fact that we cannot—it is not very helpful for us to take off our shoes and pound the desk up there for emphasis, but this has got to be met. This issue has got to be met.

We cannot let the Russians or anybody else off the hook on this assessment business. This may be a way of gaining a little time for finding a satisfactory solution, but to me there is no solution short of their paying their arrearages; that is, keeping themselves current, especially in view of the advisory opinion of the World Court on the propriety of this kind of operation, and so on. If we let them off the hook on that, the U.N. is gone, that is all, because then you will find these other countries will be running out from under or saying if they do not pay their assessments, the United States will come in and make it up in some way and all that sort of thing. That is not any way to run a railroad.

Mr. CLEVELAND. This has been very much our view.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think so. I said I was just making an observation.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

I do not know what to advise you except what you are doing strikes me as very reasonable. Just do the best you can to get the votes. You estimate if you got the votes, the Russians would do what? You do not think they will back clear out, just drop their membership if you get a majority. You do not believe that.

Mr. CLEVELAND. No. Our guess is that if it is clear that they will lose on the issue, they will find some device for paying enough to escape article 19.

A SOVIET BLOC U.N.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What would be the advantages or disadvantages, without too long a discussion on that subject—suppose the Iron Curtain countries plus the African countries plus China said, "We will set up our own U.N. We will pull clear out of this organization and set up our own U.N. in Warsaw, or set it up in Tangiers or set it up in Cairo or someplace else, with Sukarno in there and North Vietnam and all these countries. We will just set up a U.N. of our own and pull out of this thing"?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I do not think they would get very many takers outside the Communist countries as such. They would not get very many Africans and very few Asians except the satellites. The consequence would be that they would leave the Western powers really as the most influential factor for the indefinite future in the existing U.N., and this just would not serve their interests.

Moreover, I was talking recently to one of the people who studied Soviet affairs in the State Department right along. He thinks that we are witnessing a development of Russian policy whereby they propose to use the U.N. against the Chinese Communists, that this is why they are beginning to talk about border disputes, and so forth, and the importance of peacekeeping. And this is why, on the other side, the Chinese Communists, just in the last few days, have been accusing the Soviets of cooperating with us in connection with U.N. moves in Southeast Asia, which is a real turnabout.

USE OF THE OECD

Senator AIKEN. How many countries are members of the OECD [1] now?

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[1] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Eighteen, plus Japan.

Senator **Aiken**. What would you think they would say if we said we are going to work through the OECD and keep a nominal membership in the U.N.?

Mr. **Cleveland**. They would be delighted, because that would have the opposite effects of leaving all the Africans and Asians at their mercy.

Senator **Aiken**. The Africans and Asians would not like it.

Mr. **Cleveland**. They would not like it either way, because they conceive of the U.N. as a more or less universal——

Senator **Aiken**. Why don't you tell them to pay their taxes under protest the way they do in this country?

Senator **Church**. I think they would go to the World Court.

Mr. **Cleveland**. We have told them that we would be prepared to look at any of a number of possible ways of their paying up. In other words, we do not insist that they pay and also eat crow in public. If they want to pay and say, "We still think what we thought before about the Congo operation," there are lots of differents devices by which they can say that.

Senator **Aiken**. Primarily a face-saving issue.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Certainly. Certainly it is not a financial——

Senator **Aiken**. We spend a lot of time in Congress helping people get back on the limb. It is a big business here.

Mr. **Cleveland**. That is why we need your advice and assistance as we go along with this thing.

Senator **Aiken**. We have not entirely solved the problem; waste of time and money doing that.

SOVIET UNION'S THREE VOTES

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary, is there any possibility that the Soviet Union might attempt to solve their dilemma by salvaging one of their three votes in the General Assembly and letting the other two go by the board? I see that they could save one vote and have the same vote that every other member has for very little money.

Mr. **Cleveland**. They certainly could, but I think their problem obviously is not the money. It is the principle. It is the legal thing.

The **Chairman**. Prestige. Well, I do not know. We have got another bill; if there is nothing more on this subject——

Senator **Church**. I just have one more question. From the papers you have sent us this morning, our position has not changed in any way from the position that you came up and presented some months ago on this matter, is that right?

Mr. **Cleveland**. I would say we have pulled back somewhat on one point. You remember when we were talking before, we had some discussion of the idea of selective assessment; that is to say, that there might be situations in the future whereby the General Assembly would make an assessment but would save harmless from that assessment particular countries that had political objections to the operation. We floated that in a rather vague form, much vaguer than the way I just said it, in the first discussion with the Soviets.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In other words, you are following the Maryland Legislature's philosophy. I do not want it to apply to my county, so we exempt it from the law, which to me is not a very sound philosophy.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR CYPRUS

Mr. **Cleveland**. Since on some things, such as Cyprus, we are prepared to go all the way to the other extreme and make it a voluntary contribution, with just a few countries participating, perhaps a couple of dozen, there is no particular reason why every assessment has to be an every-member assessment, at least in theory. Anyway, we indicated that might be negotiable. The Soviets did not pick up that point at all.

The question in our mind was whether this would mean something to them, enough to induce them to pay their arrears. We have had no indication whatever that it does mean anything to them. We are not wild about the principle ourselves. So we have not included that in this document. If the Soviets want to do some business about that, we would like them to raise the subject next time, but that is the only real substantive difference between this and our February testimony.

HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE

Senator **Church**. With the passage of the congressional resolution on this subject just the week before last, I think it is plain that the sense of Congress is that you should continue to hold their feet to the fire and hand up on this proposition and see it through to the final vote. I hope that continues to be the policy of the Department, the administration.

Mr. **Cleveland**. It does indeed.

The **Chairman**. It seems to me you almost have to do that. If it goes against you or either way it goes, you have to assess then in light of what the circumstances are. I can understand you may not be able to determine what the vote will be until you actually have the vote. That is true up here on the floor very often.

As far as I am concerned, you are following the right policy. I do not know anything better to do but negotiate the best you can. They may have a change of heart. I see where the Chinese this morning have told them they won't cooperate with them. Maybe if the Chinese will keep putting the pressure on them, they may get a change of heart themselves.

Anything else?

[No response.]

The **Chairman**. We have another bill. If not, thank you very much.

Mr. **Cleveland**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The committee then proceeded to the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12259) to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 relating to claims of nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba. After discussion, and on a voice vote, the bill was ordered to be reported favorably to the Senate. Senator Lausche was recorded in the negative by proxy.

[The committee then moved to a discussion of its previous action in amending the bill (H.R. 12342) to authorize certain retired and other personnel of the U.S. Government to accept and wear decorations, presents, and other things tendered them by certain foreign countries. The chairman inquired if the committee wished to reconsider its action, and in getting no motion to reconsider from any of those present, he declared that the previous action of the committee stood.

[The committee waived the 6-day rule on nominations to consider a routine list of nominations, promotions, and appointments in the Foreign Service. The list was ordered reported on motion by Senator Smathers by unanimous consent.

[For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Senator Aiken then moved the committee adjourn sine die, and the Chairman declared the committee meeting adjourned. The time was 12:20 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Stennis; Robert E. Lee, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; and Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think we have waited long enough. We hope some will come in later. The committee will come to order.

We asked General Taylor, Ambassador Taylor, to come and give us a briefing on the situation in Vietnam, in which everyone is interested.

General, if you could proceed in your own way with an initial statement and then answer questions, I think it would be very useful to the committee.

Senator MORSE. I think it would be helpful—I won't ask him to do the whole thing—if he would give us a synopsis of the briefing he has given to other congressional leaders. I was not able to be there, but I understand it was very good.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am very glad to be back with you. I think as I indicated when I appeared before you for confirmation I hoped to be here periodically to report to Congress and President and also to have these direct confrontations which I find extremely valuable when you are dealing in areas of complex problems such as we have in South Vietnam.

EVENTS SINCE DIEM'S ASSASSINATION

Just to give you a framework of the discussion, I thought perhaps I should review the political course of events since last November 1 very briefly, because we find the number of our general political problems generally in that period of time.

You will recall that on November 1, the Diem government which had been in power in South Vietnam for almost 8 years was overthrown and Diem and his brother assassinated. The elements behind that coup were very largely the Buddhists supported by students, and that combination has produced riots and demonstrations and unbelievable self-immolation which startled and horrified a great part of the world.

A great deal of this discontent against Diem was in the Buddhist ranks. One has to stop and define what we are talking about when we say a Buddhist, because 80 percent of the country are Buddhists in a certain sense of the word, in the sense that they are born into the Buddhist church. They are usually wedded in the Buddhist church, and when they die are buried under Buddhist ceremony.

However, I think Buddhist experts would generally be in accord in saying that South Vietnamese Buddhism has not a living effect; it is no great motivation in the lives and behavior. I would say the political Buddhists are represented in the Buddhist association by their two leaders, one group by Tam Chau and a second group by Tri Quang.

I think the second name is better known than the first because this is the man who took refuge in our Embassy last year and stayed there until the overthrow of Diem. He is far and away the strongest political Buddhist, a man of great ambition and considerable ability. I am uncertain as to his background and I am uncertain as to his name.

When Diem was overthrown, the government then, you will recall, was the so-called Minh junta, headed by Big Minh, the most popular military figure in South Vietnam because he had defeated the sects in the sect war and later because of the fact he was given the credit for overthrowing Diem.

SURPRISE COUP BY KHANH

He is still a very popular figure. He didn't last long, however, because to the surprise of all of us, including most of the observers on the spot who were closest to the scene, General Khanh, who had been known simply as a great brigadier general and a good corps commander, overthrew without firing a shot the senior generals who were represented in the junta so that at the end of January we had the Khanh government, which has been in power since that time.

In the ensuing months, however, there was growing discontent with the Khanh government. The Buddhists were disappointed because they felt that Minh had offered them much better prospects than Khanh. They had felt that under Diem they were second-class citizens, whereas the Catholics were the first-class citizens. They had hoped there would be a definite reversal of that relationship and thought Minh and his people would accomplish it.

Under Khanh they weren't so sure. They thought they detected individuals in his government who were old Diemists and hence highly suspect to them.

The students also, who had tasted raw meat in the successful demonstrations against Diem, were inclined to grumble about the Khanh military government as being a military dictatorship. Then

Khanh himself became the strongest critic of his own government. He found it wasn't working out the way he had hoped.

In the first place, it was a coalition government deliberately made so to include all of the important political elements that could be identified, and the result is what one might expect of a coalition government, a great deal of bickering between old enemies and an ineffective government because of distrust and lack of loyalty within the cabinet. Also, Khanh was obliged to work with his old enemy Minh, whom he never liked because Minh was the chief of state whereas Khanh was the Prime Minister and the chief of government.

Hence, Khanh himself was thinking during the spring of changing his government, getting rid of Minh. He kept talking about De Gaulle-Pompidou, that type of government. He visualized himself as De Gaulle and was looking around for a Pompidou[1] whom he never found.

IMPACT OF GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT

This was the state of affairs on August 5 when the Gulf of Tonkin naval events took place which occasioned great excitement and great enthusiasm in South Vietnam. Khanh himself said it was the greatest day of his life when I reported what was taking place.

He also saw opportunity to take political advantage of the situation in two ways: First, he wanted to pull the country up on its feet, impose a higher level of war readiness, of mobilization, consistent with what he considered the dangers that the country was running at the time. Hence he promulgated by edict emergency regulations which gave him legal power to do the various things he thought necessary to strengthen his hands.

Furthermore, he decided this was the time to change the form of government and get rid of some of the bad features he had detected in the previous organization. So he put out a charter approved by the generals who constituted the Military Revolutionary Committee, which you may remember after the Diem coup had been set as the senior political body in the entire country.

This comprised about 55 or 60 of the senior military officers. Hence they were the body to whom Khanh had to go whenever he proposed an internal governmental change.

So, he received their approbation of the charter, which promulgated a presidential-type of government, Khanh to be the president, and separate legislative, executive, and judiciary branches.

KHANH'S MISTAKE

His motives were the best because first, as he tells it, he got rid of Minh, who was a troublemaker. He also reduced the numbers of ministers and got rid of some of the ministers whom he considered disloyal and ineffective. So that from his point of view he was getting a government he thought would be better able to prosecute the war.

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[1] French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou.

He made the serious mistake, however, of making no preliminary political or public relations kind of preparation. He hit everybody by surprise and it was interpreted differently by various groups.

The Buddhists felt it was a definite threat to them, that here was a strengthening of what they called the Can Lao influence, the Diemists' influence. Although they had regard for Khanh individually, they were afraid they would become prisoners of the generals they saw around him. Many of these generals, incidentally, were associated with the so-called Dai Viet political party.

VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PARTIES

I might pause and say that a political party in South Vietnam doesn't have the same meaning as perhaps the word "religion" does in the United States. The Dai Viet, which means "Great Vietnam," is the best known and probably the largest political party. Yet it is really little more than a secret society made up of individuals, many of whose names are unknown, who are banded together for their own purposes of political aggrandizement. They have no platform, they don't stand for anything. They rather stand for the individual fortunes of certain individual members.

The **Chairman.** Is that true of all political parties?

General **Taylor.** Beg pardon?

The **Chairman.** Is that typical of political parties?

General **Taylor.** This is the political party. There are several other parties that have almost no identity and certainly no influence. This is the only political group with any influence today.

The **Chairman.** They don't have any essential politics?

General **Taylor.** No.

MILITARY POWER IN VIETNAM

Now, Khanh had put the head Dai Viet into his cabinet as vice premier. This is Mr. Hoan. He is recognized as the head of the Dai Viet party. Hoan, in turn, had around him many colleagues of the same affiliation.

Hoan very quickly saw, and certainly knew before he came into the government, that to have any real influence he needed to have some generals on his side because the military is the final power in this country. Whoever controls the divisions controls the country. Hence he attracted to him a certain number of senior generals.

In some cases there is no doubt about it, in other cases there is simply suspicion, but Khanh and the Buddhists were watching this very closely for different reasons: Khanh, because he didn't want to see his generals get into the business of politics particularly in relation to a party which Khanh considered suspect; the Buddhists, because the Dai Viets are trying to get the same kind of objectives that the Buddhists themselves were seeking. The Buddhists did not like Khanh's government because they were very suspicious of it and decided to oppose it largely through the creation of public disturbances and mobs which they encouraged.

BUDDHIST AND STUDENT RIOTING

The students, who always have been a turbulent group, particularly since the Diem affair a year ago, and also because of the opportunity they had to demonstrate successfully against the French during the month of July, the students in Saigon were in the streets of Saigon tearing down the French war memorials, and the police didn't lay a hand on them. They found they were immune, so both the Buddhists and students took to the streets to oppose the charter government.

I went to Khanh at the end of the first day of rioting on August 22 and told him of my concern that nobody seemed to be trying to establish order. He answered that that was true, that he had told the police not to try to arrest those who were demonstrating because he was very much afraid that he would create incidents such as had been created the year before by the Diem police and which resulted in the Buddhist activities which resulted in the overthrow of the government. He said, "I know what I am doing; I am going to give these people enough rope and then I will pull them in at the proper time."

Well, obviously that is pretty risky business. I told him so but he still thought that was the thing to do.

KHANH'S RESPONSE TO BUDDHIST DEMANDS

Meanwhile, he identified the opposition as being largely Buddhist. The student aspect was froth and the substance was the Buddhist group, and he asked the Buddhists really what to do on it. They presented him with a list of demands on about August 25, which, in effect, asked him to revoke the charter, go back to the old form of government in which Khanh would be the Prime Minister, eliminate the military council, and clean out what the people and the Buddhists called the Can Lao and the Dai Viets.

Khanh, after some meditation, recognizing that he was losing face and eating crow publicly, agreed to do this, feeling he must have the Buddhist support in order to form a government that would stand up. The fact is, he was not unhappy about the Buddhist demands because the Buddhists were doing something for him that he wished to do, getting rid of this overall military council which was bothering him and also allowing him to move more aggressively into the civilianizing of his cabinet.

Khanh, as a military man, believes deeply in the importance of separating the military from politics. He feels that they should stay out of this business completely, and he has always been looking for civilians to take over. His problem thus far has been to find enough able civilians who are willing to undertake these very unrewarding tasks in government.

So Khanh did accept the Buddhist demands, revoked his charter, and set about civilianizing his government. But before he could do that, he had to get the approval of his military colleagues of the military committee. On August 26 and 27 he went into a 2-day caucus with them, and they must have had really a donnybrook in trying to decide whether they would agree to abolish themselves and follow the course of action that Khanh wanted.

SPLIT AMONG THE MILITARY

Here the split among the military became quite apparent, with a number of so-called Dai Viet generals coming out and supporting Minh as head of government as against Khanh.

At the end of 2 days, all the generals found that they could get no agreement on anybody other than Khanh. Khanh was known to have American support; he was known to be the strong man, the intelligent man.

Minh was a popular figure, but known to be lazy and relatively stupid. Hence even his strongest enemies at the end of the second day came to Khanh and urged him to take, resume the post of Prime Minister from which he had resigned on the morning of the second day.

Khanh played hard to get and held back until the very end of the day, when he did agree to go back to the caucus room and there accept the position of Prime Minister as a member of the so-called junta, with Minh and with Khanh. This action has been misinterpreted here as setting up these three really as a ruling triumvirate. That was not the intention, that is not the fact. It was really to form a lightning rod to take some of the heat off Khanh himself as a protection to Khanh. There was no doubt that Khanh was to remain and run the government, and there was no doubt in his mind. Hence the reports that he went to Dalat to give up the government just weren't so.

ACTIONS OF VICE MINISTER OANH

He was going up to Dalat to take a rest, and he did make the imprudent mistake of leaving in charge a vice minister, Oanh.[2] We call him Jack Owen. He is a Harvard man, a Harvard professor of economics, a very valuable man in the technical field, but my story will indicate not too helpful in the political field, because no sooner had Khanh gotten on an airplane to go to Dalat than Jack called a press conference.

He said, "Well, boys, I am in, and I am running this show for the next 2 months. I am not going to make very many changes, but you know, boys, how it is with General Khanh. He is worn out and he has been mentally affected."

This was incredible on the part of the acting minister that he would so talk about the head of state, but he did. Actually there was nothing wrong with Khanh mentally, except he was tired. He hadn't slept for 2 nights. He went up to Dalat and he followed a course of action which we had suggested to him.

The first thing to do was to find out who really was on his side among his generals. He called them up, his senior commanders. They swore fealty to Khanh and signed their names in blood. They were indeed for him, except three or four who had been identified in the caucus as being members of the Dai Viet party. Later after verifying his military base, he called in the suspects, both military and civilian.

In the case of Oanh, his vice minister, he gave until the Sunday of that week to get out of town, to get out of the country. He has indicated plans for accepting resignations of several of the military officers to include his colleague on the triumvirate, General Khiem, who has been relieved now as minister of defense.

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[2] Nguyen Xuan Oanh.

He still retains, or had when I left the country, the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but Khanh intends to abolish that post and not to fill it again so there will be no commander-in-chief of the armed forces but just a chief of staff following more or less the American practice.

REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

So to sum up then, Khanh purged his enemies, both military and civilian. He received the backing in writing of the Buddhists and the Catholics and the vast majority of the generals, and hence returned to town at the end of the following week, the first week of September, with carte blanche to reorganize the government, and that is what he has proceeded to do now.

His plan is as follows: The triumvirate will remain in existence. He is allowing Minh to be called the chairman and give him the attributes of a chief of state, in other words, he receives credentials of Ambassadors, has power of clemency, and things of that sort. That is the window dressing. He is the front man.

Khanh himself remains as Prime Minister and conducts an interim government for what he says will be the next 2 months. In that 2-month period the triumvirate will select members of a new organ called Council of National Security, 10 or 20 experienced men, elder statesmen-type they hope, who will represent the principal subdivisions of the society and political public, the Catholics, the Buddhists, the sects, labor, and possibly the military.

This council then will be charged with drawing up and approving a blueprint for a provisional government which will hopefully go into effect after November 1. Khanh thinks and hopes it will be on a presidential line, in other words, virtually the government that he was proposing in mid-August.

The council will not only approve the government, it will also establish the ground rules for the selection of the members of the legislative body, the assembly which doesn't exist today. Finally, it will select a provisional president. So he will have three very difficult things.

My only comment at this point is I think it is impossible in 2 months to do these things which have been laid out. Even in our society, it would be difficult indeed. So I think we are likely to face a period of interim government of a wobbly kind for a period exceeding 2 months; perhaps not, but that is what I think. After that time, the provisional government presumably will go into effect and it then will conduct normal day-to-day business while laying the foundation for the drafting of a permanent constitution and the passage of constitutional government a year or so later.

GAINS AND LOSSES

That is the general picture of where we stand. I might sum up how it looks to me, the gains and losses of this turbulent period.

First, I would say that on the military side, the conduct of the war against the Vietcong, strangely enough, shows no diminution.

Generally speaking, the activities in the field are just decentralized to the corps commanders and the provisional chiefs.

It is not a centralized war. It can't be by its nature, hence the political impotence of Saigon is not felt in the field. General Westmoreland has just finished a complete tour of the country and reports back that so far as he can see everything is moving from the military point of view essentially as it was August 1.

The economic picture hasn't changed. The economic factors, indicators essentially have not changed, so what we have has been a political turmoil and growing ineptitude on the part of the central government.

In the course of these exchanges, I would say that Khanh has lost considerable amount of face, face vis-a-vis his military colleagues, face internationally as viewed by the populace, and certainly face vis-a-vis critics abroad. He has mortgaged himself to some extent to the Buddhists whose support he has bought, if you want to put it that way, by accepting their demands. He is going to have more troubles from the Buddhists. They are going to ask for more undoubtedly, and how he responds is going to be very important indeed.

Certainly these events have encouraged the Vietcong, although as I mentioned they have been strangely quiescent. They have not reacted at this time. Actually the military actions initiated by the Vietcong are much lower than average.

I would say there are certain pluses, however, which may nullify to a large degree the losses which I have enumerated. In the first place, even in the eyes of his enemies Khanh is the indispensable man. They found when they tried other solutions there weren't any, and they all lined up to accept the fact that Khanh is the strong man of the day.

GOVERNMENT OF AN INDETERMINATE KIND

Second, Khanh himself is an intelligent fellow who has been through a very rough 2 weeks in which he has learned a lot. He has conceded privately to me some of these were mistakes which he has identified himself. We didn't point them out to him.

Third, he has got the army, at least, for better or for worse, out of politics, out of government for the moment. This may not be a good thing, it is a principle upon which I would agree with Khanh. We would like to have a civilian government but ability is extremely limited in this country, and I don't think Khanh can afford the luxury by picking men from their profession. He hasn't got much time, so he may have to go back to an adamant stand and have no military in the government.

Finally, we have learned about the dangers of political disunity and the danger caused by the demonstrations we have seen in the last 2 weeks.

Between the pros and cons, I don't see how we will come out. I would just say we are faced with a rather prolonged period of government of an indeterminate kind. I feel it is our prime business as American representatives there to do all we can to facilitate and expedite the creation of a civilian government, hoping we can get as much iron into it as possible.

Mr. Chairman, that is my prime comment. I would be glad to answer any questions.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, General. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

NOT A HOPELESS CAUSE

Senator **Sparkman**. General, just what is our situation there, I mean with reference to that, is it a hopeless cause as some people think?

General **Taylor**. No, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. Are you encouraged?

General **Taylor**. I would say it is a difficult situation, Senator Sparkman. We are wrapped in battle, so to speak, and the outcome is not in sight. That is not the time for anyone to become fainthearted and say we cannot win. I have no way I can prove we are going to win, but I certainly can think of a lot of ways we can lose and I can see the disaster of losing.

I think we have the resources here, human and material, to come out all right if we can get the right combination of people, if we can instill by our example the idea of team play, governmental operation into our opposite numbers. We are trying to do that by linking our mission staff with the cabinet so that we will have day-to-day contacts with the key men in the government. Also we have committees working side by side with government committees on the really tough governmental problems, hoping by example at least to get them pulling together as a team and not as individuals.

VIETCONG CADRES

Senator **Sparkman**. Are the Vietcong relying on their own people or are they relying to a considerable extent on the help that comes from the north?

General **Taylor**. There has always been a hard core, an indigenous operation very largely. Almost all of the Vietcong ever captured have been indigenous to South Vietnam. However, the hard core, the trained cadres of the men, have all been educated in North Vietnam, then infiltrated south.

Certainly the help that comes from the outside in trained personnel and heavy weapons is very important to the Vietcong. However, if that stopped tonight we would still have a problem, a much easier problem but it would certainly not end with cessation of aid from the north.

MORE VIGOROUS ACTION TOWARD NORTH VIETNAM

Senator **Sparkman**. I saw in the paper several days ago that the Chiefs of Staff were in favor of taking more vigorous action toward North Vietnam. Is that a correct story?

General **Taylor**. I am just an Ambassador, Senator, I wouldn't know.

Senator **Sparkman**. You are not in the military? [Laughter.]

You leave that up to the Military?

General **Taylor**. I leave that up to the military. They are a bad lot in Washington. [Laughter.]

Senator **Sparkman**. That is all I will ask, Mr. Chairman. I have lots of questions, but I know everybody wants to ask questions.

BUDDHISTS' POLITICAL LEADER

The **Chairman**. One question I wanted to ask, that political leader of the Buddhists, Tri Quang, I believe you called him.

General **Taylor**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Does he have any possibility of becoming a good political leader?

General **Taylor**. We don't know him well enough yet, Senator. He is a hard man to get to know. I passed the word I would be glad to talk to him. He says he wants to meet the Ambassador but he is sick, and he stays sick whenever that point comes up.

The **Chairman**. He doesn't want to meet you?

General **Taylor**. Apparently he wants to meet me now. He has a great debt to the United States because we saved his life. He spent much of that time in learning what the American policy was, he tells us allegedly what the American policy is, but we didn't spend any time finding out what his objectives are. So we still have a question mark alongside of that. I know Ambassador Lodge felt he was a very able man and a dangerous man by virtue of his ability and the uncertainty of his motivation.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

THE INS AND THE OUTS

I want to ask this question, General.

The motivation for the vigor and the tenacity and the willingness to organize and take hardship of the attacking forces; that is, let's say, the guerrillas, who in many ways are the same ethnic kind of people that the defenders are, what makes these people the vigorous, attacking, persistent people that they are, when we can't get the persistence and the unity and the vigor on the part of people defending their homes? Has anybody ever come up with a real answer to that question?

General **Taylor**. I don't think they have.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You see it so often, not only in the country alone, but in many places. The guerrillas seem to have all the zip and vim, vigor and vitality. They can raise hell, but nobody raises hell with them too much, so far as the indigenous population is concerned.

General **Taylor**. The only answer I could make might have a facetious sound, that it always looks as if the outs always fight better than the ins. These are the outs; these are the have-nots struggling to get something.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think that is true—the desire for power, all that sort of stuff normally. Banditry used to be stimulated in many occasions by the prospect of loot and other things which they might get, but I don't think there is a devil of a lot of loot down there in South Vietnam anymore.

General **Taylor**. South Vietnam is a rich country compared to North Vietnam, and the prospect of absorbing that potentially rich area into the Communist cause is very attractive to the leaders.

That does not answer your question as to why the little man stays out in the jungle as long as he does. He certainly is controlled by discipline, an iron discipline and a fear of disobeying which does not exist in the ranks of governmental forces. Certainly the cadre men who come down are deeply convinced of the rightness of their cause. They are sincere Communists. But it is the ones they recruit around the villages, how they retain their loyalty that constitutes the question.

CATCHING UP WITH THE COMMUNISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is that very conviction or assertion of sincerity on the part of these people who attack.

I am not criticizing, I am just asking questions. Why can't we instill the same kind of a conviction of righteousness in the people who have something to defend down there? Why can't that same cohesiveness be developed that seems to be developed in the infiltrators, the saboteurs, and their groups of groups?

General TAYLOR. Which didn't start there at the cradle and develop these young men and mold them into a single pattern.

We started our resistance—I say "We," I am speaking in terms of the South Vietnam Government. We started late. This whole framework of Vietcong control in the country was left there in 1954. They decided in advance how they were going to organize this. This was planned years ahead, with a wisdom or a farsightedness which is admirable for a better cause. So we, on our side, have always been late trying to catch up in matching preparations which have been in existence and have been carried out over a long period of time by the Communists. That still is not a good answer. I don't think that answers your question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I found the answer, I wouldn't ask the questions. I don't know who has the answer. It is just, I don't know, it is one of those phenomenal human motivations which—well, I guess you can get all kinds of explanations for it—but it always seems that the bandits are organized and allegedly have the unanimity and the vigor and the purpose and all this sort of stuff, and the people have got their homes to protect, maybe it is because they are self-satisfied or something.

THE WILL TO RESIST

Senator LAUSCHE. May I intervene for just a minute? Didn't Clausewitz make the statement that wars are not won by the destruction of cities and human beings and property but rather by the destruction of the will to resist, and isn't it a fact that there does not exist in South Vietnam among the people the will to resist?

General TAYLOR. First, your quotation is a good one, I don't recall Clausewitz. But on the question of resistance, I would fight back hard on that, Senator. I would say these people in South Vietnam do fight back. They take very heavy casualties; they take them with a patience I admire. I wonder sometimes if we could take the same casualties for ten years and continue to resist.

There is no alarmism, there is no dash about it, there is no enthusiasm, but there is a patience in hanging on, fighting off, opposing a threat which is almost a way of life with them. The fact they have not collapsed into a state of war-weariness and put down their weapons is, I think, amazing.

Senator **Lausche**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Morse.

FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR

Senator **Morse**. General, there used to be a South Vietnamese who was helpful to us, but he last seemed to drop out of the picture. I refer to the father of Madame Nhu, when he was Ambassador.[3] Whatever happened to him?

General **Taylor**. The Ambassador?

Senator **Morse**. What has happened to him?

General **Taylor**. He has been in the United States, and the last report was he was coming back to Saigon. I am interested in finding out myself. She was there for a while and I saw her once, but she is back in the United States.

Senator **Morse**. Do you know whether our State Department is using him for intelligence help in any way?

General **Taylor**. I know he was contacted many times last year. I am not aware that he is presently contacted.

Senator **Morse**. What would be his status if he went back to Saigon?

General **Taylor**. A little hard to say. He was a well-known lawyer and an able lawyer, and whether he would be acceptable now in the present fight, frankly, I am not quite sure. He has a son, by the way, in jail since the coup.

Senator **Morse**. We keep hearing about the paucity of intellectual ability over there, trained, able. I was wondering whether this fellow was just persona non grata and whether he could be of any help or whether he could be worked into the civilian government over there. If they are going to go forward with trying to set up an executive, judicial, and legislative branch of government, why can't that man be used?

General **Taylor**. I think it is a good point. We were talking about him in connection with a jurist committee.

Senator **Dodd**. Will the Senator yield?

Senator **Morse**. Yes.

PURGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATORS

Senator **Dodd**. I am told by some Vietnamese whom I know that a great many capable administrative people were purged and removed after Diem's death, might have been thrown in jail and are still there. Many others are under house arrest, and still others were just put out of their jobs and never returned.

For example, I met one of these men when I was at Yale. He is a trained physician in public health. He was the deputy head of the public health service in Vietnam. He was purged—he hasn't been thrown into jail. His wife is here. By the way, he was a member of the parliament before it was dissolved. She told me this. She says it is a terrible waste of trained manpower, and those not in jail or under house arrest are just thrown out of their jobs. She tells me, for example, that the public health service, whatever it is properly called, is being planned by some minor technicians who are not at all competent to head up such a department, that this goes on over and over again, and nothing can be done about it. She is quite despairing of any possibility of ever getting any decent administration of government.

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[3] Tran Van Chuong.

General TAYLOR. After the Diem coup, the jails were filled with Diemists and gradually released. At the last count, the admitted number of political prisoners was 58. This may even include these people you mentioned.

I would hope comparatively soon we could get all of them out. This would include the Ambassador.

Senator MORSE. I suppose Vietnamese exiles in Paris and elsewhere in the world generally would be personae non grata on the charge they would be French-motivated.

General TAYLOR. Most of them would be charged with that, that is correct. Those who have gone to France and lived there are strongly suspected of being Pro-French and Pro-neutralism or some equivalent.

BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ISLANDS

Senator MORSE. Did General Khanh discuss with you his plan for the bombardment of the two North Vietnamese islands before the bombardments took place?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure which bombardment you are referring to.

Senator MORSE. The South Vietnamese PT boats or whatever they were that they sent up to bomb the islands prior to the Tonkin Bay incidents.

General TAYLOR. They are constantly having their naval vessels up and down the coast engaged in various kinds of exchanges of fire, sometimes against ships, sometimes directed ashore. Any specific action of that sort I would not be consulted about.

Senator MORSE. In regard to this Tonkin incident, this was a major incident about which we have had testimony before this committee that prior to the attack on the *Maddox* the South Vietnamese boats did go up to these two North Vietnamese islands, did engage in the bombardment. The record will speak for itself, but I recall accurately when the Secretary of Defense was asked if there was any knowledge of this on the part of American officials. His testimony was to the effect, I believe, that there was probably knowledge of it in Saigon on the part of officials, but there was no knowledge here at the time and that the commander of the *Maddox* had no knowledge. Subsequent discussions varied, that certainly it was known in Saigon by American officials that these bombardments were going to take place, which of course raised the discussion here as to what extent this bombardment might indirectly involve us as far as creating the impression on the part of the North Vietnamese that we were involved in it, too.

But you had no discussion with General Khanh——

General **Taylor**. I would simply say this, that I am aware of the fact that the naval vessels are constantly patrolling, trying to block naval infiltration, in the course of which they take junks, they exchange fire, and I say sometimes they hit naval targets and sometimes shore targets. Insofar as day-by-day operations are concerned, what they are doing, that is not my business.

Senator **Morse**. For how long has that been going on?

General **Taylor**. I imagine for some months, I really couldn't tell.

ESCALATION OF WAR INTO NORTH VIETNAMESE WATERS

Senator **Morse**. Would it be fair to say to the extent this has been going on, there has been in effect thereby escalation of this war into North Vietnam, in North Vietnamese waters for some time?

General **Taylor**. No, I don't think so. This is like counteraction to the infiltration which is effected on the Land. This is simply the naval part of it.

Senator **Morse**. When you say "counter," counteraction involves committing acts of attack or aggression, war, or whatever you want to describe it as, beyond South Vietnam and into North Vietnam?

General **Taylor**. That is what North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam.

Senator **Morse**. I have no question about that. I never have questioned it. But I have been objecting for quite some time about our seeking to present a posture to the world that there is no escalation of the war into North Vietnam. I have been satisfied there has been an escalation of war into North Vietnam for many, many months. Maybe it is just a matter of definition, but you testify here now that for some months past there have been engagements in North Vietnamese waters and areas by way of what you call counterattack. True or false, is that a correct statement of your testimony?

General **Taylor**. No, I am not saying that this occurred in North Vietnamese waters. I am saying in naval waters. I don't know where these ships are. They go north for the purpose of trying to intercept the infiltration from the north, quite properly so, and I think it is a thoroughly sound program. I am not in charge of it. I am the Ambassador, not the commanding general.

BOMBARDMENT OF TWO ISLANDS

Senator **Morse**. As Ambassador, do you know whether or not there was a bombardment of the two islands that have been a matter of great discussion on the Tonkin Bay incidents.

General **Taylor**. Yes, I am sure—I can't point out on the map where they are, but I know some islands have been fired on.

Senator **Morse**. No question about their being on North Vietnam territory?

General **Taylor**. I presume that is right. On the other hand let me say that, meanwhile, South Vietnamese territory is being invaded constantly and this reaction is just overdue, I would say, on the part of the South Vietnamese Government.

Senator **Morse**. I am not quarreling with that.

Do you know of your own knowledge as to whether or not there have been air forays on the part of South Vietnamese air forces into North Vietnam for some months past?

General **Taylor**. I never [4] see the program for such things.

Senator **Morse**. Do you have knowledge that such a thing has taken place?

General **Taylor**. I am quite sure that overflights do occur, however.

NO RELIGIOUS SCHISM IN VIETNAM

Senator **Morse**. General, is there danger that this war over there may develop into an issue as to whether or not the Catholics or Buddhists are going to be put in power?

General **Taylor**. No, I don't think so. This is not really a religious schism, although it sounds like one. It is, rather, jockeying for political power.

Senator **Morse**. Is it true that there are Catholic leaders in South Vietnam that are seeking to develop a considerable amount of control of the government in contrast with the Buddhist leaders?

General **Taylor**. No, sir, I see no such signs. Actually, the relations between Buddhist leaders and the Catholic leaders on the top level are quite good. They formed by mutual agreement, after expressing mutual concern over these clashes in the streets, a joint committee or the adjudication of religious disputes of any sort, and I would say that the senior people are thoroughly aware of the need to quell and suppress any further division on their parts.

Senator **Morse**. Is it true in the recent riots involving students and, I understand, some others, that those riots represented a conflict between Catholics on the one hand and Buddhists on the other?

General **Taylor**. Not generally.

There were one or two incidents where there were fights in front of schools or pagodas where it looked as if the contestants had been Catholic versus Buddhists. Generally speaking, however, this was more rioting against the government than against the two faiths.

Senator **Morse**. We had a report that they burned a Catholic church and smashed a statue of the Virgin Mary as sort of a religious protest.

Did you have anything like that?

General **Taylor**. There was more of a protest in Hue than in Saigon. Hue is a center of religious protest. Hue is the home of Tri Quang and used to be the seat of Archbishop Thuc, the brother of Diem.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Excuse me, where is he now? The Archbishop.

General **Taylor**. He was in Rome when last reported.

AMERICAN MILITARY IN VIETNAM

Senator **Morse**. How many American military personnel do we have in South Vietnam at the present time?

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[4] General Taylor later amended his testimony from "never" to "rarely."

General **Taylor**. I don't have the exact figure, but it is approaching 22,000, I would say.

Senator **Morse**. Is it presently contemplated as you survey the problems of the next 6 to 12 months that it will be necessary to send additional military personnel to South Vietnam?

General **Taylor**. No. The present authorized strength is about 23,000, which, in General Westmoreland's estimate, would last him. He foresaw no requirement beyond that in the coming year.

Senator **Morse**. At the present time do you assign any so-called American military advisers to South Vietnamese military groups that engage in counterattacks, or whatever descriptive term you want to use to describe them, beyond the borders of South Vietnam into North Vietnam?

General **Taylor**. That accompany units across?

Senator **Morse**. Yes.

General **Taylor**. I know of no such units going across.

Senator **Morse**. If you knew of such American military participation would you raise objections to it?

General **Taylor**. No, I would not.

Senator **Morse**. You would not.

SENDING AMERICANS INTO NORTH VIETNAM

You would have no objection then to American military officers in advisory positions in South Vietnam assigning American boys to planes or ships or troop contingents that would be leaving the borders of South Vietnam and entering North Vietnam to carry on counterattack?

General **Taylor**. I am not the American Government. I reply as an individual that we—our American effort in South Vietnam is for one purpose, to free that country and allow it to determine its own destiny as a non-Communist state. Any effort that contributes thereto I think is a legitimate act to be supported by the United States.

Senator **Morse**. But you are not an individual. You are a symbol of the American Government as our Ambassador, and I am seeking to find our what our Ambassadorial position is as a matter of policy.

In South Vietnam, as I understand your testimony now to be, you, as Ambassador, would raise no objection with your Government if you had information that American military personnel were accompanying South Vietnamese personnel beyond the borders of South Vietnam?

General **Taylor**. No, if I felt that contributed to approved American policy.

Senator **Morse**. Aren't you really saying that you are not objecting to American escalation of this war by indirection?

General **Taylor**. If it is in the interest of American policy.

Senator **Morse**. I think the President of the United States has the duty to tell that to the American people, and I shall do my best to challenge him to tell it to the American people.

OIL EXPLORATIONS IN VIETNAM

Mr. Ambassador, do you know of any oil explorations in South Vietnam?

General **TAYLOR**. No, sir, I do not.

Senator **MORSE**. Do you know whether or not any American oil company is contemplating the building of any oil facilities in the form of either a refinery or oil development for exploration?

General **TAYLOR**. I don't know anything about that.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Have you heard this subject raised?

General **TAYLOR**. Never heard it before.

Senator **MORSE**. That is all, except to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I am more convinced than ever that our policy in Vietnam is against America's public interest.

Senator **SPARKMAN** [presiding]. Senator Carlson.

EXTENDING AID PROGRAM TO CITIES

Senator **CARLSON**. General, all I know about this Vietnam situation is what I read in the papers. Recently, in the last 10 days, I read three articles out of Saigon that said that the United States is considering extending their aid programs to the cities.

General **TAYLOR**. Yes.

Senator **CARLSON**. Now, have we not given aid to cities before?

General **TAYLOR**. Very little. I would say the emphasis has been on the country because that is where the problem lay as we saw it.

I wouldn't suggest by this that this report means we are changing the whole direction of policy, but we are becoming more and more aware that we do have an urban problem in a place like Saigon because so many country people have come to the cities to escape the Vietcong threat that there have been unemployed problems, the housing problem that is building up all the time. I really think what is required is a long-range, say, a 10-year program for the principal cities like Saigon which we will progressively move into.

Senator **CARLSON**. We do have, of course, an extensive aid program in South Vietnam?

General **TAYLOR**. Yes, sir.

Senator **CARLSON**. Will this require a greatly expanded appropriation and funds?

General **TAYLOR**. I don't think so. I think that our funds thus far have been quite ample, and I think this is more a question of shifting orientation of effort somewhat.

BUSINESS AS USUAL IN SAIGON

Senator **CARLSON**. Then again, I read in the papers that the cities in South Vietnam are the one place in this country where they don't seem to realize there is a war on, they are all happy, they don't want the war to end, and that they are all getting rich.

These are articles that actually come out of Saigon. What about that?

General **TAYLOR**. I wouldn't take all that language as being an accurate picture. It certainly is true that Saigon doesn't strike you as a war capital. There is too much business as usual in Saigon, I quite agree to that.

Khanh is also aware of it, and that is one of his purposes, after the Gulf of Tonkin affair, that he wanted to have greater powers in order to impose on the cities, primarily Saigon, a higher level of austerity. That has been thrown out of gear now by these recent events, but I am sure he is coming back to it.

Senator CARLSON. What could we do, if you are in a nation where there is just a rural section of the population concerned about winning a war, what can you do about it? What can he do about it?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't say that the people in Saigon aren't concerned about winning the war. I wouldn't admit, I wouldn't accept for a moment, they don't want the war to end. But there lives are not at stake. It is quite a different thing to realize there is a national crisis, but when one's own physical possessions and one's own life are not on the table, that is quite different from the peasant who lives under the gun.

So, it is a difference of proximity to the problem, I would say, rather than one of complete indifference.

RAIDS IN SAIGON VICINITY

Senator MUNDT. Didn't they get within 12 miles of Saigon once?

General TAYLOR. What is that?

Senator MUNDT. Didn't I read someplace that they got within 12 miles?

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes, you can have a raid closer than that to Saigon.

Senator MUNDT. Didn't that scare them a little bit?

General TAYLOR. Well, not really. At night you can hear the cannon firing on all sides of the city; you can imagine the western front.

Senator MUNDT. I would imagine that would shake them up a little.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you suppose the citizens of Saigon adopt the philosophy of "Let's you and him fight"?

SOMEBODY IS GOING TO MAKE SOME MONEY

Senator CARLSON. That is all, General, Mr. Ambassador. I had been disturbed by this because, after all, just trying to see a nation in which one section of the country is greatly concerned about their safety and freedoms and future feel war, and here is the great area of the population getting rich. In fact, one of these articles stated more millionaires are being made there in a week than anywhere in the world and things like that.

General TAYLOR. That is a vast overstatement. There is no great amount of wealth in Saigon. It is just the contrast between the peace of Saigon and the unhappy disorders of other parts of the country.

Senator CARLSON. Of course this article stated we are pouring in, what is it, a million and half dollars a day?

General TAYLOR. That has been quoted. That is what they had reference to.

Senator CARLSON. That has been quoted and that has been made reference to, and somebody is going to make some money.

General **Taylor**. No doubt it is, but we are making sure it gets out into the provinces where it is intended to go.

Senator **Carlson**. That is all.

Senator **Sparkman**. Senator Lausche.

NO COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

Senator **Lausche**. In the formation of this triumvirate government, was there any consideration given to the inclusion of Communist representation in it at any time?

General **Taylor**. No, indeed.

Senator **Lausche**. None whatsoever?

General **Taylor**. Completely unthinkable.

Senator **Lausche**. And this triumvirate is made up of three military men, is that correct?

General **Taylor**. That is correct.

COMPARISON OF DIEM AND KHANH

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Ambassador, can you tell whether there is in existence any feeling among the people that the Diem government served better the interests of South Vietnam and the United States than this new junta?

General **Taylor**. It would be very hard to get a consensus on any point of that sort, but I would say that the Diem government had become so unpopular, rightly or wrongly—I put it that way because the Diem government had many merits in my judgment—but it had become so unpopular that its overthrow was received with tremendous enthusiasm, and when you mention today Diem wasn't really a bad fellow, very few Vietnamese would risk that statement.

Senator **Lausche**. I ask that question because for years we heard that Diem was the man about whom we had to build our strength and our hopes, that he was the only one available.

Now we hear the same words about Khanh. You just stated that you thought that he was the indispensable man at present.

General **Taylor**. He is certainly the best one in sight. If we had our pick, we would go back and pick Khanh again. Actually, we didn't pick Khanh. He simply popped up and surprised everyone.

I am thoroughly aware of the weakness of our position where our hope rests in one man. I would not say that is exactly that way. There are three or four that I could think of who could be thrown in, but not one of whom is as good as Khanh as we now know him.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator **Lausche**. How many military men does South Vietnam have now?

General **Taylor**. They will have, including all the paramilitary forces, everyone with a gun that starts with the regular forces all the way down, something over 500,000.

Senator **Lausche**. Is that number less or more than it was in the maximum of their strength since 1954, if you know?

General **Taylor**. It is the maximum.

Senator **Lausche**. It is the maximum?

General **Taylor**. And going up somewhat above that.

RATE OF DESERTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. To what extent have there been desertions?

General TAYLOR. Desertions?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. There are always desertions in any army, some more than others. Desertion rates have concerned us very much at certain times. During the postcoup period where everything was trembling a bit, the desertion rate shot way up in not only the paramilitary forces but also the army itself.

Senator LAUSCHE. When was that?

General TAYLOR. That was in the early spring, in March, April were bad months.

Senator LAUSCHE. And to what percentage did it jump?

General TAYLOR. It went up as high as 20 percent, 20 per 1,000 in paramilitary and, as I recall, about 12 per 1,000 in the regulars. That is past, however; the desertion rates are well down now, well down by previous standards, so that I would say that the rate is about normal.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was 20 percent?

General TAYLOR. Twenty out of 1,000 in a given month deserted. You have to go back and define terms again. Desertion isn't necessarily what it means with us. It means absence from the ranks over a number of days, and the record of whether this man comes back again is never shown in the statistics.

Senator LAUSCHE. You were disturbed by this?

General TAYLOR. Many of these would be absent without leave the way we count it.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the number of desertions at present?

General TAYLOR. I would have to get the figures. It is about one-half of what I quoted before.

Senator LAUSCHE. But I thought they at one time gave us figures that were far in excess of 20 per 1,000. Twenty percent would be one-tenth of 1 percent, wouldn't it?

General TAYLOR. Per month.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, 2 percent.

General TAYLOR. If you would like to have it accurate for the record, I will give you the exact figures. Frankly, I am hazy as to the exact numbers, but it was very, very high in those two months. It is about one-half of that at the present time. In other words, it has fallen back to what we call normal.

Senator LAUSCHE. You understand why I am asking the question. I think that would be an area in which your words are corroborated or repudiated by the status of the military strength at present. But——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Frank, 2 percent a month would be the equivalent of a total of 24 percent a year if you gave no credit for any returnees.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. That matches up with what has been said to me.

General TAYLOR. I think that is right. If you want the exact figures, I would have to go to the Department of Defense to get it, but your point is well taken. It is very high, distressingly high, in the spring and now it has subsided to a nominal level.

ARMY INDUCTION GOALS

Senator **Lausche**. Are the military leaders having trouble in keeping their subordinates in order?

General **Taylor**. No, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. Are they having trouble procuring induction into the military service?

General **Taylor**. This has been a major problem because they have a goal for the end of the year which I was sure they weren't going to meet because of the limited volunteering and inductions about June. We called this very forcefully to the military authorities and they have made very great efforts to improve the efficiency of the mobilization system, the conscription system, and to put on a real drive in picking up draft evaders. In the fourth corps alone, they picked up over 4,000 last month. So that now they are almost on the projected curve of increased strength, and I really have a feeling they are going to reach their objective, if not on January 1, no later than February 1.

Senator **Lausche**. That is, in your judgment the ability to procure military men, either by forced conscription or enlistment is not one that should cause us worry?

General **Taylor**. It is something to watch all the time, because it goes deeper than your direct question. It is the rational use of manpower at this time. Every country, in time of war, at some point has to really sit down and decide how they can afford to use their men. That has never been done carefully in South Vietnam.

We have now a joint committee, United States and Vietnamese, working on this, and we have invited from the United States two experts, one from the Selective Service people, and the other from the Office of Defense Mobilization, who are experts in the wartime use of manpower. There is a lot of work to be done before we are sure that the right people are going into the right places. For example, now a young man can volunteer to be a village guard and defend his village and get credit for military service and never go into the army although he may be exactly the right age.

INCREASING AMERICAN PERSONNEL

Senator **Lausche**. Why are we increasing our number of personnel?

General **Taylor**. To improve supervision, largely. This was to get down one more echelon in the military and the administrative side, getting down to battalion level on the military side and to the district level in the territorial side. The district is just below the province; one province will have four to five to six districts.

Senator **Lausche**. It has not been because you have been having trouble in keeping the South Vietnam army intact?

General **Taylor**. No, sir, it is simply to get better supervision, trying to get better performance.

STATUS QUO IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH

Senator **Lausche**. Has there been any change of opinion regarding the necessity of our Government maintaining the status quo, at least, in that Southeast area?

General **Taylor**. Not that I know of, sir. I wouldn't say that our objective is simply the status quo. The status quo is not good enough.

Senator **Lausche**. I am putting it in that limited form.

That is, among the chiefs of the military staff?

General **Taylor**. No, sir——

Senator **Lausche**. I know you are not a member, but as far as you know, there has been no change about the correctness of the position which we have taken that that is our first line of defense and we can't give it up?

General **Taylor**. In these last 3 days, Senator Lausche, I have talked to every senior official who has a right to participate in this program or have an opinion about it. I find nothing but determination to carry forward to a successful conclusion, which is better than the status quo.

Senator **Lausche**. And that determination is predicated on the conviction that it is necesssary for the security of our own country.

General **Taylor**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. All right. That is all.

Senator **Sparkman**. When you say you have talked to, you mean our people here you talked with?

General **Taylor**. Yes, in Government.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Senator Mundt.

OVERTHROW OF BIG MINH

Senator **Mundt**. General, we used to hear a lot about a fellow over there who was called Big something or other.

General **Taylor**. Big Minh.

Senator **Mundt**. Yes. Whatever happened to him?

General **Taylor**. He is very much around. He is one of the characters I have been talking about.

Senator **Mundt**. Big Minh, is it?

General **Taylor**. M-i-n-h.

Senator **Sparkman**. He is part of this group.

Senator **Mundt**. Is he one of the triumvirate?

General **Taylor**. Yes. He has been the head of state. He has been the front man all long.

Senator **Mundt**. He was kind of jumpy.

General **Taylor**. He is like Achilles, he sulks in his tent. He doesn't like his role. He wants more power but no work.

Senator **Mundt**. You said earlier they had a triumvirate and one was kicked off.

General **Taylor**. Minh was the head of the junta that overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963. He then was thrown out with his junta by Khanh, but Khanh retained him even then as the head of state, the front man.

Senator **Mundt**. Does he have capacity to take over if something happened to Khanh?

General **Taylor**. He might well be the man we would turn to. He is not as able a man as Khanh. He is more popular, but he is not bright and he doesn't like to work.

Senator **Mundt**. What happened to the Harvard professor who had 2 weeks in the sun?

General **Taylor**. He is still in business but his wings have been rather trimmed because Khanh did not enjoy being called a "mental case."

Senator **Mundt**. I imagine not.

USE OF MERCENARY TROOPS

I read the other day about 54, or something like that, mercenary troops who were flown up to the front and then quit all at one time.

What was the story behind that?

General **Taylor**. Mercenary troops?

Senator **Mundt**. Yes, about 50 mercenary troops. I gathered they were Chinese, but I don't know. They were flown up to the front line, they didn't like the looks of the situation, and they all quit. They just quit, in the last week.

General **Taylor**. We have no mercenaries that I know of.

Senator **Mundt**. That is what I was trying to get at. What kind of mercenaries do we have?

General **Taylor**. I am confused.

Senator **Mundt**. Do the Vietnamese have them? They were called mercenaries.

General **Taylor**. They had difficulties in a special forces unit but, which is not a mercenary force.

Senator **Mundt**. As you know, neither the United States nor Khanh employs any mercenary troops that would be non-Vietnamese, that would be recruited from some other countries.

General **Taylor**. We have a few technicians who come in for various purposes, but no formed body of mercenary troops that I can think of.

Senator **Mundt**. None at all. It was written right out in bold-faced type.

General **Taylor**. I am sorry, I am just confused.

Senator **Mundt**. You are probably right, the reporter is probably wrong.

General **Taylor**. I think he used the word "mercenary" wrong.

Senator **Mundt**. Yes, he might have used it wrong.

VIETCONG BEHAVIOR

The Vietcong must be trying to win that war. Why do they slack off when there is turmoil and trouble at home? You would think they would be stepping it up. If you were running the troops, you would be stepping that up.

General **Taylor**. I would. I don't have a good answer. I have two possible ones: One, they were caught by surprise with all this turmoil and they stood back and looked over the situation, and then I expect we might get a flareup pretty soon; and second, they enjoyed seeing the South Vietnamese punching each other on the nose and they might interrupt it if they came in. Those are about the best explanations that I can think of.

DESERTERS AND DEFECTORS

Senator **Mundt**. You have told us about the ratio of desertions on our side, the free side. There have been desertions from the other side coming our way. Is that getting greater or smaller?

General **Taylor**. That is right. Many fewer than—of course, what we get is a true deserter, he is a defector. When we say deserter, that does not mean he goes over to the enemy. He wants to go back to his family because there has been no leave or furlough policy of any kind in the South Vietnamese army of any rationality. So the two are really not comparable.

Senator **Mundt**. I realize that. I was trying to find out whether the true deserters coming our way are getting more numerous or fewer in number?

General **Taylor**. They never have been very numerous. They are still few in number and always have been.

Senator **Lausche**. Would you provide for the record a tabulation of the desertions just before the Diem government was put out and what it has been since, say, at various intervals of three months?

General **Taylor**. If we have the figures.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

General **Taylor**. I say this because a lot of our datakeeping is of fairly recent origin.

Senator **Lausche**. Give us the figures the best you can, please. Pardon me, Senator Mundt.

[The following information was received:]

VIETNAM DESERTION RATES PER THOUSAND

	RVNAF	Regional force	Popular force
1962:			
June	5.88	3.38	17.13
July	4.27	12.16	13.08
August	4.25	13.46	12.78
September	3.08	6.61	8.22
October	3.67	5.29	11.57
November	3.98	9.68	10.19
December	4.07	2.51	11.03
1963:			
January	4.00	8.58	11.60
February	3.32	3.08	11.50
March	2.99	11.98	13.18
April	3.99	8.27	13.48
May	4.55	11.33	12.27
June	4.05	.99	13.28
July	3.14	10.54	14.06
August	3.81	12.46	14.25
September	3.11	7.69	16.20
October	2.71	7.47	16.27
November	4.10	3.09	19.35
December	4.92	14.86	28.62
1964:			
January	6.80	(10.1) 14.36	40.72
February	5.40	(8.9) 24.83	32.83
March	12.05	(24.4) 13.12	43.03
April	10.05	21.93	38.44
May	6.77	12.28	22.91

VIETNAM DESERTION RATES PER THOUSAND—Continued

	RVNAF	Regional force	Popular force
June	5.72	8.65	19.91
July	5.29	19.24	17.37

BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Would it tend to follow in your mind, as a military expert now, and not as Ambassador, but as a career military man?

General TAYLOR. I have taken off that coat, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. No, don't talk as an Ambassador. Would it tend to follow the fact we went up there and bombed the boat bases and their depots and their supplies and gave them a pretty good bombing, as I understand it, and they did nothing more dangerous than to scream, would it tend to follow if we would carry this warfare to them a little more vigorously on their supply lines and so forth that maybe we could drive them out of there, that they are not prepared to go beyond screaming?

General TAYLOR. I don't think—I certainly could not give you any answer in which I would have any great confidence, but I certainly don't have the feeling that they are looking for direct military confrontation with the United States. I think it is still a mystery why they stuck their neck out as far as they did on the occasion last August.

Senator MUNDT. Have we any intelligence from any of these deserters coming our way as to why they decided to take on the navy?

General TAYLOR. The kind we get wouldn't know.

Senator MUNDT. They wouldn't know. It would seem to me that if they are not prepared to do anything more than just holler, that if we go up and gave them that lambasting, if we just pursue them a little bit with hot pursuit, they couldn't do anything more besides scream either, and maybe we would begin to win the war.

General TAYLOR. You may be right.

DAMAGE DONE BY BOMBING

Senator GORE. What losses were inflicted by our bombing of August?

General TAYLOR. Of North Vietnam on the enemy? I really don't know. I have been off the track of the military reporting on this, so I really am not the——

Senator GORE. You haven't heard any report as to the casualties?

General TAYLOR. They destroyed pretty well the targets which were attacked. There was a minimum of any civilian damage, apparently a good surgical job done by the naval bombers, but I really don't have any figures.

Senator MUNDT. Did I understand you to say earlier that Madame Nhu, the assassinated president's wife, had really been in Saigon?

General TAYLOR. The mother of Madame Nhu.

Senator MUNDT. The mother?

General **Taylor**. Yes, the mother.

Senator **Mundt**. I thought you said Madame Nhu.

General **Taylor**. This was the former Ambassador.

Senator **Mundt**. I misunderstood you.

The **Chairman**. Tran Van Chuong.

Senator **Mundt**. I misunderstood you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. No more questions.

The **Chairman**. Senator Stennis.

HOW CAN KHANH GOVERNMENT CARRY ON A WAR?

Senator **Stennis**. Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank you for being here. If there are no other members of your committee, I do have one question.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead. Do you want to ask a question?

Senator **Aiken**. I have no questions.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator **Stennis**. I just want to say to the Ambassador, the way you described this government, I don't see how they can carry on a war at all, General. Your appraisal, I believe, would be worth a lot to all of us. Just how do they manage to keep this thing going at all?

General **Taylor**. Well——

Senator **Stennis**. How well is it going?

General **Taylor**. I haven't painted a very brilliant picture of the government, I must admit, but I don't have the feeling that it can't keep on doing about what it has done. It is, frankly, not good enough. But so much of this is decentralized. Military operations aren't even planned or ordered from Saigon. It is done from four levels. So much of the aid that goes out through the war goes out through the American side.

So the government is not nearly as deeply involved in military operations as one would think. Without examining the paraphernalia of government, this is not a good situation, but it doesn't augur at all a cessation of military effectiveness in my judgment.

Senator **Stennis**. So the military operations are operated by the military part of the regime there?

General **Taylor**. Pretty much.

Senator **Stennis**. Plus the American guidance and supplies and facilities.

General **Taylor**. Pretty much so. There are injections from the government which should be there in terms of help from the nonmilitary agencies, from public health, from agriculture, and welfare. All these other agencies have a role to play, and if they don't perform that reduces the efficiency of it but it doesn't stop it.

ORIGINS OF THE VIETCONG

Senator **Stennis**. Did you say, and this is the only question in addition I have, that the Vietcong military men are largely men from South Vietnam, or did I misunderstand that?

General **Taylor**. Yes. Almost to a man, the Vietcong are of the origin of South Vietnam. They either have been recruited there or they have gone north and trained in the north and come back again. We found about a month ago three or four prisoners who were bona fide North Vietnamese. That caused a great interest because we didn't know whether that meant they were running short of recruits in the south or whether perhaps they were actually sending volunteer units down to join the Vietcong or what.

We still have nothing to follow that. We got those prisoners and that have all stopped, so we don't know exactly what has taken place. But up to that point, these people had been local boys fighting in the country but generally trained outside.

Senator **STENNIS**. Trained in the north?

General **TAYLOR**. Yes.

Senator **STENNIS**. I didn't know to what extent that this was true.

General **TAYLOR**. Yes, sir.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Will the Senator yield?

Senator **STENNIS**. Yes.

CONFLICT WITH REPORTS OF INFILTRATION

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Doesn't that conflict with reports made to us that the problem has been the infiltration from North Vietnam and through the Laotian border of outsiders that were causing the trouble?

General **TAYLOR**. The outsiders, though, are many times South Vietnamese who have gone north, received their training, and come back again, and the equipment they have brought back is always from the north, so I don't think it is contradictory.

A CIVIL WAR

Senator **STENNIS**. That is all. That is the major point I wished to make. it means more or less a civil war in South Vietnam directed by the Vietcong.

General **TAYLOR**. Directed and supported.

Senator **STENNIS**. Yes.

General **TAYLOR**. Their logistics base is outside the country.

Senator **STENNIS**. Yes.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Does Red Russia have diplomatic relations with them and an office in South Vietnam?

General **TAYLOR**. Not in South Vietnam, no, sir.

Senator **CARLSON**. May I ask one question?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes.

AMERICAN CIVILIANS IN VIETNAM

Senator **CARLSON**. General, you mentioned we had 22,000 military people there. What is the total of our civilian population in all phases we operate in over there, just roughly?

General **TAYLOR**. I would have to—on top of the military people, there are only a couple of thousand, but then there are several thousand dependents also. If you would like to have the exact figures, I can supply it.

[The following information was received:]

U.S. Civilian Personnel in Vietnam

Organization:	*Number*
Embassy:	
Personnel	103
Dependents	93

USOM (AID Mission):	
Direct hire personnel	481
Dependents	509
Contract personnel	210
Dependents	108
USIS:	
Personnel	51
Dependents	84
Military civilians:	
Personnel	299
Dependents	142
Dependents of military personnel	523
Total	2,403

Senator CARLSON. I thought it was more than that we had out in the field, in the aid programs and all that.

General TAYLOR. No, the aid program is still about 600,000 to 700,000 people.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

General TAYLOR. Recruiting has been very slow in that area. It is hard to get good men in there.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

UNITED STATES PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to ask one question arising out of a previous one you mentioned.

You said how it operates, in spite of the confusion in the central government. Is our aid program, I believe Mr. Killen is now operating it——

General TAYLOR. Killen.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Is it operating in a satisfactory manner under these conditions?

General TAYLOR. It is having growing pains. I would say Mr. Killen has a much more difficult problem than General Westmoreland, because he has to put together these very complex, nonmilitary programs with limited personnel. I just mentioned the difficulty of recruiting people for that. He has not got to the point where there is in every province at least one representative of AID so there is somebody on the ground seeing that the end product gets where it is intended.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering if this wasn't a stabilizing effect.

General TAYLOR. It is working and we still have a lot of progress to make, not only in better efficiency in the operations we do but also getting the best priorities to be sure we get first things first and not get a sort of shotgun effect application.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard Mr. Killen as a competent administrator?

General TAYLOR. I never had known him before. He came with a very fine reputation. He had been in Pakistan, Korea, and one other country. He is a driver, he is a logical thinker, a two-fisted fellow. I am sure he is going to be a strong man.

I just haven't seen enough of him to have a firsthand knowledge.

The **Chairman**. I was just wondering how that aspect of the operation was proceeding, and I thought it might have some bearing upon the carrying on of the war.

General **Taylor**. It has a very important part.

The **Chairman**. And going on in spite of this difficulty in Saigon?

General **Taylor**. It is so important to dovetail the nonmilitary and military. It is important that as the troops provide security, the other elements come in showing the people you have liberated there is a better way of life and orchestrating that, and it is not easy without a good government.

GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC

The **Chairman**. Yes. The press always ask, "Was the General optimistic or was he pessimistic?" They invariably ask that. What should I answer in case they ask me?

General **Taylor**. Well, say the General is generally optimistic.

The **Chairman**. He is just a born optimist.

Senator **Sparkman**. I find usually a good answer is, "He was realistic."

General **Taylor**. It is easy to look at these situations either with dark spectacles or light ones. I always feel better when I use the light ones.

The **Chairman**. Is it fair to say it is a difficult situation, but you don't think it is hopeless?

General **Taylor**. There is hope.

The **Chairman**. There is hope. Of course, all of us have that question. Is this a fair question, is it fair to say that you should not regard this as an isolated obligation but it does have very grave bearings, important bearings, to what is going on in Malaysia and Indonesia?

General **Taylor**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. For example, if we pulled out——

General **Taylor**. Pakistan, India.

A DOMINO EFFECT

The **Chairman** [continuing]. If we pulled out, what effect do you think it would have upon the struggle that is going on now with regard to Malaysia?

General **Taylor**. Certainly you would get a domino effect in that, first, if we pulled out then all South Vietnam would very shortly become Communist under a single government. Whatever we have in Laos would slough away. Thailand would at least become neutral and soon have to start playing footsie with the Communists. In Burma and India you would soon feel the tremors in this situation. Indonesia would be encouraged to take the step which she may take anyway with Communist help. The Philippines could hardly be unaffected by this gathering mass of Communist encirclement.

The **Chairman**. So in your opinion, this is an extremely important operation contributing to what stability there is in the whole area?

General **Taylor**. Very much so, and the final point is that we can't afford to confirm Ho Chi Minh's and Khrushchev's statement that this is a war of liberation and wave of the future, and that this is the way communism is going to grow.

A REALISTIC POLICY

The **Chairman**. At the moment you feel that our present policy is about the only one; we have no alternative but to pursue this as a practical, realistic people?

General **Taylor**. I certainly believe so. There is no true alternative. There are variants from what we are doing but no alternative to our objectives.

The **Chairman**. You want to do better, of course, but the basic objective of maintaining the operation and the independence of the Saigon government is still our objective.

General **Taylor**. Yes.

NO POLICY TO ESCALATE WAR INTO NORTH VIETNAM

The **Chairman**. Is it also fair to say that as of the moment there is no plan to escalate the war into North Vietnam in a large way?

General **Taylor**. There are always plans, but there is no decision.

The **Chairman**. There is no policy or, what should I say, intention of it?

General **Taylor**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. There is no plan at the moment that you are about to go into it.

General **Taylor**. No.

The **Chairman**. They will always ask that.

General **Taylor**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions?

SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSCRIPTION

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two very brief questions, first to clear up one thing in my own thinking. You referred to the draft. They do have a selective service program?

General **Taylor**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. Does that apply to the entire country?

General **Taylor**. Well, only South Vietnam.

Senator **Sparkman**. I mean South Vietnam.

The **Chairman**. That is under control.

Senator **Sparkman**. In other words, it is not just in this area?

General **Taylor**. No. Obviously it has no meaning in the areas where there is no control.

A NO-WIN POLICY

Senator **Sparkman**. Now, the second thing, following the line of questioning of the chairman. We often hear the criticism that ours is a no-win policy in South Vietnam. You do not subscribe to that?

General **Taylor**. I am not trying to conduct a no-win campaign, I can assure you.

Senator **Sparkman**. We are in there with the intention and purpose and aim of winning.

General **Taylor**. We don't spend a million and a half dollars a day to lose.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. I meant to ask, How large is the Vietnamese army aside from ours?

General **Taylor**. In total strength, you have to count, just under 500,000

The **Chairman**. Under 500,000. Any other questions?

A SENSE OF ADVENTURE

General, I think you have had a tough job out there. When you came here I told you, I warned you about giving up the relatively pleasant——

General **Taylor**. You are right.

The **Chairman** [continuing]. And organized position to take the one out there, and I admit your sense of adventure——

General **Taylor**. There is a lot of adventure in it. It is an exciting life, I must say.

The **Chairman**. I can imagine it is. We certainly wish you well.

General **Taylor**. Don't ever feel sorry for us. We don't need sympathy.

The most frustrating part of the assignment is having people say, "What can I give you that you haven't got," and I say, "Nothing." So it leaves me with nobody to blame but myself.

FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET DIRECTOR

Senator **Hickenlooper**. May I say, Mr. Chairman, this fellow Vou Van Thai, who used to be budget director——

General **Taylor**. Yes; I know him by name there.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He had a falling out with Diem. He was over in this country. He came over, I think, with credentials as Ambassador, and then Khanh came in and he never presented his credentials and he is hanging around someplace.

General **Taylor**. I never met him.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He impressed me. When he was budget director, he impressed me as being a fellow with some considerable capability, although he wanted to take the bit in his teeth and go on frolics of his own in organizing the department probably. That is where he fell out, I guess, with Diem.

General **Taylor**. The great pity is that among the able, experienced administrators of the Vietnamese, so many of them are either tarred with the Diem brush or the French brush, and these are both ruled out completely at present.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, he finally fell out with Diem. I think Diem's crowd was looking for him. He managed to get away. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

Mr. **Lee**. The General was asked the same question by the House committee this morning about what would be the effect of our pulling out, and the committee liked his answer so well that they asked permission to take that out of the record and make it public, which the Ambassador——

The **Chairman**. The Ambassador has an opportunity to make it public right outside the door.

Senator **Sparkman**. They are lying in wait.

The **Chairman**. They are lying in wait for him now.

Senator **Carlson**. As a matter of fact, I don't want to leave until the chairman and General leave here.

The **Chairman**. This being an executive session, I think we ought to be very discreet, particularly with reference to some of these personalities you discussed. It won't help his job any to say anything about some of those things.

General **Taylor**. Yes; in any clearing of testimony, I forget whether this committee has a sanitized——

The **Chairman**. This is an executive session. There is no intention to make it public at all.

General **Taylor**. I hope so. There are so many things I say. There is no military violation, but there are so many——

The **Chairman**. It is just what you say out there. What I say, I will try to be as neutral as I can.

General **Taylor**. May I say I found complete unanimity in maintaining our position in South Vietnam? [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, and Carlson.

Raul H. Castro appeared before the committee in regard to his nomination to be Ambassador to El Salvador.

At the conclusion of his testimony, and on motion by Senator Morse, and by unanimous consent, the committee voted favorably to report the nomination to the Senate.

The committee discussed the probability of receiving further nominations before the adjournment sine die of Congress. On motion of Senator Morse, and without objection, the staff was authorized to poll the committee on those nominations which may be received before adjournment but could not be made a subject for a committee meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 10:25 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 9:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (Subcommittee Chairman) and Senators Mansfield and Gore.

Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, discussed the situation in Latin America with the subcommittee.

No transcript was taken at the meeting.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Hickenlooper, Lausche, and Church.

Also present: Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive meeting with Ambassador Taylor, discussing South Vietnam.

You may proceed, General.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

General TAYLOR. I know you gentlemen are well informed on the overall subject. Looking back on my last visit 2 months ago, it occurred to me to ask myself what happened since then and introduce the subject in that manner.

On the governmental side, you recall when I was here in September it had just been agreed by the Khanh government that the Khanh government would turn over power to a civilian government within a period of some 60 days and that a series of events would take place; that there would be the selection of what was later called the High National Council—some 15 members, representative broadly of the social and political interests in the country. And these founding fathers, then, would draw up a charter which would be a kind of outline constitution. The High National Council would also choose a chief of state, the chief of state then would choose a prime minister, the prime minister would form a cabinet and they would set up in business with the High National Council then becoming a legislative branch, charged with drawing up an ultimate constitution and deciding how to form a national assembly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Off the record.

General TAYLOR. I want to point out, we are on schedule, we have done these things. Mr. Suu is the chief of state. Mr. Huong is the Prime Minister. He, in turn, has a Cabinet of some 14 members who are in business.

The High National Council is starting to work on the very tough problem of how to set up the national assembly, to what extent will elections be held, the basis of representation, and all those problems. That would sound as if I am giving you a favorable governmental report. Up to this point, it is good. They have carried forward a program which we didn't even know whether they could execute or even advance so far as they actually have.

CRITICISM BY MINORITY GROUPS

But no sooner had the Huong government been set up in business and accepted by the High National Council and the chief of state, than all of the little minority groups who were not represented in the cabinet and who had in their midst an ambitious politician, began to chip away at the government, before it had done anything. The general criticisms have been that it is not truly representative, that there is not enough true revolutionary spirit among the ministers, that they are technicians and not politicians, and so on. The result has been the disorders which have been occurring now for some 3 weeks, all designed to pull Huong down before he even got started.

As you see, Huong has shown courage, determination, and said he is not going to allow this downfall to happen. He is going to carry forward at least for the period of time required up until the composition of the assembly, which may then either confirm his government or choose another one. So his objective is to carry on and execute this mandate.

PUTTING OUT FIRES

If it did not have all these disturbances, I would say the government has a reasonable chance for doing a pretty good job. It is not a brilliant government. We are not going to turn out a brilliant government. You don't have brilliant men there.

I would say, however, it would be an acceptable government. It has been difficult for ministers to govern while they are putting out fires, resisting the efforts to tear them down. Yet in spite of that, the ministers are generally relatively competent men with some administrative experience, and most are doing quite well.

On the economic side, our AID director is quite happy with the way these men are picking up his programs and moving forward with them.

MILITARY PROGRESS

On the military side, in the last 2 months, again, there has been considerable progress in that the performance of the government troops is improving all the time. The kill ratio is vastly in favor of the government, running 5 or 6 to 1 at the present time.

Senator **Lausche**. Do you verify that phase of it?

General **Taylor**. Actually, a great many of the operations are observed by American officers, and they count the bodies. So the body count is accurate in those cases.

Now, there are cases where there is no American, and then the credibility goes down. And there also is the factor, when you see the dead bodies, you are not sure who is a Vietcong and who is a farmer who was in the line of fire. So there is ample room for error in the estimate. But even with 20 percent plus or minus, it is still a rather impressive record on the side of the government.

This results to some extent from the fact that volunteering is up. We had about twice as many volunteers last month as anticipated. Not very many, a couple of thousand, but nonetheless the estimate based on past experience would have been a little over one-half of that. The conscription law which has always been on the books is starting to be applied somewhat better, but there is still a great lag in the administration of the conscription law.

GENERAL KHANH'S WITHDRAWAL

I will remind you, however, that of all the armed forces in South Vietnam, of which now there are over 500,000, about 80 percent are volunteers. It is essentially a voluntary force. Conscription has never produced a very large number. So I would say on that score there has been some progress made. The air force is now rounding out its fourth squadron, which is the present objective.

Khanh seems to be sincere in withdrawing from politics, although I must say he sits back and looks like the cat watching the mouse, as this civilian government goes ahead. He is the commander in chief now, with no position in the cabinet.

I urged strongly that he be made concurrently minister of defense, so he would have to sit at the table and share responsibility with the members of the government. He pled his point that he wanted all military people out of politics. Whether that is his bona fide reason, I am not sure, but he certainly has nothing now but military functions and he is applying himself diligently to do what he knows is necessary—trying to heal the wounds in the army, remedy the schisms which appeared, which resulted in the abortive September 13 coups. For the moment, at least, he seems to be applying himself effectively to that area.

The CHAIRMAN. How is the desertion rate?

General TAYLOR. The desertion rate is what we might call normal. It is never good, but is is down to the average rates, both in the armed forces and the paramilitary.

Now, those events, those conditions generally summarize the last 2 months.

AN UNCERTAIN GOVERNMENT

The overall picture, as I would describe it, is a highly shaky, uncertain government which has about a 50–50 chance of resisting all the minority efforts to drag it down, in spite of the determination of Huong, who really seems in earnest about holding his job.

I cannot report any dramatic success in the overpacification program; that is, the clearing and holding of the provinces. The reports we get each month are spotty, they are uneven. There is progress in one province and retrogression in the next one.

Certainly the overall picture is not good. If anything, the national average is a little down. We have the feeling pacification operations are bogged down, and no impetus is immediately available to get this thing moving again, and probably there won't be any impetus until we get a reasonably satisfactory government in Saigon.

REINFORCEMENT OF THE VIETCONG

So our problems really are twofold. We have many problems, but they stem from two basic problems. One is the instability of government which I have already commented on. The second is the continuing direction and reinforcement of the Vietcong movement from North Vietnam. This goes on all the time. There are efforts to plug this up by covering the frontier, by what we call resources control throughout the country—all make some contributions, but they are certainly far from adequate. We kill one Vietcong off, but like the phoenix they seem to be able to regenerate their strength, either from an influx in the north or from local recruiting.

Now, local recruiting must be getting tougher for them, because we have found among the killed and captured, boys 14 and 15 years of age. And that last time I was here I commented on the appearance, which has now been confirmed in many cases, of bona fide North Vietnamese who have never put their foot in South Vietnam before being sent down to fill the gap. In other words, they are running out of indigenous South Vietnamese who can be trained and inducted into the VC.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

The problems of government we must work on in all the ways we can think of, first by overall encouragement and advice to the government, putting all the pressures we can upon the minority groups to remind them of their folly in tearing down a government in time of war, in trying to assist the government into doing those things which will testify to its sincere interest in the people. Such things include civic action programs in the provinces which will result in the creation of many small things, a new bridge here, a new well there, a new school yonder, inexpensive in themselves but highly important to attract the loyalty of the people in the country to the government.

MEASURES AGAINST INFILTRATION

In the matter of infiltration, we are just where we have been in all our previous discussions. The in-country measures we take are inadequate. We are faced, then, at the proper time with going outside the country, into Laos, to try to destroy the logistic installations along the Laotian trails leading into North Vietnam; by sea, trying to control all sea movement emanating out of North Vietnam, and finally always being prepared to retaliate for something like the Binh Hoa attack, or moving into the attack on infiltration targets in North Vietnam.

These military possibilities I am talking about have been discussed many times in the past, and we always come out about the same place. Most of us feel we will have to do some of them at some point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do what?

General TAYLOR. Engage in anti-, counter-infiltration military operations outside of South Vietnam.

But, on the other hand, we should not start off on such operations with a government in whose name we are acting or whom we are supporting that might fall on its face.

The **Chairman**. That is the big trouble, isn't it?

General **Taylor**. So we really come out, in my mind at least, by saying we have to demand of this government some evidence of reliability beyond what we have now before we engage ourselves deeply on the military side. On the other hand, I am equally sure that at some point, unless we get that kind of government and take that kind of military action, I see no chance of ultimate substantial success.

That is about all the fill-in I wanted to make.

WHAT ARE YOU FIGHTING FOR?

The **Chairman**. That last point is the very point that disturbs me. It seems to me futile to go on expanding it when the government itself is so shaky. If you cannot create a reasonably stable government that has the support of a good solid majority of the local people, what are we going to come back to? What are you fighting for? We don't want the country.

General **Taylor**. There is a chicken-egg aspect to this, of course. Any action against the north that would tell the South Vietnamese, "The old enemy is suffering just as they made us suffer for these years" would be good for the government.

The Vinh Long action on our part had a stimulating effect, but it was short lived.

BUDDHIST OPPOSITION

The **Chairman**. What is the face of this opposition? Is it Buddhist thinkers?

General **Taylor**. No, sir, it is not. We delude ourselves by our own term.

The **Chairman**. How do you describe that?

General **Taylor**. The Buddhists we are talking about are the leaders of the Buddhist Institute for the Realization of the Darma. Now, that is really the political Buddhist structure in South Vietnam. It is made up largely—the active members come from the Hoa area, Tri Quang, the leader comes from that area. Most of the strength is outside of Saigon, but its offices are in Saigon, and Saigon being the capital, that is where they have most of the demonstrations.

But they are not the spokesmen for 80 percent of the country, whom we often say are Buddhist. For example, this government which they say they fear because it might be anti-Buddhist, there is only one Catholic in it or maybe two. They are all Buddhists, and respected citizens. But they are not the kind of Buddhists who will do things for the leadership in Saigon. And these lads are just as political as Tammany Hall in terms of what they are looking for. It has nothing to do with religion in the slightest. And, again, they don't control very much. They can turn out a mob in the street of 200 or 300, make a lot of noise, and headlines here.

WHAT THE BUDDHISTS WANT

The **Chairman**. This aspect puzzles me so much. Why in the world are they so difficult to get to join in support of the government? Nothing seems to suit them. What in the world do they want?

General TAYLOR. It is awfully hard to find out what makes them tick, primarily because—they won't even tell their own people.

I was talking to General Khiem, the new Ambassador here. I said, "Let's take our hair down and talk about some of these things. We are outside of Saigon now. Tell me what the Buddhists want." He said, "I don't know what they want. I have asked the same question. I suspect they are fronting for neutralist groups who are pushing toward a neutralist solution of some sort."

Now, I hear that report on all sides. I cannot prove it, but there is a deep suspicion that the Buddhists are fronting for neutralist politicians.

SAIGON AND THE COUNTRYSIDE

The country in general—I don't have the feeling the country is against this government. The countryside, out in the provinces, hardly knows this government. Many of them never heard of Huong. Whom they do know is their province chief, they know their district chief, the people who are conducting local government, and who are giving them protection. If that is well done, they are for that local government, regardless of who is in power back in Saigon. So it is a very curious way how you can have disorder and almost anarchy in Saigon, and the provinces almost unaffected by it.

The army has been almost unaffected by all this. Internal politicking has affected it. But insofar as government instability in Saigon, the soldiers could not care less, and don't even know much about it.

The CHAIRMAN. It sure is a puzzler to me.

I can see the logic if you had a reasonably stable government, and you thought they were relieved of such pressure as has developed. Then you have good reason to do some of these other things. But until that develops, it seems to me it would be very unwise to go out and do it, and then have, as you say, the thing blow up in your face at home the next week.

General TAYLOR. I have tried to define in my own mind in our discussions with our people in Saigon what is the minimum acceptable government. We come out with something like this.

THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE GOVERNMENT

First, we need a government that can speak for and to its own people. They have to be the government in existence and able to interpret to their own people what is taking place, and also to interpret to the outside world what is going on in their own country.

Next, they should have the ability to maintain law and order in the principal urban centers.

Third, they should be able to direct and maintain their armed forces. That means little more than saying that their armed forces are loyal to the government and accept their orders, and furthermore they can get the resources of the armed forces to maintain them in the field. The recruits have to be raised and trained, the food has to get there, and all the things necessary for the maintenance of forces in the field.

Then, finally, this is to be a government with whom we can mesh. Unless the gears of our drivewheel mesh with the wheels of their government, we spin, and our help becomes entirely worthless.

I would say those four points must be met. I think they can be met.

VISIBILITY AND DURABILITY

I would say, Huong would say, and some of the people here in town I have been discussing it with would say they probably have that now. I think that is true. Right today Huong can speak for his government, he is speaking to his people—how eloquently and effectively, I am not quite sure.

He is maintaining law and order, overcoming great odds. His military forces are presently loyal to him, and he is certainly making every effort to cooperate with them.

The feeling I have, though, Senator, is that is true today, but will it be so tomorrow?

So it is visibility and durability rather than the level of performance that concerns me.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. There are two or three things that bother me.

A WILL TO WIN

In the first place, I have not been at all convinced there is any will to win this thing on the part of the South Vietnamese. Maybe a few leaders. But this is just an impression. They are not willing to fight for their own——

General **TAYLOR**. But they do, Senator. They have been fighting for 20 years, and they are fighting today. They are taking heavy losses without any sign of flinching in the field.

The trouble is, it is these vacillating, unpatriotic, unreliable politicians in Saigon who have given this atmosphere to the whole country, which is not really true.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Then I would think in answer to that—the methods of which I would not be capable of suggesting—but the answer to that is that we had better be getting around to see that we eliminate one way or another these self-seeking politicians in Saigon who are stirring up the trouble. It is easier said than done. I know it is difficult.

General **TAYLOR**. That is the task before us. There is no doubt about it.

AMERICAN ADVISERS WITH VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. On these military activities, I also have a feeling that most of the successful actions in South Vietnam are really actions in which American so-called advisers are really leading the show. What about actions where these Vietnamese are out entirely on their own, and there is no American present?

General **TAYLOR**. We try to have that never happen, or at least to happen as infrequently as possible, because now we have our military advisers down to battalion level, which means that only company or patrol actions will not have an American, and even then sometimes the battalion adviser will join a company and go out with them.

Your picture is accurate to a large degree. This American is a good man; he is in there to see everybody is pitching. But he still is not giving orders; he is doing just what we did in Korea. This relationship is nothing new. There you got behind a Korean commander and you did whatever was necessary to get the results required from him. If your day-to-day relations were all right, you had no greater problem in getting him to perform just about the way he should.

MOTIVATION OF VOLUNTEERS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. These volunteers that you mentioned awhile ago, are they volunteers because they want to fight for their country or because they get better food and a little pay?

General **Taylor**. Certainly to a large degree because they want to fight for their country. Up until quite recently, their pay was thoroughly inadequate. In the last 3 months the government raised their pay and tried to rationalize their promotion.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. How was their pay in comparison to their income or living situation in the villages from which they came?

General **Taylor**. I cannot give you a good comparison. Of course, a man that has his own rice paddy will do better than a soldier. You look at their dependents, and they live miserably, the soldier's dependents. On the other hand, military service is not unattractive, although the police, for example, are paid considerably more than a soldier gets.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There is a growing impression on me that we are going down the same road the French did in Dien Bien Phu.

General **Taylor**. No, I would not agree with you. This may go against us, but not in that French pattern.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The pattern is slightly different, the operation is different. But I am talking about the opinion of the world, and a lot of people are watching this thing—whether we are not losing a great deal of respect, and the paper tiger is not getting a little bit more prominent.

General **Taylor**. If we ever get thrown out of this country, I agree with everything you say, we will have lost a great deal. But I say we don't have to get thrown out.

AN EROSION OF PUBLIC OPINION

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If it is an inconclusive operation continuing, continuingly inconclusive, it seems we cannot avoid the erosion of public opinion. Here is the great United States—are we as great as a lot of people used to think we were?

General **Taylor**. We haven't done a very good job in explaining this to people. I think we have discussed this point in the committee before. We still have a long way to go, but we still have resources and still have the means available to us to give us a reasonable chance to come out on top.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Without a doubt we have the means and the resources.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you mean resources of the South Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. In combination, theirs and ours.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a rather distressing thing in many ways. The problems are great.

A BUDDHIST ALTERNATIVE

I get foreign reports on some of these things periodically. I expect you do, too, Bill.

This report is talking about the Soka Gakkai in Japan. That movement there seems to have quite a revolutionary impact on the thinking of a lot of Japanese, and especially the Japanese dissidents. This report says that the Soka Gakkai would be willing to make an effort in South Vietnam if the American authorities encouraged it to do so. "He"—referring to the head of it:

> He is absolutely confident in a few months Soka Gakkai could change the situation rapidly and give the people of South Vietnam something to fight for. Soka Gakkai has carefully studied the psychology of the Communist movement, and particularly of Ho Chi Minh. Soka Gakkai knows exactly how to combat this. Soka Gakkai activities in South Vietnam would be part of a wider cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and Southeast Asia. This is the secret of defeating the Communists in this region.

That is a conclusionary paragraph.

I don't know anything about this Soka Gakkai.

General TAYLOR. May I copy that down?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You can have it.

That is the paragraph I picked out.

In other words, it apparently is Buddhist, but it is not quite the same Buddhism as in Saigon. It has an appealing impact to a lot of people, and they are apparently strongly anti-Communist, as Asians and as Buddhists, and they are anxious to do something.

I suppose they would not be adverse to getting a foothold in South Vietnam, too, as far as the Japanese are concerned. But they may have something there.

General TAYLOR. A leading Japanese Buddhist came through Saigon on his way to the conference taking place in India, and we talked along these lines, what could Japanese Buddhism do. He pointed out that there is a great sensitivity among the Buddhists because of the divisions along denominational lines. The Japanese are even more divided by sects than they are in South Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is a particular sect of Buddhism there that seems to have had a sort of electrifying effect on Buddhists in Japan. It is a sect of the Buddhists that is strongly oriented toward anticommunism.

General TAYLOR. I would certainly try anything to get a lever on the Buddhist situation in South Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know anything about these people. I just brought that over to show you.

Thank you very much.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask a few questions.

RECOMMENDATION TO PULL OUT

I read in the paper several days ago a statement attributed to some Polish leader urging us to pull out while we can do so gracefully. Are you familiar with that at all?

General **Taylor**. I have a vague recollection of reading it in the paper. I have seen nothing official on it. This, as I recall, is one of a number of what you might call peace feelers that seem to be sprouting out of the Communists now. Over in Phnom Penh we have had some little feelers. This Communist writer Burchett floated some over there.

Senator **Lausche**. Peace feelers for what purpose?

General **Taylor**. You have the feeling that Hanoi and Peking were just floating these things more or less as trial balloons to see what kind of reaction would be gotten. None of these were official. These came from third parties who talked to the Pole and indicated so and so.

But this kind of thing has turned up enough places to create an impression.

Senator **Lausche**. To me there was connected with it an element of propaganda, because it certainly made our stature appear to be small when this Polish person said, "Get out while you can gracefully get out."

Why would they be making peace overtures?

General **Taylor**. I just have a feeling they would like to know how serious we are. They don't expect anything serious from this kind of contact, but they try to get the fingers on the other fellow and see how he feels. They must be really concerned after all of the statements about what we are going to do: We are going to extend the war north, we are going to bomb Peking—all these things that have been in the press. I would think they are worried about that.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

WHAT MOTIVATED THE BUDDHISTS?

Now, I wasn't here—what is motivating the Buddhists in causing these disorders? Have you arrived at some conclusion in your own mind what they want?

General **Taylor**. They wanted their own people in the cabinet so they could really influence and pull the strings in the government. The Buddhist leaders took Huong, the present prime minister, two cabinet lists. They tried out one list on him. He wouldn't have it. They brought a second one back. He wouldn't have it. They concentrated on three posts in the government. He turned them down on the ground they were well represented in other areas in the government.

Since that rejection they have become increasingly difficult. But only in the last couple of days have they come out in the open and condemned the Huong government for no religious reason, but purely on the basis of the political composition of the cabinet. Behind them we think there are unidentified, partially identified politicians who are really their boys, who would expect to get into the cabinet if the Buddhists tear down this government.

Senator **Lausche**. If you yielded to them, would that solve the problem?

General TAYLOR. It certainly would not. It would make the next government's life impossible.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

WE MUST STAY AND WIN

Now, then, in your inner ranks, has there been any thought of pulling out? Has there been any change in the position that has been repeatedly taken that we cannot afford to leave that area?

General TAYLOR. On the U.S. side?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. Absolutely no weakening that I have ever determined.

Senator LAUSCHE. And your personal opinion on that item?

General TAYLOR. We must stay and win.

Senator LAUSCHE. And now, why?

General TAYLOR. Because of the tremendous impact of the loss of South Vietnam, first in Southeast Asia, and then expanding circles which would flow into the Philippines, into Indonesia, all through the western Pacific, and the great buildup of China in both a military and political sense, and, finally, the overall loss of United States prestige, not only in the Far East but throughout the entire world.

Senator LAUSCHE. To what extent is there an absence of unanimity on this judgment that we can't afford to pull out?

General TAYLOR. I know of none in the councils I have attended.

Senator LAUSCHE. You know of no disagreement?

General TAYLOR. I know of none.

Senator LAUSCHE. And on that score, we occupy the same judgment now that we did, I would say, for the last 7 or 8 years?

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

DANGERS RESULTING FROM A PULLOUT

Just for the purpose of the record, if we do pull out, what, in your opinion, will be the new troubles and dangers that will face us?

General TAYLOR. I think it would be progressive. First we would have to define the terms in the pullout to know how slow or how fast the subsequent degradation would take place. Certainly the immediate loss would be of South Vietnam itself. There might be a neutralist government which would very shortly be absorbed into the orbit of Hanoi and eventually politically assimilated into it.

The effect of that would be felt in Laos. Laos would very quickly go the same course. The two are Siamese twins, they are tied together.

Thailand would probably initially try to become neutral and hold out as best it could while accommodating necessarily with the Communists. But the Thais would have no really long-term independence, because they have no real lasting strength.

That is fairly easily predictable The rest of it you just don't know.

The Communist regime in China would get an enormous lift out of this, and you might see greater activity on the part of the Chinese in Africa, South America, many places.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They are pretty active in Africa now.

General **Taylor**. They are, that is right.

A NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT

Senator **Lausche**. To what extent, if at all, have there been discussions about creating what you would call a neutral government, or a three-headed government?

General **Taylor**. There have been no discussions in the councils I have attended.

Senator **Lausche**. And what is your opinion on the advisability of this?

General **Taylor**. I can see no acceptable formula that could be advanced for a truly neutral government. If one could wish a truly neutral government into existence, one shouldn't reject it out of hand. We would have to look at it pretty closely. But all the neutralist formulas proposed in effect take away from South Vietnam our aid, all the sources of strength which are keeping this little country alive, pulling them out, then we wait until the inevitable collapse takes place which will allow the takeover by the north.

Senator **Lausche**. I am convinced you will never have a neutral government that will last for any reasonable period of time without the Communists taking over.

TURNING THE PROBLEM OVER TO THE U.N.

Now, has there been any thought of pulling out and turning the entire problem over to the United Nations?

General **Taylor**. No, sir, I know of no such proposition.

Senator **Lausche**. What would be the advisability or inadvisability of that?

General **Taylor**. I don't think you could possibly get the U.N. to do it. They don't have the resources. We have seen their great difficulties in much easier areas than South Vietnam. You would still have 80,000 to 100,000 armed Communists within this country. Who is going to take care of them? Can the U.N. resist them? The answer is "No." They would take over just as soon as our strength was pulled out, particularly if the South Vietnamese were required to reduce their forces.

Senator **Lausche**. If we turned it over to the U.N., with the imbalance we are now faced with, with these Asian and African countries, in what position would that place us?

General **Taylor**. It exceeds the possible strength of the U.N. to such a degree it is just not a possible suggestion.

Senator **Lausche**. All right. Thanks very much.

Senator **Church**. Mr. Ambassador, when we went into Korea, the United States, as you well know, presented the strength, but we want in under the U.N. flag, U.N. auspices, and thus in a way represented the moral position taken by the world community. I don't know whether that is feasible in South Vietnam or whether the circumstances would ever permit the U.N. to move in under that kind of arrangement again, but if it could be done, would you see some possible advantage there, inasmuch as our close connection as a white Western nation with this government in Saigon might very well be a powerful stimulus to Communist propaganda?

General TAYLOR. I can see some advantage to that, Senator Church, although I am afraid as long as the Russians are still sitting at the table, it just cannot happen. So we are doing the next best thing, trying to get as many third-nation flags to participate as possible. There are now 15 third countries in the country, small detachments only, but their flag is there, their presence is there, and the effect insofar as morale is concerned has been very good indeed.

We are still pressing further to get more countries to come in on this, and also there present to raise their actual contribution. I think we can get something more. How much more, I don't know. But this is all to the good.

NO NEW DEPARTURES IN POLICY

Senator CHURCH. Are you able—and perhaps you have already covered it, but having come in a little late—are you able to tell us of any departure, new departures in policy that are now contemplated?

General TAYLOR. No, I don't think there are any really new departures in policy, because the alternatives we are looking at now we have always had in front of us, but we have always said the time hasn't come. We are still saying the time hasn't come for a great deal of this, for the reasons we developed with Senator Fulbright. We still don't have a government we are sure can last beyond the week after next. Not that I am selling this government short, I just have my fingers crossed. So until we can clear that question up, we are still left with alternatives among which we can choose, but about which we haven't made up our minds as to timing.

Senator CHURCH. The particular question that concerns me is the growing speculation that we are about to underwrite attacks on North Vietnam of various kinds.

General TAYLOR. Ever since I started back from Saigon, I have been allegedly bringing back bombs in my pocket. I can assure you that is not the case. My own point of view has not changed. We must have some form of government before we try some of these other things. I do think the day is going to come when we have to do some other things, but until we have a government that can speak for its own people and guarantee the effectiveness of its own armed forces, we certainly should not embark on any dramatic venture.

Senator CHURCH. That is all I have.

COMPARISON WITH LAOS

The CHAIRMAN. General, I would like to examine this line that Senator Lausche developed, more or less for clarification. I don't have much of a conviction. I don't know enough about it to have one.

I remember when we talked about Laos. I don't remember whether you participated in it or not, but we had conferences with the Executive about Laos. There was contemplated at one time quite a large movement there—I think 30,000 or 50,000 troops. It was thought about, but it was turned down.

The argument was made then, if we did what we did do in Laos that this would be a first domino over, and the whole thing would collapse. Well, nobody thinks the Laotian solution is an ideal one, but yet it still hangs on there, sort of in purgatory. I mean it neither goes one way nor the other.

General TAYLOR. We are a lot better off today than I thought we would be.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me we are, because not too long ago it seemed as if the whole thing was going to collapse, and for some reasons I don't understand it sort of went the other way and is a little more stable than it was.

Coming back to the effect of this thing, supposing that government—it is called "neutralist"—it looks in some ways it is a little more weak than it is neutral. I don't know whether it is neutral or not, but I really don't like this involvement. I understand the reasons you give. I don't see any future to it. Even if you get a good government, I don't see where we come out as the United States.

General TAYLOR. I would hope some day that we will have a government that obviously cannot be kicked over. Bear in mind the Communists' objective is not military. It is political. They fight their battle on the political field.

The CHAIRMAN. They do. I am reminded also of trying to see what would happen.

COMPARISON WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Take the experience of Yugoslavia. Here you have a Communist government, they call it Communist. They themselves refer to it most often as Socialist, much in the same terms that many people refer to the British Government as a Socialist government.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Yugoslavs?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, they call themselves Socialist.

Mr. Stalin thought they were renegades, the Chinese think they are renegades now.

I think we are all tangled up in these words. Everybody means something different by the word "Communist" or "Socialist." Those who dislike the British Labor Government call them Socialists, the next first cousin to a Communist, although they call the government in Demark a Socialist government without the same meaning. It is perfectly acceptable socialism. So what people mean by these words—that is everybody's subjective opinion. There is no accepted meaning in many respects.

The only point I come to is this: I am very dubious about our political capacity in this or any other of those countries to ever achieve any kind of a satisfactory solution without a strong indigenous government. That is, I don't think we can create a political government for any of these countries.

General TAYLOR. We can facilitate, we can encourage.

The CHAIRMAN. We can only help.

General TAYLOR. I agree.

NEED FOR TOLERANCE

The **Chairman**. I have always supported the policy that we have had all along. I thought that they deserved what I call a fair opportunity to create such a government. But after each failure and inability to do it, I get more and more discouraged that it is at all possible.

General **Taylor**. Let's not be too discouraged. Just look at South Vietnam. It has never had a chance to govern itself before. The adult male that you talk to in Saigon, whom you reproach frequently for all his zeal in politicking when he ought to be out saving his country—his defense is this: "Look, we want to do something for our country. We have never had a chance to. Under the Chinese we were subdued, under Bao Dai we were subdued, the French held us down, Diem held us down. For the first time we have a chance now to get out and make a contribution."

The trouble is this is a disorderly contribution, every man for himself, every voice raised in his own interest, without any sense of team play and cooperation. These countries just don't suddenly have—they grow, with political experience.

So I think we have to be tolerant, even though the facts as you state them are quite correct.

The **Chairman**. Well——

General **Taylor**. Give us time, I think we can do this. The question is do we have the time?

COMPARISON WITH THE CONGO

The **Chairman**. I am willing to give you time, but the best thing I like about what you say is that you yourself don't believe we should engage in any outside adventure until there is a real, solid belief that this government has got the support of the people, the civilian government, and it will be there after you do these other things. I think that is an absolute precondition.

General **Taylor**. I think where we will have trouble, between the two of us, or in our own government, is to decide what is the level of government performance that represents the minimum acceptable.

The **Chairman**. It is like the Congo in a way. I, of course, feel sorry for those people. I don't think we can do anything for them. I think they have got to fight it out. They may take 10 years, but I don't want to get involved in that fight in the Congo. I hope we don't go in there and try to help them establish a government, like we are doing in Vietnam. I think they do it just as well and just as quickly if they fight it out among themselves. I don't want to get in the middle.

Senator **Church**. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, along this line?

The **Chairman**. Surely.

PEKING DOES NOT DOMINATE HANOI

Senator **Church**. I just picked up an article in the Evening Star, a kind of journalistic summation from Hong Kong, summing up what was referred to as our experts on Red China giving their opinion on American policy.

The burden of the article was that the general opinion was that the United States has got to begin to establish better contact with Red China one way or another, but that they did not think that whatever was done in the direction of dealing with Red China would have much effect upon the situation in South Vietnam, the reason being, according to the article, that it is the opinion of our experts on Red China that Peking is not in a position to call off the war in Vietnam, that Peking is actually not dominating the picture to that extent, that it is basically an indigenous war. It may be aided and abetted——

General **Taylor**. Peking or Hanoi?

Senator **Church**. Peking.

General **Taylor**. Peking is not in a condition to call it off. Hanoi is.

Senator **Church**. This is the thing that perplexes me.

We are told two things. On the one hand, they say Peking cannot call this war off, they do not have this control over Hanoi. Then on the other hand, we are told that if there is some other solution to the internal problem in Vietnam, other than the triumph of the government we support, the anti-Communist government in Saigon, that the inevitable result of this is going to be to extend the Chinese hegemony and control and Communist control all throught Southeast Asia. It is hard to stack these two propositions up and make sense out of them.

General **Taylor**. No, the immediate danger is not Red China. It is Hanoi. And it would be Hanoi that would take over in the south, not Red China. But the ultimate communization of all Southeast Asia is an objective in the long run for the bloc of which Red China is the leader.

SOURCE OF HANOI'S SUPPLIES

Senator **Hickenlooper**. May I just ask General Taylor this: You mean to say if Red China just closed the borders and stopped sending all supplies into North Vietnam that would not affect the ability to continue this fight?

General **Taylor**. It would have some effect.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Where is Hanoi getting its supplies from?

General **Taylor**. Some from Red China. But the supply problem is a very simple thing.

The **Chairman**. Most of them come from what they capture from us.

General **Taylor**. They have plenty of guns. They have taken many from the French, from our people—from the South Vietnamese, that is. It is a relatively simple thing.

The **Chairman**. It sounds very much like what happened in some cases with the old Chinese when they were fighting Chiang Kai-shek.

General **Taylor**. It would certainly help to get Peking on our side and tell Hanoi to lay off at the same time we say so, but they have no reason to do that.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I simply cannot envision Hanoi being able to sustain this action for a long period of time at all without getting replenishing supplies.

General **Taylor**. They need some supplies.

Senator **Hickenlooper** [continuing]. And things of that kind from the Red Chinese.

DEFECTIONS TO THE VIETCONG

The **Chairman**. An article this morning picked up from the London Observer says:

> A local cease-fire would be observed with satisfaction in Saigon. The Vietcong claims that last year nearly 40,000 men of the Vietnamese army and its auxiliary defense forces came over to them.

General **Taylor**. That is not true.

The **Chairman**. Is it partly true?

General **Taylor**. No. The popular forces, which are the lowest echelon of the paramilitary forces, are not too well trained. They are recruited just to look after their own hamlets. Whenever an area becomes dangerously exposed, some may go over to the enemy.

The **Chairman**. Did you read this article?

General **Taylor**. No, sir.

The **Chairman**. What struck my attention is that it comes out of Singapore. To read it you would think that one of the directing influential influences in this fight is coming from Singapore.

> Senior officials of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist guerrilla army in South Vietnam, accept that the Vietcong cannot win a purely military victory. When I met some of these officials secretly in South Vietnam recently, they said that two ways were open to them.

It is a long article.

LIBERATION FRONT PROPAGANDA

General **Taylor**. Yes. It sounds like an old liberation front kind of thing. They pass this propaganda out in various capitals where they have an outlet, and it is picked up by the press.

The **Chairman**. Is there such a thing as a national liberation front in Singapore?

General **Taylor**. They probably have an office there. I have not verified it.

The **Chairman**. I never heard of this before. It is a new approach. And, of course, they are looking—the net effect of the article was that the only solution will be some form of neutralization. But that statement about 40,000 having come over with their arms——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, that is the typical Communist line.

The **Chairman**. I don't know who he is. It is written by a man from the London Observer, and the dateline is Singapore. This paper picked it up. I don't know who they are. I have no knowledge of them at all.

Still, we have argued in the committee, we had it over South Korea—such an enormous amount of cost in it, and it is a long way off, and how does the United States ever come out in this kind of an operation?

I don't know. I am not able to give——

SCENARIO FOR SUCCESS

General **Taylor**. The program which I would hope to follow, Mr. Chairman, would be, first, a government of some relative stability. We can argue——

The **Chairman**. That, I am all for.

General **Taylor**. The second course, accompanying that, the improvement of the in-country pacification program. We can do that.

The **Chairman**. If you get it first.

General **Taylor**. Third, pressure on Hanoi to remind them they are going to pay an increasing price if they continue. In the long run, if they don't respond to the pressures in Laos and at sea, then to start hitting infiltration targets up there. I cannot believe they will sacrifice their economy, that they will sacrifice the society they have constructed at great pains over the last 10 years. It just shouldn't be worth it to them.

If we can get that message across and organize that scenario, I would have hopes we can come out of it.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The **Chairman**. Isn't it true in China that the Communists really had no support from Stalin when they were making their most favorable progress against Chiang Kai-shek? They have managed, in one way or another, to mount a successful revolution and overthrow Chiang without the blessing of Russia.

Now, later, after they did it—he didn't expect them to be able to do it.

Senator **Church**. In fact, over the opposition of Russia.

The **Chairman**. Russia didn't approve of that in particular. They misjudged it. They didn't think you could mount a successful revolution based on peasants. They thought it had to come from the industrial area.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It was an agrarian reform movement.

General **Taylor**. These lads laid their foundation in 1954 when partition took place. They left their agent infrastructure in place and carried this thing forward.

The **Chairman**. I know they did. We got into it in a most peculiar way, I think—when we go back. I regret we ever got into it, frankly. I wish we never heard of the place, but we are in it. I realize it is a hell of a problem to get out of it.

THE ROAD TO PARIS IS BY WAY OF PEKING

But I agree with what was quoted somewhere in here, where [Gen. Douglas] MacArthur said never get into a land war in Asia. I am entirely in accord with that. I don't care whether it all goes Communist. I don't want to have 100,000 American boys fighting in the forests of Vietnam. It is not worth it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I still remember the Communist philosophy—although their tactics have been jiggled up a little bit—that the road to Paris is by way of Peking.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Look at what is happening. The President himself, in his statement just a day or two ago, as reported in the paper, is holding out the olive branch to Eastern Europe.

Now, somebody has persuaded the President that there is some opportunity here to loosen the bonds between Eastern Europe. We have received a Rumanian delegation. We are putting out feelers to Hungary and encouraging them to look to the West.

I don't know whether they are getting any closer to Paris or not. I don't think they are, not in that area.

But if you want to go to war, I don't approve of it. I don't give a damn what the provocation is. If they come up here, I am not going to vote to send 100,000 men, or it would probably be 300,000 or 400,000. The French had 500,000.

General **TAYLOR**. The French tried and failed.

DANGER OF LOSING CONTROL

The **CHAIRMAN**. Once you get into it—if in this Tonkin thing one of those torpedos had accidentally sunk one of our boats, the whole country is in flames, and there you are in it, and you can't get out of it. You lose control of it.

General **TAYLOR**. We should respond with our air, punish them appropriately, and let it go at that.

The **CHAIRMAN**. If it doesn't succeed—America never fails—once it engages in that they will just go all out.

General **TAYLOR**. I think we have got to the point where this idea of all war or no war tends to fade out. This is too dangerous a world to live in, for uncontrolled actions.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I agree. That is why I don't want to get into a position where you lose control of it. It is awfully easy to arouse the chauvinism of any country, not just America. I don't think we are any different from any other. But if they sunk one of our destroyers, and we lost 300 or 400 men in that dark night, you couldn't do what you wanted to do, no matter how much you wanted to do it.

General **TAYLOR**. I think we have more maturity now.

Senator, I am supposed to be on the other side at 4 o'clock.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Go ahead. This is a hell of a problem. I don't think it is worth a war.

General **TAYLOR**. It is not good, it is not easy, but we have got the means to win.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I am willing to try to work with this government. If the government fails, if they do unseat it, I would certainly come around—I am not willing to attack North Vietnam just because this happens.

General **TAYLOR**. I would say accept a military dictatorship and try government under that form.

THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM HAS FAILED

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. With the Communist pattern and platform of encirclement, where time is no element to them—25 years is no element, 50 years, it is the ultimate conquest of communism.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You have a lot more faith in communism than I have. I don't think it is nearly as great a system of society as you apparently do. I think it is a very poor system, and given a little time they are going to collapse. I think they themselves are recognizing it is a poor system, and even in Russia they are trying to find a better way because the system has failed.

General TAYLOR. They are trying to plunder a better system in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it is such a good system.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Communism cannot live unless it can conquer all the rest of the opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it is conquering.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When I think of the long-range programs of communism, I get back to what Franklin Roosevelt said at one time in the early part of World War II. He said that he wanted to assure the world that we as Americans would rather die on our feet than live on our knees.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX A

Southeast Asia Resolution and Report

88th CONGRESS
2d Session

S. J. RES. 189

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

August 5, 1964

Mr. Fulbright (for himself, Mr. Hickenlooper, Mr. Russell, and Mr. Saltonstall) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services jointly

JOINT RESOLUTION

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast

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Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Calendar No. 1266

88TH CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
No. 1329

PROMOTING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

AUGUST 6, 1964.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S.J. Res. 189]

The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, hereinafter referred to as the "joint committee," having had under consideration Senate Joint Resolution 189 supporting the President's determination to repel any armed attack against U.S. forces in southeast Asia and to prevent further Communist attacks, report the resolution favorably and recommend that it be passed by the Senate.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The basic purpose of this resolution is to make it clear that the Congress approves the actions taken by the President to meet the attack on U.S. forces in southeast Asia by the Communist regime in North Vietnam. Full support by the Congress also is declared for the resolute policy enunciated by the President in order to prevent further aggression, or to retaliate with suitable measures should such aggression take place.

BACKGROUND

It should be stressed that the current conflict in the area of the Gulf of Tonkin occurs against the backdrop of a Communist-directed military and subversive offensive which has been sustained with little real interruption since 1946. In that year France resumed titular control over what was then Indochina from the Japanese wartime occupation, and by year's end was under guerrilla attack by the Communist-trained and supported Vietminh under the leadership of Ho Chi-minh. The latter organization gained much support throughout Indochina by reason of its ability to pose as a nationalist movement dedicated to ousting a colonial regime; few of the Indochinese rural areas were left untouched by Vietminh infiltration. For almost 8 years the French, at great cost—mitigated by about $2.5 billion of U.S. aid—fought what has been described as "the longest war of the 20th Century," until the disaster at Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954 led France to submit armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference convened the previous month to discuss Korea and "peace in Indochina."

The Geneva armistice agreements, signed on July 21, 1954, theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which were to become fully independent countries, with the last-named partitioned near the 17th parallel into two states pending reunification through "free elections." Yet the day after signature President Ho Chi-minh of North Vietnam was calling for a "continuation of the struggle." As Senator Mansfield noted after his visit to the area in September of that year:

> Vietminh sympathizers are to be found throughout that region [South Vietnam] and it is likely that their number is growing. It must also be presumed that Vietminh activists are being left behind as the Vietminh withdraw their regular forces * * *.

Such proved to be the case: there was scarcely any break in the long process of Communist-inspired subversion aimed at encouraging chaotic conditions in South Vietnam. This activity in itself constituted a violation of the intent of the Geneva agreements, although one difficult to detect and virtually impossible to document satisfactorily.

Since that time, the North Vietnamese campaign against the South has increased in scope and tempo. It has added a new dimension to traditional concepts of warfare and aggression—the dimension of subversion and terror on a planned, centrally directed, and coordinated basis. This new kind of aggression is not symbolized by armies marching across frontiers with bands playing and flags waving. But it is no less outrageous international behavior.

Another point should be made here. Of the participants at Geneva, South Vietnam and the United States alone did not sign the agreements (the other participants and signatories were the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., France, Communist China, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam). South Vietnam merely declared its intention to seek peace through all means, and

> * * * not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, although it deems them to be inconsistent with the will of the nation * * *.

The United States noted that it would not join in an arrangement which could have the effect of denying self-determination to the Vietnamese people. It nevertheless declared that—

> (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them [the agreements], in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

At the beginning of 1955 the United States began to fill the vacuum in the area created by the general but somewhat halting withdrawal of France from Vietnam. U.S. assistance was directly provided to South Vietnam, rather than through the French, and a small number of American military advisers took over the training of the Vietnamese Army from France.

At the same time, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty[1] came into effect—on February 19, 1955. This pact, described as a "comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area," was envisaged by the United States several years before its creation, but was especially sought by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in March of 1954. In the words of the latter:

> The President and I had hoped that unity could be forged in time to strengthen the negotiating position of the free nations during the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. However, this proved impracticable.
>
> The Geneva outcome did, however, confirm the need for unity.

The deliberations which followed in September resulted in two particularly significant actions for the purposes of committee consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 189. First, an "Understanding of the United States of America" was made a part of the treaty to record the fact that this country would only take measures to meet military attack on a treaty member if it were Communist aggression, although it would follow the consultation process in other circumstances. Second, a protocol was added to the treaty to provide that Cambodia, Laos, and "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" would be covered by treaty articles III and IV; these read as follows:

ARTICLE III

> The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

> 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
>
> 2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other

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[1] The SEATO members are Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

> State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.
>
> 3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

The period from 1955 to 1957 saw the South Vietnamese Government struggling valiantly under President Diem's leadership to create order out of near chaos. A substantial amount of progress was achieved, and it probably was a measure of that success that large-scale Communist guerrilla attacks began to occur at the beginning of 1958, reflecting a steady increase in such armed activity since Diem's visit to the United States in mid-1957 and the promise of continued help against communism. By 1960, North Vietnam was abandoning any subterfuge and was proclaiming itself the "revolutionary base" for the attacks on the South. It was in this context that the United States agreed to the South Vietnamese Government's request for increased assistance. Such aid has continuously expanded since that time, in large measure scaled to keep pace with the heightened North Vietnamese contributions to the guerrilla war. Some decrease or suspension of assistance took place in connection with the developments surrounding the fall of the Diem government in November 1963, but was resumed shortly thereafter. Just as North Vietnam's open involvement in the war has reached new levels, so has the U.S. provision of aid to the government of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh formed last February. This aid has always been entirely defensive in character and the United States has taken no action outside the territory of South Vietnam.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

It is against this background that the unprovoked attacks by North Vietnam on U.S. forces in international waters must be assessed. The joint committee believes that the best means of describing these events is by quoting from the presentation of Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson to the U.N. Security Council, convened at our request on Aug st 5:

> At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam.

WARNING SHOTS FIRED

> The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offen-

sive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels.

At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* was fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the U.S. Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland.

HASTY RESPONSE AVOIDED

Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3, the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling attention to this aggression, stating that U.S. ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against U.S. forces."

This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hope that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese Navy.

This time the American vessels were 65 miles from the shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time, numerous torpedoes were fired. The attack lasted for over 2 hours.

NO "SHADOW OF DOUBT"

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was planned deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against boats and their support facilities.

This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and the facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves.

Now, Mr. President, gentlemen, it is our fervent hope that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

On August 4 and 5 the President consulted with congressional leaders, both before and after the limited military retaliation directed against North Vietnam. On August 5, 1964, he sent the following message to Congress:

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.
2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.
3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

> 4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on Armed Forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again at Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in

1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 5, 1964.*

COMMITTEE ACTION

The President's message and Senate Joint Resolution 189, introduced by Senator Fulbright (for himself and Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Russell, and Senator Saltonstall) to give effect to the Presidential recommendations, by unanimous consent were referred jointly to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. During the morning of August 6 the joint committee, with Senator Fulbright presiding in executive session, heard Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After receiving the testimony the joint committee voted 31 to 1 to report the resolution favorably without amendment.

SCOPE OF THE RESOLUTION

Senate Joint Resolution 189 is patterned quite closely upon precedents afforded by similar resolutions: the Formosa resolution of 1955, the Middle East resolution of 1957, and the Cuba resolution of 1962.

The phrasing in section 2, "in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," comprehends the understanding in that treaty that the U.S. response in the context of article IV(1) is confined to Communist aggression. It should also be pointed out that U.S. assistance, as comprehended by section 2, will be furnished only on request and only to a signatory or a state covered by the protocol to the SEATO Treaty. The protocol states are Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

The language in section 3, which governs the termination of the resolution, combines the relevant provisions of the Formosa and Middle East resolutions.

JOINT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

With only one dissenting vote, the joint committee endorsed the resolution and recommended its adoption by the Senate. Members of the committee expressed approval of the handling of the crisis in southeast Asia by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by U.S. naval forces in the area of Vietnam.

On the basis of testimony submitted by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the committee was satisfied that the decision of the President to retaliate against the North Vietnamese gunboat attacks was both soundly conceived and skillfully executed. In the circumstances, the United States could not have done less and should not have done more.

APPENDIX B

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1964: HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1964

Jan. 21, 1964	Compliance with the Convention on the Chamizal.
Feb. 24, 1964	Peace Corps Amendments.
Mar. 13, 16, 23, Apr. 8 and 9, 1964.	East-West Trade.
Mar. 31, Apr. 1, 14, 21, June 18, 19, 22, and 23, 1964.	Foreign Assistance 1964.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

March 1964	Legislation on Foreign Relations.
Undated	Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on 7th Meeting.
June 11, 1964	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on 4th Meeting.
November 1964	East-West Trade: A Compilation of Views of Businessmen, Bankers and Academic Experts.

SENATE DOCUMENT

S. Doc. 65, Apr. 16, 1964.	Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (2d annual report).
S. Doc. 111, Sept. 25, 1964.	Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (3d annual report).

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Ex. Rept. 2 (Ex. R, 88–1), Jan 27, 1964.	Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement.
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APPENDIX C

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